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CHAPTER 1
Guardians of Public Value: How Public
Organizations Become and Remain
Institutions
Arjen Boin, Lauren A. Fahy, and Paul ‘t Hart
Institutions as Enigmas
It’s an institution—a phrase we have all come across or may have used. We
intuitively understand what it means. The Louvre is not just a museum.
Ascot is not just a horse race. The Ryman Auditorium in Nashville is not
just a music venue. Wembley is not just a stadium. Cambridge University
is not just a university. These are institutions. There is something special,
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perhaps mythical, about them. We value these institutions. We may even
find it hard to imagine a life without some of these institutions.
Some public organizations, too, have achieved this special ‘institu-
tional’ status: organizations that—in the words of Philip Selznick (1957:
17), the pioneering scholar of institutions—have become ‘infused with
value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand’. Institu-
tions embody and safeguard certain values that are important to a society
(Hendriks 2014). Institutions guard these values against overt attacks and
the forces of erosion.
The average citizen may never wonder about the critical importance
that these public institutions play in their lives. At the same time,
academics hardly ever question the importance of institutions. It is
simply assumed. This combination of limited public interest and academic
conventional wisdom has done little to further research into the way insti-
tutions emerge and persevere. In their efforts to protect their institutions,
leaders cannot fall back on a full body of academic research findings.
Such protection is increasingly necessary. Government agencies as well
as other public sector organizations today face a climate where perfor-
mance expectations are relentless, transparency and accountability regimes
have thickened, and there is little tolerance for failure. Critical factors
in the broader environment—technology, economic tides, societal beliefs
and values, political fault lines and ‘rules of the game’—change constantly,
sometimes rapidly and deeply. No institution, however powerful and well-
regarded, is immune to ‘events’ and to the churning tides of public
opinion. Even long-standing institutions face reputational and sometimes
existential crises.
Yet, even in this volatile environment, some public organizations
remain deeply valued by the public. They have not just survived challenges
and controversies; they have found ways to thrive. They have adapted in
the face of crises, preserving their institutional character while meeting
newly imposed demands. They have become iconic features of the public
landscape. That’s why we call them public institutions.
This volume is about these public institutions. We have selected
twelve organizations that have met Selznick’s definition for at
least a significant part of their lifespan. We examine each of
these twelve institutions in some depth to understand their nature,
formula and impact. We seek to show what scholars and organi-
zational leaders can learn from them, warts and all. The overar-
ching puzzle that drives the case studies collected here is simple:
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Why do some public organizations develop into institutions, proving remark-
ably adept at becoming and remaining publicly valued over relatively long
periods of time?
In this introductory chapter, we explain how in Selznick’s work and of
those that have followed in his footsteps institutions differ from organiza-
tions. We then describe the key conceptual and analytical tools that have
informed the case studies in this volume, and briefly introduce each of the
cases. Next, we present a thematic preview of the institutional patterns
that emerge when we look across the twelve case studies. We offer these
patterns as pointers for classroom discussion, but also as starting points
for more empirically informed theorizing about how and why public
organizations become institutions (and how they can also ‘deinstitutional-
ize’). Finally, we ask a pertinent and perhaps uncomfortable question: can
public organizations that effectively and authoritatively guard public value
and receive widespread recognition for doing so, continue to flourish in
our turbulent and more unforgiving age?
How Do We Know an Institution
When We See One?
We use the concept of institution to describe a particular category of
organizations. An organization is, in essence, nothing more than an estab-
lished way of cooperation between two or more individuals (Barnard
1938). What sets an organization apart as an institution is its pursuit
of aims that are widely considered to fulfil a societal need, its reliable
performance over time, and its exemplary conduct as perceived by soci-
etal constituencies. The cases in the book provide powerful illustrations
of these institutional characteristics:
• The BBC has been producing a judicious and widely respected mix
of news and entertainment, has built itself into a global media brand
while adapting successfully to major technological (such as satel-
lite and online television) and regulatory changes (introduction of
commercial broadcasting).
• The scientific centre for particle physics research CERN has gained
international recognition as the hub in its field, has kept on pushing
the boundaries of knowledge, has educated generations of influential
researchers and has sparked the public’s imagination both through its
mammoth underground research facility (the Large Hadron collider)
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and its discoveries (the Higgs Boson particle) as well as through its
spinoff technologies (such as the World Wide Web).
• Médicins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) has been much
acclaimed for its fearless commitment to providing medical care to
populations caught in complex and devastating conflicts around the
world. It has become a beacon of courageous behaviour in very chal-
lenging and dangerous circumstances. Moreover, it has repeatedly
called attention to the follies and excesses of the humanitarian aid
industry, and in doing so has become its moral conscience.
These examples suggest that there is something special about institutions:
they are regarded as more valuable than just any organization. Goodsell
(2011a: 477) refers to mission mystique, which he defines as an organi-
zation’s ‘aura of positive institutional charisma that is derived from the
nature of its mission and how well it is carried out’. Aura is, of course, a
matter of perception: people must recognize something special in what an
organization does and how it performs its tasks. This subjective dimen-
sion of institutions makes it challenging for social scientists to arrive at a
more systematic way of establishing why and to what extent an organiza-
tion can be categorized as an institution. But it is a challenge that has to
be met.
Selznick’s (1957) classic distinction between organizations and insti-
tutions provides a helpful tool in this endeavour. He formulated three
criteria that can help us identify the institution in a population of orga-
nizations (see Fig. 1.1). Selznick’s framework can also help us track and
interpret institutional trajectories: how an organization takes on institu-
tional characteristics and how an institution may deinstitutionalize. Let’s
have a look at these three criteria.
Distinct identity and unique competence. An institution has a clearly
developed and widely recognized identity that communicates to both its
members and the outside world what it seeks to achieve and why, what
the dominant practices in the organization are, and how it addresses
conflicts that occur in the pursuit of its aims. Mark Moore (1995)—
a self-confessed Selznickian—speaks about identity in terms of a ‘value
proposition’ and refers to institutional competence as the ‘operational
capacity’ of an organization. An institution’s identity and competences
are well-suited to meet societal aspirations and expectations. An institu-
tion has fostered a strong alignment between the rationale for its existence
and the day-to-day strategies and practices it deploys. This alignment is
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Fig. 1.1 An organization as institution: Selznick’s criteria
routinely reconfirmed in the responses that institutional actions draw from
its audiences.
Strong reputation, high legitimacy. An institution is trusted and
respected, to such a degree that its existence is sometimes taken for
granted. Employees are proud to work there and intrinsically motivated to
contribute to the cause. The institution’s external stakeholders—Moore
(1995) speaks of an ‘authorizing environment’—support the institution
through thick and thin by what they say and do. They provide funding,
procure its products and services. They trust it to do the right thing in the
right manner. They forgive its occasional lapses, to a much greater extent
than they would for an organization not endowed with mission mystique.
It is hard to imagine that anyone would even propose to abolish it.
Enduring viability through adaptation. An institution has adaptive
capacity, which helps it to stand the test of time. This is not just about
changing structures and practices to make the organization more effective
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or efficient. Institutions have the paradoxical ability to change in order to
remain the same—changing whatever must be changed to protect the
institutional core (Ansell et al. 2015). An institution can consistently
deliver on its mission, working in ways that reaffirm its value proposi-
tion and satisfy the evolving expectations and norms of its stakeholders.
It does what most public organizations find really hard: adopting and
implementing reforms that prove to be effective.
An important recent study that provides support for much of what
Selznick was proposing, albeit cast in slightly different language, is
that of Charles Goodsell (2011a, b), who examined the organizational
history and development of ‘mission-driven’ public agencies in the United
States, including such iconic institutions as NASA and the National
Forest Service. He provides an in-depth, case-oriented study of what
life in public institutions looks and feels like. Table 1.1 gives us Good-
sell’s matrix of cultural characteristics and organizational practices that
his institutions all shared. It provides a useful elaboration of Selznick’s
institutional characteristics.
The combination of Selznick’s and Goodsell’s institutional characteris-
tics allow us to make a snapshot of any organization in order to determine
whether, or to what extent, it qualifies as an institution. Importantly, the
three criteria can be applied in a dynamic manner: we can ‘shoot’ a film
of the institution’s development by applying the criteria at several points
in time. That film would show the ebbs and flows of an organization’s
Table 1.1 Organizational features of institutionalizing public organizations
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institutional status, identifying periods of strong institutionalization but
also periods of institutional decline.
Such a dynamic perspective on institutional development is crucial.
Institutions are never born as ‘institutions’, though their architects and
foundational leaders may have high hopes for them. They become insti-
tutions. They see the light as a small social group, a budding network, a
small organization; some develop and gain institutional characteristics. We
refer to this as a process of institutionalization (Boin and Goodin 2007).
But just as an organization can take on institutional characteristics,
an institution can also lose institutional characteristics. Institutions can
deinstitutionalize (Oliver 1992; Suchman 1995; Boin and ‘t Hart 2000;
Boin 2001). Its mission can become less relevant, or diluted by mission
creep. Mission creep refers to the widening of the mission, adopting new
ambitions and tasks that distract from the original aims. Also, the orga-
nizational structure, culture and established practices may lose relevance,
hindering rather than helping to achieve the mission. The institution can
become ridden with internal conflict, or lose touch with its authorizing
environment.
Institutions as Guardians of Public Value
Institutionalization brings enormous benefits for public organizations. It
helps to bind members to a common cause, thus diminishing the transac-
tion costs in the organization. It buttresses against the winds of fashion,
as the high level of legitimacy effectively grants a degree of autonomy
so that leaders of an institution can chart its course. Institutions inspire
confidence in those to whom they are accountable and as a result are
less scrutinized than other organizations. When an institution is found to
have failed or strayed, it is forgiven for more and for longer than organi-
zations that lack their charismatic aura. Institutions are, in other words,
better prepared to weather the storms of failure, scandal and crisis that any
organization faces in its lifetime—provided, as Selnick (1957) reminds us,
that they remain responsive and adaptive to the environments they work
in and from which they derive their public licence to operate (in fact,
Selznick identified this as the most difficult leadership task).
Institutions also benefit society. They fulfil certain functions in ways
that are appreciated by that society. As the case studies in this book will
show, these functions can vary widely. The institutions discussed in this
book:
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• Provide fair elections
• Protect against corruption
• Offer a trusted source of news
• Preserve the value of money
• Create a legal framework that benefits collaboration
• Preserve cultural traditions
• Protect the integrity of sports
• Create conditions for path-breaking research
• Protect a society against disaster
• Assist helpless victims of disaster
• Foster a shared interpretation of complex research findings.
A society needs institutions to ensure that we will have fair elections in
the future, that we may expect a continued stream of validated news, that
we can trust research findings, and be confident that future disasters will
not cut the lives of citizens short. But institutions do more than fulfilling
useful functions. They guard against the erosion of these functions and
protect the values that underlie them. Institutions are the guardians of a
state’s promises; they preserve a society’s hopes and ambitions.
Our fascination with institutions builds on two empirical observations.
First, it has been observed that a minority of public organizations live
a long life. A majority perishes (a sizeable chunk does not even make
it longer than a decade) (Lewis 2002). Second, only a handful of those
survivors meets the institutional test set forth by Selznick. We therefore
conclude that public institutions are exceptions or outliers. We want to get
to know these outliers.
Are Institutions ‘Good’ by Definition?
A key challenge for institutional scholars is dealing with the normative
connotations that come with the “institution” concept. We generally
reserve the term ‘institution’ for an organization or a cultural practice
that is valued—this is, indeed, exactly how we defined the institution.
But what is valued by many, may be highly controversial to others. What
is valued in one society is anathema in another. An organization revered
in a certain era, may today be discussed as an example of malpractice or
organized evil.
Selznick’s three criteria do not resolve this normative conundrum.
Take, for instance, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). When
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applied in a broad-brush, across-lifespan fashion, Selznick’s criteria would
have us regard it as an institution. The FBI has a distinct identity: most
people (not just Americans) have heard of the FBI and will have an idea of
what it represents. The FBI has a unique competence and has existed for a
long time. At the same time, it is easy to unearth a range of questionable
values it espoused and activities it deployed for extended periods of its
existence. For example, the latter decades of long-serving and founding
Director J. Edgar Hoover were marked by practices that are now widely
recognized as questionable if not outright illegal (Jeffreys-Jones 2007).
So what does this mean for Selznick’s criteria? What does it mean
if organizations with dubious identities and questionable competences
qualify as an institution? Should we reject these criteria and look for
others? Should we avoid institutions that today are widely viewed as
epitomizing questionable values?
We feel that Selznick’s criteria can still be used, but their use needs to
be directed and qualified by situating organizations in a particular window
of time and then assessing to what extent the institution embodied,
advanced or provided stewardship of values deemed important by the
society in which it existed. We must take into consideration that the value
sets that stakeholders and the community at large apply to an organi-
zation can and do change over time. Institutions, in other words, are
to be taken as organizations that have become effective and legitimate
‘guardians of public value’ in a certain time and context. When removed
from that time and context, certain institutions or certain epochs in
their existences or certain practices in which they engaged may well be
considered dangerous or deplorable. The intriguing question is how such
morally problematic organizations could maintain high levels of internal
and external legitimacy at the time (cf. Selznick 1952).
If we suspend judgement, we can learn—even from institutions that in
our time and context may look questionable—valuable lessons about their
emergence, their value proposition, their governance, their ‘formula’ for
success, their ways of acquiring a public licence to operate, their ways of
navigating conflict and tensions, and in some instance, their decline and
downfall. An institution tells us something about the society it emerges
from and exists in.
This is also true for the cases included in this book. The fact that
these particular organizations have ended up as specimens of ‘guardians
of public value’ does not mean that we hold them up as being exemplary
all of the time and in each respect. Most institutions go through periods
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of mission ambiguity and conflict; they are sometimes at a loss to develop
distinctive competence and sustain effective practices, and they may have
found it hard at times to adapt to significant changes in their context.
Each case study will therefore situate the story of the institution in time
and space, and treat its institutional (and normative) status as a variable
and not as a given.
In this book, we study institutions that have done things and done
them in ways that were of value to society and were indeed valued by
their authorizing environments. Moreover, they have not merely ‘created
public value’ (Moore 1995) and gained recognition for doing so, but
continued to do so for considerable periods of time. They have acted
not just as creators of public value, but as its guardians. Our aim is to
introduce a set of sensitizing concepts in this opening chapter and see if
they can help students, researchers and practitioners grasp and interpret
the dynamics of institutionalization that have contributed to their lofty
reputation and social status.
Studying the Rise and Fall of Public Institutions
We are obviously not the first to study organizations as institutions.
Selznick’s work inspired a series of detailed studies and theories that
explain how organizations become institutions (DiIulio 1987; Wilson
1989; Boin and Goodin 2007; Boin and Christensen 2008; Goodsell
2011a, b) as well as accounts of how they become deinstitutionalized
(Boin and ‘t Hart 2000; Alink et al. 2001; Collins 2009; Mair et al.
2014; Ansell et al. 2015). There is an entire library of institutional study
material, both theoretical and empirical, in many different languages
and in different disciplines. This research helps to explain why some
public organizations (and not others) become—and remain—institutions.
More specifically, it helps to answer three big questions that institutional
scholars have endeavoured to answer.
• How do institutions emerge?
What are the drivers of institutionalization? Under what conditions
does institutionalization happen? Do organizational characteristics matter?
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Does it matter in which ‘niche’ the organization operates? Is institution-
alization an outcome of leadership? Or funding? Particular environmental
demands? Happenstance perhaps?
• How do institutions stay strong and relevant?
Institutions have to perform a balancing act: distinctive (and cherished)
competences must be wielded to satisfy societal expectations and percep-
tions of their performance. But societal expectations and perceptions
of public organizations rarely remain fixed over long periods of time.
This simple observation means that institutions are always vulnerable to
contextual changes. They must, in other words, adapt to remain an insti-
tution—they must remain attuned to changes in both their operating
environment (e.g. technological innovations, new products and services,
competing organizations) as well as their authorizing environment (e.g.
political power structures and governing philosophies). To adapt is also
to risk alienation from societal expectations and perceptions. Becoming
an institution may be one thing, remaining an institution is quite another
challenge.
• What explains their decline and downfall?
Many long-standing institutions have ‘lost it’ and declined into oblivion.
Whether we think of the Roman Senate or the Dutch East India
Company, it’s clear that these were institutions in their time, remained
institutions for a long time, and no longer exist. That prompts the ques-
tion why institutions lose it. Do they somehow lose their capacity to
adapt to changing expectations? Do their leaders succumb to hubris, drag-
ging the institutions away from society? Or are these institutions faced
with shocks that are so large and sudden that timely adaptation is simply
impossible?
Schools of thought
These three research questions have been studied by different theoretical
traditions of institutional analysis that have been extensively described,
summarized and compared elsewhere (Peters 2011; Scott 2013). To
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give an impression of the variety in explanations offered by students of
institutions, let us just mention four dominant schools here.
Philip Selznick was a pioneer of what is called Classic Institutionalism.
This school focuses on organizations (as pillars of what they called the
Organizational Society), seeking explanations for their emergence, func-
tioning, effects and survival (see f.i. Thompson 1967; Wilson 1989).
As we have seen, Selznick famously explained how and why institutions
differ from ‘mere’ organizations. This happens when the organization is
deeply valued by its employees, stakeholders, political leaders and the
public. In explaining the emergence and downfall of these institutions,
this approach pays a lot of attention to organizational leaders and the
strategies they employ to maintain a relation between their organization
and its environment.
Research in the tradition of New Institutionalism shifted attention
from the individual organization to a class or type of organizations (Meyer
and Rowan 1977; Deephouse and Suchman 2008). Where Selznick might
focus on Oxford University as an institution, New Institutionalists would
focus on the University (sui generis) as an institution. This School has
done much to conceptualize the political and social environment in which
particular types of organizations do or don’t evolve into institutions. The
key idea is that organizations assume institutional properties by adhering
to an ‘ideal-type’ that reflects how a society thinks about that type of
organization. Through processes of ‘isomorphism’ these organizations are
thought to adopt the required characteristics without necessarily changing
the way they conduct their core business. While the New Institutionalists
revived a scholarly interest in institutions, this school of thought has less
interest in our core question: why do particular organizations become
and remain institutions whereas others flounder and perish?
In recent years, a small group of political scientists became interested
in the survival chances of public organizations. Inspired by the path-
breaking work of Herbert Kaufman (1976), David Lewis (2002, 2004)
built a database of US public agencies to test a theory that predicted
‘survivors’ would have different birth characteristics than non-survivors.
A key assumption is that ‘normal’ organizations are perennially prone to
capture, politicization and restructuring (Carpenter 2010). They can only
survive these pressures, or so the theory goes, if they are ‘hardwired’
against efforts to terminate or co-opt the organization. The premise of
this Design School has found empirical support: birth characteristics do
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seem to matter, as they raise survival chances. But they cannot explain
which particular organizations will survive and which will perish.
Subsequent research has shown that design factors can only explain so
much. Population ecology scholarship, for instance, also seeks to explain
why some public organizations survive over time whereas others fold
(Kaufman 1985; Boin et al. 2017; Kuipers et al. 2017; Van Witteloostuijn
et al. 2018). Ecological studies are highly focused on structural and envi-
ronmental factors. These studies offer support for the Design School, but
also suggest that there are other factors at work at the population level.
Their studies reliably show that the ‘carrying capacity’ of a population is
probably the most important factor in predicting survival chances.
Both the Design School and the population ecologists tend to de-
emphasize the potential role of behavioural and cultural factors in
explaining institutionalization. Precisely those factors emerge in case
studies of organizational and entrepreneurial success in both the public
and corporate world (Lewis 1980; Peters and Waterman 1982; Doig
and Hargrove 1990; Collins 2001; Malone and Fiske 2013). Also, there
are many organizational biographies that describe the genesis, purpose
and inner working of public and private institutions, offering in-depth
accounts of their performance, legitimacy and endurance (Kaufman 1960;
Boin 2001; Wetterberg 2009; Carpenter 2010). These biographies are
not designed to draw general lessons or make comparisons. But they
make clear that political and organizational leaders can affect the course
of institutionalization.
The Analytical Approach of This Volume
We began this project with a set of ideas that may explain why and how
some organizations with a public purpose or public relevance end up
acquiring mission mystique and become widely viewed as guardians of
public value (and thus also why other organizations do not achieve this).
First, we don’t think institutions materialize by happy circumstance—
they have to be created, maintained and protected. That requires a form
of leadership, both within the organization and in its authorizing envi-
ronment. At the same time, we do not believe that, as the Design School
implies, institutions are ‘created by blueprint’. Institutions arise from
organizations because they have the capacity to adapt and bounce back
from the inevitable crisis. This requires a culture that is conducive to
experimenting and learning (De Geus 1997; Goodsell 2011a, b).
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Second, we are convinced that a public organization cannot do without
some minimal level of legitimacy (Suchman 1995). Organizations become
institutions because they enjoy high levels of legitimacy for long periods of
time. While legitimacy is granted (or not) by those whose views count,
organizations can actively work to earn that support. They can systemati-
cally regain it when it is has been compromised or lost; if these efforts are
successful the organization re-institutionalizes.
In summary, we see an important relation between leadership and the
process of institutionalization. We view institutionalization as a process
that is at least partially spontaneous and unplanned. Organizations are not
designed with a goal in mind to become an institution. But that does not
mean that institutionalization simply happens, as a resultant of favourable
circumstances or a dose of luck.
Following Selznick, we view institutionalization as an evolutionary
process, which can be influenced but not fully controlled by organi-
zational elites (Boin and Christensen 2008). Leadership is important
as it guides, facilitates and shapes the process of becoming an institu-
tion. It is also critical for protecting the institution against the ‘forces of
fragmentation’ (Kaufman 1960).
We conceptualize leadership as a collective endeavour by organizational
elites to fulfil a set of tasks (cf. ‘t Hart and Tummers 2019). Leadership
is not the property of the one individual who happens to occupy the
highest rank in the organization. This helps us to escape from simplistic
assumptions that institutional success is related to a particular leader (even
if that leader stars in the organization’s mythology). At the other end of
the continuum, we must be careful to relate lapses and pathologies of
leadership directly to processes of deinstitutionalization (cf. Padilla et al.
2007; Helms 2012).
In summary, we follow Selznick in assuming that organizational leaders
can guide the process of institutionalization in three ways (Selznick speaks
of three executive tasks).
Task 1: Shape the Identity of the Organization
A key challenge for any public organization is that it must deliver on its
formal (legal) assignment (or policy goals) while serving societal values
and aspirations. If the organization solely seeks to deliver what it is built
to deliver, the organization can quickly become redundant upon comple-
tion of the mission or shifting policy priorities. Organizations become
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institutions when they are perceived to embody societal ambitions while
delivering on formal aims. To combine both is no easy task and will
require tough choices—in a world of scarce resources, diverging pref-
erences and bounded rationality, more often than not something will
have to give. Making these choices amounts to a process of character
building, which shapes the identity of the budding institution. Leaders
can help shape this process, by facilitating experimentation that helps to
discover the organization’s identity and by making critical decisions (Boin
and Christensen 2008). Leaders also play a key role in communicating a
sense of purpose, which keeps the organization aligned, determined and
hungry.
Task 2: Build and Nurture a Workforce That Can
Deliver (and Loves to Do That)
An organization with a mission needs people (professionals) who fit what
the organization is trying to do. Selznick made an important point:
professionals have to buy into the mission and believe in the underlying
values that anchor the institution (cf. Kaufman 1960). This is especially
true for public institutions, in which profit and competition cannot be the
motivational drivers of the enterprise. Leaders of public institutions need
to evoke and harness the ‘public service motivation’ of their employees
(Perry and Hondeghem 2008). When professionals identify with and are
energized by the mission, the management is relieved of the burdensome
task of command-and-control duties. A high level of decentralization is
then possible, as coordination is achieved through shared values (that
functions as a ‘software of the mind’). The acid test is employees who
proudly talk about their work and institution during birthday parties (cf.
Dilulio 1994).
Task 3: Preserve a Strong Relation with the Authorizing Environment
Institutions, by definition, enjoy a high level of legitimacy. They are
valued by their stakeholders and, as often is the case, by society at large.
It is a task of institutional leaders to protect and strengthen that rela-
tion. In doing so, leaders will face an inherent dilemma that will have
to be negotiated time and again. Institutions enjoy a high level of legit-
imacy because they perform a task in an effective, consistent and highly
valued way. Successful institutions are therefore not inclined to change
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their practices (which have been proven to work). But societal ambi-
tions and preferences change. However well an institution may perform,
they will be confronted with a ‘performance deficit’—the gap between
societal expectations and perceived performance—sooner or later. If the
deficit becomes too wide, an institution faces declining trust and may
experience what we have labelled an institutional crisis (Boin and ‘t Hart
2000). Continuous adaptation of mission and work practices is therefore
necessary. But such adaptation can rock the internal balance—the shared
professional pride—that gives rise to its performance. When an institution
changes slowly, it may be forced into reform; when it changes too quickly,
employees may rebel. It is a leadership task to preserve a sensible balance.
A Catalogue of Institutions:
Introducing the Case Studies
This volume brings together case studies of very different organizations
that managed to become institutions and have maintained their institu-
tional status in the face of pivotal challenges, controversies and crises.
A multidisciplinary cast of subject matter experts, guided by a shared
analytical framework, provide educators and students with a rich array
of teachable case studies.
The starting assumption underlying this volume is that many factors
can shape the trajectory of institutionalization. Birth characteristics likely
matter, as do the circumstances in which the institution saw the light.
Leadership matters, both within and around the institution. Other institu-
tions may cast their shadow. The same is true for historical contingencies.
In short, we do not think it makes sense to hew closely to one particular
school of thought, entering into a shadow boxing match with other theo-
retical schools. It is in this vein that we ‘instructed’ our authors: we gave
them the freedom to identify and analyse factors that seemed to matter
most in their individual case—leaving the door open for answers that we
have not heard before.
Each chapter describes the story of an institution: its origins and
early years; how it coped with change, adversity and crisis; the role of
design, choice, chance and learning in these institutional trajectories. Each
chapter has something to say about institutional leadership, in particular
its balancing act of aligning mission, capacity and support in the face of
ever-changing environments.
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We selected cases that we could reasonably expect to have institutional
characteristics (for at least a considerable part of their life spans to date).
We also set out to include a wide variety of organizations. Our cases cover:
• governmental and non-profit organizations from a variety of coun-
tries and regions. Most cases are situated in the Western world, but
there are also cases from Singapore and India.
• very old and relatively young organizations, ranging from the Swedish
national bank (1668) to the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)
(1999).
• organizations operating at different levels of aggregation—varying
between locally grounded cases such as Singapore’s anti-corruption
watchdog and Amsterdam’s Concertgebouw Orchestra to global
players such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) and WADA.
• organizations performing different kinds of public functions—from
production of cultural artefacts (such as BBC and Concertgebouw
Orchestra), scientific knowledge (IPCC, CERN) and public infras-
tructures (Rijkswaterstaat) to delivering medical aid in complex
emergencies (Doctors Without Borders), adjudicating disputes
within or about the governance of the European Union (European
Court of Justice), exercising regulatory oversight (ACCC, WADA)
and enforcing the law (Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Bureau).
We selected these cases for pedagogical and not for theory-building
or hypothesis-testing purposes. We chose this variety of cases to give
instructors and students alike a menu for choice. Cases were selected to
allow readers to compare two or more most-similar cases, most-different
cases, or other clusters of like/unlike characteristics. Readers should be
able to draw on cases to identify patterns or perform plausibility probes
on theoretical claims about institutions and institutionalization. More-
over, readers should be able to examine the impact of factors such as
institutional contexts, organizational capabilities and institution-building
leadership strategies.
The authors have been selected because they are experts on ‘their’
institution, not because they subscribe to our analytical framework. Each
chapter loosely works around the framework set out above and thus
actively encourages the reader to interpret the dynamics of each case.
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What actors, factors and mechanisms shaped the fate of the institution?
What can we learn from this particular institutional history?
The volume offers case histories of the following organizations:
The Indian Electoral Commission has stewarded free and honest elec-
tions in the most populous and complex democracy on earth. The
Commission successfully manages more than 1.4 million voting machines,
930,000 voting centres, 1.1 million government and 5.5 million civilian
election employees, and more than half a billion voters. The story of
its institutional development is one of mandate expansion: institutional
leaders using the legal system to enhance the powers it can wield during
election time.
Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigations Bureau was established in
1952 to battle the rife corruption present in all sectors of the public
service, where bribes, favours and nepotism were fundamental norms of
‘doing business’. The Bureau had to earn its stripes fighting corruption
among the country’s most powerful individuals: both in the police force
and in the parliament. Through a record of successful actions against
corrupt individuals, the agency gradually developed substantial authority
to investigate any case in which corruption may be involved. The Bureau
has been a driving force in making Singapore one of the least corrupt
nations on earth.
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is one of Great Britain’s
most venerable public institutions. It is also the world’s oldest (created
in 1922) and largest national public broadcaster (in terms of employees
as well as its global reach and authority). Through its coverage, the BBC
has documented and shaped the transformation of British society. It has
maintained a reputation for impartiality and journalistic integrity. It has
successfully weathered challenges, incidents and crises and continues to
define the standard for quality broadcasting.
Celebrating its 350-year anniversary in 2018, the Swedish Riksbanken
is the oldest central bank in the world. Its independence from government
waxed and waned over time, and finally became firmly cemented in 1999.
Its public authority helped Sweden survive the terrible 1992 economic
crisis. In response to the global financial crisis that started in 2008, it
was the first central bank to adopt negative interest rates to stimulate
economic activity. In 2018, it announced that it was considering issuing
E-Krona, electronic currency (the first central bank to do so).
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the undisputed guardian of
the European Union’s transnational legal order, issuing landmark rulings
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and generating jurisprudence at a considerable pace. It was created in
1952 and has the power to invalidate the laws of EU member states when
those laws conflict with EU law. The ECJ serves as the final arbiter of the
growing body of international law that has accompanied the economic
and political integration of Europe. It always faces the challenge of main-
taining its authority and legitimacy when the EU’s ideals and institutions
come under pressure.
The Amsterdam Concertgebouw Orchestra has historically been rated
as one of the top symphonic orchestras in the world. Founded in 1888,
it has had only seven chief conductors. It has found ways to balance
the twinned but often conflicting imperatives of artistic excellence and
financial viability. It remains dependent on government funding, which in
the early 2010s became highly uncertain, triggering a mood of crisis that
required astute management.
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) promotes, coordinates
and monitors the fight against performance-enhancing drugs in sports.
WADA’s key activities include scientific research, education, development
of anti-doping capacities and monitoring of the World Anti-Doping Code.
Among the youngest organization in our set of cases, it came into being
in 1999 as an independent foundation with a hybrid public–private struc-
ture. It is the chief guardian of the World Anti-Doping Code that has
more than 600 signatories, including many states as well as international
sports foundations. Its work has gained global recognition as contributing
significantly to key values in sports such as fair play and the protection of
athletes’ health and well-being.
Founded in 1954 and based in Geneva, the European Organization
for Nuclear Research, better known as CERN, is a remarkable example
of enduring international scientific cooperation in pursuit of one of the
most elusive goals ever embraced by any organization anywhere, one that
requires sustained and large amounts of public funding. Among its key
accomplishments are the pioneering of Internet technology, the creation
of the World Wide Web, several Nobel Prize-winning staff members and
the 2012 discovery of the Higgs Boson particle.
Founded in 1798 during the French occupation, Rijkswaterstaat, the
Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management of the
Netherlands, has evolved into an iconic institution. Its defining accom-
plishments are in the area of water management—digging canals, building
and maintaining dikes, reclaiming vast tracts of land from the sea (‘pold-
ers’). Its planning and engineering feats are essential to the survival of
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a country where more than 25% of its territory lies below sea level and
another 30% is highly exposed to flooding. The institution faced major
adaptive challenges when its ‘safety-first’ paradigm was challenged by the
rise of environmentalism. As it strives to transform itself, climate change
is presenting another key test of its resilience, ingenuity and collaborative
capacity.
Few humanitarian aid organizations enjoy a global public standing like
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has. Described as the most important
humanitarian organization and conscience of the humanitarian world,
MSF was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999. It displays a fierce sense
of independence. Throughout its history MSF has often acted contro-
versially, going public with its knowledge about atrocities committed by
parties to the violent conflicts in which it operates, as well as explicitly
challenging the humanitarian sector’s own practices and principles.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), founded
1988, is the international body that reviews the latest science and
produces assessment reports which inform international negotiations on
climate change. It is tasked with establishing a consensus between climate
experts and governments, communicating knowledge on climate change
to policymakers, negotiators and the public, and for making recommen-
dations on potential courses of action. The IPCC and Al Gore were
co-recipients of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize. The IPCC has also been
criticized at times for its work and is a target of climate sceptics. The
IPCC’s reputation was damaged when its leadership failed to respond
effectively to mistakes found in its 2007 report. Since then it has worked
to restore confidence. Its reports have been very important in the UN
climate negotiations and strongly influenced the goals of the 2015 Paris
Agreement.
Within a decade of its inception in 1995 the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) had become a trusted institution
in the Australian regulatory landscape. The product of a merger, the
ACCC soon carved out and dramatized its mission as a crusader for level-
playing fields and fair play in markets. By successfully taking on some
of the biggest corporations in the country in both the courtroom and
the court of public opinion soon after coming into existence, the new
authority quickly gained notoriety. By asserting its independence from
political interference, it gained public credibility in a country that has
long held its political class in low esteem. The ACCC has subsequently
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conserved its enforcement mission by adapting to challenges in the polit-
ical and business environments, expanding and redirecting its repertoire
for regulatory action, and broadening its consumer and small business
constituencies.
What Do the Cases Tell Us About
the Dynamics of Institutions?
This book revolves around a central puzzle: Why do some public orga-
nizations become—and remain—institutions? Our relatively small and
purposefully skewed set of case studies does not allow us to systemat-
ically test hypotheses, nor to generalize insights to larger populations
of organization types. That said, what we can do is inductively identify
possible patterns and relate them to conventional wisdom in academic
theorizing and the world of practice. In interpreting these patterns, we
can discern possible scope conditions or social mechanisms that may be
at play in bringing about the institutionalization (and deinstitutionaliza-
tion) of public organizations. More specifically, our cases provide food for
thought with regard to four often-mentioned patterns of institutionaliza-
tion. To help readers interpret the case studies, we will now discuss our
observations in more detail.
Pattern 1: Virtuous Cycles
In his study of highly successful corporate organizations, Jim Collins
(2001, 2019) found that these organizations had one critical character-
istic in common: they have in place what Collins refers to as a flywheel.
Collins is, in essence, talking about what across the social sciences has
been called a virtuous cycle: a set of processes that reinforce one another
(Sitkin 1992; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Boin and Christensen 2008).
Within an institution, the virtuous cycle might look like this (see Fig. 1.2):
• The cycle starts with the discovery or invention of an effective,
efficient and legitimate way to reconcile organizational aims with
societal aspirations. This typically happens through a mix of experi-
mentation and smart copying.
• Successful practices give rise to the emergence of an internal norm:
this is how we do things around here.
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Fig. 1.2 The virtuous cycle of institutionalization
• The internal norm makes it easier to recruit and train the right
people, which facilitates cohesion and effectiveness.
• Effective and dedicated people make the organization look good.
This results in enhanced funding, support for the mission and
strengthened autonomy.
• A strong and legitimate organization performs better, which solidi-
fies the internal norm.
Our case studies bear witness to this virtuous cycle of institutions.
Consider the following three examples:
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The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) began as an
informal collaboration of scientists who worried about climate change. By
establishing a network of committed and reputable scientists, they created
a platform for policymakers to learn about causes and potential solutions.
The IPCC established ‘input and output legitimacy of the rigorous and
extensive process by which the IPCC’s teams of expert authors and peer
reviewers carry out their work’ (Paglia and Parker, this volume), which
increased its epistemic power and reputation. Their reports helped to
spread awareness about ongoing climate change, which, in turn, led to
increased demand for evidence-based science. The growing interest of
policymakers (prompted by growing awareness about the threat) helped
to mobilize scientists who recognized a podium for their research. The
density of scientific expertise secured privileged access to policymakers,
which enhanced the importance of the IPCC.
Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigations Bureau (CPIB) began as a
small police unit seeking to root out corruption among colleagues. When
it busted a drug ring that was run by the police, the CPIB became an
independent statutory authority. Its autonomy enhanced its investigative
powers, which were widely and effectively applied. The success of the
CPIB came to define Singapore’s status as a ‘clean’ state. Singapore’s
enhanced international standing reflected back on the CPIB, which saw
its autonomy and authority strengthened. Decades of successful investi-
gations and prosecutions have embedded the institution in Singapore’s
landscape (and indeed in the esteem of the international community).
The CPIB’s effectiveness and Singapore’s reputation went hand in hand,
reinforcing each other over the decades.
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was created to address the
protracted doping crisis of the 1990s. Its chances of success seemed low.
But it soon began to command the respect of its stakeholders, initially by
formulating standards that made sense. As governments and sports foun-
dations began to accept the standards, they also legitimated the Agency.
As the Agency gained in stature, it could enlarge its role in the global
fight against doping. The enlarged role translated into visible successes,
which further strengthened its reputation. Quite incredibly, the WADA
managed to become an undisputed authority in the international field of
sports. Its role in other sports organizations became entrenched, which
further helped the standards to take root.
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Pattern 2: Institution-Building Leadership
Institutionalization does not just happen; virtuous cycles do not simply
materialize. This prompts the question if and to what extent the actions
of leaders matter when it comes to the institutionalization process. The
chapters in this book do not give rise to a new or definite take on this crit-
ical question. But they certainly provide powerful illustrations of leaders
forging practices, crafting norms and protecting the identity and integrity
of their organizations—and they show that this can be done in different
leadership configurations and employing different leadership styles. Let’s
look at some examples to illustrate this variety:
The institutional history of the Amsterdam Concertgebouw Orchestra
cannot be written without recognizing its early and long-serving
conductor Willem Mengelberg. He was the archetypical institution
builder, translating the aspirations of the founding regents into an ambi-
tious and appealing musical vision for the orchestra. Mengelberg then
translated this vision into an unprecedented and uncompromising regime
of excellence that produced both classical and contemporary symphonic
music, while building an international audience. By placing his orchestra
squarely on the map, Mengelberg forged a broader authorizing envi-
ronment for his orchestra, extending well beyond the original group of
regents.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) began as a technical tribunal. It
was hard to imagine at the time how this small court in Luxembourg
could become an institution, creating conditions that today make Euro-
pean integration a seemingly one-way road. This did not happen because
of one leader. It happened because a group of judges—all appointed
sometime in the early 1960s—shared a vision and began to build the
ECJ in light of that vision. These judges were well-known professionals
who moved in the insulated elites that pushed for European integra-
tion. Without seeking the limelight, they exerted the leadership of true
institution builders.
The founding Commissioner of the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission, Allan Fels, not only brought academic expertise
and long regulatory experience to the job, but also a brisk determination
to give the new agency the institutional clout its predecessors had often
lacked. Painstakingly independent and politically neutral, Fels used the
media to create a powerful platform for the ACCC’s ‘naming and sham-
ing’ of big corporations that engaged in anticompetitive or manipulative
1 GUARDIANS OF PUBLIC VALUE: HOW PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS … 25
behaviour. In prosecuting and winning high-profile cases, he instilled
professional pride in its staff and ensured the ACCC became a highly
visible and impactful crusader for consumers.
Pattern 3: Mature Management of Conflict
Institution building is more than formulating an evocative mission.
Professionals must be seduced and coaxed to accomplish the mission
(leaders cannot do it by themselves). This can be an arduous job, as
the chapters suggest. Institutions are not, by definition, happy fami-
lies (certainly not all the time). A public institution must find ways to
harness conflict in ways that make it smarter and stronger (Coser 1956).
The chapters show how institutions do not always suppress conflict, but
manage to canalize it.
The European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) did not
become a celebrated scientific institution without tension or strife.
Bringing together the best scientists in the world and have them compete
for funds can be a recipe for disaster. CERN developed a form of shared
leadership, which allowed this international community of super-smart
scientists to evolve ‘norms and practices of balance-seeking’:
Balance between funding member states and the spending CERN admin-
istrators. Balance between small and large contributors. Balance between
centralized lab and infrastructure funding and bottom-up funding of the
experiments. Balance between getting on with current work and preparing
the ground for taking on new challenges and realizing future ambitions
that are decades away. Balance between the scientists’ advances in funda-
mental physics and the engineers’ development of the technological tools
required to test them. Balance between running a tight ship financially and
maintaining the ability to respond flexibly to financial setbacks or emerging
expenditures. Balance between the patience required to do the work neces-
sary to achieve major scientific breakthroughs and the need to be seen to
be active, relevant and impactful in the present vital to maintain the insti-
tution’s global public and political support base. Balance between banking
on the authority of established scientific leaders and on empowering the
innovative irreverence of emerging research talents. (Engelen and ‘t Hart,
this volume)
The governance of the Concertgebouw Orchestra has been marked by
decades of tension between protagonists of its artistic aspirations and
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business managers seeking to ensure the organization remained finan-
cially viable. It describes how Mengelberg, the legendary conductor,
waged no-holds-barred battles with a succession of business managers
and artistic directors who had the temerity of proposing pragmatic rather
than ‘perfect’ options to address pressing financial challenges. It refer-
ences the painful, unnecessary and politically costly estrangement of
maestro Bernard Haitink from the orchestra during the latter years of his
highly successful tenure. But the story also demonstrates, using Coser’s
(1956) words, the positive functions of social conflict: the many conflicts
resulted in a change of the governance model, which finally resolved the
long-simmering tensions between artistic excellence and financial viability.
The birth of Médicins Sans Frontières was rooted in a conflict of
values and criticism of the status quo in mainstream humanitarian aid
organizations such as the Red Cross. Witnessing severe atrocities among
civilians during the Nigerian civil war in the late 1960s, doctors were
forced to remain silent under the Red Cross’s principle of ‘neutrality’.
This motivated a group of French doctors to set up MSF as a breakaway
organization. It set the organization on a path of fierce independence,
going public with inconvenient truths and occasionally engaging in very
public withdrawals from theatres of conflict where the integrity of its oper-
ations was being undermined by conflicting parties. Its contrarian ethos
also affected MSF’s internal culture: its policies and strategies took shape
though sometimes sharp disagreements about the right thing to do in
war-torn areas.
Pattern 4: Adaptive Capacity
Organizations become institutions because they somehow maintain high
performance over the course of their existence. Institutions have survived
many cultural, societal and political contexts changes. Institutions face
constant threats to its engrained and established formula, yet manage to
preserve their virtuous cycle. This requires timely, in some cases even pre-
emptive, forms of adaptation to maintain the flywheel.1
Our case studies suggest how institutions manage to accomplish this.
Institutions monitor the environment for new demands and potential
threats; they probe the internal culture for complacency and newly
emerging fault lines that have the potential to compromise the insti-
tution’s integrity and performance. Institutions maintain a culture of
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learning, innovation and contestation—they are ‘charged with vitality’
(Goodsell 2011a).
Rijkswaterstaat provides a fascinating case study in this regard. The
traditional institution was at first reluctant to acknowledge that its tech-
nocratic paradigm of project planning and management had gone past its
sell-by date as a result of changes taking place in Dutch society during the
1960s. But once its eyes were opened, it went on a learning journey that
continues into the present. Rijkswaterstaat keeps trying to reconcile the
traditional strength of ‘go-it-alone civic engineering’ with the ‘soft skills’
and ‘collaborative mindset’ required to thrive in a post-paternalistic era.
The European Court of Justice is another intriguing example of adap-
tive capacity. Just when the Court had found its institutional footing and
delivered hallmark rulings that would cement European integration for
decades to come, the European project itself came under intense criticism
(in the 1970s). Around that time, the most influential judges in the Court
were set to retire. This confluence of events created a dire need to revisit
and rethink the way the Court functioned.
This brings us to what is known as the paradox of success: the capacity
to adapt can be undermined by the successes of the institution. The
very strength of an institutional formula sows the seeds of the institu-
tion’s demise. The operative mechanisms here are not only the kind of
hubris, complacence and rigidity foreseen by Selznick (1957) as chief
forces of erosion of institutional integrity. There is something much more
mundane at the heart of it: the dedicated adherence to what has been
proven to work well makes it seemingly unnecessary to consider alterna-
tive ways of working that may be better suited for dealing with evolving
contexts and new challenges.
Figure 1.3 captures how a virtuous cycle can turn into a vicious cycle of
deinstitutionalization, which can be described as follows (Masuch 1985;
Boin and ‘t Hart 2000; Ansell and Bartenberger 2017):
• Successful practices give rise to a strong internal culture (‘this is how
we do things around here’) that makes it hard to suggest or even
imagine alternative ways of working.
• Institutional members do not recognize impending threats to the
institutional model.
• When shifting contexts and new challenges begin to undermine
the effectiveness, efficiency or legitimacy of that very model, the
institution doubles down on what it believes to be the best practices.
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Fig. 1.3 The vicious cycle of deinstitutionalization
• This is perceived by parts of its authorizing environment as a refusal
to acknowledge the need for change.
• Legitimacy declines as a result; criticism begins to mount.
• The institution is at a loss of what to do, falling back on practices
that are still assumed to work (but actually exacerbate the problem).
• As perceptions of institutional performance continue to decline
and institutions demonstrate limited or no willingness to change,
conditions for an institutional crisis are created.
If allowed to continue, this process of deinstitutionalization can create
an existential crisis for an institution. It requires exceptional leadership
to guide the institution through such a period. For example, the so-
called Climategate crisis facing the IPCC , when inaccuracies in its Fourth
Assessment Report were revealed, opened up the institution to charges
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of bias, hidden agendas and politicization of its processes and findings.
Playing into the hands of ‘climate deniers’, the crisis put pressure on the
IPCC to acknowledge its fallibility, which, in turn, appeared to confirm
the criticism put forward by its critics. The IPCC survived the crisis
by creating procedures that enhanced the integrity of its findings and
conclusions.
Anti-doping watchdog WADA was plunged into an institutional crisis
of its own making. WADA had failed to detect the brazen, systematic
subversion of its norms and its compliance regime by the Russian sports
federations, peaking at the Sochi Winter Olympics. Its initial response to
whistleblowers, which came forward from within the Russian system, was
inept. It also proved unable to orchestrate support for firm sanctions. The
organization compounded its problems by gullibly declaring its Russian
counterpart Rusada fully compliant again in 2018, a declaration it had to
retract when it transpired that the data on which the decision was based
had been tampered with. But the crisis did not undermine the belief that
without an institution such as WADA there can be no credible anti-doping
policy.
The Future of Institutions in Turbulent Times
Institutions are conceived in this book as ‘societal safeguards’. Institutions
protect our better angels from the detrimental effects of partisanship,
moral panics, opportunism (the temptation of the quick fix) and adven-
turism (the temptation of the sweeping promise). Institutions, in other
words, protect us from ourselves. This is especially important in a time
when public entities are fragile to the whims of public opinion and the
impulses of politicians. Some argue that today’s institutions experience
unique challenges (Rosanvallon 2018).
One challenge derives from the rise of what has been called ‘moni-
tory democracy’ (Keane 2018). In monitory democracies, all forms of
authority, all organizations and all power-holders are continuously vetted,
interrogated and challenged by a plethora of accountability regimes. If
institutions indeed depend on a certain ‘mystique’ in gaining and main-
taining their elevated status, the question arises whether that mystique
can survive the withering challenges of hyper-transparency, the relentless
thickening of accountability and the growing vagaries of public emotions
and political will (Hood 2010; Bovens et al. 2014; Busuioc and Lodge
2017).
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The dense web of arrangements and rituals of verification and control
has made institutional ‘mission mystiques’ more fickle. Operating in
today’s more polarized social and political climate may make it hard for
institutions to claim that they are serving the ‘public interest’ (McCoy
et al. 2018). Institutions can, in other words, rely less and less on their
legal mandates, their formal autonomy and their professed commitment
to certain fundamental values—to ensure their social licence to operate.
Institutional legitimacy has become more dependent on whether they
actually ‘perform’ (hitting targets, scoring wins) and how they go about
performing (i.e. complying with ever more strongly worded and policed
procedural norms of transparency, fairness and propriety).
A second challenge is grounded in the shift from the machine age
to the network age (Castells 1996). Twentieth-century organizing was
grounded in hierarchy, specialization and compartmentalization of knowl-
edge, funding, task performance and responsibilities. The dominant
ideology of twenty-first-century organizing is one of collaborating across
boundaries, pooling of resources, flexible arrangements, shared power and
responsibility. In the face of relentless globalization, wicked problems and
transboundary crises, public institutions find it hard to position them-
selves as islands or bulwarks organized around a self-proclaimed mission
and accompanying values.
Today’s world is very different from the America of the mid-1950s
where Selznick wrote his path-breaking book Leadership in Administra-
tion. Collaborative approaches to public innovation, societal problem-
solving and dealing with wicked issues and creeping crises have become
the new normal (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015). If they are to remain
relevant in a network society, public institutions must be able to act as
co-creators in hybrid public–private, intergovernmental and transnational
collaborations. The question is how institutions can align or even coalesce
their operations, norms and identities with network partners in service
of a shared purpose without diluting their own institutional character.
In modern society, the concept of a focal organization with a distinct
mission, structure, value set, membership and value chain may have to be
refreshed.
But it would be premature at best to announce the impending death
of public institutions and the obsolescence of the kind of institutional
analysis performed in this book. The virtuous cycles that these institu-
tions create and maintain are needed perhaps even more than before.
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Networks may be important to make complex service delivery or emer-
gency response work, but they don’t have the visibility and established
identity that institutions enjoy. Citizens of monitorial democracies may
have become more transactional and less forgiving in how they assess
those organizations and their leaders. By the same token, however,
in times of turbulence and confusion, citizens (and markets) look for
beacons of hope, protection, direction and order. Public institutions may
well be our best hope in times of turbulence.
Public institutions are guarding something that is probably older and
weightier than the current interests and priorities of any one group or
party in the system, however powerful. Whether in times of turbulence
of relative stability, the pivotal challenge for institutional leaders remains
threefold: to make the case for its raison d’être by claiming guardianship
of salient, widely desired public values; to motivate people so that the
institution delivers on its licence to operate; and to continuously adapt
the organization’s make-up, beliefs and practices to remain in tune with
the norms and demands of ever-changing times. These are no easy tasks.
The chapters in this book provide tales and insights that will hopefully
prove useful for future institutional leaders. To facilitate classroom use of
each case study we have placed questions for discussion at the end of each
chapter.
A final note. The manuscript of this volume was closed just weeks
before the Covid-19 pandemic enveloped and disrupted practically the
entire world, thus presenting people, businesses, community organiza-
tions, government and international organizations with an unprecedented
‘stress test’ of their adaptive capacity. It remains to a next group of
researchers to investigate whether and how the institutions covered in
this book managed to not only survive but productively absorb and adapt
to the immense challenges the virus and its many impacts presented.
Note
1. The kind of consolidating leadership that is required to ensure the institu-
tion stay relevant and valuable externally and continues to cohere internally
has been captured nicely by Frederickson and Matkin (2007) in their essay
on public leadership as ‘gardening’.
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CHAPTER 2
The Election Commission of India:
Guardian of Democracy




The Election Commission of India (ECI) is one of the most powerful
electoral regulatory bodies in the world and one of the most widely cele-
brated and trusted public institutions in India (McMillan 2012).2 It has
overseen the completion of 17 national and over 370 state elections since
Indian Independence in 1947. It also conducts some of the largest and
longest elections in the world. The 2019 parliamentary elections, for
example, had 900 million eligible voters, and were completed in nine
phases over 39 days. Celebrated as an ‘undocumented wonder’, the ECI
has emerged as a guardian of public value—free and fair elections—in
India (Quraishi 2014).
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The role of election commissions in the regulation of elections is of
vital importance throughout the world, not least because democratic
legitimacy turns on election credibility. In many countries, opposition
parties protest election results and boycott elections.3 The legitimacy of
election results are questioned because the institutions that ensure their
validity are themselves questionable. In India, one of the most heteroge-
neous societies in the world, politics remains highly contentious. Both the
democratic system and the state secure their legitimacy through regular
free and fair elections. The ECI is responsible for India’s long-standing
record of uncontested, free and fair elections.
The world over, democracy has struggled to take root in low-income
countries (Przeworski et al. 2000). India’s democratic record also makes
it an outlier in this respect. Elections have remained popular with the
poor. Members of socially excluded groups have emerged as powerful
political leaders (Varshney 2000; Jaffrelot 2003). Steps taken by the
ECI have ensured that the poor and marginalized have been enthu-
siastic voters (Ahuja and Chhibber 2012) and have participated in
elections in increasing numbers (Kumar 2009), without fear of intimi-
dation by higher-ranked, more powerful groups. The security provided
to poor voters has also enabled the rise of marginalized groups’ political
parties. Leaders from these groups have achieved electoral success. Few
low-income democracies can claim such transformative achievements.
The popularity of the ECI is not restricted to citizens alone; political
parties have also come to view it as a neutral referee. During our inter-
views with 62 party leaders and officials, belonging to 15 national and
regional political parties, we found that 51 of our respondents generally
regarded the ECI in a positive light.4
Yet the ECI was not always as prominent or powerful, especially vis-à-
vis the executive. In a parliamentary system like India’s, the cabinet and
the prime minister’s office comprise the executive branch. Before 1989,
the executive restricted the ECI’s autonomy. Its Chief Election Commis-
sioners (CECs) mostly remained quiescent. Even the most entrepreneurial
CECs had little leeway. Occasionally, when a CEC tried to assert his
authority, like Peri Shastri in 1987, the executive would curtail his
efforts.5 When innovations in electoral practice appeared, they resulted
from the executive’s rather than ECI’s initiative.6
In recent decades, however, the ECI has grown into a powerful insti-
tution. Krishna Bose (2016), from the All India Trinamool Congress,
remembered how the ruling Communist Party that mastered the art of
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rigging elections in West Bengal, had to eventually contend with ECI’s
close monitoring. ‘In fact, all political parties have a vested interest in a
neutral and effective EC’, she wrote. A retired Chief Election Commis-
sioner corroborated this view during an interview: ‘Chief Ministers who
do not like the EC when they are in office’, he quipped, ‘are very happy
with us when they are in opposition because they rely on a free and fair
poll to find their way back to power’. Baijayant Panda, from the Biju
Janata Dal,7 a regional party in the state of Odisha, echoed this senti-
ment about the ECI’s close election monitoring: ‘It is a bit of a pain in
the neck actually. But it does serve the purpose of establishing a degree of
fairness and a perception of fairness’. Mayawati, India’s first Dalit (former
untouchable) Chief Minister, attributed her party’s majority in the 2007
state assembly election in Uttar Pradesh to ECI protections for poor and
marginalized voters.
The ECI is thus deeply implicated in India’s exceptional democratic
experience. Understanding how a public institution such as the ECI was
able to enhance its powers is an important question. How did the ECI
build its institutional credibility? What was the role of the ECI’s leadership
and strategy in the process of institution building? These are the questions
that this chapter seeks to answer.
We explore and explain the ECI’s institutional development by
analysing electoral data and drawing from interviews with six CECs, four
Chief Election Officers and eight ECI officials. These lengthy, semi-
structured interviews were conducted over two years, sometimes over
multiple sittings. We also utilize insights gleaned from hundreds of voter
interviews conducted across four large Indian states: Uttar Pradesh, Bihar,
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu.
We use historical process-tracing to unearth the mechanisms that
enabled the ECI to interpret its mandate expansively and enhance both
its power and status. Such an approach allows us to identify the sequence
of causes that came to produce a more powerful ECI than was orig-
inally envisioned (Goertz and Mahoney 2012). In keeping with this
methodology, we carry out an over-time process analysis of ECI activities,
focusing on Model Code of Conduct (‘Model Code’) implementation
and election duration, considering different observations at different
points in time and identifying key historical junctures and events.
We begin by describing the ECI and the executive–ECI relationship
over time. We then focus on the political opportunity presented by a
weakened executive, state-based demands for a referee institution and
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bureaucratic entrepreneurialism. We examine the ECI’s institutional chal-
lenges in a moment of executive resurgence. We conclude with reflections
on the conditions that support institutional development in democracies.
The Indian Election Commission in the Time
of Congress Dominance and Decline
In developing countries, public institutions rarely enjoy statutory protec-
tions from executive pressure. When they do, protections may be ignored
by a marauding executive (Collier 2009).8 The ECI, over time, success-
fully secured institutional autonomy while expanding its mandate.
Gilmartin and Moog (2012) note that ‘in historical context, the estab-
lishment of the Election Commission can best be seen as an effort to
“nationalize” elections in India, not only in structural terms to centralize
their oversight, but also to associate them strongly with the idea of the
Indian nation, unifying a highly disparate and divided population’. Free
and fair elections require: (1) an independent electoral management body
to conduct elections; (2) a set of rules governing electoral conduct; and
(3) an effective electoral dispute resolution mechanism.
The Indian constitution provides all three. Article 324 establishes an
independent election commission; Article 327 empowers Parliament to
enact laws governing all aspects of elections; and Article 329 provides
a mechanism for resolving electoral disputes through review by an
independent judiciary. These articles reflect the clear preference of the
Constituent Assembly to ensure the autonomy and independence of the
ECI, protecting it from executive interference in particular (Devi and
Mendiratta 2000).
Administratively, the ECI is tasked with a number of core electoral
functions. These include the conduct of elections to parliament, all state
legislatures and the offices of the President and Vice President; regis-
tration of voters and maintenance of electoral rolls; and assistance with
electoral district delimitation. The ECI is headed by a CEC, who is typi-
cally an outsider drawn from senior members of the Indian Administrative
Services (IAS) and the Law Commission.9 Since 1995, two additional
Election Commissioners have regularly worked alongside the CEC.10
The ECI, in part, because it is small, depends upon state employees to
administer elections and oversee the deployment of substantial staff. For
example, 11 million personnel administered the parliamentary elections
in 2019. In addition, the ECI deploys paramilitary and military forces to
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secure polls in insurgency-affected regions, where federal forces are often
used instead of state police to guard against local influence.
While the ECI enjoys some formal autonomy from the executive, it
is not an independent agency. The executive controls the EC’s finances
and personnel appointments. During its first 20 years, democratic India
was dominated by a single party, Congress, at both the state and national
levels. Congress dominance was made possible by its stature as the face of
the freedom movement, its relatively well-developed organizational struc-
ture, and the pre-eminence of its leadership. It also actively co-opted
different interests.11 Congress did not intrude on ECI autonomy during
this period. It did not have to, as elections regularly installed national-
level Congress governments and few protested electoral irregularities (as
the overall result would not change). The ECI had little reason to exercise
its powers and was not pressured to do so by opposition parties.
Over time, Congress’s freedom movement leadership12 gradually
disappeared, the party underwent multiple splits, and its organizational
structure weakened. By 1967, Congress began losing power in the states.
Under Indira Gandhi’s (‘Indira’) leadership and, later, that of her son,
Rajiv Gandhi (‘Rajiv’), Congress’ hold on power became tenuous. Both
leaders undermined public institutional autonomy, including that of the
ECI.
During this period, the influence of the ECI was circumscribed. CECs
knew that if their actions were interpreted to be detrimental to Congress’
interests, they would have to contend with Congress and the Prime
Minister after the election. In describing the ECI during this period,
McMillan (2010) observes that the Election Commission had become
absorbed into the Congress system of government and lost sight of its
broader remit to maintain the democratic structure of the Indian political
system.
The ECI’s minimalist institutional profile was reflected in the public
stature of the CEC. Unlike CECs since 1991, who have been prominent
public figures, pre-1991 CECs were not well-known. A remark by a CEC,
who retired after 2010, captures this change:
During my tenure, I visited different states, in each place I felt the authority
of the CEC’s position. The politicians and bureaucrats were deferential. I
say this because this was not the case earlier. I remember being introduced
to the CEC, Mr. S.L. Shakdher, in 1981, when I was serving as a district
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magistrate and no one knew him or really cared that much about the
CEC’s office.
While discussing the same period, another CEC pointed out that ‘In those
days, the ECs were just told by the PM or the Principal Secretary, get
ready for elections on such and such date…. But when the elections are
held is the prerogative of the CEC, not the PM’s office’. Another former
CEC asserted that ‘the EC during the 1970s and 1980s was seen as a
sidekick of the government…. You could find the CEC waiting outside
the office of the Law Minister…. The ECI is [now] an independent and
autonomous body. It does not have political masters’.
A key test of the ECI came in 1975, when the President of India,
upon the advice of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, imposed Emergency
Rule under Article 352 of the Indian Constitution. The justification was
imminent threats to public order. During the 18-month long Emer-
gency, Indira’s government disempowered state governments, incarcer-
ated opposition leaders, cracked down on the press and subdued the
judiciary. Then, against expectations, and for the first time in Indian
history, the ruling Congress Party (‘Congress’) lost a parliamentary elec-
tion. The ECI’s reputation benefited from its management of the 1977
election at the end of the National Emergency.
Overall, under Congress dominance and during its decline, CECs
retained some independence despite executive power; this proved crucial
in the following decades. The independence of the ECI’s office was
protected during this early period for three reasons. First, it was consti-
tutionally protected under Article 324. Second, after 1967, as Congress
began to lose state-level elections, the Indira-led federal government
invoked Article 356 to simply dismiss non-Congress governments, instead
of resorting to rigged elections.13 The executive, therefore, had little need
to override ECI autonomy. And, third, Indira’s Model Code violation
and judicial disqualification in 1975 made her wary of direct institutional
clashes with the ECI.14 The judiciary, by being willing to stand up to
the Prime Minister’s Office, bolstered ECI authority vis-à-vis the execu-
tive. CECs we interviewed viewed the judiciary as an important safeguard.
‘The courts realize that we act in public interest’, explained one retired
CEC, ‘so they have been willing to side with us and not the government’.
The reputation garnered by the ECI under Congress dominance, as well
as during its decline, provided opportunities for its further institutional
development.
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A Turning Point
In the post-Emergency period, Congress, a leader-centric party, suffered
two significant organizational setbacks: the assassinations of Indira, in
1984, and her successor, Rajiv, in 1991. In the early 1990s, Congress
dominance unravelled. In 1952, national-level Congress vote share was
45%. By 1967, it had shrunk to 41%, by 1991, 36% and by 2004, 27%.
This decline was accompanied by: (1) an increase in the number of polit-
ical parties15; (2) more competitive electoral politics; and (3) coalition
governments.
With party system fragmentation in the 1990s, coalition politics
became institutionalized at the national level. A similar pattern occurred
in many states. Between 1989 and 2014, all 8 national governments were
coalition governments. The number of states being ruled by coalition
governments increased from 0 in 1952, to 4 in 1995, to 18 in 2006.
In the states where regional party systems replaced Congress earlier, party
systems also experienced fragmentation resulting in party proliferation.
The number of state-based political parties increased from 33 in 1984 to
209 in 1996.
Before 1989, party competition was more limited. Between 1952 and
1984, the effective number of parties (‘ENP’), as measured by vote share,
ranged from 3.40 to 5.19; when measured using seat-share in parliament,
the range was 1.69–3.16. The corresponding ENP for the period 1989–
2014 were between 4.80 and 7.98, and 3.50 and 6.50, respectively.
With no party in a position to form a majority government, a variety of
coalition governments came to power. This meant that executive power
was, to varying degrees, dispersed among alliance partners. The addi-
tion of multiple veto players weakened the executive.16 With coalition
governance, government tenures at the national and state levels became
more uncertain, surviving as long as their coalitions held. Under these
constraints, political parties supported an assertive ECI that was willing
to clean up the electoral process. The ECI profited from this uncertainty,
as weaker governments became unlikely to limit its autonomy.17 One
ECI official recounted a moment when A. B. Vajpayee’s Bharatiya Janata
Party (‘BJP’)-led coalition government between 1998 and 2004 moved
to appoint an outsider instead of promoting the senior Election Commis-
sioner as CEC. When this news reached the Election Commissioners, they
threatened to resign. The government withdrew its proposal (Sridharan
and Vaishnav 2017).
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State-based parties came into prominence during party system frag-
mentation. These smaller parties relied on the ECI to ensure free and fair
state-level elections. As challengers, they did not trust the state machinery,
bureaucrats or the police to discharge their responsibilities in a nonpar-
tisan manner, perhaps remaining loyal to incumbents. Thus, state-based
challengers turned towards the ECI, a federal body, to ensure fair state-
level competition. Aware of incumbent loyalties among public officials,
an assertive ECI was willing to prevent them from influencing the elec-
toral process. Smaller parties supported ECI efforts to clean up electoral
rolls, as inflated rolls allowed major parties to fraudulently exaggerate
vote share. Parties also demanded the use of the federal security appa-
ratus rather than local police during elections, which the EC was willing
to support. Parties that relied on support from poor and marginalized
groups supported the ECI’s vulnerability mapping project.18 The ECI
cracked down on the flow of money and alcohol, despite resistance.
Occasionally, the ECI ran into resistance. In 2001, for example, the
ECI had a standoff with state governments. The ECI wanted to be able
to ensure public officials’ compliance with ECI instructions after state-
level elections had been announced. State governments viewed this as
a violation of federal principles that protect state government personnel
from federal sanction. The ECI did not back down and a compromise
was reached. The ECI was granted the power to remove government
officials for the duration of an election, but state governments alone could
act against them. The earlier changes had an immediate effect on ECI’s
autonomy. Structural constraints on the ECI declined. The ECI became
more autonomous and began to assert its authority.
The Pivotal Role of the Entrepreneurial
Chief Election Commissioner
The collapse of single-party dominance and increase in party competition
in the 1990s was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the develop-
ment of a powerful ECI. The decline in single-party dominance weakened
executive power, a key constraint on the ECI’s autonomy. Increased party
competition created state-based demand for the ECI’s role. These condi-
tions provided the ECI with a political opportunity. Then, in the 1990s,
entrepreneurial CECs used and built upon the credibility the ECI had
developed over the years to expand its mandate in the name of serving a
diverse coalition of interests.
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Indeed, the CEC played an important role in the expansion of ECI
power. Mandate expansions have often been driven by entrepreneurial
leadership from bureaucrats, acting in moments of political opportunity
(Bakir 2009; Nay 2011). In many parts of the US federal bureaucracy,
bureau and division chiefs were responsible for mandate expansion. These
entrepreneurs crafted agendas, shaped the composition of the long-term,
organized workforce, marketed their agencies and themselves, controlled
information flowing to the legislature and, ultimately, convinced elected
officials to use programs the agencies themselves had designed (Doig and
Hargrove 1987; Carpenter 2001).
After 1989, with no party in a position to win a majority, the ECI
faced few structural constraints on its autonomy. CECs began to assert
authority over political actors during elections. The first to do so was T.
N. Seshan, who introduced several changes to the election process. Seshan
was able to win concessions from the Congress-led minority government
to elevate the CEC’s position, in the warrant of precedence, from that of a
High Court judge to that of a Supreme Court justice. He also introduced
election observers for state assembly elections, pioneered voter ID cards
and refused to take executive instructions. Seshan skillfully navigated an
expanding media environment. He regularly issued press releases and used
publicity to ‘force politicians to internalize… the norms’ embodied in the
Model Code (Gilmartin 2009).
Such was his influence that politicians, it was said half-jokingly, ‘feared
only God or T.N. Seshan’. His aggression and repeated executive clashes
made him controversial. Sometimes he exceeded his authority and the
Supreme Court stepped into overrule his decisions. Despite occasional
losses, Seshan differentiated himself from predecessors by demonstrating
the constitutional powers that an entrepreneurial CEC could exercise.
Seshan was the force that moved the ECI from a little-known institu-
tion to a highly regarded one in a moment of opportunity. This change
was likely not inevitable and owes a considerable debt to Seshan’s leader-
ship. Opportunities do not automatically convert into outcomes. Those
of his successors who we interviewed, even those who did not always
approve of his methods, acknowledged as much. A less entrepreneurial
CEC may not have responded similarly to the political opportunity he
received. Seshan demonstrated ECI authority and set a standard by raising
the ECI’s profile and altering public expectations of both the CEC and
the ECI. ‘Before Seshan, the CEC’s main job was to announce the elec-
tion results’, a former CEC observed. ‘From the 1960s right up to the
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80s, the ECI was being run Ram-bharose (left to the mercy of God), said
another former CEC’. Additionally, another former CEC commented,
‘The ECI can continue to learn from his legacy’. One CEC described
Seshan’s tenure as an era in which the CEC set new benchmarks for all
CECs who followed.
The CECs who followed were not as controversial, but they were also
not reluctant to assert ECI authority, even when this meant taking on the
executive. More significantly, an informal norm arose in which each CEC
would try to leave a mark on the ECI by improving the electoral process
in some way. Introduction of electronic voting machines, vulnerability
mapping, closer monitoring of elections, digitizing of voter lists, voter
education programs, publishing information on a candidate’s economic
assets and criminal records are all initiatives that have been introduced by
Seshan’s successors.
But if the executive appoints CECs, why have weak executives not
chosen more pliant CECs? After all, it is not in the executive’s interest
to appoint entrepreneurial bureaucrats to the ECI, but some have done
just that. Our interviews point to three answers.
First, these are seasoned bureaucrats who have spent their entire careers
around politicians. An important aspect of the professionalization process
is learning to mask personal preferences. It is then difficult for politicians
to assess the capacity and intent of such bureaucrats. Second, potential
CECs are ECI outsiders and it is only when they join the institution that
they actually discover the true stature of the position. Third, bureaucrats
are beholden to their profession. Their prestige is rooted in what fellow
bureaucrats think of them. More than one CEC described how much
their professional reputations matter to them. One CEC noted, ‘When
the ECI organizes elections, it works with civil servants from all over the
country. I always felt that these bureaucrats must be able to look up to
the CEC and take pride in my conduct’.
Institutional Development
and Evidence of Mandate Expansion
The institutional development of the ECI occurred in two phases: a pre-
1991 period, in which the ECI played an important-but-circumscribed
role; and a post-1991 period, in which, the ECI, under a weakened exec-
utive and led by an entrepreneurial CEC, began to expansively interpret
its constitutional mandate and play an increasingly powerful role. Below
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we substantiate the ECI’s expanded role by examining two key indicators:
Model Code Implementation and Election Duration.19 We use these two
indicators because: (1) they represent the most significant manifestations
of the ECI’s expansively interpreted mandate and (2) they can be tracked
longitudinally.
Model Code Implementation
The Model Code of Conduct began in the South Indian state of Kerala,
in 1960, as a consensus between political parties regarding their electoral
conduct. It delineates the types of appeals that may be made during the
run-up to an election (e.g. no ethnic or religious appeals, no criticism of
candidates’ private lives), outlines the procedures that must be followed
for meetings and processions, describes what members of the ruling party
cannot do while acting in official capacity, describes permissible election
manifesto material and lists polling day rules (e.g. distance parties must
maintain from polling booths, how parties must cooperate with authori-
ties, how party workers must identify themselves, etc.). While infractions
occur on a regular basis, parties largely adjust their conduct once officially
notified, suggesting that the Model Code does represent the rules of the
game.20
Until the late 1980s, the ECI merely watched how the Model Code
was updated and gradually adopted by additional states. It wasn’t until
1990, however, that the ECI enforced it. In December 1990, T. N.
Seshan became CEC and quickly began pursuing ECI independence and
mandate expansion. He did so, in part, by formalizing the Model Code.
These efforts drew the ire of Narasimha Rao’s Congress government
and the executive pushed back, expanding the ECI to three members
to check Seshan’s power. These two additional election commissioners
failed, however, to curtail both the ECI’s power expansion and Model
Code institutionalization.
As Singh (2012: 153) explains, ‘since 1991, the Model Code has come
to be seen as an integral part of elections, making the electoral contest
democratic by ensuring that the party in power and those who staked
claims to power would abide by certain rules, and by pruning the powers
of the ruling party to reduce the advantage that it may have in the
electoral arena’. One former CEC pointed out, ‘[we] are interested in
catching violations of the Model Code. It requires substantial manpower.
But in such a competitive environment rivals (parties and candidates)
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monitor each other. A large number of complaints and Model Code viola-
tion reports come from political parties. We take these complaints very
seriously and investigate them immediately’. ECI officials knew that a
proliferation of television channels and media platforms ensure that such
incidents are well-publicized, so the ECI has to respond swiftly.
Examples of Model Code enforcement abound. In January 2017,
Arvind Kejriwal was censured for remarks at a rally in Goa.21 Kejriwal,
the Aam Admi Party leader, suggested that voters, when parties offer Rs.
5000 for their vote, should ask for Rs. 10,000. In 2015, in the lead-up to
Bihar’s state elections, BJP President Amit Shah was censured for stating
that, if the BJP loses in Bihar, ‘firecrackers will go off in Pakistan’, a viola-
tion of the provision prohibiting aggravation of existing differences or
creation of mutual hatred. In the same election Rahul Gandhi, Congress
Vice President, was cautioned for suggesting that the BJP makes Hindus
and Muslims hate each other; these were unverified allegations used to
criticize other candidates or their workers. A more subtle Model Code
violation occurred in the lead-up to the 2009 general elections. The ECI
notified the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, the Cabinet Secretary
and the Chief Secretary of Delhi, for taking out a full-page advertisement
on the 2010 Commonwealth Games in major Delhi newspapers listing
the infrastructure built for the event and the thousands of job opportu-
nities created. The ECI found this list of the government’s achievements
to be a clear Model Code violation.
Since it is not based on legislation passed in parliament, the Code
is not judicially enforceable. The action against a violator usually takes
the form of an advice, warning or censure. No punitive action can be
taken. But this does not make the Code toothless. Its moral authority
outweighs its legal sanctity. Its impact is instant. Political leaders are scared
of inviting a notice for a violation, as it creates negative public perception
about them and their party just before elections. Importantly, while indi-
viduals sometimes contest whether their behaviour truly violated Model
Code regulations, both candidates and parties almost never argue that the
Model Code is illegitimate or should be abandoned.
Election Duration
In addition to Model Code institutionalization, the ECI’s expanded
mandate manifested itself in the duration of both national (parliamen-
tary) and state-level elections. With the exception of the 1952 and 1957
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national elections, early Indian elections, as evidenced by Fig. 2.1, were
brief. Most national elections, from independence to 1996, took only
a few days. This has since changed dramatically. The first three parlia-
mentary elections were held over four months, 17 days and ten days,
respectively.22 The three elections conducted between 1967 and 1977
were each completed in less than seven days. The same trend continued
through the 1980s. The 1991 election was supposed to be completed in a
week; however, Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in the middle of the election
extended its duration.
Since 1991, however, the general trend has been towards substantially
longer elections. In 1996, election duration began to increase sharply. The
1996 election was completed in three phases over the course of a month;
the 1998 election in four phases over three weeks; the 1999 election in
five phases over four weeks; the 2004 election in four phases over three
weeks; the 2009 election in five phases over four weeks; and the 2014
and 2019 elections in nine phases over five weeks.
This pattern holds at the state level as well, where the ECI
also conducts elections. While longer election duration is particularly
pronounced in larger states, it also exists in smaller states. For example, in















Fig. 2.1 Parliamentary election duration in India (Source Election Commission
of India)
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since then. In Maharashtra, the average pre-1991 election duration was
1.86 days, and 8.75 days since then. Meanwhile, in Odisha, the pre-1991
number is 3, and 6 since then. In Andhra Pradesh, pre-1991 election
duration averaged 1 day, while post-1991 duration averaged 8 days.
Finally, in Assam, a much smaller state, in terms of both geographic
size and population, average pre-1991 election duration was 1.75, while
post-1991 duration was 3.8.
Entrepreneurial CECs justified the increase in election duration by
pointing to demands for cleaner elections. The ECI has to move security
force personnel and other parts of the administrative apparatus over long
distances. These logistical constraints help justify longer election duration
because they are directly related to the process of ensuring free and fair
polling.
The ECI’s expanding mandate in the post-1991 period is also visible
across other indicators. Since 1991, the ECI has mandated voter ID
cards, curtailed campaign periods, engaged in large-scale voter mobiliza-
tion, tried to regulate political parties and entry of candidates into the
electoral process, and assumed both executive and quasi-judicial control
during elections (Quraishi 2014).
Credibility: The EC’s Core Institutional Currency
The ECI has gradually expanded its mandate and increased its activity
both during and in the run-up to elections. The enforcement of the
Model Code, curtailment of electoral campaigns and longer election
durations all constitute mandate expansion. While some credibility was
required in order to make these changes, they have also served to rein-
force institutional credibility, which has, in turn, allowed the ECI to
leverage public and sometimes judicial support to confront government’s
intrusion between 1990 and 2014. It has helped the ECI to become a
powerful public institution. A closer look at the ECI’s pursuit of cred-
ibility reveals how important this ratchet function was to the ECI’s
expansive interpretation of its mandate.
The ECI entered the era of party system fragmentation in the 1990s
with some institutional credibility. Its quiescence during Indira Gand-
hi’s and Rajiv Gandhi’s tenures notwithstanding, it had retained a degree
of independence, and it had successfully conducted a large number of
national and state assembly elections. Since 1967, Congress had regularly
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lost power to opposition parties in state assembly elections overseen by
the ECI.
The 1977 and 1989 national elections were pivotal to the ECI’s cred-
ibility. Opposition leaders had feared that post-Emergency elections in
1977 would be rigged in Congress’ favour. Charan Singh wrote as much
to Jayaprakash Narayan (both opposition stalwarts) in January 1977:
‘Mrs. Gandhi is thinking of staging an election. I call it “staging” because
conditions for a real election–free and fair–will be lacking’ (Raghavan
2017). As it turned out, Congress was voted out of national office for
the first time during these elections. Had the ECI not presided over a
free and fair election in 1977, political parties would likely have had less
faith in the ECI as an honest referee and would have resisted its mandate
expansion.
Prior credibility allowed an ECI led by an entrepreneurial CEC to
take advantage of a political opportunity and expand its mandate. The
ECI then used its added powers to further equalize treatment: demon-
strating political neutrality and being willing to intervene in favour of
marginalized voters. This approach reinforced the ECI’s credibility.
The long-term credibility of a referee institution turns on its perceived
neutrality. The EC needs to be viewed as an impartial institution by two
sets of actors: (1) politicians and political parties and (2) voters. The ECI
has put in place a set of policies to ensure neutrality with respect to both
sets.
To ensure neutrality with respect to politicians and political parties, the
ECI appoints a Chief Election Officer for each state who reports directly
to the ECI. It also has the power to remove and/or suspend partisan
state government officials. To secure polling stations and voting machines,
the ECI always uses the Central Armed Police Forces to ensure that any
security action taken is not affected by local-level loyalties. It also penal-
izes candidates for Model Code violations. Finally, it regularly consults
with political parties, especially before implementing new policies, and
takes their concerns into consideration. In the words of an ECI official,
‘elections are their show, we are only referees’.
To ensure neutrality with respect to voters, particularly subnationalist
groups and individuals especially suspicious of the ruling dispensations
in Delhi or their respective state capitals, the ECI has ramped up secu-
rity in violence-prone areas and conducted vulnerability mapping. The
ECI’s past failure on this count proved consequential. During the 1987
state assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir, when, under the federal
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government’s pressure, the ECI looked the other way while the elections
were rigged in favour of state-backed parties, it triggered an insurgency.
The ECI’s failure contributed to the onset of India’s bloodiest internal
conflict, but also provided the ECI with a learning opportunity.
A more assertive ECI has been able to ensure that elections in violence-
prone areas are seen as free and fair. For example, J. M. Lyngdoh, CEC
in 2003, spoke to the Army and Paramilitary commanders in Jammu and
Kashmir and told them that security forces should neither cast ballots
nor force citizens to vote to boost turnout, as doing so would rob the
election of its legitimacy (Lyngdoh 2004). He also threatened to cancel
the election results if his warnings were not heeded.23
Similarly, as CEC, M. S. Gill engineered a compromise to enable free
and fair elections in Assam, in 2001. Gill assured local groups that they
could petition the ECI to cancel the votes of Bangladeshi migrants whose
Indian citizenship was in doubt, thus preventing a boycott of the elec-
tions by local ethnic groups. Along the same lines, soon after the 2002
Hindu–Muslim violence in Gujarat, the ruling BJP called an election that
would allow it to benefit from religious polarization.24 The ECI thwarted
this plan, challenging the state government’s assertion that the state was
ready to hold a free and fair election (Lyngdoh 2004), and delaying the
elections by six months.
Besides deploying security forces and delaying elections after violent
incidents, the ECI closely tracks criminals and potential troublemakers.
Preventative arrests are made, surety bonds are obtained and targeted
individuals are tracked with video surveillance. Candidates with crim-
inal backgrounds are continuously tracked. Reports of observers, security
personnel, media and videographers are reviewed to assess instances of
violence (Shukla 2010; Mendiratta 2010). If they suggest disruptive
activity, then a re-poll is ordered immediately. These efforts seem to
have paid off, as instances of electoral violence have dropped dramati-
cally across most states. During the 1970s and 1980s, electoral violence
claimed hundreds of lives and polling booth-level irregularities were
common across some states (Crossette 1989). This is no longer the case.
The ‘active neutrality’ described above also characterizes ECI vulner-
ability mapping efforts to ensure the equal opportunity of voters who
are particularly susceptible to social intimidation and disenfranchisement.
In North Indian states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, where historically
marginalized voters have been intimidated and prevented from voting,
acts of violence and bullying have dropped drastically. During interviews,
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elderly Dalit voters in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar often reported that in
the past they had been asked not to vote, or turned away from polling
stations after being told by dominant caste individuals that their ballots
had already been cast. One-on-one interviews revealed that 33% of 206
Dalit subjects in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar reported that either they or a
member of their immediate family had experienced intimidation during
elections at some point (Ahuja 2019).25 Today, the situation is different,
however. During recent interviews, voters rarely reported feeling insecure
or unsafe while lining up to vote on the day of polling.
Post-1991, the ECI came to be regarded as a force for good in Indian
politics and neutrality was essential to its success. CECs we interviewed
generally believed that being perceived to be above partisan and ethnic
politics was critical to their credibility with both parties and the public.
An increase in political contestation beginning in 1967 tested the ECI’s
role as a referee institution. The ECI is a public facing institution, so
its legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens and political actors turns on its
performance. Elections are high-stakes contest, especially in first-past-post
winner-take-all electoral systems like the one in India. The widespread
acceptance of election results across the political spectrum of India’s
multiparty democracy as well as the reduction in electoral irregularities
and violence together have built the ECI’s legitimacy.
Return to Quiescence?
Since 2014, after a gap of twenty-six years, the executive has been resur-
gent in India. All governments between 1989 and 2014 were coalition
governments and no single party enjoyed a parliamentary majority. The
Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) attained parliamentary
majorities in both 2014 and 2019. Its vote share increased from 31% in
2014 to 38% in 2019. The BJP is also in government in a majority of
Indian states. For the 2019 elections, the ENP values, based on both
vote and seat shares, have fallen to 5.4 and 3.0, respectively.
It should not be surprising, then, that the executive has instead turned
to the tactic of limiting the ECI’s authority from within, by appointing
pliant election commissioners. The ECI deferred the 2017 Gujarat state
assembly elections. This move went against the ECI’s own convention
and opposition parties alleged that the ECI’s actions were designed to
delay the implementation of the Model Code of Conduct and allow
the BJP-led Gujarat government to announce new programs that might
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convince voters to cast their ballots for the BJP. In a separate incident, the
CEC disqualified twenty legislators of the Aam Admi Party, a BJP rival,
from the Delhi assembly. As this move occurred without following due
process, the CEC was criticized for his actions. The ECI was also widely
criticized for its meek response to Narendra Modi and the BJP’s repeated
model code violations during the 2019 parliamentary election campaign.
The ECI was slow to respond to these violations, and it failed to censure
bad behaviour and impose penalties on the ruling party and the prime
minister.
By contrast, it was much swifter in its response to similar violations
by opposition parties. The same pattern was visible in the 2020 Delhi
state assembly elections. Faced with unprecedented levels of hate speech,
the ECI’s rebuke was weak at best.26 Together, these actions point to a
consequential slide. The ECI’s moves in the state assembly and the 2019
parliamentary elections have cast a shadow over the ECI’s reputation for
neutrality, something it has gradually built over decades.
Still, election commissioners are not as helpless in the face of a
marauding executive as they were in the 1980s. Today, entrepreneurial
election commissioners can leverage the ECI’s enhanced reputation to
retain its authority and stand up to the executive. One of the Election
Commissioners, Ashok Lavasa, wrote four dissenting notes against the
ECI’s meek response to the Model Code violations of the BJP and its
leadership during the 2019 elections. After taking office, the BJP govern-
ment was swift to punish Lavasa by opening investigations against his
family. Lavasa is scheduled to take over as India’s next CEC in 2021. It
remains to be seen if the executive will intervene to prevent this transition.
To assert its authority, the ECI can also draw on the demand for
a reputable referee institution among India’s national and numerous
regional political parties. It risks politicization of the institution, however,
if it relies solely on support from opposition parties to stand up to
the executive. In addition, ultimately, if the election commissioners and
the chief election commissioner in particular, are unwilling to protect
the ECI’s institutional autonomy from the executive who appointed
them, the ECI will struggle to maintain its power and reputation. To
the degree that the executive wins this battle, we expect weaker Model
Code implementation and the emergence of irregularities that favour the
executive.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, we showed that the Indian EC’s mandate expanded
during a moment of political opportunity created by a fragmented party
system. Faced with a weakened executive and a more competitive party
system between 1989 and 2014, and led by entrepreneurial bureaucrats,
the ECI successfully bargained for greater political power. The institu-
tional values of competence and integrity enhanced the ECI’s credibility.
It gradually increased its credibility by offering additional protections to
voters and procedural assurances of the fairness of the voting process.
As it did so, it began to enforce a Model Code and expanded the scale
and duration of the electoral process. Political parties that had become
increasingly reliant on a strong, neutral referee institution were unable to
resist the ECI’s expansionist interpretation of its mandate.
The ECI emerged as a credible referee institution, not only for India,
but as a model for the developing world, where contested election results
and biased referee institutions have often weakened the foundations of
democracy. This chapter suggests that a weak executive, often associ-
ated with political uncertainty and therefore regarded as detrimental
to state institutions, can benefit credible regulatory institutions led by
bureaucratic entrepreneurs and be a boon for state capacity in the long
run.
The ECI is not invincible, however. Since 2014, the resurgent execu-
tive has constrained the ECI, and if the ECI’s competence is in question,
or its behaviour is perceived as being partial it will also begin to lose its
legitimacy. In fact, as recent democratic experience has highlighted and
the literature on democratic backsliding has documented, neutrality of
referee institutions and the credibility of the democratic process cannot
be taken for granted, even in long-standing democracies (Levitsky and
Ziblat 2018). Such institutions are vulnerable to being undermined from
the outside as well as from within.27
One clear implication of this chapter on the ECI’s institutional devel-
opment is that a weak executive can facilitate the strengthening of state
institutions. A competitive party system that regularly transfers power
from one party or coalition to another allows state institutions the space
to both remain apolitical and maintain high credibility. Such a party
system also creates a demand for neutral institutions. A single-party or
a single-coalition dominant system is likely to have the opposite effect. In
a single-party system, institutional mandates and credibility are protected
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by strong leadership or executive self-restraint. In India, while a CEC
enjoys substantial protections, their appointment is in the hands of the
executive making the ECI vulnerable.
The corollary of this argument is that a stronger executive may well
reassert itself and reclaim the authority it has ceded to the ECI over
the years. We do observe evidence that points in this direction. Still,
given the credibility the ECI has accumulated, even a strong execu-
tive must avoid an open challenge to the ECI’s institutional authority.
Demands for referee institutions are unlikely under single-party domi-
nance; instead they appear in moments of political contestation. In federal
systems, state-based actors often demand strong referees. Governance
of heterogeneous, pluralistic polities demands a set of shared institu-
tions, principles and procedures that make it possible to rule a divided
society without undue violence. Such rules are particularly necessary in
federal systems where power is shared between the federal and provincial
governments. In such systems, citizens and state-based political organiza-
tions may want common rules and external referees, even as they remain
opposed to central rule. Generally, we expect that the greater the number
of conflicts at the subnational level, the higher the demand for federal
referee institutions.
The findings of this chapter can be connected to perennial questions
about public institutions. When are institutions able to expand their
mandate and accumulate power in the name of public welfare? How are
institutions able to take advantage of political opportunities to preserve
and expand their power? Broadly speaking, the evidence points to a nested
set of factors at work in a federal democracy: the political opportunity
presented by weakened institutional constraints is a necessary prerequi-
site for institutional mandate expansion. In this moment of opportunity,
when entrepreneurial bureaucratic actors take advantage of a demand for
a competent, neutral arbiter, they are able to successfully increase the
powers of their institutions.
Questions for Discussion
1. This chapter describes two types of institutional leadership. Can you
identify both types and explain how they relate to the institutional-
ization of the ECI?
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2. What roles do national election regulators such as the ECI play
within the political process, and what values do they seek to
safeguard?
3. What are the main challenges to the effectiveness and legitimacy of
national election regulators?
4. How did the ECI manage to overcome these challenges—what were
the key drivers of its current status as a public institution?
5. How might the independence and competence of regulatory bodies
such as ECI be ensured irrespective of who holds political power at
any given time?
Notes
1. This chapter draws substantially on previously published work: Ahuja and
Ostermann (2018).
2. The 1996 National Election Study (‘NES’) found that the ECI enjoyed
the highest level of public trust among major public institutions, including
the judiciary, police and political parties (Mitra and Singh 1999). In the
2004 NES, 80% of respondents believed elections to be free and fair (De
Souza et al. 2008).
3. Beaulieu (2014) examines 1975–2006 electoral protest data and finds that
after 1990 post-election protests increased threefold and election boycotts
ninefold.
4. Interviews conducted by Ahuja between 2004 and 2009 in Uttar Pradesh,
Bihar, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu.
5. Peri Shastri annoyed Rajiv’s government by not adhering to the govern-
ment’s election schedule. Unable to fire Shastri, the executive punished
him by opening false investigations against him and packing the ECI with
two additional Election Commissioners.
6. For example, in 1971, Indira shifted vote-counting from polling stations
to district headquarters. Indira, who was popular among poor voters,
believed them vulnerable to reprisals from property-holding groups and
acted to protect their anonymity (Blair 1972).
7. Baijayant Panda shifted from Biju Janata Dal to Bharatiya Janata Party in
March 2019.
8. In postcolonial democratic societies, universal franchise from the begin-
ning presented an institution-building challenge (Nordlinger 1968).
9. Most CECs have been IAS officers. This is not surprising—conducting
elections is an administrative exercise carried out with the help of state-
level bureaucrats.
10. In 1989, a Congress-led government appointed two additional Election
Commissioners for the first time. This policy was reversed soon after. The
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number of Election Commissioners increased again in 1993. After a legal
challenge in 1995, the Supreme Court approved two additional Election
Commissioners permanently.
11. These included ethnic, religious and class-based interests. Congress was a
catchall party.
12. By ‘freedom movement leadership’ we me those members of the Congress
political party who were actively involved in the struggle to free India of
British rule, including Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra
Prasad.
13. Article 356 was invoked only thrice from 1949 to 1974, while from 1975
to 1979, it was invoked 21 times, and, from 1980 to 1987, 18 times.
14. The complaint against Indira was made not to the ECI, but the courts,
which found in the complainant’s favour.
15. The logic of federalism implies that coalition governance at the national
and state levels creates more opportunities for small parties to gain access
to public resources.
16. According to Tsebelis (2002), veto players are individual or collective
actors who possess the power to prevent a decision-outcome.
17. Rudolph and Rudolph (2001) suggest that in a moment of executive
weakness the Indian state shifted from interventionist to regulatory mode.
This may not entirely be true. For instance, the executive mustered
the coalition strength to extend affirmative action programs to Other
Backward Castes in 2006 and implemented a national rural employment
guarantee program across India in 2008. Since all parties desired a neutral
referee, it was not possible for the executive to build a similar coalition
against the ECI.
18. Vulnerability mapping involves the ECI identifying groups—like the poor,
Dalits and Scheduled Tribes—that are particularly susceptible to voter
intimidation. At relevant polling stations, the ECI then contacts these
individuals to assure them of ECI protection on the day of the election.
Vulnerable voters are encouraged to report misconduct and immediate
action is taken on complaints.
19. We measure election duration from first to last polling date after removing
exceptional dates. We do not use election notification or MCC enforce-
ment date because of the longitudinal nature of our analysis; the level of
disruption associated with the first has changed over time and the second
did not exist during many of the early years included in our analysis, thus
preventing clean comparisons.
20. The exception is with respect to alcohol distribution during the campaign.
The Model Code prohibits this and the distribution of similar enticements,
but, despite the ECI generally confiscating thousands of litres of alcohol
during an election, most parties at least attempt to continue this practice.
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21. Censure is supposed to publically embarrass the candidate in the middle
of an election campaign. When appropriate, the ECI can file a criminal
complaint against the candidate.
22. Poor infrastructure, weather and lack of experience conducting elections
contributed to the unusual length of these first elections.
23. We learned this from ECI officials we interviewed.
24. The BJP and the state government were directly implicated in supporting
an anti-Muslim pogrom.
25. These semi-structured interviews were conducted in 2004 across rural and
urban Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The subjects for these interviews were
selected using stratified random sampling.
26. The ECI’s conduct during the 2020 Delhi state assembly election
provoked criticism from one of the former CECs (Quraishi 2020).
27. For a similar argument about European bureaucracies, see Olsen (2007).
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CHAPTER 3
Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigations
Bureau: Guardian of Public Integrity
Zeger van der Wal
From Crooked Cops to a Valued Institution
We were sickened by the greed, corruption and decadence of many Asian
leaders. We had a deep sense of mission to establish a clean and effec-
tive government. When we took the oath of office in June 1959, we all
wore white shirts and white slacks to symbolize purity and honesty in our
personal behaviour and our public life. We made sure from the day we
took office in June 1959, that every dollar in revenue would be properly
accounted for and would reach the beneficiaries at the grass roots as one
dollar, without being siphoned off along the way. So, from the very begin-
ning we gave special attention to the areas where discretionary powers had
been exploited for personal gain and sharpened the instruments that could
prevent, detect or deter such practices. (Lee 2000: 182–184)
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In 1951, a criminal gang including three police detectives stole
1800 pounds of opium with a value of $400,000 from a police depot in
Ponggol (a district in the north-east region of Singapore). To investigate
the robbery, the British colonial administration that governed Singapore
at the time appointed a special team led by a senior officer of the Anti-
Corruption Branch (ACB). The ACB had been established in 1937 to
investigate corrupt activities within the Singapore Police. Investigations
soon revealed that several senior police officers were involved in the racket
in conjunction with the hijackers and the opium importers (Quah 2011:
209).
While police involvement in drug trafficking was hardly a revelation,
this scandal revealed that the British government had made a serious
mistake putting the ACB on the case: the branch was part of the police
force and many corruption cases involved police officers. The British had
essentially turned the investigation of rampant police corruption over
to the police. The bungling of the opium case proved to be the last
straw. Displeased with the outcome of the investigations resulting in the
dismissal and forced retirement of two key senior officers (CPIB 2003:
0.6), the British formed another special investigation team to critically
evaluate the previous investigation. When the special team completed
its investigation in September 1952, the government decided to replace
the rather dysfunctional ACB with the so-called ‘special team’. This
team would become the now legendary Corrupt Practices Investigations
Bureau (CPIB).
Many people might associate governments in Asia with corruption
rather than good governance. Such perceptions are corroborated by
various indices, rankings and studies (Transparency International 2019;
World Bank 2018; Quah 2011). Two small ‘city states’ notably stand
out: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) and Singapore.
Both have managed to curb, or at least drastically reduce and control
corruption, in just a few decades. In recent years, Singapore in particular
has managed to preserve political stability with large corruption scandals
being absent. As a result, it can rightly be called a ‘unicorn’ in the region.
Since 1960, the CPIB has been a driving force in making Singapore
one of the least corrupt nations on earth. Before that time, corruption
across all parts of the Singaporean public sector was endemic, especially
among the police. It had been since at least the 1850s. Corruption was
widely seen by civil servants as a ‘low-risk, high-reward’ activity (Quah
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2003: 184; 2011: 215). Salaries were often poor, particularly for non-
British officials, and could be supplemented by bribes and favours. The
threat of detection and punishment for such activities was a little deter-
rent. The commonality of corrupt conduct by public officials contributed
to widespread distrust in public institutions, slow economic development
and low morale among public servants; issues we can still observe today
in many developing countries.
Indeed, over time the agency has developed the authority, mandate and
legitimacy to investigate any potential corruption case. Singapore has been
consistently ranked among the 10 least corrupt countries in Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 25 years and is the
least corrupt country in Asia. In 2010, Singapore was ranked joint first
with Denmark and New Zealand among 178 countries on the CPI with
a score of 9.3.
The institutionalization of the CPIB is closely intertwined with Singa-
pore’s success as a nation. It is hard to imagine Singapore’s phenomenal
economic growth would have been possible without the work of the
CPIB. But how is it possible that this agency has won such extensive
powers to fight corruption? This chapter shows that the agency is more
than an organization. It has become an institution and as a result has been
able to safeguard public values important to the Singaporean government.
The agency has trumpeted and protected values like fairness, meritocracy
and the rule of law, guarding them against forces of erosion for more
than half a century.
This chapter first briefly explains how the CPIB meets Selznick’s
(1957) criteria for an institution: (1) a distinct identity and unique
competence; (2) strong reputation and public legitimacy; and (3)
enduring viability through adaptation. It presents in more detail the
CPIB’s tasks and functions. The chapter then seeks to explain how CPIB
came to enjoy its institutional status, and how this status has supported
its efforts to safeguard Singapore from corruption.
At the same time, the CPIB cannot afford to become complacent given
the emerging challenges it faces: virtual and transboundary corruption,
money laundering and an increasingly vocal and critical citizenry and
political parties challenging Lee Kuan Yew’s regime-founding People’s
Action Party’s half-century of uninterrupted rule. In this vein, the chapter
concludes with broader lessons that can be distilled from CPIB’s institu-
tional tale, while asking whether the CPIB’s institutional model is only
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possible given Singapore’s unique political context which, itself, may
already be starting to change.
In summary, the chapter addresses three key questions:
1. How did the CPIB become a successful public value creating
institution? What were the driving factors?
2. How has the CPIB adjusted over time to maintain that status?
3. (How) can the CPIB maintain its status into the future?
The CPIB as an Institution
Through a record of landmark cases against corrupt individuals, including
ministers and senior public- and private-sector executives, and with
continuous support from political leadership and an initially sceptical
general public, the agency gradually developed substantial authority,
mandate and legitimacy to investigate any potential corruption case.
In doing so, it successfully obtained and leveraged preventative, inves-
tigative and legal functionalities way beyond those of comparable agencies
in both developing countries as well as other developed and relatively
‘clean’ countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, Denmark or the
Netherlands. As such, the CPIB was and is a driving force in making
Singapore one of the least corrupt and most successful nations on earth,
in a region still largely characterized by corruption, nepotism and poor
governance (Van der Wal 2019).1
Over time, the CPIB managed to develop into something much more
than just an organization. It has become an iconic institution, enjoying
not just regional but global name recognition and widespread admira-
tion, even from Western critics of the Singapore governance model. It
is an institution because—in the words of the pioneer of institutional
studies, Philip Selznick—the organization is ‘infused with value beyond
the requirements of the task at hand’ (1957: 17). Institutions create, safe-
guard and embody values that are important to a society; they guard these
values against erosion or overt attacks.
This ‘extra dimension’ is, of course, largely a matter of perception:
people recognize something special without perhaps being able to imme-
diately express why the institution is different than the organization.
Goodsell (2011) refers to a certain ‘mystique’ that permeates the aura of
such organizations. Indeed, it may be illustrative that while many other
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countries have tried to mimic central features of the CPIB and the legisla-
tion underpinning the agency’s mandate, such attempts have rarely been
successful, let alone durable.
This may be due to the absence of key contextual drivers, inspira-
tional leadership and perceived competence and ‘belief’ in the agency’s
distinct mission from external and internal stakeholders. Often, the crucial
features that contribute to the institutionalization have to operate in
tandem, in a ‘perfect storm’, to create and maintain mystique and legiti-
macy. In his seminal work, Selznick (1957) uses three criteria to identify
an institution, which are applied here to the CPIB and the way in which
the bureau is perceived by key stakeholders.
1. Distinct identity and unique competence—an institution has a
strong alignment between the rationale for its existence it puts
forward and the day-to-day strategies and practices it deploys to
deliver on that promise. Over time, the CPIB has managed to
continually ‘earn and keep’ its immense legal and investigative
powers and mandates. Partly, this is the case because it lived up
to its promise of cleaning up Singapore, which contributed to the
stability that attracted international investment and regional head-
quarters of multinational companies, and partly because the CPIB
never misused its powers and mandates for political vendettas (Quah
2011, 2017).
2. Strong reputation and public legitimacy—the institution is broadly
trusted and well respected, with high internal support from
employees and external support from key stakeholders including
those who fund the organization, in some instances to such a
degree that its existence is almost taken for granted. The CPIB
enjoys high public—some would say ‘performative’—authority (cf.
Van der Wal 2017a) because it has fairly consistently ‘delivered the
goods’: a high conviction rate for the cases examined while not
exempting public- and private-sector executives at the highest eche-
lons, including ministers. Legitimacy is also manifested in the ability
to persuade the government to almost triple its staff in the past
decade (from 90 FTE in 2010 to around 250 FTE today) and
double the annual budget in that same period from almost S$15
million to S$30 million.2
3. Enduring viability through adaptation—to qualify as an institution,
an organization must demonstrably have been able to ‘deliver’ on its
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mission over time, creating valued outputs and outcomes that satisfy
its key constituencies and stakeholders even as the manner in which
it does so has changed quite considerably. Arguably, given Singa-
pore’s high degree of political stability and top-down governance,
the CPIB has had to endure fewer adaptation challenges than its
counterparts in more volatile, polarized and fragmented democracies
(cf. Quah 2017). At the same time, the CPIB has had to upgrade
technological capabilities and skills in response to emerging integrity
risks just as any other anti-corruption agency.
Central to Selznick’s definition is that institutionalization is a process,
often lengthy and sometimes rocky, in which the institution and its leaders
have considerable agency. At the same time, just as an organization can
take on institutional characteristics, it can also lose them. Institutions
can deinstitutionalize (Oliver 1992; Boin 2001), sometimes rapidly in
times of crisis and scandal. They may have to reinvent themselves by
adapting to changing circumstances and modernizing their mission and
focus. In short: the actions, decisions and leadership of the institution
actively contribute to the process of institutionalization, over and over
again.
CPIB’s institutionalization merits the question of how unique this
phenomenon really is in light of the overall performance of other public
agencies in Singapore, some of which are widely known and admired
for being successful and iconic.3 The answer is that the institutional-
ization of CPIB and Singapore’s extraordinary development are closely
intertwined; in fact, they are mutually reinforcing developments that
constitute a virtuous cycle. The CPIB could not have become an insti-
tution without the country’s sustained efforts to address corruption and
unethical behaviour. Singapore could not have become the economic
success it is without its clean image. They are, in many ways, two sides of
the same coin and are also communicated and ‘branded’ accordingly by
the Singapore government (Ho 2010; Skilling 2012; Van der Wal 2019).
CPIB’s substantial education and communication efforts have helped
to turn public opinion against the use of cultural and anthropological
excuses for corruption as a way of life, which was common in Singa-
pore for many decades (Graycar and Jancsics 2017; Quah 2011). Indeed,
the communication efforts of the CPIB fit seamlessly with the broader
government discourse that has long propagated key public values such as
fairness, integrity, service, excellence and meritocracy as being at the core
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of the public service (Neo and Chen 2007). In this regard, subsequent
PAP governments have implemented adjacent policies such as extremely
competitive remuneration for public officials (Singapore’s public sector
elite is by far the highest paid in the world), competitive Ivy-league and
‘Oxbridge’ scholarships to attract the best and brightest into government
(Quah 2011; Van der Wal 2019), and community service programs and
outreach programs at schools and universities.
The CPIB’s Structure, Functions and Tasks
CPIB’s staff and budget have grown by around 45 times since 1952.4
Most Anti-Corruption Agencies (or ACA’s) in Western countries that
perform well on integrity, such as New Zealand, Switzerland, Denmark
or the Netherlands could only dream of the budget, support and powers
of the CPIB. In most cases, their anti-corruption institutions are also
structured very differently. ‘Western ACA’s’, which are usually named
differently to begin with, usually fulfil advisory roles, conduct research,
investigate reports of unethical conduct. However, they often also end up
spending considerable time and energy fulfilling ‘linking pin’ or ‘traffic
police’ roles. They refer cases to the police or prosecutor’s office, or ‘back’
to confidentiality officers or integrity coordinators within the agency in
question.
In comparison, the CPIB has an encompassing as well as strong
mandate. The CPIB’s tasks are ‘the administration of the CPIB, the inves-
tigation of corruption and malpractices, and the review of administrative
weaknesses in the public sector that provide avenues for corruption and
the screening of officers for appointment in the public service’ (Quah
2011: 223). The agency can investigate and adjudicate Singaporeans
abroad for corrupt behaviour in other countries. They have a mandate
and responsibility to pursue anti-corruption activities for the public as well
as private sector; a key difference with most other ACA’s.
The CPIB reviews procedures and practices in those government agen-
cies where corruption is likely to occur, but it also conducts proactive
risk assessment of new policies and practices to formulate recommen-
dations to remove loopholes and vulnerabilities. The agency uses this
review process to ‘identify potential problem areas and loopholes’ to
minimize the opportunities for corruption (Soh 2008: 8). As part of
its preventive function, the CPIB also ensures that candidates selected
for positions in the civil service and statutory boards in Singapore are
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screened, and it increasingly engaged in a wide range of communicative
and promotional activities to sensitize both the general public. In addition
to regularly training and communicating to public servants about the risks
and dangers of corruption, CPIB officers attend school classes (starting
as early as in primary schools) and use videos and cartoons to explain why
corruption is harmful to personal and professional relationships.
Over time, CPIB has adopted a ‘total enforcement approach’ by
addressing big as well as small corruption cases in both public- and the
private-sector organizations, involving ‘both givers and receivers of bribes’
and ‘other crimes uncovered in the course of [the] corruption investi-
gation’ (Soh 2008: 1–2). With just 358 on its books for 2019 (CPIB
2019b), the overall number of reports received by CPIB on an annual
basis is low, especially taking into account that the Bureau’s mandate
covers both the public and private sector of the city state. In fact, in the
CPIB’s most recent annual report, 88% of the cases reported concern the
private sector (CPIB 2019b).
An important lever of its authority and symbol of its centrality in
Singapore’s administrative system is that the CPIB reports directly to the
Prime Minister.5 Importantly, the agency is constitutionally enabled to
immediately shift to a reporting structure under the President in case the
Prime Minister himself becomes the subject of investigation, which has
not happened in Singapore to date but which occurs with some regularity
in other Southeast Asian countries.
There is little on the public record about individual leaders of the
CPIB. Yet, a few have been celebrated in their steering of the agency.
In its ‘pre-POCA stage’6 the CPIB director was a British bureaucrat
reporting to the colonial government. After the opium scandal and the
embarrassment it created among the colonial rulers, self-preservation and
reputation management were key objectives. Subsequently, CPIB direc-
tors have usually been senior career public servants from the domains
of civil defence, police, immigration and intelligence. Most recently, on
1 October 2018 Denis Tang Siew Taeng, who oversaw border security
and anti-terrorism measures at Singapore’s Immigration and Checkpoints
Authority, was appointed as the successor to Wong Hong Kuan, who
led the Bureau from 2013 to 2018 and was most lauded for commu-
nity outreach initiatives and promoting ethical conduct in the business
sector (CPIB 2019c).
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The fact that CPIB’s leaders have rarely taken on a highly visible public
profile, says something, we might speculate, about the nature of the orga-
nization and its mystique. The somewhat secretive nature of the agency’s
mission and the need to keep the identity of its employees undisclosed
may be at play here. Also, the relative anonymity of leaders may simply
reflect that information sharing and transparency about the inner work-
ings of government are much less the norm in Singapore than in most
Western countries.
CPIB’s Institutionalization
In its early years, the CPIB was constrained by poor design and piece-
meal resourcing. In the period between 1952—when the British colonial
government established the CPIB—and 1959—when Singapore held its
first independent elections—the Bureau was not particularly effective.
The agency was tainted by its ongoing association with the Singapore
Police Force. The CPIB fell under the purview of the Attorney-General,
with Director Middleton-Smith reporting to the Colonial Secretary, the
de facto governor of colonial Singapore. As Singapore’s leading corrup-
tion expert Jon S. T. Quah (2011: 217–218) describes, the agency also
suffered from a severe lack of funding and manpower:
Indeed, it is difficult to understand why the British colonial government
did not provide the CPIB with more personnel and powers to enable it to
perform its functions more effectively. In fact, the CPIB began its existence
with only a small number of staff of 5 members, which was much smaller
than the ACB’s 17 personnel. The CPIB’s small number of staff and lack
of powers was a clear manifestation of the British colonial government’s
lack of political will in combating corruption.
Political tides, however, were about to turn. When Singapore held its first
parliamentary elections in 1959, the leaders of the People’s Action Party
(PAP) built their campaign around combatting corruption. The PAP
exposed the sitting government’s corruption. The incumbent Minister for
Education, Chew Swee Kee, was caught receiving more than S700,000
in unreported American donations. The PAP’s anti-corruption stance
resonated with the public. The party won 43 of the 51 seats in the house
(Quah 2011: 218).
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The 1960 Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA)
On 13 February 1960, the Minister for Home Affairs Ong Pang Boon
stood to address the Legislative Assembly on the second reading of the
Prevention of Corruption Bill. He said:
The Prevention of Corruption Bill is in keeping with the new Govern-
ment’s determination to stamp out bribery and corruption in the country,
especially in the public services. Therefore, this Government is determined
to take all possible steps to see that all necessary legislative and adminis-
trative measures are taken to reduce the opportunities of corruption, to
make its detection easier and to deter and punish severely those who are
susceptible to it and who engage in it shamelessly. (in Quah 1978: 10)
The 1960 Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) is foundational to the
CPIB and its work. In many ways, the CPIB’s institutional strengths only
started to fall in place from then onwards. The Act contained features
that eliminated previous legislative weaknesses, enhanced the CPIBs legal
powers and increased its headcount from 5 FTE in 1952 to 33 FTE in
1963.7 Corruption was defined more explicitly. Corruption now encom-
passed much more than cash bribes, which was at the core of its definition
in earlier colonial legislation. It could include favouritism or bribery by
‘gifts’, including:
[p]roperty or interest in property of any description, whether movable or
immovable; any office, employment, or contract; any other service, favour,
or advantage of any description whatsoever, including protection from
any penalty or disability incurred or apprehended or from any action or
proceedings of a disciplinary or penal nature, whether or not already insti-
tuted, and including the exercise or the forbearance from the exercise of
any right or any official power or duty. (Quah 2011: 219)
By far the most important boost to the CPIB evoked by the POCA were
its severe penalties for corrupt conduct and the sweeping investigative
and adjudicate powers bestowed upon the CPIB. Officers could enter
any place associated with suspected transactions and search, seize and
retain incriminating documents under a warrant issued by a magistrate
or CPIB’s Director. Prosecutors could authorize CPIB’s Director and
senior officers to arrest suspects. Once arrested, the CPIB was empow-
ered to investigate a suspect’s ‘bank account, shared account or purchase
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account’. Other sections of the POCA enable the CPIB officers to inspect
a civil servant’s financial status and those of his or her partner, child or
agent by obtaining information on their property, income tax statements
and bank accounts from the relevant government departments and banks
(Quah 2011: 220). The most famous, and infamous, of CPIB’s legal
powers under the POCA comes from Section 24 that states:
“The fact that an accused person is in possession, for which he cannot
satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate
to his known sources of income” is evidence that (s)he obtained them
“corruptly as an inducement or reward.”
Section 24 implies that the CPIB is not bound to operate under the
presumption of innocence, which is pivotal to Western conceptions of
criminal law; in fact, it allowed the agency and the public prosecutors to
treat suspects as guilty until proven innocent. Individuals found guilty of
corruption faced hefty fines or imprisonment for up to five years.
The POCA was supplemented by more detailed regulations for the
conduct of civil servants. Civil servants and their families were forbidden
from receiving gifts or entertainment from members of the public.
These regulations were revised and strengthened over the years, and are
currently among the strictest in the world.8
Driving Forces of Sustained Institutionalization
The combination of its far-fledged powers and staunch and stable political
support aided by long-term policy stability are distinctive for the CPIB
when compared to other anti-corruption agencies in neighbouring coun-
tries as well as Western countries that feature in the top rungs of global
rankings alongside Singapore (Quah 2011, 2017).
Why has Singapore succeeded in fighting corruption when other Asian
countries have failed to do so? In addition to the mandate, design and
leadership of the CPIB described above, there are a number of important
contextual factors which have driven the agency’s institutionalization and
success. ‘Little red dot’ Singapore is a tiny, highly urbanized city state
with a total land area of only 710.3 sq. km, lacking substantial agricul-
tural areas and natural resources. Singapore’s smallness, high degree of
urbanization and centralized, top-down governance model have certainly
contributed to CPIB’s success. These features facilitate political control,
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administrative coordination and the absence of competition and turf wars
between national, provincial and local government bodies (Singapore has
only one layer of government), responsiveness of public officials and the
absence of problems arising from implementing reforms in rural areas or
provinces (Quah 1984, 2011).
Since independence, Singapore’s government has built on, and almost
mythicized, the notion of meritocracy introduced by the British in 1951
to ensure the recruitment and promotion of civil servants was based
on merit and to accelerate the pace of localization of the administra-
tive apparatus (Quah 2010, 2011). This commitment to meritocracy is
seen beyond the work of the CPIB. An important driver has been the
Public Service Commission (PSC) which until this very day plays a key
role in HR management and performance appraisal throughout the public
service, and awards very competitive and highly sought-after scholarships
to the best students in each cohort (Quah 2010: 74, 91; Van der Wal
2019). Tellingly, experts have labelled Singapore a ‘macho meritocracy’
(Quah 2010: 5; Van der Wal 2019: 56; Vogel 1989: 1053).9
Political stability and commitment have also been major factors. The
PAP government has been re-elected 13 times after winning the 1959
general elections, with opposition parties usually occupying no more than
10–20% of the seats in Parliament. This remained the case even after the
ruling party received ‘only’ 59% of the popular vote in the now legendary
2011 election. The continuity of the PAP government and its commit-
ment to curbing corruption in a context of high policy stability and low
political turbulence has enhanced the effectiveness of its anti-corruption
strategy, as well as prevented the government from using the CPIB as an
attack dog against political opponents (or vice versa).
In fact, Quah (2011, 2017) documents that the Singapore govern-
ment spends significantly more money per capita in the fight against
corruption than most other Asian nations. In addition, it has eliminated
political interference with anti-corruption investigations to the largest
extent possible. In many other Asian countries both Parliament and
Senate control various aspects of the workings of anti-corruption agen-
cies, while (deliberately) limiting its investigative powers and expertise.
Singapore has legislatively enabled the CPIB to be effective domestically
and abroad, in the public as well as the private sector.
In addition, the political and institutional edifice of anti-corruption
policy is rooted in the rule-abiding nature of the Singapore society. Singa-
pore takes great pride in being seen as a ‘rule of law’ nation, in which
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law-breaking is frowned upon, with the high odds of getting caught and
being severely punished acting as continuous deterrents. Lee Kuan Yew’s
synthesis of the factors behind Singapore’s strong stance in these domains
makes a similar case:
The effectiveness of our system to check and punish corruption rest, first,
on the law against corruption contained in the Prevention of Corruption
Act; second, on a vigilant public ready to give information on all suspected
corruption; and third, on a CPIB which is scrupulous, thorough, and fear-
less in its investigations. For this to be so, the CPIB has to receive the full
backing of the Prime Minister, under whose portfolio it comes. But the
strongest deterrent is in a public opinion which censures and condemns
corrupt persons; in other words, in attitudes which make corruption so
unacceptable that the stigma of corruption cannot be washed away by
serving a prison sentence. (Quah 2011: 233)
To ensure the POCA’s continued effectiveness and buffet CPIB’s license
to operate, the PAP government has introduced, whenever necessary,
amendments (in 1963, 1966 and 1981) or new legislation (in 1989) to
deal with unanticipated problems or to plug legal loopholes. For example,
in 1966, the POCA was amended so that a person could be found
guilty of corruption without actually receiving the bribe as long as he
had shown the intention of doing so. The POCA was also amended in
1966 so that Singaporeans working for their government in embassies
and other government agencies abroad would be prosecuted for corrupt
offences committed outside Singapore and would be dealt with as if such
offences had occurred within Singapore. In doing so, Singapore was an
early adaptor of practices now commonplace in the United States, United
Kingdom and other OECD countries (Graycar and Prenzler 2013).
In 1981, the POCA was amended a third time to increase its deterrent
effect by requiring those convicted of corruption to repay all the money
received in addition to facing the usual court sentence. Offenders who
could not make full restitution were given heavier court sentences. Eight
years later, the fine for corrupt offences was further increased by 10 times
from S$10,000 to S$100,000 (US$78,5113) to enhance the POCA’s
deterrent effect. Sections 11 and 12 stipulate that MPs and members of
public bodies found guilty of corrupt offences would be fined S$100,000
and imprisoned for a term of seven years.
The high level of political and societal support can be deduced from
the way the CPIB navigated deep crises. On 14 August 1986, the suicide
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of the then long-serving Minister for National Development the Cheang
Wan, less than two weeks after he had been interrogated for 16 hours
by CPIB officers after a corruption complaint against him by a building
contractor (Quah 2011: 199) shocked the nation and put the CPIB in
the spotlight. Four months later, the building contractor was fined the
maximum amount of S$100,000 for offering a million-dollar bribe to
another building contractor for keeping the Minister’s name out of the
investigation.
The Minister’s suicide is indicative of the gravitas and legitimacy of
CPIB’s investigations and accusations, and the shame and reputation loss
associated with being accused of being corrupt after 25 years of successful
CPIB operations and campaigns. The whole affair, however, also led to
questions from members of Parliament and a subsequent parliamentary
inquiry into what had happened exactly, at the request of MP Chiam See
Tong, the opposition MP for the district of Potong Pasir. Accordingly, on
26 March 1987, President Wee Kim Wee appointed a three-man Commis-
sion of Inquiry to investigate the matter. After complaints by Chiam about
not being allowed to access necessary information, he requested to be
excused from the proceedings (Quah 2011: 200).
The inquiry concluded five months later that ‘the two acts of corrup-
tion of Teh Cheang Wan might never have been uncovered but for the
CPIB’s commitment to investigating all leads to acts of corruption in
Singapore’ (Quah 2011: 200–201). According to Quah (2011: 201) ‘an
important consequence of the Teh Cheang Wan scandal was the intro-
duction of the Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1989, which
was enacted on 3 March 1989 to enable the court to issue a confiscation
order against the estate of a defendant if he had derived his benefits from
corruption’.
Singapore’s government leaders have been unwavering in their calls for
vigilance and awareness regarding corruption, and have warned ministers
and agencies against complacency based on past performance and reputa-
tion. For instance, shortly after Lee Kuan Yew’s son and Singapore’s third
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong assumed office in 2005, the govern-
ment introduced revisions to the codes of conduct for ministers and MPs.
Lee explained the rationale for the revisions to these codes of conduct as
follows:
The integrity and reputation of the PAP MPs and Government is our most
precious asset, which has been built up over half a century. If we lose this,
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we will lose the respect of voters and the confidence of investors, and
Singapore will go down. (Quah 2011: 235)
More recently, the agency has been investing heavily in enhancing both its
physical and human technological capabilities. In close collaboration with
other public agencies, data analytics and algorithms are used extensively
to detect (virtual) fraud and money laundering, and newly employed
data scientists and programmers investigate and prevent new types of
twenty-first-century corruption, to ensure the sustained relevance and
performance of the institution (Poon 2020; Tan 2020).
Lessons for Agency Design and Leadership
In the introduction to this book, the editors write that institutions are to
be taken as special organizations in their time and in their context. They
add that when removed from that time and context, certain institutions
or certain epochs in their existences or certain practices in which they
engaged can be recognized as deplorable. In other words, an institution
tells us something about the society it emerges from and exists in.
An intriguing question is the extent to which the CPIB’s sustained
success and legitimacy in the eyes of the general public would have been
similarly impressive and uniform if it would have had to endure the polit-
ical turbulence and polarization, and the 24/7 scrutiny of competing
media outlets that have characterized most Western societies for decades
now. In a sense, the CPIB has not just been revered but also shielded from
assaults and potential erosion by subsequent PAP cabinets exclusively
governing ‘guided democracy’ Singapore.
Political scientists and journalists—critics and admirers alike—have
tried to classify Singapore’s rather unique governance system in variety
of ways, with ‘benevolent dictatorship’, ‘authoritarian democracy’, ‘illib-
eral democracy’, ‘guided democracy’, ‘nanny-state’ and ‘Singapore Inc’
being oft-used labels (e.g. Aoki 2015; Friedman 2011; Haque and Lee
2008; Sagar 2016; Tan 2012). At the same, the rather tight grip on the
media landscape through the Media Development Authority (MDA) and
Singapore Press Holdings (SPH) may have left more grey area unethical
conduct by elites such as cronyism, nepotism, patronage and misuse of
information off the public radar.
The argument that the many registered opposition political parties are
weak and ineffective and do not provide a credible alternative, with the
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exception of the Worker’s Party who has become increasingly popular in
recent years, or whether a degree of ‘state capture’ as a result of decades-
long PAP rule has inadvertently created legal and institutional barriers
for effective political competition, is fiercely debated among local scholars
(e.g. Aoki 2015; Low 2014; Mahbubani 2015; Quah 2011; Tan 2008,
2012, 2018).
Anti-corruption enforcement in Western countries is often a much less
centralized affair, as individual agencies and sectors tend to have their own
integrity bureaus, coordinators and reporting structures, partly because
multiple layers of government exist. These layers—municipal, regional
and provincial—each have their own electoral dynamics, governance tradi-
tions and types of integrity issues and policies. At the same time, the fact
that these countries do well without such a powerful institution implies
their more fragmented and softer approach may suit their contexts better
(Graycar and Monaghan 2015). Their more pluralist and liberal tradi-
tions, with separation and decentralization of powers being pivotal, may
not sit well with a CPIB-like approach.
For these reasons, distilling one silver bullet or key instrument from
‘the Singapore approach’ is hard, if not impossible. Certain features of
the Singapore ‘success story’ are not easily transferable to much larger
countries with different political systems and histories. Still, four mean-
ingful and intriguing factors can be distilled from CPIB’s virtuous cycle
of institutionalization that bear lessons and inspiration for other anti-
corruption agencies and systems, and public institutions more generally,
in both developing and developed country contexts.
Political Will and Continued Support
The continued political support for CPIB’s approach to curbing corrup-
tion, reinforced by Singapore’s political stability as a de facto one-party
state has massively contributed to the success of the CPIB. Subsequent
prime ministers have frequently explicated the importance of Singapore’s
clean image for its overall success and prosperity. Senior civil servants
constantly stress the importance of integrity and the Civil Service College
(CSC), which sees 40,000 civil servants attending its courses annually,
organizes a variety of courses and conferences on the topic of integrity.
These efforts are supplemented by a multitude of courses and talks offered
by individual agencies, as part of onboarding programs and personal
development.
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Adequate Legislative Backing and Mandate
A second lesson regarding institutional success is the importance of up to
date and clear legislative underpinning and mandates. The fact that the
political leadership in Singapore did never exempt themselves (and legis-
lation stipulating the President can take over investigations if they involve
the Prime Minister meant he himself could also be investigated) have
ensured that the CPIB has managed to continue to operate with sufficient
operational and strategic autonomy. Concomitantly, it has maintained
political support and attention by reporting directly to the PMO.
Clearly Defined and Demarcated Roles and Responsibilities
Many anti-corruption agencies, and in fact many public agencies in
general, suffer from contested boundaries and goal ambiguity (Chun
and Rainey 2005), degrading them to ‘traffic cops’ who spend most of
their time and energy deciding whether a complaint or report falls under
their purview or not, and if not, to which agency it should be redi-
rected. CPIB’s legal mandate and subsequent responsibilities are clearly
defined, updated when needed and backed up by operational strength and
capacity. Due to Singapore’s top-down, one-layered governance system,
the CPIB doesn’t suffer from administrative traffic jams and bureaucratic
competition to the extent many of its international counterparts do. In
short: the agency’s public value proposition aligns with the authorizing
environment and its operational capacity, to paraphrase Mark Moore’s
(1995) famous vocabulary regarding public sector strategy.
Competitive Compensation and a Performance Culture
Although the CPIB is responsible to a large extent for Singapore’s
effective anti-corruption strategy, it should also be acknowledged that
the CPIB’s efforts in curbing corruption have been assisted by other
core principles and policies of the PAP government. For decades, the
government has emphasized and enforced meritocracy in hiring and
promoting, with scholarships and extensive training being provided to
top talent (scouted as early as at the age of 16). In addition, it rigorously
applies extensive, private-sector inspired performance appraisal systems.
The approach has inspired scholars to label the Singapore government a
‘macho meritocracy’ (Quah 2010; Van der Wal 2019).
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One much debated and increasingly controversial feature of this
approach is the remuneration of ministers and senior civil servants, which
is pegged to top salaries in the private sector through an intricate system
of annual benchmarking against the average salaries of top earners in
six industries (law and banking, among others). This policy of paying
competitive salaries deviates from most other developed countries in
which senior government officials are paid considerably less than their
private-sector counterparts. As a result, (Deputy) Permanent Secretaries
and (junior) Ministers can earn as much as 2 million USD annually in
fixed and variable pay, which makes them by far the world’s best paid
politicians and public managers, leaps ahead of their counterparts in coun-
tries with relatively high public sector pay, such as Australia, Switzerland,
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the United Kingdom (Van
der Wal 2017a, 2019: 58).
Arguably, this policy has curbed the brain drain of ministers and perma-
nent secretaries to the private sector and reduced the temptation for
senior civil servants and ministers to be corrupt (Gong and Wu 2012;
Quah 2010: 103–116, 119–120). Indeed, the government has consis-
tently used two types of arguments to justify the high salaries: a HR-based
argument of wanting to recruit and maintain the ‘best and brightest’ in
the government, and an integrity-based argument of wanting to prevent
senior officials get tempted to seek additional monetary gain. In this vein,
it is somewhat ironic that the salaries are increasingly contested by critics,
sometimes referring to the remuneration policy as ‘legalized corruption’
(Van der Wal 2019).
It remains to be seen whether as a fairly traditional law enforcement
agency it is up to task to address partly unknown corruption risks related
to ‘borderless’ digital revolutions such as cryptocurrency, block chain and
their implications for transboundary money laundering and bribery. Like
other government agencies, more frequent reviewing and updating of
procedures and tools will be required, alongside investment in new capa-
bilities and human competencies such as big data analytics (cf. Van der
Wal 2017b).
Perhaps the biggest challenge to the continued authority and legit-
imacy of the CPIB is the changing nature of Singaporean society, in
which more assertive stakeholders and a less docile citizenry scrutinize
government performance more intensely than they used to, with social
media playing an important role (Low 2014; Tan 2017). Therefore, the
chances of the PAP’s monopolistic hold on government power continuing
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indefinitely have decreased with observers jesting that the nation is almost
‘becoming a normal country’ (Mahbubani 2015). If the political atmo-
sphere becomes more polarized and divisive as a result, the chances of the
CPIB’s function and operations being politicized also increase. In fact,
more combative electoral political dynamics present in many other coun-
tries—developed and developing—may well explain why they have chosen
not to establish such a powerful institution or have failed to mimic the
success of the CPIB if they did try.
The most important question is whether the CPIB and the Singapore
government can maintain the ‘virtuous cycle’ described in this chapter
(cf. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Can the CPIB discover new effective
practices, which become the norm internally? Can it keep delivering on its
mission, which, in turn, will help to preserve its institutional status both
internally and externally. Time will tell whether the agency will continue
to display high performance and public legitimacy in an increasingly
complex, so-called VUCA world (Van der Wal 2017b).
Questions for Discussion
1. What would have happened if the CPIB has remained within the
police organization where it started?
2. If you were to compare the CPIB to the main anti-corruption
agency in your country, what are the main differences and similar-
ities? How would these affect agency effectiveness and institutional
potential?
3. Can anti-corruption agencies develop into equally effective and
lauded institutions in more liberal, Western-style democratic
regimes?
4. If you had to identify one transferable lesson for public agencies in
your country that address complex policy issues, what would it be?
5. Can you think of a scenario in which the CPIB would suffer an
institutional crisis? What can be done to prevent such a crisis?
Notes
1. According to Quah (2011: 199), however, ‘this does not mean that corrup-
tion does not exist in Singapore’. Indeed, in recent years various major
incidences of bribery featured prominently in the media, ranging from local
contractors soliciting contracts from government agencies to subsidiaries
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of famous companies and businesses operating at Changi Airport being
involved in large-scale corruption cases, also abroad.
2. A tangible example of the organization’s effectiveness is the extremely high
conviction rate of 98% on average over 2014–2018 for the cases it has
helped bring to trial, with 2016 denoting a staggering 100% conviction
rate. Other key indicators of effectiveness are the speed with which cases
are moved forward (80% within a year’s time). See CPIB (2019a).
3. Among such agencies are The Housing Development Board, responsible
for Singapore’s high quality and accessible public housing and the overall
local home ownership rate of over 80%, The Economic Development
Board, often credited with engineering the nation’s persistent economic
growth and interplay between educational and industrial strategy, and
the Public Utilities Board, responsible for Singapore’s water governance
and secure and continuous access to clean drinking water (Everest-Philips
2018).
4. The CPIB’s relocation within the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and its
legal powers that have enabled the CPIB to obtain the necessary coop-
eration from both public and private organizations may not require a
headcount similar to Hong Kong’s ICAC (around 1300 FTE) in order
to be effective, according to Quah (1995: 337).
5. The Bureau was first moved to the Ministry of Home Affairs before it
got its own building in 1961. Moving back and forth between the Prime
Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Attorney-General’s (AG) Office, it has
remained under the purview of the PMO since 1969.
6. As explained later in this chapter, the CPIB only started to operate fully
and effectively when Parliament adopted the Prevention of Corruption Act
(POCA) in 1960.
7. The headcount has expanded gradually towards 93; this number has been
fairly stable since 2009.
8. As an example, civil servants are required to register with their supervisor
and senior manager any personal loan (including mortgages) exceeding
S$100,000, as part of continuous risk assessment of the liability of
civil servants and to minimize opportunities for blackmail and financial
extortion.
9. Meritocracy, however, is not perfect. Modern-day Singapore is being criti-
cized for having bred an elite class of senior officials who are often accused
of being out of touch with regular citizens (see Low 2014; Tan 2008,
2017). More broadly, the fact that the PAP has been in power since Singa-
pore attained self-government, many senior Ministers have been part of
subsequent cabinets for over 20 years, and the country has had only three
Prime Ministers in 60 years, have contributed to its somewhat authoritarian
image.
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CHAPTER 4
The BBC: Guardian of Public Understanding
Jean Seaton
An Institution at the Crossroads
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has endured as institu-
tion over the decades, surviving many challenges. Launched in 1927
as a British public service institution that would ‘inform, educate and
entertain’, it has become a British institution that served the world. It
enriched democracy by serving audiences, irrespective of class, wealth,
age and any other division, all over the nation, as equal citizens. It
has served the world by reporting expertly and fairly into many closed
and authoritarian political systems and by displaying cultural ingenuity
and sensitivity in doing so. It has held power to account and represented
the interests and voices of the less powerful. The founders saw the BBC as
an institution that would create informed public opinion as the basis for
functioning democracy at a time of risk. They thought the Corporation
needed to accumulate authority and trust to be an independent arbiter of
information. The first and founding principle was editorial independence.
Yet the trust and reliability that this engendered had to be remade time
and again throughout its history.
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The BBC was designed to represent the nation to the nation, the world
to the nation and the nation to the world. It is the epitome of the project
of sceptical empirical inquiry that the Enlightenment proposed; with the
imperative of finding, holding, amusing and serving audiences. But the
BBC has also been challenged and threatened.
Finding new ways of securing the legitimacy of properly based infor-
mation is a global challenge. The revolution in public understanding, the
collapse in the legitimacy of evidence, the emergence of mis- and disin-
formation are new challenges. The BBC potentially remains an important
tool, one of the few we have that is dedicated to the public interest, for re-
engineering rational debate. The issue now is how to relate that reliability
to everyone.
This chapter describes the institutional origins of the BBC and details
its institutional DNA. It explains how this has informed the BBC’s institu-
tional trajectory, helping it survive many political and societal challenges.
It discusses the BBC’s current position in a fast-changing world where
public institutions and the idea of fact-based news have come under fire.
The Birth of the BBC
It is a fretful and uncertain time. There is concern that voters have insuf-
ficient knowledge to make rational judgements, in particular, that a new
tranche of the electorate who have not previously voted will inadvertently
vote irresponsibly because they will make choices on partisan or partial
information. It is feared they may be easily misled. There is legitimate
anxiety that hostile foreign powers are seeking to influence elections and
political movements in novel ways.
There is a new technology barely understood by politicians and civil
servants that they suspect may have influences they don’t trust: but
frankly, most are completely out of touch with how it works or what
it might be. So, they are quite unable to think through the opportunities
and threats it poses. There is a distrust of the press which is seen as sensa-
tionalist and mendacious because of recent experience. There is a lack of
trust in politicians (because they have apparently led the nation towards a
variety of disasters). There is alarm about the detrimental impact ‘pro-
paganda’ can have on behaviour, un-anchoring voting from authentic
interests; a nagging worry that public opinion can be ‘bought’ by polit-
ical interests; and an anxiety about the role of big business in politics.
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A political anxiety about the ‘people’ is mirrored by the possibility of
revolutionary disruption.
The year is 1922. Creating the BBC is the solution to the prob-
lems sketched above. Of course, few understood that it was a solution
at the time. The BBC was founded before anyone had the idea that
broadcasting technology might matter to more than a few, techy ‘exper-
imenters’. Besides, everyone knew that fun was nothing to do with the
solemn business of government. Yet within a mere four years (from 1922–
1926) Asa Briggs, the first great historian of the BBC wrote that it was
remarkable that:
Broadcasting itself ceased to be a toy, an amusing novelty, an affair of
‘stunts’ and gimmicks: it became an institution. It affected people’s ways
of thinking and feeling, and their relations with each other. (Briggs 1961:
4)
To understand how the BBC became so important one has to combine
some sense of the inner life of the organization with that of the changing
place of the organization in society. And this has to be situated within an
international context. The BBC swiftly developed an international service
and role that was both a reflection of UK values and a gift to the world,
and other broadcasting systems came to be measured (and in some ways
still are a century later) by reference to the BBC. And perhaps its signifi-
cance had a philosophical basis as well. The BBC worked, because it was
dedicated to a principal of reality: ‘an order of things that is independent
of us, where that means, in particular, independent of our will’ (Williams
2002: 115).
Spreading broadcasting all over the nation as fast as possible, for the
same ‘licence fee’ (in effect a hypothecated tax) paid by everyone to
receive broadcasting, irrespective of the actual costs of delivering the
service, was the foundation of the public service. The universal licence
fee freed it both from the damaging limitations of commercial advertising
revenue, and direct dependence on state revenue. It wasn’t a business and
it wasn’t a department of state. It served citizens wherever they lived, was
fundamentally redistributive and was not focused on well-off or conve-
nient markets as a commercial service would have been. It was also a
moral and political project that was in the national interest.1 The capacity
to serve everyone was implicit in the technology. John Reith, the BBC’s
first Director-General, was almost alone in grasping this.
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In 1926 the British Broadcasting Corporation was given a mission
to ‘inform, educate and entertain’ the public. Coinciding with the final
extension of the franchise to young women, it was created out of an
anxiety with the impact on democracy this newly enfranchised electorate
might have. And it was created out of the distrust of politicians left by
the First World War, and the distrust of big business that the economic
failure after the war created. There was good evidence of Russian attempts
to intervene (rather clumsily then) in UK affairs, and official concern over
public order.
The creation of the BBC came at a moment in time when there
was more institution-building going on: public organizations tasked with
rolling out other public utilities—water, roads, education—in the national
and individual interest were set up all around. This wave was in some ways
a forerunner of the United Kingdom’s unique National Health Service,
which was founded in the wake of the Second World War.
The forging of the BBC occurred while the first (and last) General
Strike in 1926 took place, a deeply divisive period in British society.
The notion of ‘balance’ in reporting had to be invented—there was no
template to relate to both sides during a conflict within the nation. In
an inevitably imperfect way, arguably too much on the government side,
the BBC creatively found a national audience by giving both the views of
the striking miners (whose pay was being cut) and at least some of their
establishment supporters a voice, as well as the government: this in the
face of fierce government opposition when society was painfully divided.
The BBC learnt a crucial lesson that both sides listened to it because it
gave them accurate information. Within three months the BBC—listened
to in gatherings of people congregating around the new and as yet few
‘wireless sets’—had a national audience. The lesson was clear: in order for
people to listen you had to give them something they needed.
Astonishingly radical at the time, its aim was not to push voters in any
direction, but rather to help them make better choices and live richer
lives. In the eyes of the BBC pioneers, broadcasting was an inherently
democratizing and life-enhancing public service. The very best of music
and theatre, public discussion and a ringside seat at great events were to
be part of every listener’s life. This was not an obvious or necessary role
for broadcasting. In Germany during the 1930s, the same technology was
employed as a very effective agent of Nazi nation-remaking.2 In America,
a strong public service voice has never emerged as the market was seen as
supreme.
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Above all, the BBC was built on a progressive vision of an educat-
able, decent, aspiring public whose understanding (and pleasure) in many
things could be made deeper and enhanced. Fun, feeling and irreverence
soon became part of the programming offer. At its best the BBC came to
follow John Stuart Mill, the British philosopher, in believing that however
self-evidently true an argument seemed ‘if it is not fully, frequently and
fearlessly discussed, it will be held as dead dogma not living truth’ (Mill
2010 [1859]: 214). The BBC was built on but also evolved a set of
principles that would guide its governance and its operations:
• it was not a state broadcaster but the state facilitated it;
• it had an independent source of finance (the licence fee) that govern-
ments might set but which the BBC had the right to spend and
invest as it thought fit;
• it was impartial, balanced and was editorially independent (a
relatively complex issue over time but fiercely fought for and
protected)3;
• it served the public interest and what the public were interested in;
• it would not provide the lowest common denominator of content—
it was not in this sense commercial. It would offer the public things
they did not yet know they liked. It was experimental.
• It would be impartial, but would do more than just seek ‘balance’.
• It would provide ‘popular’ programs that everyone could delight in
as it belonged to everyone, everyone paid for it and in this way, it was
accountable to everyone. ‘Good’ and ‘popular’ were not opposites.
It was there to provide ‘public service popular’.
• As long as a reporter or program-maker followed these principles the
organization would defend and protect them.
These principles emerged from exploring what it meant for the BBC
to serve the public and what the novel concepts of editorial indepen-
dence and impartiality might mean in practice. For instance, as the BBC
interrogated the state on behalf of the public, it offered politicians a fair
opportunity to explain their policies; but this did not prevent the BBC
from coming into conflict with governments as they came and went.
The BBC as a nascent public institution was profoundly shaped by
the first Director-General, John Reith, who oversaw the ‘start-up’ phase.
He was a driven, bullying, difficult, wily, very tall and overpowering man
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who had been wounded in World War One. He had spent time in America
improving the quality of the mass production of small arms. So, he under-
stood the new opportunities of mass production and mass consumption.
A Presbyterian Scot, his furious, gloomy Protestantism provided the new
organization with the evangelical belief in the capacity of words, speech,
(secular sermons) to transform lives and to save people and society. But
he combined this with a brisk modernism: progress, engineering, women
working (as they did for the early BBC). As a trained engineer he was able
to put the BBC in the forefront of technological accomplishment. His
ambition was boundless and his energy prodigious. He was also very effec-
tive in accomplishing the goals he had set for himself and the fledgling
organization.
A Very British Institution
The BBC has been a pillar of the United Kingdom’s peculiarly robust
unwritten constitution. This flexible mish-mash of laws, customs, conven-
tions and courtesies relies on the idea that politicians know where the
unwritten lines of the constitution lay and never stray over them. ‘The
British Constitution is a state of mind’ said the historian Peter Hennessy.
It depends on a sense of restraint, politeness and sense all round to make
it work. It depends on people obeying the fairness in the spirit of non-
written conventions applied to new eventualities. It also depends on what
you might call ‘system honor’: that it is shameful as well as imprudent to
overstep the lines in the sand.
The BBC has a universalist, democratic responsibility to everyone in
the United Kingdom. Alongside measurable data about them, the rela-
tionship comes from the public’s moods and needs: from the fun that
diverts them and the arguments they want to have. This flexible settle-
ment is now being tested in a radically different political and media
landscape from the one in which the Corporation originally emerged.
The Corporation’s history has made the institution. During the Second
World War it became indispensable to the British public: their reliable
companion in anxiety and fear (and a warm source of distraction). In
what was a war of national survival, there were inevitable compromises
in independence. But as the BBC told reliable truths both at home and
abroad, government came, grudgingly, to trust it, and delegated commu-
nicating to the public as a professional skill to the BBC. The BBC turned
towards understanding audiences with a new urgency. Consequently, the
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BBC was able to register public frustration with the war in, for example,
comedy shows like ITMA (It’s That Man Again), which ridiculed the
bureaucratic controls of the war, or talks like those of J. B. Priestley which
challenged official views and championed the public’s experience of the
war. Crucially, while being anti-Nazi, it was not anti-German.4 Producers
had an essential freedom to make programs that interested a war-weary
audience. The BBC was made great in studios and in arguments about
how to broadcast best: not in the meetings of the Board of Governors.
In occupied Europe—where people risked their lives to listen to it—it
gave audiences accurate news when they could trust no other source. It
did not flinch (much) from telling them how badly things were going in
the United Kingdom and in battles. ‘Its greatest victory’, according to
George Orwell, was its accurate news. ‘Even in India where the popula-
tion are so hostile they would not listen to British propaganda and will
hardly listen to a British entertainment program, they listen to BBC news
because they believe it approximates to the truth’ (Orwell 1944). Telling
the truth in as far as it could be ascertained embodied a moral authority
in the BBC.
During the Cold War, broadcasting into closed Eastern Europe was
a lifeline for populations starved of reliable information. It was trusted
because it did not preach and concentrated on what audiences in closed
societies needed to know and wanted. In the twenty-first century, as more
societies suffer from closed, inadequate, intimidated information systems
and media this is still (surprisingly) a vital task.
It was program-making that give the Corporation an unrivalled rela-
tionship to other aspects of national and community life. It has different
data about the public than any other service: it has to provide programs
for when people get up and when they are tired, over the year. And it has
a direct relationship with people over the course of their lives: from child-
hood onwards, winding programs into everyday experience. The public
has to be wooed and enticed. The Corporation’s capacity to mobilize
attention, delight, amuse and enthral, allied with the values of impartiality,
objectivity and the right to interrogate power, wherever it lay, has been
eyed warily but also avidly by commercial rivals and politicians alike. The
BBC sees it as a duty to represent and explore the temper of the nation,
to show the nation (for bad and good) to itself and include the nation’s
voices in the national conversation.
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Structures, Crises, Adaptations
The BBC survived as an institution because the habits and structures that
held it were reiterated and continuously adapted in policies and docu-
ments. It has a Royal Charter, which arrives in a very nice box with
a remarkable amount of gold and red ribbons. This quaint custom has
political meaning: it decisively puts the BBC in a special relationship to
the constitution, above any mere government and to the Crown.
It has been subject to a regular cycle of reviews of the BBC Charter and
licence fee (carefully distanced from the election cycle so that the BBC is
somewhat protected from becoming a political football during an elec-
tion). The most recent review of the Charter in 2016 asserted that ‘The
BBC must be independent in all matters concerning the fulfilment of its
Mission and the promotion of the Public Purposes, particularly as regards
editorial and creative decisions, the times and manner in which its output
and services are supplied, and in the management of its affairs’ (UK
Government 2016). These reviews are an important part of refreshing
the BBC. In 2016, during Brexit arguments, the BBC was told it had to
represent the ‘diversity of the Nation’ to the Nation.
There have been many large overhauls, investigations and reports as
well, usually as the product of some crisis. Most have developed along
two fault lines: a clash with the government over a political matter when
the government of the day felt that the BBC has not treated it fairly (Suez
in 1956, the reporting of Elections in 1972, the Iraq War). The other
fault line has been prompted by commercial rivals, asking why the BBC
was subsidized to make popular programs that competed with them.
Sometimes the BBC made mistakes, was out of touch, failed to deliver.
BBC crises burn fiercely—not least because the BBC has box office appeal,
and its competitors, the Murdoch-owned media the other press and
online competitors, have powerful platforms to attack the BBC. Another
aspect of the relationship between the public and the BBC has been
collective—it is an expression of Britishness and valuable in other lives,
not just your own. This sense of ownership and collective will is another
source of the Corporation’s political independence and resilience.
Holding the state to account is more difficult post-Brexit. In 2020,
the newly elected Johnson government refused to put up any ministers
onto the flagship morning radio program Today—a unique exercise of
raw power. This dangerous innovation fell as the Covid 19 pandemic crisis
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sent politicians scampering back to the BBC to reach the public. Never-
theless for the BBC belonging to the nation is harder when the nation
is at a more fractious juncture, and when the government of the day’s
governing style reflects or exploits those divisions.
However, the BBC has always had—and still has—a distinct role that
sets it apart from other organizations: its task is to hold other institutions
to account on behalf of citizens. It stands at an angle to everything else.
Some of the ‘values’ that it calls on are also distinct: for example, the
morality of news is solely driven by a duty to the story. This is a hard value
to embrace. During thirty years of ‘The Troubles’ (the violent conflict in
Northern Ireland, 1969–1998), the BBC had to be exempted from the
Constitution of Northern Ireland that obliged government institutions to
‘work to promote peace’. This would have limited the BBC’s capacity to
report fully and accurately on dissent and indeed violence.
This single-mindedness is tempered by responsibility and the never
perfect, but vital processes that secure verity: a story has to be as accurate
as the BBC can make it. But the story matters above all else, it has to
be pursued without fear or favour: a fierce, professional and sometimes
unnerving purpose. While much that is called ‘news’ is merely a busi-
ness proposition, using the vehicle of sensationalism to attract audiences,
BBC news values instead ought to reflect public interest values. News may
indeed expose and indeed ‘harm’ some subjects—but not for profit and
only in the public interest.
The BBC’s institutional legitimacy rests on the way in which it exercises
its duty of vigilance and service to the whole nation—not the government
of the day, not just the bits of the public that are rich, or the ones adver-
tisers are interested in, not the fashionable nor the powerful who have
influence, not the groups whose views it agrees with, or those it likes,
or those who speak loudly, but the whole baggy, untidy nation. Freedom
of speech in this perspective is not seen as a market or a battle in which
the loudest, most popular voice is seen as a justified winner. Rather, the
BBC’s aim has been to open the ring of potential speakers wider, to find
and privilege minority voices, and to see argument not as a battle but as
an organic and aesthetic process of development and reflection. The BBC
has always tried to get people from the widest possible spectrum of British
society (and beyond) to listen to each other. It steers close in this way to
models of deliberative democracy.
Establishing where and who these communities are is an ongoing
search. Puzzling out what they like and need is revealed experimentally, as
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it were, by making programs, gauging their uptake and people’s responses
to them. Of course, the BBC can get out of touch, understand wrongly,
and have its own in-built prejudices. But across the decades it has demon-
strated its willingness to be curious and open-minded, and its ability to
adapt and change its programming. The BBC has often been accused of
bias on one side of some debate or another. Often the accusations are
wrong (and come from a jealousy of the BBC’s authority). But they can
also be correct. It then is the Corporation’s interest to adapt and reform.
Craft
Most institutions have ‘craft’ at their hearts, which is found in the daily
habits and skills of institutional members. BBC ‘craft’ resides in the
program makers: those who make drama, documentary, comedy and
entertainment; those who create new things in pursuit of the institution’s
purpose. Some of their ideas may fail—public service can test originality
and creativity and take risks in attempting to find new public tastes. Fawlty
Towers was a failure on its first outing, and even on the repeat. Only later
did it achieve iconic status. Then more recently it has been called into
question. Fleabag became a cult hit because it riskily but deliciously iden-
tified in public (and very funnily) a shift in mores, yet its success was
not predicted. The ‘craft’ is also found in the daily editorial decisions of
news (enshrined in the BBC’s Editorial and Producers Guidelines [BBC
2019]—a magnificent contribution to the demanding task of making
decisions in fast-shifting situations). It is this craft and protecting it that
is the task of governance, management and the institution.
BBC craft also involves understanding taste (a complex matter to
bring off in the public interest). Take classical music. The BBC is the
largest patron of music in the United Kingdom and the Proms is the
world’s largest and most adventurous music festival. The constraints of
public service have been liberating: it has a duty to keep and refresh the
classical repertoire, commissioning new music, keeping up standards of
playing and performance, exposing audiences to world music, the British
musical tradition, to new ways of playing and new performing stars. It
has some sense of advancing the understanding of music and reflecting
and enhancing musical life. It has to grow audiences and foster tastes.
The most important audience at the Proms—a strange summer-long love
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affair with music in central London and now elsewhere in the country—
are the people who pay the least, who stand in the arena and who care
the most.
The BBC’s ‘craft’ involves imaginatively creating new ways of talking
with people in drama and children’s programming, in comedy and music.
This entails the risk to deliver, for example, a drama series that creates new
compassion as well as absorption; new ways of identifying social and polit-
ical movement (often done better through culture, really, than politics),
and new ways of representing diverse groups to themselves and others.
The key to it all is the friable stuff of creativity. The BBC has been re-
made in the last five years. It was noticable that during the volatile ‘Black
Lives Matter’ protests of 2020 in the middle of the pandemic it was able
to address a range of issues from health to the legitimacy of statues in
public spaces with a responsive schedule. It was agile and in sympathy
with public concerns and needs.
While the BBC cannot preach to the public, its programs can enlighten
them. For example, David Attenborough’s series The Blue Planet (2018)
put plastic waste onto the world’s agenda. Pictures of birds attempting
to feed their young bits of glittering plastic appalled and mobilized
young people and governments. Pictures of the mysterious intelligence
and deviousness of octopuses changed attitudes towards an alien but
great intelligence. Attenborough has worked for the BBC since 1954 and
though decades of path-breaking nature documentaries have helped make
its reputation. Attenborough’s breakthrough series, Planet Earth (1979),
a hymn to evolution in 12 episodes, was revolutionary: it was made with
new specially developed technology, a new business model, a remark-
able script, an utterly new way of organizing shooting and research, and
was based on and indeed developed scientific knowledge. Such programs
come from investment. They are very expensive. They also depend on
profound knowledge both of science and of program-making and their
impact comes from their authority—and the integrity and scientific and
televisual eminence of Attenborough himself.
Governance
The BBC has been sustained by a system of governance that has secured
its independence from but maintained a strong relationship to the state.
The issue is how the BBC manages that relationship, and how it responds
when agents of the state seek to exercise influence on how it governs itself
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and how it operates. The shape of BBC governance has changed but there
are continuities and these have so far largely been husbanded carefully.
Originally, the Board of Governors ‘were’ the BBC. They held the
Corporation to account in the public interest. They appointed the
Director-General who was the Editor in Chief. The principles on which
Governors were appointed have shifted. Sometimes they were chosen
for ability but also to ‘represent’, for example, women, working-class
interests or regional views. At times, political parties and governments
have believed (sometimes rightly, sometimes alarmingly) that they need
a ‘better’ representation. Occasionally people have been appointed who
appeared hostile, but then turned into adept defenders of the BBC.5
Governments have, so far, largely respected the BBC and have been
cautious about attacking let alone wrecking it. However, quite small
changes in the system of governance can have large, long-term and unpre-
dicted effects. The quality of ministerial responsibility is a real concern.
The BBC used to be in large departments like the Home Office—and so
overseen by senior ministers of standing. At the time of writing it is over-
seen by a minor ministry whose recent ministers have tended to be more
junior, of variable quality and have changed all too frequently. Thus, in
recent times the BBC has not had the level of ministerial protection it
used to have.
Then there is the vocal power of opposition to the BBC, which has
grown. Some of this is because in times of social polarization the BBC
has a harder task in balancing a wider and more disparate set of political
views. And at times when the opposition is weak and politics is fractious
and angry, the BBC is always in danger of appearing to be the opposi-
tion, rather than reporting on it. Some of the criticism against it stems
from commercial more than political motives, however. The UK tabloid
press, for example, sees the BBC as competition online. Very large Media
organizations like News International also see the BBC as a threat and
campaign and lobby against it. Also, in the changing technological land-
scape the competitive position of the BBC has altered beyond recognition.
Netflix, Facebook and other online rivals are far larger in scope: the BBC
now competes with the biggest businesses that the world has ever known.
In 2007 (in response to a crisis), the Governors were abolished and
an external, more independent body, the BBC Trust, was appointed in
their place. The idea was that it could review evidence and set targets
for the BBC at arm’s length. After a deep institutional crisis over Jimmy
Savile—a paedophile who had abused his position as a prominent and
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long-serving BBC presenter to engage in egregious acts of behind the
scenes sexual abuse—the Trust was replaced again in 2017 by a new
supervisory board located within the BBC. At the same time, more of
the oversight of the BBC has gradually been ceded to external bodies:
the National Audit Committee can look into BBC finances and some of
the regulation has been sent to the media regulator OFCOM. The task of
making BBC appointments said one recently retired senior civil servant is
‘surrounded by processes that are designed to protect and distance such
positions from political interference’, but ‘depend in the last instance on
political propriety’.
Overall, the more recent response pattern to challenging issues and
critical incidents has been repeatedly to overhaul the BBC’s governance
arrangements. Such continual tinkering with governance structures is
destabilizing. One ex-official, who had spent a decade setting up the BBC
Trust, observed:
Although the BBC as an institution had had a central role in sustaining
civil society. and while the intention is still explicitly reflected in the “public
purposes”, in practice its importance in this respect is diminished. This is
partly to do with the context in which it now operates, with a multiplicity
of providers undercutting its central role – as reflected in lower reach and
share of audiences. It is partly to do with sustained attacks, both on “main-
stream media” in general and the BBC in particular, partly with sustained
attacks from commercial rivals which have caught the ear of government,
but also it is to do with all sorts of monkeying around on funding, regu-
lation and governance. As a result, the BBC’s position feels less stable and
its role less central. (Nicholas Kroll, 2019, personal communication)
Leaders and Members
Institutions are not made by governance structures alone. People make
institutions and they can sink them. Institutional leaders, in particular,
have to interpret the work of institutions in the context of the shifting
challenges of the times. In times of stress, institutions depend on the
sense of rectitude, the vision, the agility and cunning or even the bravery
of individual leaders.
BBC Director-Generals have been remarkable in a variety of ways.
Hugh Carleton Greene (1960–1969) was the last journalist to leave Berlin
in 1939, ran propaganda into Germany during World War II, created
the shape of German broadcasting after it, ran a successful hearts and
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minds campaign in Malaya and brought Berlin Cabaret-style satire to the
BBC in the 1960s. He helped lead a shift in public taste and made the
BBC central to a new generation. Greene was a remarkable defender of
freedom of speech and because of his pre-war experience in Germany very
sensitive to racial politics. Charles Curran (1969–1977), the first Roman
Catholic DG had had a wide experience in the World Service and was
an innovator, but as the BBC came under political pressure the BBC
needed a more public face. John Birt (1992–2000) infuriated BBC staff,
but called the future of technology better than any other broadcasting
leader, not least because (like Reith) he was originally an engineer. Mark
Thompson (2004–2012) was an outstanding news organizer. Tony Hall
(2013–2019), a gifted, decent man, steadied the BBC after the Jimmy
Savile crisis. Hall nurtured a new program-making excellence within the
BBC. Hall lead the BBC through the Covid 19 crisis with inspiring
warmth: the Corporation responded by inventing new services (in educa-
tion for home schooling, in health and local information) and supporting
the decimated arts especially music and getting beside the UK public in
innovative ways. Yet the job has become so political that director-generals
rarely go at a time of their choosing.
Most people working in the BBC for most of its history have felt some-
thing like a dedication to its values (not all of the time, of course). The
BBC also breeds gossip more than other organizations because it has a
sceptical purpose. Dedicated staff members often moan about the imper-
fect machine in which they are expected to do their work. Indeed, hostility
to the ‘managers’ is an important feature of the organization. A recurrent
allegation holds that the institution is failing to live up to ideals that most
BBC people take to heart. Such allegations can be corrosive if it goes too
far—but they can also be very powerful inculcators of values.
People who have worked in the BBC recognize that it seems to have
a life of its own. And they are proud of it. Indeed, in interviewing many
past leaders and program makers of the BBC I was struck by the way
in which they readied themselves to be held to account. ‘The BBC’ said
one senior manager, in the middle of a BBC conflagration and watching
a career being trashed by the media outside, ‘is like a yoghurt monster.
It eats you up to survive’. That is to say an admirable, successful career
within the BBC may not protect you during a crisis.
Indeed, one of the ways in which the BBC works is that individuals take
responsibility for errors, which may be real, or may merely be perceived,
but which have impact. Sometimes the mechanism is faulty—reporters
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who exposed an injustice that caused a problem ought not to pay for the
row their reporting provoked.6 But most BBC crises happen in public—
not least because the BBC newsroom (magnificently but appallingly for
the people at the centre of a crisis) turns ruthlessly on the BBC itself. It is
a point of honour that the BBC will be reported on as forensically as any
other subject of the news. This is a unique feature of the Corporation:
it is very difficult to think of any other institution which savages itself so
comprehensively in public. It is one of the formal and informal ways the
institution regulates itself.
Institutions develop a hive mind—a collective consciousness, analogous
to the behaviour of social insects, in which a group of people become
aware of their commonality and think and act as a community. This is a
resource, which helps members of that community to understand shared
purpose, values and limits. The BBC World Service has preserved editorial
integrity because it is attached to and protected by what one of its direc-
tors called ‘the mothership of values’ in the BBC (Sir John Tusa 2018,
personal communication; also see Tusa 2018). It informs, for example,
the way a news film is cut (frame by frame); it helps to determine how far
a comedy show, at a particular time of day, for a particular demographic
of an audience, can go with jokes, or how to assess the significance of a
political event, or whether or what a classical and national repertoire of
music needs to contain (when the canon is under attack).
The BBC’s hive mind depends on autonomous, conscious and moral
individuals making such choices. The BBC has inculcated its workforce
with values by a rigorous selection process, by treating people reason-
ably well, and by the everyday discipline of practical decision-making
in newsrooms and commissioning meetings, in cutting rooms and in
drama commissioning and delivery. Working for the BBC has clearly been
something like a vocation: many staff felt (and feel) they were working
for a principle. One intriguing feature of this tremendously competitive
and professional cadre is that even as individual careers are sometimes
wrecked during political or cultural rows, they recognize the necessity of
the institution to survive.
Like the UK Civil Service, the BBC has in recent decades moved
towards a more managerial model. This has changed the nature of its
leadership strata: more managers, not first and foremost producers in
the traditional creative sense. If this is developed further, it would have
two consequences. Firstly, the BBC would have more leaders who have
not come through program-making decisions on their way to managerial
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roles. And secondly, the route to the top would include more external
candidates. Both of these will affect the composition of the hive mind of
shared values.
Precedent as Compass
History matters to institutions. What looks like a complete pattern of
relationships and rights has in reality been assembled over time and in
response to different and challenging circumstances. In the case of the
BBC, apparently long-lasting principles have always been identified in
specific circumstances. Do we put a man who has admitted bombing
a British Minister on the screen so that viewers can make up their
own minds about him as he is interrogated by the interviewer, or is
this endorsing violence? Does the BBC use the word terrorist? Is it a
meaningful word?
Within the BBC, its history is used as precedent. It turns to the past
for a starting point in many formal negotiations but also during attacks
and problems. The BBC also has the rich store of material to celebrate
(the first broadcast, De Gaulle’s broadcasts during World War Two, the
first broadcast in Europe from a Mosque in 1937) and reuse in program-
ming. So, the formal processes of recording history have been carefully
nurtured. But history is also part of a collective memory. Previous exam-
ples are used in training programs but, more importantly, can be used to
chew over the past and learn where things went wrong. The history is
weighty. It adds heft.7
An important part of the BBC’s history is the succession of men and
women who have been in charge of it (see Seaton 2016). The BBC has
a relatively visible Director-General and a prominent, eminent and well-
connected Chair. This makes it unlike, for example, the National Health
Service. The recurrent defenestration of DGs and on occasions both DGs
and Chairs has been a mechanism fraught with potential political threat
and very traumatic to live through. Extraordinarily painful, indeed trau-
matic, for the individuals at the heart of the events, so far it has been
a swift way of producing change and visible responsibility within the
BBC, perhaps an instance of the ‘ritualized scapegoat’ theory of executive
succession (Bynander and ‘t Hart 2016). It is first and foremost an expres-
sion of the intensely political nature of running the BBC—a way of solving
nasty problems and the refreshing and reviving of the organization. One
that, of course, could be abused.
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Today’s Challenge: A Revolution
in the Architecture of Understanding
The BBC is now the fourth largest news organization in the world. What
does being such a big provider and finder of news mean? You may get
‘news’ from Facebook, online, twitter and it may feel free and abundant.
People certainly can (and it is a democratizing opportunity) tell eyewit-
ness stories from where they are, from what is happening around them
and in real time using their phones.
Tested journalism, editorially holding power to account and reporting
from other places (whether that is the town along the coast or on
the other side of the world) is hard to do, expensive, important and
threatened globally. It has been a challenge to all of the traditional
news organizations—particularly those dependent on advertising revenue.
News and news outlets first had their content stolen by the social media
companies. Then they had (if they were dependent on advertising) their
revenues stolen by them, as viral advertising drawn by their content, went
to the platforms who stole the content. Finally, they had the attention
of their audiences stolen, through digital harvesting of preferences. This
has led to a new political settlement whose consequences we can begin to
see but which we have few tools to combat. Political leaders and groups
can now communicate directly with voters and consumers, bypassing the
traditional media gatekeepers and their interrogations.
Journalists and reporting are threatened by regimes all over the world.
Violence against reporters has increased. Oppressive regimes have been
remarkably successful at closing down reporting.8 Even in large, appar-
ently lively democracies like India the restrictions on reporting have been
startling. Business concerns that have direct interests in government now
own most of the media. The space for independent and critical voices has
shrunk dramatically. The use of intimidation, online attack, direct physical
violence, the use of regulation to strangle opposition voices and so on—is
now common.9
The BBC, with its reporters, bureaus, experienced editorial judgement,
values and sheer heft of journalism, is in this sense a global resource. But it
faces extraordinary competition. The Chinese state has invested in news
organizations across the world pursuing its own foreign and domestic
policy agenda. American social media companies have unrivalled budgets
and have persuaded policy makers that they are merely ‘publishers’ with
no duty towards content. But without a way of identifying and pursuing
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stories we become more ignorant and more vulnerable to false views of
the world. The ‘heritage’ media are immensley influential in providing
the material for online discussion—so we need more quality reporting.
Algorithms are programmed to give you more of what you want.
They allow you to avoid alternative points of view and encourage silos
of information and feeling. Viral advertising has turned out to be a
dreadful model for running socially responsible discussion (Moore 2018;
Moore and Tambini 2018).10 The architecture of the social media means
that views and interests that you become interested in appear to come
endorsed by your peers and social group. Misinformation spread unwit-
tingly between social media users has the direct impact of personal
contact. Distrust of other points of view can be reinforced by sometimes
fabricated but shared personal contact.
Modernity has been characterized by the growing significance of exter-
nally legitimated and authoritative information. This is being overturned
by the new communication engineering of the internet and social media.
We are now living through a great, fast, potentially dangerous revolution
in public understanding. Although it offers many advantages, it is rapidly
undermining political and business models, as well as the authority of
well-sourced and reliable information.
The accidental and sincere sharing of information that is wrong has
blown away journalistic conventions. This misinformation is persuasive
because it comes from personal contacts. Yet it may be wrong because
it is not tested (indeed it has the status of information but is really
the same as pre-modern rumour). It can be spread by malicious propa-
gandists, or campaigns that are partisan, passionate, but ill-founded. It
can also be prompted by deliberate attempts to interfere in systems of
understanding—disinformation.11 Some of these can be foreign, whose
disruptive tactics lead people to question the very systems that they
depend on for life. We are in the middle of something like an informa-
tion war. Few politicians seem to have the capacity to understand the
re-engineering of understanding that is underway.
The BBC lies on the grand fault line of having the intention, resources,
practices and independence to produce the imperfect yet strenuously
achieved and vitally important information that is proper news. Much
robust social science research over the last seventy years has shown that
individuals are resistant to propaganda because their social position, class,
work place, family, age and gender determine their views more effectively
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than the media. However, the new social media revolution has turned
that research on its head.
The BBC has to work with the turbulence these new communication
systems are producing. The whole project of a shared reality based on
shared facts is threatened. The BBC has to adapt and change to these
new realities and risks. The impact on everything by the shift to the
social media and the driving of all attention and belief into narrow silos,
fed, produced and groomed by the model of viral advertising (you only
encounter more of what you like), is the biggest challenge to the BBC
since its inception.
Yet, over the last thirty years the BBC has, to some extent been
limited from innovating in this new world in the public interest. The
BBC proposed a public service search engine, where the algorithms
would drive you to wider evidence; it proposed something like Netflix, it
wanted to make a public interest information space. But it was prevented
from pursuing these innovations (although it did make the iPlayer and
the market for it). UK national media policy, run by a good regu-
lator, prescribed the preservation of commercial fairness (although with
a narrow but important dedication to preserving public service broad-
casting).12 This policy prevented the BBC from creating public service
access to the internet.
The BBC, like many other democratic institutions, has to arrive at
innovative solutions to the problems posed by communicating in the
twenty-first century. It has to find its way creatively to where people
are, even if its regulatory framework and institutional structure have not
been robust enough for the new realities. Political impartiality supported
by balance and rigour was a consequence of its mission. That this is an
ongoing, imperfect process is part of the strength of the BBC.
But the BBC faces an unprecedented ‘stress test’ in the new realities
of social media, and an atomized audience. In a new, more nationalist
phase of policy-making which puts the national interest above commerce,
there may be an opportunity to create a new remit for the BBC based on
the same enduring values. Indeed, as we are clearly in something like an
information war, the BBC may be a tool with the journalistic weight to
make a difference and the international reach to help create new public
information spaces. Policymakers will have to unleash this creative energy
(Mair 2020).
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Conclusion: The Interconnectedness of Decency
The propriety of institutions is contingent. Any one institution, probably
unconsciously as well as formally, depends on the practice and strength
of many others. They know each other indirectly and abut directly to
each other, yet see themselves as distinct: the law and the civil service,
the Monarchy or presidential systems, medicine, the universities and
museums, the army and urban planning, parliament and local govern-
ment. They subtly refer to each other, shape and condition each other,
depend on and support each other. Their capacity to deliver their purposes
and to identify improper pressure (and resist it) accumulates over time. It
is hard to know what to do for the best in a crisis. All institutions face
failures—they may let the public down; they may face unfair attacks. Even
harder to identify is the slow insidious undermining of rules and propriety,
but vigilance over little things matters.
The BBC is one of the institutions of the open society that potentially
can be used on the side of reason and reliability. It has always dealt with
emotional matters: drama and comedy, news and scandal, but the BBC
also easily relates to the temper of the times. It is therefore especially fit to
deal with the new age of fury and self-righteousness. Very few institutions
have as part of their remit a direct responsibility to think about and help
shape feelings creatively, but that is core BBC work.
The Corporation is a very peculiar beast. It has strong, complex ties
to political institutions. It is also a public service that provides a binding
capacity within the nation, an image of the nation to itself and an image of
the nation abroad. And it survives—not merely as it were economically—
but socially, constitutionally, politically, by amusing people and holding
their attention for things that matter. It is peculiarly fragile. BBC history is
often cyclical, the same problems appear again and again: but it is cyclical
with terminal possibilities.
The BBC will survive if it creates magic: if it soldiers itself as it has in
the past into people’s lives through moments and memory. While it has
unique and appropriate powers and potential to call out abuse of power,
it cannot stand alone in this endeavour. We look to well-functioning insti-
tutions to behave better than individuals do. Few of us can claim to be
good, moral, people. We know how adaptable, safety-seeking and self-
serving we are and how fallible our judgement. Not being heroes, we
need institutions to call out the best in us and do better than we can.
Professionally run institution help those who work within them as they
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can rely on the values, processes and purposes of institutions both for
guidance and as a protection. Yet people that work in institutions must
not be too obedient to the institution. Compliance and deference can
lead to corrupt practices: as they have power institutions can abuse it.
In some ways the BBC, full of stroppy-minded, professional hard-headed
journalists ought to have some protection from such abuses.
Institutions like the BBC must not hoard power for themselves or
only for their purposes. Nevertheless, they are more than the sum of
their purposes and rules. Civilization is very complicated to sustain, and
they make civilized life possible. Institutions are hard to build and take
care of and pay attention. Yet they and the values that they hold in trust
for citizens can be destroyed by carelessness or vandalism. The BBC has
many features and values that make it poised for a new and greater role in
contemporary life. Yet the propriety and power of institutions depends on
their interconnected decency. The seventeenth-century British poet John
Donne (1959 [1624]) wrote:
‘No man is an island entire of itself: everyman is a piece of the continent,
part of the main……
the death of any man diminishes me because I am involved in mankind
And therefore, never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.’
Perhaps no institution is an island.
Questions for Discussion
1. Is having a national news institution like the BBC a good thing for
a democratic society?
2. To what extent are all public institutions in the end dependent on
political systems?
3. To what extent does leadership matter in explaining the institutional
trajectory of the BBC?
4. In the present moment of technological, political and social turbu-
lence, how can public institutions steer a responsible course? How
can they help each other do the right thing?
5. ‘Perhaps no institution is an island’, so the chapter ends. What do
you think is the author trying to tell the reader?
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Notes
1. There is a lively scholarly debate about which form was ‘best’: Amer-
ican historians prefer the market and European scholars prefer public
service, see Hendy (2008), the work of Scannel (e.g. 1991), and the
subtle work of Hilmes (1997). While both systems had advantages and
innovated differently, and while ‘public service’ values reside in the Amer-
ican Press rather than broadcasting, America has failed to produce robust,
sustainable, impartial public service broadcasting. A hundred years later
the foundation of the BBC the commercialization of all communication
clearly undermines democracy.
2. There is an extensive literature on the use of broadcasting by the Nazi
state, most recently see Stargardt (2015) and Connelly et al. (2019).
3. The BBC remains the only organization, anywhere, of any kind that effec-
tively sacked its own CEO on air (George Entwistle over the Savile affair
20).
4. Unlike the British public which did not like Germans. Yet such a distinc-
tion was essential for the post-war reconstruction of Germany. See Curran
and Seaton (2018).
5. Chairs of the Governing body have often been appointed to ‘bring the
BBC into line’. It looks and may be hostile. While Charles Hill (who
had been Chair of the competitive Independent Television) was appointed
Chair of the BBC by the Labour Government in this way, and was
damaging, nevertheless, for example, Marmaduke Hussey and Christopher
Bland were both initially controversial, seen as ‘politically’ appointed to
tame the Corporation but in practice were excellent Chairs. Both oversaw
a reorganization and growth of the BBC: they did not tame the BBC but
helped creatively to change it’s direction. Too many recent Chairs have
been business people—out of depth in public service.
6. Thus, Merion Jones who exposed Jimmy Savile’s abuse in a Panorama lost
his job inexplicably. This caused legitimate resentment. It was also the case
that 4 senior managers also lost their jobs. But they were responsible for
the mishandling of Savile not indicting him.
7. The BBC first commissioned an official history when it was under attack
during the Suez crisis. The history (written by Lord Briggs) was at first
an outward facing defence. Now it is a recourse.
8. The author travels widely in South Asia talking to journalists and editors
for a long-term UK project, and this is based on interviews with journalists
from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
9. India slipped down the World Freedom of Press listings last year to an
ignominious 140th place, down 2 from last year down 6 from 5 years
ago.
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10. Also see Moore’s excellent reports for The Centre for the Study of Media
Communication and Power at https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-institute/
cmcp.
11. See Watts (2018). But there have been excellent UK Government analysis
and responses, see DCMS (2019).
12. The United Kingdom’s broadcasting regulator OFCOM has been excel-
lent and has been a scrupulous protector of public service content more
widely but having been tasked with preserving commercial fairness it has
made decisions on that basis. The concern is always about ‘regulatory
drift’ that the regulator is influenced by the industrial interests of the
businesses it regulates.
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The Oldest Central Bank in the World
The Riksbank, Sweden’s central bank, was established in 1668 and is
the oldest central bank in the world. It has played a central role in the
Swedish economy and in Swedish economic policymaking for centuries.
In an era of increasing scepticism of central banks, the Riksbank enjoys a
high degree of public confidence. In 2016, more than three hundred years
after it began to issue paper money, the Riksbank announced that it was
considering creating a new, electronic currency: the e-krona. It was the
first central bank to take active steps towards issuing central-bank-backed
currency for a post-coin, post-paper-money age.
Today’s Riksbank is politically independent and widely respected
within and outside Sweden. An institution, as defined in this volume, is
‘an organizational form that reliably performs a societal task or function
in a highly valued way’.1 Following Goodsell (2011), and building on
Selznick (1957), the book’s introductory chapter hypothesizes that insti-
tutions have a few important qualities in common: they are appreciated
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for their ability to address important social problems; they celebrate their
history and employ personnel who are motivated to defend their values;
and they encourage learning, adaptation and innovation. The Riksbank is
a good example of a modern institution that meets these criteria, which
helps to explain its status in contemporary Swedish society and abroad.
It would be wrong to infer from the Riksbank’s status as an indepen-
dent and widely respected institution that there is no political conflict over
Swedish monetary policy or the regulation of Sweden’s financial system.
On the contrary, the modern Riksbank is independent and respected
precisely because of conflict. For Sweden’s political parties, interest orga-
nizations, and other political and economic decision-makers, the dele-
gation of policymaking authority to the central bank serves to contain
and manage conflicts over distribution and redistribution—conflicts that
might otherwise become harmful to a small, open economy. Changing
the nature of its often complicated relationship with the Swedish govern-
ment and parliament, the bank began to play this particular role in the
aftermath of Sweden’s deep financial and economic crisis in the 1990s.
This chapter includes a brief account of the Riksbank’s 350-year
history, but it concentrates on the last few decades, when Sweden’s
current macroeconomic regime was established and consolidated.2 The
Riksbank’s path-breaking strategy after the exceptionally severe crisis in
1991–1993 features prominently in this account. This chapter also covers
the Riksbank’s ambitious response to the global economic downturn of
2008–2009 as well as its current attempts to introduce new approaches
to monetary policy and the regulation of the payments system, notably
the controversial idea of introducing a new electronic currency.
Central Banks as Institutions
The Riksbank’s main offices are located in a rock-clad, cube-shaped
building at Brunkebergs torg in Sweden’s capital, Stockholm. Approx-
imately 360 people work for the bank (Sveriges Riksbank 2019a: 15).
Its main units are the Financial Stability Department, which analyses
the performance of the financial system; the Markets Department, which
manages the Riksbank’s assets and trades them in accordance with the
monetary policy decisions of the bank’s governors; the Monetary Policy
Department, which carries out the research that informs the governing
board’s monetary policy decisions; and the Cash and Payment Systems
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Department, which is responsible for the provision of cash and the func-
tionality of the payments system. The bank’s various departments thus
contribute to achieving the bank’s two goals: price stability and a safe and
efficient system for making payments in the economy.3
The bank is headed by an Executive Board, which is made up of six
governors appointed by the General Council, which, in turn, is appointed
by parliament. Many of the bank’s employees are economists, but it
also employs lawyers, IT experts and communications specialists, among
others.
Institutions, according to Selznick (1957), are defined by a strong
reputation and public legitimacy, by a distinct identity and unique compe-
tence, and by a capacity for adaption that enables them to survive over
time. As discussed in the introductory chapter, Goodsell (2011) opera-
tionalized these concepts for public agencies, emphasizing three indicators
of the institutionalization process: (a) a ‘reputation based on achieve-
ment’, (b) ongoing ‘agency renewal and learning’ and (c) having an
‘agency history’ that is ‘known and celebrated’.
As I discuss in more detail below, the Riksbank’s status in contempo-
rary Swedish society is a result of how it responded to Sweden’s deep
economic crisis in the 1990s (which corresponds with the first point of
Goodsell’s list). The modern Riksbank has proven to be an innovative—
sometimes even radical—organization when it comes to the means of
achieving its main objectives of maintaining stable prices and securing a
secure system of payments (the second point in Goodsell’s list).
The Riksbank also celebrates its history and endeavours to make itself
known internationally, domestically and within the bank itself (the third
point in Goodsell’s list). In 2018, the Riksbank celebrated its 350-year
anniversary. To promote the anniversary abroad, the bank’s research
department contributed to a book about the history of the Riksbank in
a comparative perspective, which was published by Cambridge Univer-
sity Press (Edvinsson et al. 2018). The bank also organized numerous
public events in Stockholm and around Sweden to promote its history
with domestic audiences (Sveriges Riksbank 2019a: 18–19). Within the
Riksbank itself, the strategic plan that was adopted in 2014 reminded the
organization of the bank’s storied history; it was called En 350-åring i
täten (A 350-Year-Old in the Lead) (Sveriges Riksbank 2019a: 16).
Like most central banks around the world, the Riksbank seeks to
maintain its operational independence from cabinet ministers and from
lawmakers in parliament. Autonomy is something that all institutions
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aspire to, but it has a special meaning for central banks. In current
macroeconomic thinking, shared by most policymakers, operational inde-
pendence for central banks is seen as a necessary condition for effective
monetary policymaking (Cukierman 1992; Marcussen 2005; for a critical
perspective, see Adolph 2013).
Selznick (1957) observed that institutions can only maintain a degree
of autonomy in a democratic society if they remain valued by political
leaders, stakeholders and the general public. He made this observation
in the middle of the twentieth century, at a time when most central
banks were manifestly not operationally independent and long before
central-bank independence became a widely accepted principle of good
government. It is interesting to note, therefore, that modern central banks
face the three challenges that Selznick mentions in a direct way. Their
governors are appointed by, and report to, elected politicians in govern-
ments and parliaments; they interact directly with stakeholders such as
commercial banks and other financial institutions; and they only remain
effective if citizens trust them to maintain the value of money and to
provide for an effective and secure system of payments.
Central banking is thus not merely a technical, engineering-like
activity; it is also a communicative and social one (Hall and Franzese
1998). As Woodford (2003: 15) notes in his classic of contemporary
macroeconomics, modern central banking is essentially a matter of the
‘management of expectations’. Woodford (2003: 15) observes that it is
‘important for the public to understand the central bank’s actions, to the
greatest extent possible, not only for reasons of democratic legitimacy –
though this is an excellent reason itself, given that central bankers are
granted substantial autonomy in the execution of their task – but also
in order for monetary policy to be most effective’. It would not be an
exaggeration to say that central banks can only achieve their main policy
objectives if they are ‘institutions’ in Selznick’s sense—in that they enjoy
the confidence of governments, corporations, social organizations and the
general public.
The most important consequence of the high level of confidence that
political and economic decision-makers in Sweden have had in the Riks-
bank is that since the late 1990s, wage bargaining has been premised on
the Riksbank achieving its inflation target. How wage-bargaining insti-
tutions work is highly consequential in a small economy with powerful
labour market organizations, such as Sweden. A few years after the intro-
duction of the bank’s inflation target in 1993, Swedish trade unions and
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employer organizations began to assume that the target would be met,
give or take, and they adjusted their wage negotiations accordingly. This
high level of confidence in the Riksbank among powerful interest orga-
nizations was by no means a given. In the past, trade union leaders had
been highly critical of the Riksbank’s actions, accusing it of unduly prior-
itizing low inflation over high employment and low unemployment. By
the late 1990s, however, the bank’s inflation target had become a gener-
ally accepted anchor of inflation expectations, including within the labour
movement (Bergström 1999: 79).
It is possible to track trends in the general public’s confidence in
Sweden’s central bank over the last fifteen years. Starting in 2005, the
nationally representative SOM surveys have asked about the public’s views
concerning the Riksbank (Tryggvason et al. 2014). As Fig. 5.1 shows, the
Swedish public has considerable confidence in the central bank, at levels
only slightly lower than its confidence in the police and the health-care






















Fig. 5.1 Public Confidence in the Riksbank (Note The figure describes the
percentage of survey respondents who say they have confidence in the Riksbank
minus the percentage of survey respondents who say they don’t. Data for 2013
are missing. The specific question is ‘How much confidence do you have in how
the following institutions and groups do their jobs?’ Source The national SOM
surveys, 2005–2018)
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The public’s confidence in the Riksbank has been consistently higher
than its confidence in parliament. Note that the level of public confidence
in the Riksbank varies slightly over time. As one might have expected, for
example, there was a dip in confidence in 2008, during the global and
economic crisis commonly known as the Great Recession, but it soon
recovered (Karlberg and Meyersson 2012).
There are a few noteworthy differences among different groups in
the population. Table 5.1 describes the differences among the supporters
of the eight political parties represented in the Swedish parliament (the
data are from the autumn of 2018). As the table shows, ideologically
centrist voters who support the two liberal parties—the Center Party and
the Liberal Party—have the highest level of confidence in the Riksbank.
Left-wing voters and radical-right voters supporting the Left Party and
the Sweden Democrats, respectively, have the least confidence. But even
among supporters of the Left Party and the Sweden Democrats, those
who have confidence in the Riksbank outnumber those who do not.
Comments: The table describes the level of confidence in the Riks-
bank among the supporters of the eight parties that are represented in
the Swedish parliament. The numbers are the percentage of each party’s
supporters who said that they were either ‘highly confident’ or ‘fairly
confident’ in the Riksbank, minus the percentage who said that they had
either ‘fairly little confidence’ or ‘very little confidence’; in other words,
positive numbers mean that those who were confident in the Riksbank
outnumbered those who were not, and vice versa. The Center Party is an
agrarian, liberal party. The Sweden Democrats are a populist radical-right
party.
Table 5.1 Confidence
in the Riksbank among
Swedish voters









Source The 2018 SOM survey
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Group Confidence (−100 to 100)
Low household income 29.7
Medium household income 37.0




Note The table describes the level of confidence in the Riksbank
among groups defined by income and education. The numbers are
the percentage of respondents in each group who said that they
were either ‘highly confident’ or ‘fairly confident’ in the Riksbank,
minus the percentage who said that they had either ‘fairly little
confidence’ or ‘very little confidence’; in other words, positive
numbers mean that those who were confident in the Riksbank
outnumbered those who were not, and vice versa
Source: The 2018 SOM survey
These patterns are explained in part by the evidence in Table 5.2,
which breaks down confidence in the Riksbank by income (low, medium,
high) and education (low, intermediate, high), using the standard cate-
gorization of income and education in the survey. As the table shows,
high-income earners and—especially—the well-educated have more confi-
dence in the Riksbank than individuals with low incomes and low
education. Although the majority of people have confidence in the Riks-
bank across all segments of society, it is worth keeping in mind that even
widely trusted and respected institutions such as Sweden’s central bank
enjoy higher levels of support in some groups than others.
The Parliament’s Bank
The Riksbank has a long history (see Wetterberg 2009; Fregert 2018).
The precursor of the Riksbank, a private bank called Stockholms Banco,
was granted a royal charter in 1656. Stockholms Banco soon collapsed,
but it was replaced, in 1668, by a new institution called Riksens stän-
ders bank (‘The Bank of the Estates of the Realm’), which was under
the authority of three of the four estates that comprised Sweden’s
early-modern parliament: the nobility, the clergy and the middle-class
‘burghers’. The fourth estate, the peasants, refrained from taking part
118 J. LINDVALL
in the banking venture, declaring, rather endearingly, that they didn’t
understand much about banking.
Ever since its beginnings in the 1660s, the Riksbank—which received
its current name when the old estates parliament was abolished in 1866—
has been responsible to parliament and not to the king nor to government
ministers. This sets the Riksbank apart from most other central banks
in the world.4 Riksens ständers bank continued to operate both under
the proto-parliamentarian political regime of Sweden’s ‘Age of Liberty’
in 1718–1772, under the absolutist Gustavian regime that followed in
1772–1809, and under the constitutional monarchy that was established
in 1809. The 1809 constitution provided, in §72, that Riksens ständers
bank would ‘remain, as it has been until now, under the protection and
care of the Estates of the Realm’; in other words, parliament, not the king
or his advisors, controlled the bank.5
The modern idea of central banks as banks with a monopoly on the
release of paper money and with the role of lender of last resort within a
wider banking system emerged during the nineteenth century. In Sweden,
these ideas became law with the adoption of the 1897 Riksbank Act
(Wetterberg 2009: 233–239).
The Riksbank’s current tasks and responsibilities are defined by the
Swedish parliament, the Riksdag, in The Sveriges Riksbank Act (Lag
[1988:1385] om Sveriges riksbank) which was revised most recently
in 2016. In 1999, the bank was made formally independent through
the introduction of a new clause in Sweden’s main constitutional docu-
ment, the Instrument of Government. The clause provides that no other
public authority may instruct the Riksbank on how to conduct its mone-
tary policy. Like most other contemporary central banks, the Riksbank
is thus operationally independent, although it remains constitutionally
responsible to parliament.
An inflation target of two per cent, plus or minus one per cent, adopted
in early 1993, has guided monetary policy ever since. The Riksbank
estimates inflation expectations and sets interest rates on the basis of prog-
noses that draw on these estimates. This method of setting interest rates,
known as ‘inflation targeting’, has become the standard procedure among
modern central banks. In 1989, New Zealand was the first to embrace it,
and the Riksbank joined the group of early adopters of inflation targeting
a few years later (Truman 2003).
When studying an old institution such as the Riksbank it is tempting to
attribute great explanatory power to the institution’s origins, foundation
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and early history. In doing so, however, one runs the risk of committing
the ‘genetic fallacy’, or, more generally, engaging in flawed anachronistic
reasoning. That said, the fact that the Riksbank is primarily responsible
to parliament and not to the government of the day or the monarch is
a long-standing constitutional fact that has had important implications
for the bank’s standing and role in Swedish society, and it continues to
do so today. Just as the 1809 constitution declared that the bank would
‘remain’ under parliament’s ‘protection and care’, the current constitu-
tion, adopted in 1974, provides that the Riksbank ‘is the central bank of
the Realm and an authority under the Riksdag’ (RF 9:13).
The Politics of Independence
Independence from political decision-makers inside the government and
in parliament has been a salient issue throughout the Riksbank’s long
history. An independent central bank derives its legitimacy from technical
expertise and good performance. This raises the question of how such a
powerful, autonomous body fits into democratic institutional structures
in which the main source of legitimacy is popular sovereignty.
Curiously, the Riksbank’s autonomy and operational independence
have varied over time in a manner that has reflected changes in the bank’s
physical location. For more than two centuries, the Riksbank operated
out of an Italianate building at Järntorget 84, in the part of Stockholm
that is now known as the ‘old town’. In 1905, it moved half a kilometre
north-northwest, to the new Parliament House on Helgeandsholmen.
The bank’s most recent move, a further half-kilometre north-north-west,
was in the 1970s: the current rock-clad, imposing central-bank building
at Brunkebergs torg was completed in 1976 (on the Riksbank’s various
buildings since 1668, see Larsson 1976). When parliament returned to
Helgeandsholmen from temporary accommodations at Sergels Torg in
1983, there was again a half-kilometre distance between parliament and
the central bank. The five hundred metres that today separate the Riks-
bank from parliament and from the Prime Minister’s office are a symbol
of political and institutional independence.6
One important event occurred in 1957 when the Riksbank’s General
Council—which made operational monetary policy decisions at that
time—raised the interest rate from 4 to 5% without first consulting the
finance minister or the prime minister (Carlsson 1993). This decision
followed an intense debate over monetary policy among politicians and
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in the newspapers. The political parties, leading economists and various
media outlets soon took sides in the struggle between the bank and
the government. The end result was that the chairman of the General
Council, Per Eckerberg, resigned. Significantly, however, the central bank
governor, Per Åsbrink, did not resign, although several prominent politi-
cians maintained that he should. In a sense, therefore, the 1957 ‘interest
rate coup’, as it would become called, manifested the central bank’s rela-
tive independence. The coup marked the end of low-interest-rate policies
that the Social Democrats and the Farmers’ Party had pursued in the
1950s, in combination with detailed regulations of the financial system.
By the 1990s, in spite of significant disagreements between the Riks-
bank and both centre-right and social democratic governments, it had
become unthinkable for the government to instruct the Riksbank on how
to conduct monetary policy. In November 1993, for example, under a
centre-right government, the Finance Ministry prepared a memo on the
relationship between the government and the central bank and concluded
that exerting pressure on the bank ‘would be a minor disaster’. Leif
Pagrotsky, a leading economic adviser to the Social Democrats, who
formed a new government the following year, noted that by that time,
the Riksbank didn’t take orders from anyone, that it said what it wanted,
and that the government had no choice but to adjust to what it said and
did (Lindvall 2004: 122).
In constitutional and legal terms, however, the central bank only
gained full independence in 1999. A 1993 government commission of
inquiry (SOU 1993:20) had concluded that the central bank should be
made independent. The Social Democratic members of that commis-
sion resisted independence and filed a dissenting opinion. Nevertheless,
a few years later, it was a Social Democratic government that introduced
central-bank independence. One of the main reasons for this change in
policy was that Sweden had joined the European Union in 1995. Leading
Social Democrats regarded central-bank independence as a legal obliga-
tion under the EU treaties. This included Jan Bergqvist, who was one
of the Social Democrats who wrote a dissenting opinion in 1993 and
who chaired the parliament’s standing committee on finance. There were
also prominent groups within the Social Democratic party who believed
that central-bank independence would offer economic and political bene-
fits, much like New Labour did when it made the Bank of England
independent soon after winning power in 1997.
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When a more recent Social Democratic government commissioned
a review of Sweden’s monetary policy framework in 2016, it stated
explicitly that the Riksbank should remain independent. By now, central-
bank independence was the unassailable starting point for any discussion
about economic policy. It was no longer to be questioned. Interestingly,
when the final report of this commission was released in the autumn
of 2019 (SOU 2019:46), there was only one dissenting opinion—by
Johan Lönnroth, a former deputy leader of the Left Party—and that
dissenting opinion did not propose reducing the Riksbank’s independence
(it only suggested that the inflation target should be combined with an
employment target) (1877–1878).
Rising to the Challenge of Economic Crisis
The 1991–1993 Recession
The growing authority of the Riksbank in Sweden’s political system is
best explained by two crisis episodes in the 1990s and the 2000s in which
the bank was seen to act firmly and effectively. The first was the after-
math of the exceptionally deep economic crisis in Sweden in the early
1990s. In 1991–1993, Sweden experienced three consecutive years of
negative growth. Unemployment increased from less than two per cent
to approximately 10% of the labour force. In the beginning of this crisis,
the centre-right government, the Social Democratic opposition and the
Riksbank were all convinced that maintaining a fixed exchange rate was
essential for economic stability. They were wedded to a ‘German model’
of economic governance (Stern and Sundelius 1997: 38). During the
most acute phase of the crisis, the Riksbank took drastic steps to defend
the exchange rate, at one point even raising the short-term interest rate
to 500%. But the government and the Riksbank were ultimately unsuc-
cessful in their efforts. Sweden was forced to abandon its fixed exchange
rate on 19 November 1992.
It was the Riksbank’s actions in the aftermath of the most acute phase
of the crisis—the product of a fast learning curve following its fruitless
attempt to ‘defend the Swedish Crown’—that mattered the most for
subsequent events. Immediately after floating the Crown, the govern-
ment’s view was that Sweden should return to some form of fixed
exchange rate. For example, on 20 November 1992, the day after the
float, the Prime Minister wrote in an email to the Finance Minister
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that Sweden should join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, the
precursor of the Euro, as soon as possible. Meanwhile, however, the Riks-
bank took immediate steps to introduce the 2-plus-or-minus-1% inflation
target that it has followed ever since, and adopted new methods of infla-
tion targeting, following speedy communications with other central banks
that had already introduced this method of conducting monetary policy
(for an overview of these events, see Andersson 2003).
In the wake of the float, the Riksbank thus abandoned the prevailing
orthodoxy of Swedish macroeconomic policy, which was to achieve
economic stability in Sweden by aligning its economic policies with
those of its European partners, especially Germany. After the economic
crisis, generations of Swedish policymakers have regarded the rapid reori-
entation of economic policy after the crisis as essential to Sweden’s
subsequent economic success (Lindvall 2008). In a 2000 government
report, for example, the Swedish government reflected on the conduct
of its economic policy throughout the previous decade. In that report,
the section on how Sweden got out of the deep crisis begins—in its
very first sentences—with the Riksbank’s adoption of the new inflation-
targeting policy in 1993 (Prop 2000/2001:100, Appendix 5:21–22). The
bank’s inflation-targeting policy was, similarly, the first topic of a speech
on Swedish economic policy by the first deputy governor of the Riksbank,
Cecilia Skingsley, in early 2020, almost thirty years after the policy was put
in place. She illustrated its beneficial effects with numerous graphs that
compared inflation, growth, real wages and the current account balance
before and after the early 1990s (Skingsley 2020).
These experiences from the 1990s are a good example of the insti-
tutionalization process that was described in Chapter 1 of this volume.
According to the argument made there, a cycle of institutionalization
starts with the discovery or invention of an effective, efficient and legit-
imate way to reconcile formal aims with societal aspirations through a
mix of experimentation and smart copying. After abandoning the fixed
exchange rate, the Riksbank immediately sent officials to their counter-
parts in New Zealand’s and Canada’s central banks to learn from their
experiences, and adapt the lessons learnt to Swedish conditions. The next
step in the institutionalization process is that successful practices ‘give rise
to the emergence of an internal norm’ that say ‘this is how we do things
around here’. As the documents and speeches cited above suggest, that is
what happened with the Riksbank and its role within Sweden’s political
system after the deep crisis of the 1990s. The adoption of a new monetary
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policy strategy so quickly after the failure of the previous fixed-exchange-
rate policy was a formative event that has shaped monetary policymaking
since.
The two subsequent steps on the institutionalization ladder concern
building an organization that embodies the new norm and promoting the
norms and practices within the new, or altered, organization. This process
unfolded in the 1990s and early 2000s, a period in which the Riks-
bank was headed by Urban Bäckström, a former centre-right economic
and political adviser who was appointed governor in 1994, and Lars
Heikensten, a former social-democratic political and economic adviser
who eventually replaced Bäckström. Notably, many of the leaders who
had been responsible for monetary policy in the period leading up to the
failed defence of the fixed exchange rate in 1992 left the bank soon there-
after. For the new leadership, the switch to a floating exchange rate and
the adoption of a policy of inflation targeting represented an opportunity
to bring about wider changes—not just a discrete change in policy but
a new monetary policy regime, which they sought to consolidate within
the bank and communicate to other stakeholders (for a discussion of this
process, see, for instance, Heikensten 2003).
The development of a new communication strategy with the general
public and with market actors has been an important element in the
Riksbank’s evolution as an institution after the mid-1990s (Karlberg and
Meyersson 2012). Indeed, there is something almost paradoxical about
the differences between the pre-independence period and the current
period of independence. Before the mid-to-late 1990s—when the central
bank was not formally independent—monetary policy and exchange-rate
policy were typically treated as opaque and mysterious in media coverage.
Subsequently, political debates about Sweden’s monetary policy have
become more transparent and accessible to the public. The goal of low
and stable inflation is easier to understand than the earlier exchange-rate
target, and the Riksbank has increased the transparency of its methods
of monetary policymaking. In a sense, then, the Riksbank has turned
itself into a more responsive institution on one dimension (public trans-
parency and accountability) while becoming less responsive on another
(democratic political control).
It is often assumed that the delegation of policymaking authority to
central banks or other autonomous agencies is motivated and justified
by the expertise those organizations possess. Politicians set broad targets
and then let skilled and trained professionals carry out actual policy. But
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that is not the only or even the main reason that politicians assign this
role to independent central banks or other agencies (Majone 1996). The
main reason is that some forms of partisan political conflict are thought to
be harmful to a country’s long-term economic interests, even if partisan
conflict in general is necessary and legitimate in a democracy.
In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, there were recurring political conflicts
within Sweden over economic policy, not only among the political parties
on the left and on the right but also among the powerful interest orga-
nizations in Swedish society. Governments struggled to find a way of
containing those conflicts, preventing rising inflation and avoiding recur-
ring macroeconomic instability. Until the early 1990s, left-wing govern-
ments, right-wing governments and the Riksbank hoped, as discussed
earlier, that a commitment to a fixed exchange rate would solve this
problem.
When that strategy failed in 1992, the Riksbank proved to be agile.
Facing new, harsher economic realities than its long-held policy ortho-
doxy had presumed, it quickly shifted its attention to the policy of
inflation targeting that it has pursued ever since. This is a policy that
serves to address the same set of problems, but in a way that has proven
more reliable and viable in the long run. In spite of recurring debates
over the conduct of monetary policy in the years since, the Riksbank’s
contribution to finding a way out of the political and economic impasse
of the 1990s has made it the trusted and respected institution that it is
today.
The Post-2008 Great Recession
The next major economic crisis that struck Sweden after the deep
economic downturn in 1991–1993—and the lengthy unemployment
crisis that followed—was the Great Recession, which began with the
breakdown of the global financial system following the collapse of the US
investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Unlike the 1991–
1993 crisis in Sweden, the Great Recession was a global crisis, but there
were also some important similarities. Just like the home-grown Swedish
crisis some fifteen years earlier, the Great Recession began in the financial
market, as banks and financial institutions struggled with bad debt due
to falling real-estate prices and these problems in the financial market
then spread to the real economy. Due to these similarities, the Riks-
bank officials and former politicians and government officials were much
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in demand in other countries during the Great Recession. For example,
Bo Lundgren, who was the minister responsible for financial markets in
the early 1990s, working closely with the Riksbank, testified before US
Congress in 2009.
The Riksbank pursued aggressive monetary policies in response to the
crisis. Immediately after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Riksbank
combined with other central banks around the world to lower interest
rates drastically (see Fig. 5.2). In late 2010, the Riksbank began to raise
interest rates again, judging, as many other central banks and govern-
ments did around that time, that the acute phase of the crisis was over.
But in 2011–2012, as a result of the European debt crisis, interest rates
started to come down again.
In early 2015, the Riksbank cut the main short-term lending rate, the
‘repo’ rate, to −0.10.7 This made the Riksbank the first central bank
in the world to introduce negative interest rates. The main lending rate
remained negative from 2015 until December 2019, when the bank
adopted an interest rate of 0%. In the decade following the outbreak
of the Great Recession, the Riksbank also implemented other unconven-
tional forms of monetary policy, such as direct purchases of government
bonds.
The Riksbank’s aggressive policies were enabled by the confidence that
the bank had gained following its handling of Sweden’s home-grown
economic crisis in the 1990s, and by the institution building that occurred
in its wake. The bank’s leaders publicly retained their commitment to
the inflation-targeting regime that had become the new orthodoxy, but
at the same time allowed the probing of its merits under the new, this
time global, economic crisis, through rigorous internal debate over the
conduct of monetary policy.
Debates and Innovations
The debates over the bank’s monetary policies in the 2000s reveal how
an established institution such as the Riksbank handled internal disagree-
ments and tensions. As Fig. 5.2 shows, the Riksbank opted for a more
restrictive monetary policy beginning in 2010, and only reduced the
interest rate to the low levels of 2008–2010 some four-five years later.
In the very first phase after the Lehman Brothers collapse, Lars E.
O. Svensson—an internationally renowned economist who was on the
governing board of the Riksbank at the time—advocated even lower
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interest rates. When the interest rate increased after 2010, the debate
within the central bank became more heated. Svensson was joined by
another member of the governing board, Karolina Ekholm.
The governing board was thus divided between a ‘dovish’ minority
and a ‘hawkish’ majority. In Lars E. O. Svensson’s view, the majority’s
policy decisions had led to several years of unnecessarily high unem-
ployment (Svensson 2014). The majority was more concerned about
rising household debt and believed that high interest rates were necessary
to discourage households from excessive borrowing (see, for example,
Jansson 2014). The majority view, then, was that the rapid increase in
house prices justified a higher interest rate; the minority argued that the
Riksbank should concentrate on the inflation target and that monetary
policy could not be used to safeguard financial stability.
This was not just a debate over policy. Implicitly, it was also a debate
over the bank’s general standing and role. Contemporary Sweden has
a monetary policy regime that is based on a flexible exchange rate, a
clear inflation target, and a limited set of instruments (mainly the policy
rate), with a mandate for the bank leadership to decide independently
how the few instruments at the bank’s disposal are to be used to achieve
the inflation target. This was the model that the Riksbank and successive
governments consolidated during the late 1990s and in the 2000s. It was
a mutually attractive model since elected politicians could concentrate on
distributional politics while the Riksbank’s policies determined the playing
field on which they could operate, and did so in a fairly transparent and
predictable manner.
If the bank had taken a significantly broader view of its mandate, as
the majority’s view implied it should, it would have made the bank’s
policies much more politically controversial. First, the bank would have
had to weigh different goals against each other, which in itself is politi-
cally sensitive. Second, house prices would at least implicitly have become
a target for interest rate policy, which has obvious distributional policy
implications. A large proportion of Swedish households’ wealth is sunk
into their homes. As it happened, the debate within the bank petered
out after Svensson’s decision to leave the governing board in 2013—a
decision that was a direct consequence of the disagreements within the
bank. Somewhat ironically, the bank soon after adopted more aggressive,
expansionary policies—policies that were more closely aligned with those
Svensson had favoured.
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By the late 2010s, the so-called e-krona project provided more
evidence of the Riksbank’s willingness to engage in innovative policies and
programs. It revolves around the idea of creating a central-bank issued
electronic currency, the e-krona. Were the Riksbank to go through with
this reform, the e-krona would represent the world’s first government-
issued electronic currency. The e-krona would compete with electronic
money created by banks and other private organizations (through debit
and credit cards, for instance) and also with private electronic currencies
such as Bitcoin and the Facebook corporation’s Libra.
The Riksbank’s motivation for this project is that Sweden is rapidly
shifting away from paper money to electronic payments. Sweden, in fact,
uses less cash than any other country on Earth. An increasingly cashless
society makes it more difficult for the bank to guarantee the system of
payments in the economy. The e-krona is meant to address this concern
(Sveriges Riksbank 2017). Another reason for the bank’s e-krona initia-
tive is that the conditions of monetary policy, which is the bank’s main
responsibility, might change in important ways in an economy with no or
little government-backed money (Sveriges Riksbank 2018).
The e-krona project, if implemented, would have important impli-
cations that reach far beyond Sweden. Through the rapid move away
from coins and paper money, the state’s traditional role of issuing money
is being undermined, and the creation of money is being taken over
by the private corporations that oversee credit card payments and elec-
tronic transactions. In that sense, the idea of introducing an e-krona is an
attempt to reassert public authority in a world where private interests and
organizations are ascendant.8
Why is the Swedish central bank developing this project of
government-backed electronic money, and not the larger central banks in
the larger economies of Europe and North America? The main reason is
most likely that paper money is disappearing more rapidly in Sweden than
in other advanced economies (as noted, for example, by Heller 2016).
In that sense, the problem that the Riksbank is seeking to address with
the e-krona project has greater urgency in Sweden than elsewhere. But
there were other reasons as well, notably the Riksbank’s strong status
in Swedish society and its desire to be an ‘inventive, highly prepared and
responsive central bank’ (see the Riksbank’s strategic plan for 2019–2022:
Sveriges Riksbank 2019b).
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Institutionalizing Central Banks:
Lessons from the Swedish Case
In 2018, the Riksbank celebrated its 350th birthday in good health.
Its autonomy was respected by the elected government, it managed
private-sector expectations about future price levels, and inspired confi-
dence among the public. This chapter has documented many important
similarities between the Riksbank’s institutional trajectory and the styl-
ized description of a typical institutionalization cycle presented in the
introductory chapter of this volume.
When it comes to potential threats to the Riksbank, and to similar
institutions, the profound internal debates over the bank’s monetary poli-
cies in the 2010s highlighted an important dilemma for independent
institutions. The majority on the bank’s governing board was concerned
about rising household debt and wished to use monetary policy to keep
households from borrowing too much. The critics, on the other hand,
suggested that such a policy was inconsistent with the bank’s infla-
tion target and argued that household debt was a problem for other
institutions to solve.
This was not merely a disagreement over economic policy, but a
deeper, constitutional disagreement about the institutional role and posi-
tion of a central bank. In a democratic system, institutions based on
autonomous expertise, such as central banks, always maintain an uneasy
relationship with governments and elected politicians. The majority’s
views on the conduct of monetary policy were motivated by important
policy concerns, but they also carried an important risk. If the Riksbank
had extended its power into new domains, it would have become more
difficult to maintain the delicate balance between expertise and popular
sovereignty that modern central banks depend on—both for their polit-
ical autonomy and for their attempts to maintain the confidence of the
general public (Woodford 2003).
It has become increasingly common for national governments to dele-
gate important policymaking competencies to central banks, other inde-
pendent agencies and international organizations. By identifying problems
that national governments have trouble solving, and handing over the
management of those problems to independent decision-makers, govern-
ments hope to make their long-term policies more credible and durable
(Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002). Modern central banks are the clearest
examples of this governance model, but there are other examples.
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One conclusion from this chapter is that such delegation to indepen-
dent agencies need not be premised on consensus over policy, nor does
it imply that experts are better able to conduct policy than politicians are.
Instead, institutions such as the Riksbank have gained independence, and
enjoy widespread respect, because they have a reputation for being able
to manage and contain ongoing conflicts over economic policy that are
endemic in a democratic society. The future of the Riksbank will depend
on the continued willingness and capacity of its leadership to play this
role, while at the same time adapting its repertoires and capabilities to
fast-paced technological change.
Questions for Discussion
1. Public-opinion surveys suggest that most Swedes have high confi-
dence in their central bank, the Riksbank. But there are signifi-
cant differences among different groups, and individuals with low
incomes and little education trust the Riksbank less than well-
educated high-income earners. When do these sorts of differences
become a long-run threat to institutions?
2. Modern central banks typically seek to maintain their operational
independence from parliaments and governments. What do institu-
tions whose legitimacy relies on expertise need to do to maintain
their autonomy within political systems where the main source of
legitimacy is democratic elections and popular will?
3. How do trusted and effective institutions communicate their strate-
gies and intentions to political decision-makers, business organiza-
tions and other stakeholders and to the general public?
4. The Riksbank has been widely credited for saving the Swedish
economy in 1992. How did the bank do this and how has this
performance affected its institutional status?
5. The Riksbank’s e-krona project has met with significant criticism
among commentators and stakeholders who believe that it is risky
and radical, but so far, the Riksbank has maintained that the e-
krona is a necessary step to take because of rapid technological and
economic change. How do successful institutions strike a balance
between maintaining their core competencies and adapting to a
changing world?
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Notes
1. In my own discipline of political science, institutions are typically defined
as rules—written or unwritten—and not as organizations. In this chapter,
in a manner consistent with the book’s terminology, I use the term in the
sociological sense of ‘responsive, adaptive organism’ (Selznick 1957: 5).
2. For a recent history of the Riksbank in English, see Fregert (2018); for a
more detailed history in Swedish, see Wetterberg (2009).
3. The goals are defined in Chapter 1, article 3 of The Sveriges Riksbank Act
(Lagen [1988:1385] om Sveriges Riksbank).
4. During some of the more absolutist phases in Sweden’s early-modern
history, as Wetterberg (2009) notes, the bank remained formally respon-
sible to parliament, but de facto, the monarch exercised a great deal of
influence; see, for instance, 53–54 on Charles XI and 68–74 on Charles
XII; but see also p. 129 on the bank’s relative autonomy under Gustav III.
5. ‘Riksens ständers bank förblifver hädanefter, som den hittills varit, under
riksens ständers egen garanti och vård’.
6. For a discussion of the Riksbank’s role and independence in the beginning
of the twentieth century, see Cassel (1908).
7. This was actually not the first time that the bank pursued a policy of nega-
tive interest rates, since the bank’s overnight-deposit rate is typically 0.5
percentage points lower than the repo rate.
8. The e-krona project is not uncontroversial. When the Riksbank’s second
report on the e-krona project was issued in late 2018, corporations, special
interest groups and public agencies were invited to comment on the
proposal. Several of the replies were critical of the project, but it is moving
forward nevertheless. In December 2019, the Riksbank announced that it
had commissioned the international consultancy Accenture to develop an
e-krona trial in a laboratory environment.
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CHAPTER 6
The European Court of Justice: Guardian
of European Integration
Arjen Boin and Susanne K. Schmidt
A Most Influential Court
Founded in 1952, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) began as a small
‘coal and steel court’ that ‘did little more than control the legality of the
High Authority’s activities’ (Stone Sweet 2010: 20). Within a relatively
brief period of time, the ECJ transformed into a fully fledged constitu-
tional court of an expanding Union, prevailing over national courts and
carrying an ever-growing caseload as a result. Today, the ECJ is one of
the most influential institutions of the European Union (EU).
The formal objective of the ECJ (TEU, art. 19 sub. 1) is to ensure
that the interpretation and application of the Treaties and of secondary
EU law is observed (Amtenbrink and Vedder 2010: 94). The Court
meets this objective by advising national courts how to interpret EU law
(the preliminary ruling procedure), ruling on infringement procedures
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against member states (mostly initiated by the European Commission),
and annulling unlawful actions by EU institutions.
The Court has consistently interpreted the founding treaties to further
an ever-closer Union. Its most famous rulings (Van Gend en Loos and
Costa) established what is now widely accepted as a core principle under-
lying the EU: the laws of the EU directly apply to the citizens of the
member states and prevail over national laws. By treating the treaties
as a constitutional charter, the ECJ has made the EU ‘more than an
organization, more like a nonunitary polity’ (Weiler 1991: 247).
The ECJ’s rulings have had far-reaching effects on the integration of
the EU. How did the ECJ, starting out as a very small organization,
‘tucked away’ (Stein 1981: 1) in a provincial corner of Europe, become
such an influential institution? How did it manage to impose its inter-
pretation of the Treaties upon member states during a time when its
influence was limited and its existence unknown to most EU citizens?
How has it performed this feat without alienating the EU member states?
And how has the Court remained relevant in the face of a changing envi-
ronment (think of treaty changes, the expansion of the Union and waves
of Euroscepticism)? This is the puzzle this chapter seeks to resolve.
We start with a brief institutional history of the ECJ and describe
its impact over the years. We then analyse the Court as an institution,
describing its institutional characteristics and analysing its trajectory of
institutional development. We end this chapter with lessons for institu-
tional architecture in the international arena.
Foundation, Organization and Impact
The European Court of Justice was founded with the Treaty of Paris
(1952) that established the EU’s predecessor, the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC).1 The official objective was to ensure that ‘in
the interpretation and application of this [ECSC] Treaty and of rules laid
down for the interpretation thereof, the law is observed’ (Saurugger and
Terpan 2017: 11). In other words, the Court was created to ensure that
the High Authority of the ECSC would not overstep its jurisdiction and
breach the sovereignty of the member states (Tamm 2013: 16).
We don’t know much about the inner workings of the Court, beyond
what its statute and rules of procedure tell us.2 The deliberations are
secret and only ruling judges can attend. Dissenting opinions are not
made public.3 The Court has been compared to ‘a black hole, from which
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nothing – except very brief, magisterial rulings with no hint of disagree-
ment among the judges – can escape’ (Pollack 2017: 602). Secrecy
was built into its DNA: one working language (French) was reportedly
adopted to prevent that interpreters would attend the secret deliberations
(Saurugger and Terpan 2017: 14).
The Court has an internal division of labour. It operates in chambers.
The small chamber consists of three to five judges. The grand chamber
is made up of 15 judges. It assembles when the case is of greater legal
difficulty or importance, or when a member state or a Union institution
demands it.4 If the case is considered to be of exceptional importance,
the full court takes responsibility. It also decides on serious misconduct of
officials, such as Commissioners.5 The rulings of the court are collegial
and judges try to reach consensus. If this fails, a simple majority suffices
(Arnull 2006: 9).
Every member state appoints one judge to the ECJ for a (renewable)
six-year term (every three years half of the judges are (re)appointed).
Other member states must consent with the choice. The Treaty of Lisbon
introduced a new committee in Article 255 TFEU to check the suitability
of candidates to be judge or advocate-general. Eleven advocate-generals
assist the Court and provide the judges with an impartial, independent
and reasoned advice on how to judge a case before the Court starts
its deliberations. The judges don’t have to follow this advice, but they
generally do (Arnull 2006). Judges are supported by a cabinet of legal
référendaires (junior lawyers) and supportive staff (including clerks, a
research and documentation service and interpreters).6
Judges are supposed to act independently and impartially, not repre-
senting their home country. To limit potential conflicts of interest, judges
are not appointed as rapporteurs on cases from their home country.
The secrecy surrounding the proceedings and the absence of dissenting
opinions protect individual judges from external scrutiny. As judges are
term-limited and (re-)appointed by their home governments, the salary
gap to national judges in most member states is said to be used as possible
lever as political pressure (Schmidt 2018: 28).
Scholars agree that the ECJ has been highly influential in advancing
European integration beyond what could have been achieved via deci-
sions of the EU’s political institutions (Schmidt 2018: 27; Stone Sweet
2010). According to Stone Sweet (2010: 2), the ‘significance of the ECJ’s
impacts rivals that of the world’s most powerful courts’.
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The Court’s initial prospects for becoming a powerful institution were
rather slim, however. The mere ‘coal and steel court’ was not intended to
function as a court but rather as an arbitration tribunal (Vauchez 2015:
45–46). The limited mission was reflected in the composition of the
Court: only three members had a legal degree, the others were technical
experts.
The Court obtained a more prominent position with the Treaty
of Rome (Tamm 2013: 16). The 1957 Treaty created the European
Economic Community (EEC), incorporating the ECSC. In addition, it
established the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). To
prevent a proliferation of European institutions, the Treaty ‘pooled’ the
institutions for these communities, with the Court obtaining jurisdiction
over the EEC and EURATOM (Arnull 2006: 6–7).
The Rome Treaty also expanded the Court’s competences. The intro-
duction of the preliminary ruling procedure allowed lower courts to
directly ask the ECJ how a European law or regulation should be
interpreted. The preliminary ruling procedure has become an especially
effective mechanism, both for fostering European integration and for the
ECJ to establish itself as more than just an international court (Tamm
2013: 24). Intended as a means to clarify the meaning of EEC rules, it
evolved into a mechanism in which national courts check the compliance
of national rules with EU law in response to the claims of private liti-
gants. In practice, this provided near-direct access to the ECJ for citizens
and corporations (without having to litigate through the national court
hierarchy first). It did not take long for lawyers with an interest in Euro-
pean law to understand the opportunity that this new competence had
created (Vauchez 2015).
In addition, the Rome Treaty introduced the annulment procedure,
which allowed the ECJ to review the legality of acts produced by the
European Commission and the European Council (Adam et al. 2020).
The Rome Treaty also created the infringement procedure to ensure that
member states comply with Community law. Both the Commission and
member states could start an infringement procedure at the Court, which
would then judge whether a member state was in violation. These proce-
dures each elevated the importance of the ECJ as a protector of the
EU Treaties against undermining efforts of either member states or EU
institutions.
After a careful start marked by ‘self limitation’ (Vauchez 2015: 48–
49), two landmark rulings spurred a transformation of the European legal
6 THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE … 139
order, and the Court’s competences. Both rulings were triggered by a
request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court (Arnull
2006: 640). The first landmark ruling (Van Gend en Loos) in 1963 gave
private plaintiffs the right to evoke a European provision directly in a
national court; this principle became known as the principle of direct
effect (Weiler 1991). In those days, international agreements usually did
not directly impact citizens unless these agreements were transformed into
national law. The Van Gend en Loos ruling established that citizens and
corporations could directly invoke European law, superseding national
legislation. EU law in effect became national law (Alter 2009: 113–115),
thus eroding the sovereignty of member states.
The implications of the Van Gend en Loos ruling were not immediately
understood outside legal circles, however. This was partly the result of
the careful wording of the ECJ ruling and the limited attention that, in
those days, national governments paid to the little Court in Luxembourg
(Vauchez 2015). However, it also points to a crucial feature of the Court’s
power. With its rulings, the Court provides an opportunity structure that
other actors, notably the European Commission, have to seize and put to
use.
The second landmark ruling (Costa vs. ENEL) in 1964 clarified
matters in no uncertain language. The ECJ confirmed the ‘prevalence of
EC law in a clear, almost provocative manner’ (Vauchez 2015: 136). Not
only did the ECJ confirm the Van Gend en Loos ruling, it established that
European law always supersedes national law since states transferred rights
to the community. This has become known as the principle of supremacy,
and together with direct effect it gives constitutional status to EU law.
The Costa ruling sent shockwaves through Europe. During a time when
integration of the European Community was stalling (Vauchez 2015),
Costa was immediately recognized as a landmark ruling.
The principles of direct effect and supremacy have had a profound
effect on European integration. The principles enabled citizens in national
courts to directly invoke European rules. In essence, these principles
turned national courts into European courts, enabling individuals to force
states in the national court to comply with European rules (Van Middelaar
2013: 50–51). This fostered the implementation of EU law since the task
of bringing cases to the Court was no longer only upon the Commission
(Van Middelaar 2013: 48–49).
The Court subsequently developed these principles further in its case
law (Arnull 2006: 643–644). As a result, the European Treaties were
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endowed, retrospectively, with the aura of a European constitution. The
ECJ thus created a new legal layer, an alternative supreme legal order,
which would ensure the impact of European rules across the member
states. The policy goals of the Treaty, namely the four freedoms of
goods, services, persons and capital as well as competition rules (and after
the Maastricht Treaty citizenship rights) became constitutionalized, and
subject to the Court’s interpretation.
The ECJ did not stop there. It helped the European Parliament to
increase its powers (Arnull 2006: 649). It promoted the internal market
by overruling trade-inhibiting measures (Arnull 2006: 647–648). And
it established fundamental rights that cannot be found in the Treaties
(Saurugger and Terpan 2017: 26–28), in response to criticism of some
national supreme courts. Today’s Court ‘applies Treaty law to policy
areas that were formerly assumed to be in the domain of national gover-
nance, interprets EU statutes as if certain provisions express values of
higher, constitutional status, and holds that specific policy dispositions
are required by Treaty Law’ (Stone Sweet 2010: 25). Altogether, the
Court has extended its competences beyond what could be imagined in
the 1950s.7
This development is remarkable because the principles that ended up
underpinning it had never been incorporated into the Treaty texts. Nor
did member states necessarily agree that community law should super-
sede national law and that citizens could derive rights directly from the
Treaty (Alter 2009: 95; Van Middelaar 2013: 49). The EU Treaties do
not contain a Bill of Rights, but the Court constructed a formidable appa-
ratus to review Community Acts against it anyway (Weiler 1991: 2437).
By securing direct effect and supremacy, the Court, in effect, ‘rewrote the
Treaty’ (Stone Sweet 2010: 15).
The Court’s impact has been immense. Its rulings have pushed inte-
gration in a large variety of EU domains (Schmidt 2018: 246). The Court
can set the agenda if the treaty is silent or ambiguous, which usually
results in empowering the Commission to act (Dehousse 1998: 82–84).
In periods of stagnating integration, the Court functions as a policy inno-
vator, with its ruling, for example, invigorating the harmonization of
product standards (Dehousse 1998: 84–88; Saurugger and Terpan 2017:
201–203). ECJ rulings can spur EC legislation by pressuring member
states to form EU policy. The writing on the wall is clear: if they don’t
act, the ECJ will rule on the basis of the Treaty instead of on secondary
law, so that member states will forego influence over the outcome.
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The Institutionalization of the Court
The ECJ has proven an important force in the integration of EU member
states. In fact, the Court has steadily ascended the ladder of institution-
alization, even as European integration itself has followed a more erratic
pattern. To assess the ECJ’s level of institutionalization, we make use of
Selznick’s (1957) three analytical dimensions: mission, inculcation and
legitimacy. The first dimension (mission) refers to the envisioned iden-
tity of the organization: what does it stand for? What does it seek to
accomplish and how? The second dimension (inculcation) refers to the
dedication of the workforce to the espoused mission of the organization:
are employees unified in their belief in the mission? The third dimension
(legitimacy) refers to the external support that every public organization
needs: do relevant stakeholders accept and defend the Court’s mission
and proposed ways of working? By assessing the ECJ on each of the
three dimensions, we create an ‘institutional picture’ of the level of
institutionalization.
A Clear Mission: Furthering ‘Europe’
Most observers seem to agree that over time, the ECJ has come to adhere
to a set of guiding principles in its daily work. The Court has been
committed to the ideal of an ‘ever-closer Union’ (Schmidt 2018: 51;
Vauchez 2015); its working practice being informed by the ‘spirit of the
treaty’ (Van Middelaar 2013: 50; Burley and Mattli 1993: 68; Saurugger
and Terpan 2017: 22; Tamm 2013: 14). The Court has cast itself as the
guardian of the Treaties, offering as proof its landmark rulings that were
delivered during the Court’s ‘revolutionary years’ (Vauchez 2012: 60).
There seems to be little doubt within the Court with regard to its raison
d’être. The legal doctrines of direct effect and supremacy have been trans-
lated into what Vauchez (2012: 55) describes as a ‘specific judicial style’
which has given rise to a ‘striking linguistic and legal stability of EU case
law’ (Vauchez 2015: 188).
Over time, the ECJ built up a unique competence as the Chief
Interpreter of the European Treaties. As the Treaties have become the
touchstone for the development of European case law, the texts remain
in constant need of authoritative interpretation and judgement. During
the 1960s, the period of institutional ascendency, the Court had six
judges who had directly participated in the negotiations preceding the
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Paris/Rome treaties. The Court housed a unique group of founding
fathers invested with authority to interpret the treaties (Vauchez 2015:
112).
The ECJ’s unique competence and its distinct judicial style turned
the Court into a key venue for those lawyers schooled in its ‘distinctive
rules and operational logic’. Those who remained unschooled in its way
of operation found it hard to win their case (Vauchez 2015: 83, 104).
This created opportunities for those who were knowledgeable—Vauchez
(2015) calls them Euro-lawyers—and who just happened to believe in the
same ideals that the Court sought to achieve. The ECJ’s mission thus had
a far-reaching effect on those who sought to fight or employ European
law.
A Dedicated Workforce
The Court has been described in near-idyllic terms, as a ‘family’ that
lunches together while engaging in ‘intense debates [that] take the form
of disinterested legal discussion based on esteem and friendship’ (Vauchez
2015: 164). Students of the Court recognize a ‘transnational judicial
esprit de corps’ that is supported by institutional rituals, like celebrating its
anniversaries and publishing Festschriften to honour retiring distinguished
judges (Vauchez 2015: 53, 159–160; see below).
The Court, as an organization, has been marked by strong leadership of
a kind that has been described as being ‘more pronounced than is found
in other courts’ (Cohen 2017: 65). There is a focus on the consistency of
rulings, which is considered crucial for achieving compliance. The Court
has in place a system of ‘strong internal monitoring for uniformity’, which
is applied through the lawyer-linguists, the lecteurs d‘arrêts, who check
the briefs before they are discussed in the ECJ chambers.
The consistency of the Court’s judicial style and jurisprudence is
impressive given the big changes that were visited upon the Court over
the years. The enlargement of the EU, the widening of the EU’s policy
scope and the transformations that followed eight reform treaties created
new audiences and new demands. Legendary judges retired and the Court
expanded with the admission of new member states. In a period of three
years (2004–2007), the Court doubled in size (Vauchez 2015: 155). In
2018, 75 judges were working at the ECJ and the General Court. There
were 11 Advocates General. In total, there were 537 posts in the cabinets,
and 994 posts in the language services (CJEU 2019b: 55, c: 18).
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A High Level of Legitimacy
The Court has become the authoritative interpreter of EU law (Stone
Sweet 2010: 15). But the ECJ, as any court, cannot enforce its rulings:
‘it does not enjoy the power of the purse nor that of the sword’ (Pollack
2017: 143). Gaining legitimacy is notoriously hard for international orga-
nizations that, by definition, are not democratically accountable, not
grounded in domestic law and do not answer to national politicians. The
ECJ is not different: it relies entirely on its legitimacy for its rulings to be
accepted in the member states—especially when the Court rules against a
member state. When the Court is not considered a legitimate source of
legal authority, member states may become less responsive to its rulings.
The environment in which the Court operates has become more chal-
lenging over time. While the ECJ could still deliver monumental rulings
without much notice in the early 1960s, those days would soon be over.
The mid-1970s proved a turning point. As the EC did not manage to
cope with the economic crises of the 1970s in a cooperative way, its
institutions came under fire. The ECJ received its ‘first barrage of criti-
cism’ from national governments, which produced threats to redefine the
Court’s powers (Vauchez 2015: 157).
Viewed from this angle, the ECJ can be considered highly successful.
The ECJ’s key external stakeholders—national governments, national
courts and the general public (Dehousse 1998: 135)—demonstrate accep-
tance if not outright support for the Court.
It is true that member states have at times expressed reservations with
the expanding mandate of the Court.8 The Court had successfully pushed
integration beyond what national governments would have agreed to (or
did agree to) during intergovernmental negotiations (Stone Sweet 2010).
But member states did not clip the Court’s wings during the many Treaty
negotiations that over the years have presented them with opportunities
to do so. The Court is funded on a structural basis, the AGs and judges
are frequently reappointed by the member states (Schmidt 2018: 29) and
compliance with ECJ rulings is high (e.g. Saurugger and Terpan 2017:
117). A powerful indicator of the Court’s legitimacy is that the member
states accept Court rulings even when the rulings are (seemingly) against
their interests (Dehousse 1998: 142).9 Altogether, the ECJ has been fairly
resistant to mechanisms of court curbing (overriding verdicts, resource
punishment, jurisdiction stripping, court packing, judicial selection and
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reappointment and eroding public opinion) (Kelemen 2012: 44–45) that
the member states might use to keep the ECJ in check.
Support from national courts has been especially important. The
ECJ has no means to force national courts to comply with its rulings
(Dehousse 1998: 138). If national courts would not acknowledge the
ECJ’s principles of direct effect and supremacy, EU law could simply
be ignored (Alter 2009: 94–95). The ECJ has consistently received
support from national (especially lower) courts, which also allows them
to bypass higher courts. Compliance with preliminary rulings is nearly
perfect (Stone Sweet 2010: 17). The high caseload can be seen as further
proof of legitimacy (Schmidt 2018: 37). It helps that support for the
Court in the EU’s legal community has always been high (Schmidt 2018:
18). The wider legal community of lawyers and scholars appears reluc-
tant to criticize ECJ in academic journals; Conway (2012: xv) speaks of a
‘language of love’ between EU lawyers and the ECJ.
It is notoriously difficult to gauge community support for an organi-
zation of which the larger public is mostly unaware. Even those who are
aware of its existence are generally not informed about the actions of the
Court (Dehousse 1998: 145; Gibson and Caldeira 1995: 470). While the
data is limited in scope, it does at least suggest that the Court enjoys a
level of social capital (cf. Alter 2009: 82). Eurobarometer data suggests
that the ECJ is the most trusted EU institution, enjoying higher levels
of public support than national political actors (Kelemen 2012: 47–49).
Even when the ECJ rules against the interest of a member state, this does
not influence citizens’ trust levels in the affected member state (Kelemen
2012). The active use of European rights by private litigants is another
indicator of the ECJ’s legitimacy—why else would they bother to turn to
the Court (Schmidt 2018: 35)?
Explaining Institutionalization: Path
Dependency and Institutional Leadership
There was nothing inevitable about the institutional ascendance of the
ECJ. In its early years, the caseload of the Court was low; judges
reportedly broke out champagne every time a new appeal was notified
(Vauchez 2015: 49). The few rulings it produced were rather technical
and did not draw much attention (Saurugger and Terpan 2017: 16;
Tamm 2013: 18). Any ambitions the Court might harbour met with
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‘national courts, academics, zealous guardians of national and interna-
tional State sovereignty [who] were against the in-house doctrines being
formulated in Luxembourg’ (Vauchez 2015: 77). Some lawyers argued
that the Court should become a chamber of the International Court of
Justice (Vauchez 2015: 49).
Nevertheless, as we have just seen, the ECJ has taken on the char-
acteristics of an institution. It has adopted a consistent way of working
by a dedicated workforce that has proven effective over time. The Court
delivered authoritative rulings that continued to further integration even
at times of political stand-offs about the trajectory and pace of future inte-
gration, and outright backlash against the European project. Grumbling
as they did at times, member states have never once intervened to curtail
the Court’s judicial reach, while European citizens and corporations have
found their way to the Court in ever-increasing numbers (Strasser 1995;
CJEU 2019a: 121), as Table 6.1 illustrates.
So how did this happen? The Treaties were vague or open-ended,
creating ambiguities that had to be resolved (Garrett and Weingast 1993).
By filling in the gaps in these ‘incomplete contracts’ of European law,
the ECJ fulfilled a critical function in furthering European integration.
In academic language, we recognize a fortuitous combination of path
dependency and institutional momentum (Stone Sweet 2010: 7): the
Court’s caseload kept rising; in its decisions, the Court provided ‘defen-
sible reasons’ that honoured precedents; national courts and the member
states accepted the Court’s rulings, which, in turn, led to more cases
before the Court. The rising number of cases had something to do with
the introduction of the preliminary ruling. This ‘judicial gadget’ created
a relation between the ECJ and national judges who could directly access
the Court without referral to higher national courts. This made lower
courts more receptive to both using the ECJ and accepting its rulings
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(Stone Sweet 2010: 17). The completion of the internal market further
inflated the number of cases (Stone Sweet 2010: 19).
In short: as EU law became more important, the ECJ attracted
increased litigation; and by appealing to EU law, litigants in turn legit-
imized the Court and its ongoing production of EU law. To understand
the willingness of national courts of turning to the ECJ, it is central to see
that the European legal order in many instances provides alternative rights
that lower courts and litigants may prefer to their own national legal order
(Schmidt 2018: 59). National courts perceive clear advantages in pushing
and promoting the European vis-à-vis applying their national legal order.
An interesting example is the Mangold ruling (C-144/04) that
prohibits age discrimination. It was particularly controversial in Germany
(Stone Sweet and Stranz 2012). The ruling goes back to a fabricated case,
where a lawyer employed an elderly person on a limited contract with the
express intention of having the rule of the German labour law declared
void in court afterwards.
Embedding the case in the context of anti-discrimination litigation
in Germany, Stone Sweet and Stranz show how different cases, partic-
ularly with regards to women’s rights since the 1970s, helped the Federal
Labour Court to establish its preferred broad definition of discrimination
against the narrower framing of the German Constitutional Court (Stone
Sweet and Stranz 2012).
A key driver of positive feedback thus appears to be demonstrated
functionality. The ECJ fulfilled a function that garnered support for
its existence. Key actors benefited from a strong court, which means
they helped strengthen the ECJ, or at least did nothing to question it.
This strengthening, in turn, enhanced the Court’s capacity to fulfil that
function.
But this still begs the question how the ECJ arrived on this virtuous
path of endless institutionalization. Here we arrive at an additional expla-
nation: institutional leadership. While the inner life of the Court remains
hard to analyse, a few students of the Court have parsed together
evidence that points at institutional strategizing by powerful judges. At
key moments in time, ECJ judges initiated important strategies that
propelled the Court when it was stuck or set it on a different path. We will
now consider how these strategies furthered the Court’s mission, internal
cohesion and external legitimacy.
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Creating a Mission
A critical development in the ECJ’s institutional trajectory was the emer-
gence of its mission, during the early 1960s. An incoming group of
pro-European judges began to cast the Court in its verdicts as the
guardian of European integration. An overarching, teleological method of
interpreting the Treaties as a constitution for the European entity became
a hallmark of the Court. Already in its first ruling on the ECSC, the Court
had stipulated that a decision should not be taken based on an individual
article, but a ‘dispute must be examined in relation to the Treaty in its
entirety’ (French Republic vs. High Authority of the ECSC, Opinion of the
advocate-general, 1/54 in: Saurugger and Terpan 2017: 16). Referring to
the Treaty as a whole indicated an emphasis on the telos of integration.10
The Court’s sense of mission found its first public expression in the Van
Gend en Loos and Costa rulings.
The Court applied its newly discovered mission with measured zeal,
relying on an incremental way of operating (Weiler 1991). Typically, the
ECJ would test new and potentially far-reaching interpretations in rela-
tively insignificant cases (Alter 1998). The new interpretations would have
no immediate effects, but they did create precedents for future cases. The
incremental development of case law—building on precedent—became
key to the institutional expansion of the Court (Schmidt 2018: 240).
Euro law associations played an important role in the Court’s discovery
of its mission. With the founding of the Economic Community in
1958, Euro law associations were established at the domestic level by
lawyers closely engaged with the integration process.11 These associations
consisted of lawyers, political actors and other well-placed individuals
with (close) ties to the European Community, who were interested
and committed to the cause of European integration under the rule of
law (Alter 2009: 65–66). The Commission also established an umbrella
organization: the Fédération Internationale de Droit Européen (FIDE),
which organized international meetings where pro-integration lawyers
could meet each other, and other lawyers could be informed about the
possibilities of European law (Alter 2009: 68–69; Vauchez 2015: 119).
The impact of these ‘Euro lawyers’ on the formation and interpretation
of EU law was vast (Alter 2009). Initial discussions about the ECJ were
monopolized by lawyers who were committed to the European project
(Vauchez 2015: 55). Recent historical work has uncovered the intense
exchange between judges, the legal community and the legal service of
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the European Commission (Rasmussen 2012), considering possible inter-
pretations of the Treaty of Rome in order to further integration (Nicola
and Davies 2017). The Court used arguments that were posed by Euro
law lawyers to back their rulings: they served as the kitchen’s cabinet
(Alter 2009: 76–78). Through the FIDE meetings, the Court could test
innovative legal reasoning at national lawyers. If they could not find any
support for their arguments, they would simply not pursue them (see also
Saurugger and Terpan 2017: 132). But they could also borrow arguments
from lawyers to strengthen the ECJ’s position.
Engineering Cohesion
It is one thing to establish an institutional mission—core values, clear
goals, a way of working—but it is quite another to build an organi-
zation that can fulfil that mission. The ECJ never had the luxury of
selecting its judges and AGs. There is no common training or education
for incoming judges and the Court has no influence over their recruit-
ment (Vauchez 2012: 54–55). In the beginning, it was unclear which
qualifications someone should have to become an international judge.
The first batch of judges had a wide variety of backgrounds.
An important development therefore was the appointment between
1958 and 1962 of five new judges (Lecourt, Donner, Catalano, Monaco
and Trabucchi) who were lawyers and were deeply committed to the
European project and the constitutional character of the Court, or at least
the political and legal unity of the Communities (Vauchez 2015: 54–55;
Phelan 2017).
Over time, the various enlargements of the EU resulted in increasing
numbers of judges and growing diversity of legal cultures, making the task
of maintaining a committed group both harder and increasingly impor-
tant (Tamm 2013). The inevitable diversification of the ECJ ‘chipped
away at internal unity, putting at risk its doctrine’. This emerging risk
required a ‘collective strategy from the most integrated judges’ (Vauchez
2015: 154–155). It was highly important for the ECJ to succeed in
shaping a strong internal culture, fostering cohesiveness and a shared
outlook.
The Court, therefore, had to foster a shared interpretation of mission
and operations among a very diverse group of people, who did not exactly
arrive tabula rasa. In response, the judges streamlined procedures to
defend the Court’s jurisprudential acquis. Two strategies were employed:
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the codification of jurisprudence (through rules, SOPs, databases) and
the centralization of judicial decision-making process (in the hands of
centrally placed judges) (Vauchez 2015: 158). One of the judges, Pesca-
tore, wrote a Vademecum that defined the Court’s judicial style as
‘an overall process of codification around a limited number of highly
standardized formulas’ (Vauchez 2015: 187).
The référendaires and lecteurs d‘arrêts (lawyer-linguists) played an
important role in forging a uniform way of working (Cohen 2017). The
référendaires draft the ruling. Before the draft ruling is handed for the first
time to the chamber, the lecteurs d‘arrêts read the draft for inconsisten-
cies, and also for contradictions with existing case law (Cohen 2017: 69).
The lecteurs d‘arrêts receive detailed training. Until the early 1970s, each
judge had only one référendaire, and these référendaires were permanent
staff, so that new judges inherited the référendaire of their predecessor.
The use of French as the Court’s working language also played a role
(McAuliffe 2017). Many of those working at the Courts are not native
French speakers. They tend to work with citations of earlier rulings, thus
unwittingly strengthening continuity in Court proceedings.
In addition to engineering organizational mechanisms to maintain
consistency, the Court also makes a strong effort to socialize incoming
judges to the Court’s mission and its jurisprudential acquis (Vauchez
2012: 52). This socialization effort, aimed at creating a ‘transnational
esprit de corps’ (Vauchez 2012) can be distilled from different tradi-
tions and ceremonies.12 Common to all these ceremonies and traditions
is that they link today’s Court to the Court’s past (Alter 2009). The
revolutionary years (1960s) of the Court are employed to reiterate the
‘original prophecy’ that provides current judges with a ‘timeless truth’
regarding their role and a ‘juridical foundation’ for their work (Vauchez
2012: 61, 63). This way the Court creates an invented tradition of one
‘jurisprudential acquis’ (Vauchez 2015: 162).
These ceremonies do not only socialize quite diverse judges into one
community, making them feel part of a cohesive unit, but they also
ensure intergenerational continuity by passing the legacy of the court
on to new generations (Vauchez 2012: 63–64, 2015: 166). In descrip-
tions of the Court, metaphors of family, community and brotherhood are
often used. These ceremonies help shape a posterchild judge: an accom-
plished legal practitioner and renowned scholar, who represents a national
legal culture, but is also a convinced European. A good judge adheres to
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the EU’s judicial spirit, and acts ‘as a pontiff, a bridge between different
interests in EU polity’ (Vauchez 2012: 67).
Protecting and Adapting the Institution
The institutional design of the Court allows for plenty of autonomy to
perform its mission. But formal autonomy is no guarantee for a high
degree of institutionalization (Groenleer 2009). An institution can only
exist when it enjoys the support of its stakeholders and remains largely
noncontroversial. But even when stakeholders are content with the perfor-
mance of the institution and support is granted, the institution cannot
sit on its laurels. The world changes and so do the expectations of
stakeholders, requiring an institution to adapt.
Importantly, discussions about the democratic nature of the ECJ
provide a constant source of potential controversy (Schmidt 2018: 12–
13, 245). The realization that a small group of judges imposes significant
constraints on policy-making at the national and European level provides
the ingredients for a domestic political backlash against the Court and
Union, as we have seen in the debate surrounding the UK referendum. In
these discussions, the rights of EU citizens to national welfare dominated
the agenda; rights that were largely shaped by the Court and not by polit-
ical majorities. The German President Roman Herzog at some point even
pledged to stop the ECJ. During treaty negotiations—the only moment
member states can rein the Court in should they so desire—the ECJ has
come up (Schmidt 2018: 40–41). We may thus conclude that the level
of legitimacy enjoyed by the ECJ is tenuous and vulnerable to political
mood swings at the national level.
An important strategy to protect the autonomy of the Court has been
its emphasis on precedent (Schmidt 2018; Stone Sweet 2002). By refer-
ring to its own jurisprudence, it can guard against criticism that the Court
is overstepping its mandate. As long as the Court can make the argument
that it does what it has always done, it is possible to rule on controversial
cases without prompting a barrage of critique (De Somer 2019). Legal
precedent therefore plays an important role in EU jurisprudence. Legal
concepts that are established in one area, are taken up and adopted in
another one, driven by litigants that perceive this development as advan-
tageous. Importantly, when individuals base their claims on EU law they
do not only act in their own interests, but they also legitimate European
laws and ensure compliance (Van Middelaar 2013: 50). If the Court were
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to change its interpretation of EU law often, it could hardly aspire to
decentralized enforcement via national courts.
Some actors necessarily lose out in this process of expanding case-
law development, and it is crucial to understand why they cannot block
it. The highest national courts have lost their exceptional position since
the ECJ became the apex of the European court hierarchy. These courts
understandably were reluctant to accept the constitutionalization of EU
law. Especially the French Conseil d’État (‘supremacy challenges the
sovereignty of the French Parliament’) and the German Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht (‘the Community lacks democracy and basic rights’) were
reluctant. Eventually, the courts of these most powerful member states
accepted the supreme position of the ECJ (France in 1989 and 1999,
and Germany in 1986) (Saurugger and Terpan 2017: 33, 109–114).
Important for this step was the adaptation strategy of the ECJ, most
notable vis-à-vis the German constitutional court (GCC). After the GCC
had been reluctant to accept supremacy because of the missing funda-
mental rights protection in the framework of EU law in a decision in
1974, the ECJ developed such rights in its jurisprudence, so that the
GCC could denounce the need to provide for this protection by itself in
1986 (Davies 2012).
The next question is: why did the member states permit the court to
gain so much power? A purely functional line of argumentation, as we
have seen above, would point out that the ECJ helped to clarify the ambi-
guities of the European Treaties. A political approach would suggest that
the ECJ acted in accordance with the interests of powerful states (Garrett
1995; Stone Sweet 2010: 17). After all, the Court can only count on
continued member state compliance when its rulings do not venture too
far away from member state preferences. Member states can too easily
ignore ECJ decisions if they are against their interests (Garrett 1995).
The ECJ has been careful not to cross any red lines that the member
states had drawn (Garrett 1995: 172; Alter 2009: 120; Schmidt 2018:
42–43). The Court has not become a ‘lone ranger pushing the devel-
opment of case law’ and has ‘shown itself responsive to the way that
member states intervene’ (Schmidt 2018: 237, 239). It appears to assess
the political ramifications of its rulings. For instance, the ECJ stopped
the expansion of entitlements of economically inactive EU citizens after
the issue got increasingly politicized in richer Western member states
(Blauberger et al. 2018). More in general, the Court is attentive to the
thrust of (written and oral) observations that governments can submit to
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make their legal interpretation heard to the Court, following these about
50% of the time (Larsson and Naurin 2016).13
The ECJ appears to mediate between judicial activism (furthering inte-
gration) and listening carefully to the concerns of member states. The
Court usually tries to justify its decisions by pointing to the common
interest of the member states and the objectives of the treaty (Burley
and Mattli 1993: 68). Moreover, the Court tests the impact of poten-
tially important rulings through its incremental building of case law
(Alter 1998). The preliminary ruling procedure has also been helpful in
shielding the Court from national criticism. It allows the Court to avoid
conflict with member states, as the formal ruling is left to the national
court (Weiler 1991).
Crucial is that in building EU law the Court can rely on those private
actors that pursue interests compatible with those of the Community
(Stone Sweet 2010: 17). European law provides an opportunity struc-
ture for private actors. They can turn to European law, for instance for
strengthening liberalization via the four freedoms and competition law,
or further non-discrimination policies via turning to the ECJ. States are
no longer gatekeepers to the EU polity (Schmidt 2018: 50). The involve-
ment of private actors simultaneously boosts the legitimacy of the Court.
Its rulings respond to needs voiced by actors that are also important
interlocutors at the national level.
In addition, the Court’s long-term investment in building a transna-
tional legal community pays off (Vauchez 2015). In the early years,
when the Court’s existence was anything but guaranteed, ECJ personnel
worked hard to establish the Court as the supreme court on questions
of EU law (Burley and Mattli 1993: 62–63), ensuring that lawyers were
aware of the (benefits of) the preliminary ruling procedure. The ECJ
organized trips to Luxembourg for national judges, where they were
wined and dined. The ECJ helped national judges by framing and writing
their preliminary ruling requests. National judges were socialized into
viewing the ECJ as an alternative venue that could benefit their position.
European judges participated in scholarly conferences and contributed to
legal journals (Alter 2009: 70). As a result, this emerging European legal
community widely deliberated on the ECJ’s rulings, heightening broader
awareness of the Court’s importance (Alter 2009: 73–76; Vauchez 2015:
124–129).
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Finally, ECJ judges visited national capitals to generate news coverage
and inform the general public (Alter 2009: 71). Such networking activi-
ties remain an important part of the Court’s daily business. In 2018, the
Court received 2292 national judges in Luxembourg for visits or training
seminars (CJEU 2019c: 19). The year 2018 saw the founding of the Judi-
cial Network of the European Union (JNEU), which links the supreme
and constitutional courts of member states with the ECJ, and fosters
information exchange on the interpretation of EU law and on training
material (CJEU 2019c: 57).
The ECJ learned early on that it might have to sell its mission and
deeds to the world. Van Gend en Loos presented a unique vision of
Europe’s nature and future: ‘a unified legal order where EC norms have
direct effect and prevail over national norms’ (Vauchez 2015: 116). Its
seminal rulings initially appeared meek. All the Court can do is providing
an opportunity structure to other actors. Thus, Van Gend en Loos had to
be used by the law community and the Commission, and the same is true
for other judgements, such as the Cassis de Dijon ruling, which helped
completing of the single market (Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994). As
such, seminal rulings are ambiguously formulated and do not speak for
themselves. Euro-lawyers, Court members and the Commission first have
to engage in a form of ‘interpretative activism’ to clarify the importance
of rulings, constructing each one as a ‘constitutive principle of an overall
doctrine’ (Vauchez 2015: 125–127).
The Unplanned Institutionalization of the ECJ
The story of the ECJ reminds us how much institutionalization matters.
Becoming an institution meant that a particular vision of the European
treaties—as a constitution imposed on the legal order of member states—
was enshrined in the thinking and ruling of a small group of appointed
judges. Institutionalization guaranteed that, over time, new judges stuck
with this vision and employed to formulate rights that are nowhere to
be found in European treaties. By becoming an institution, the ECJ
‘weaponized’ (cf. Selznick 1952) a particular vision of the EU that has
had tremendous impact on member states and EU institutions alike.
In its early years, the Court was an unlikely candidate for becoming
one of the most important European institutions. Institutional status had
to be earned. Once achieved, it remained precarious. So how did a small
‘coal and steel court’ become such a powerful institution? The chapter
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has shown that the ECJ’s institutionalization was not designed, but rather
discovered. In hindsight, we can recognize certain patterns of behaviour
that helped to lift the Court from its initial invisibility and expected
insignificance. The eventual invention of its current mission as guardian
of European integration was made possible by the appointment to the
Court of a small group of influential ‘believers’ in the early 1960s. They
introduced and organized around a powerful idea that provided guidance
in the development of the Court’s practices.
Once the importance of the mission was realized, its maintenance
became an objective in itself. Organizational mechanisms were designed
that instil a shared sense of purpose in new members, and ensure
continuity and uniformity. Rituals were introduced that reiterated the
importance of the golden years and the ‘Big Men’ who had made the
Court. At the same time, the mission was applied in practice with guarded
zealousness. An example is the caution of the principle that big decisions
are best tested in small cases—allowing the Court a way out if it would
become clear that big ideas provoke unsuspected resistance.
While Court members believed in the mission, they had an acute
understanding of the importance of building strong relations with
national courts, the European Commission and member states. They
sensed that any of these critical stakeholders was easily rubbed the wrong
way. The Court therefore built on the support of national courts and
litigants while taking pains to listen to member states’ perspectives. This
long-term effort to create an ecology of believers who become supporters
proved very helpful over the years.
Institutionalization is the path that organizations follow to become
institutions. This path may be short and straight; it often turns out to
be long and winding. This case study reminds us that institutionaliza-
tion may also harbour the roots of future deinstitutionalization. The
Court’s most enduring source of legitimacy, the constitutionalization of
EU treaties, has the potential to become a cause of discontent. The mech-
anisms that maintain the Court’s mission are also the mechanisms that
make adaptation hard.
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Questions for Discussion
1. Can you summarize the impact that the ECJ has had on the
integration of EU member states over the years?
2. We know very little about the internal functioning of the ECJ. Do
you think this absence of transparency worked well for the institu-
tionalization of the Court? What difference would a higher level of
transparency have made in this regard?
3. Can you think of a scenario in which the ECJ would suffer a
sustained phase of delegitimization?
4. In your opinion, who are the most important actors in the ECJ’s
authorizing environment?
5. The ECJ enjoys a lot of autonomy. Is that a good thing?
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Notes
1. The French legal advisor Lagrange played a central role in designing the
initial court. He based its design mainly on the French Conseil d’État
(Tamm 2013: 17).
2. These are published on its website https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/
Jo2_7031/en/.
3. Article 35 of the Statute; Article 32 of Rules of Procedure.
4. Article 60, Article 16.
5. Article 245 TFEU.
6. In 2018, 2217 employees worked at these supportive services. The ECJs’
budget was 410 million euros (CJEU 2019c: 18).
7. In 1988 the Court of First Instance (especially for cases concerning
competition and intellectual property) was established to deal with the
increasing workload. After Lisbon, the position of the Court changed,
because the pillar system was dissolved and the Court obtained compe-
tences in the area of freedom, security and justice (with some exceptions),
and the Fundamental Rights Charter was granted the same status as the
Treaties (Arnull 2006: 650–657).
8. These concerns have been echoed by academics. Arguing that the ECJ has
turned the intergovernmental Treaty into a constitution, Grimm (2017)
argues that policy decisions are increasingly made by the Court (rather
than EU legislature) and therefore speaks of ‘over-constitutionalisation’.
Stone Sweet (2007) even speaks of a ‘juridical coup d’état ’.
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9. Intriguingly, the larger states were litigated against, and lost, more often
than smaller states (Germany lost more consistently than any other state)
(Stone Sweet 2010: 21).
10. The Court also started using the terms ‘charter of the community’ and
‘constitutionality’ (Tamm 2013: 19).
11. The Commission also established EU law as an academic field. European
law institutes were founded at several universities, where the Commission
financed doctoral positions and other Community related research. Euro-
pean law journals were founded in which academics could publish their
research on European law and the Court’s rulings (Alter 2009: 69–70).
By creating a European legal academic community, groups were created
which had an interest in expanding the position of the Court (Burley and
Mattli 1993: 65).
12. From the mid-1970s, says Vauchez (2012: 60), the Court ‘began cele-
brating itself as an institution’. There are ceremonies to praise departing
judges, and to welcome new judges. Since the 1970s the number
of commemorative venues has increased (also because of increasing
turnover). Festschriften are partly written by former ECJ judges and there
are always ‘old great men’ who attend the ceremonies of the ECJ. The
Court also celebrates its own anniversaries.
13. Article 23 of the Protocol No. 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice
of the European Union.
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An Institution Under Pressure
The Concertgebouw Orchestra performs symphonic music at the highest
level and across a broad spectrum of canonical and avant-garde orches-
tral music. The orchestra has developed a distinctive sound, conserves
specific orchestral genres (passion music and late Romantic music) while
developing a hitherto unprecedented stylistic flexibility through covering
classical, twentieth-century, contemporary music and mastery of both the
Germanic and the French schools. It delivers the magic of live concerts,
creating a sense of the ephemeral. The Orchestra performs timeless works
of art, keeping the canon of classical music alive for the next generation.
For these reasons, the long-serving (and late) chief conductor, Mariss
Jansons, spoke of the ‘universal orchestra’.
In the fall of 2019, things were in disarray. Only two years after joining
the orchestra, chief conductor Daniele Gatti had been forced to step down
following allegations of ‘inappropriate behavior’. After a successful 11-
year run, Managing Director Jan Raes was about to leave the orchestra,
just months after both the chairman and the treasurer of the Foundation
B. Koopman (B)
Bergen, The Netherlands
© The Author(s) 2021




board had completed their terms in office. Adding to the exodus, Artistic
Director Joel Fried announced his retirement, taking effect in 2020.
This major succession challenge at the top came at a time when the
orchestra was confronted with the pressures of a new Zeitgeist. A consid-
erable part of its audience was ageing, but a new generation of listeners
remained conspicuously absent. The solemnity of the old concert hall
and the classical repertoire no longer seemed attractive to young art
lovers. Government funding was under pressure as well. In 2017, the
influential Dutch Council for the Arts chastised government funders for
their bias towards elite pastimes such as classical music and opera. The
Council advocated a less elitist funding policy that pays more attention to
contemporary music such as hip hop, R&B, dance and electronic music.
The Concertgebouw Orchestra depends almost half of its annual
budget—around 29 million Euro—on public money. Without annual
subsidies, the Concertgebouw Orchestra cannot survive. Appealing to
everlasting cultural values will not suffice in a neoliberal climate. Frus-
tratingly, traditional audiences continue to age and the influx of young
people is stagnating. Most youngsters do not seem to buy the notion
that classical music is that interesting (Van Putten 2016). Performing
a ‘museum’ function is not enough. The Orchestra has to renew the
old canon, adding new classics and reworking accepted ones to remain
attractive to an audience that has many entertainment choices.
That is exactly what the Orchestra has tried to do. The Orchestra
continually seeks to renew itself, while staying true to its identity as
a cultural carrier. It has created partnerships with other cultural orga-
nizations such as museums and theatres. It has designed new forms
of presentation, such as short late-night concerts for ‘yuppies’ without
intermission and followed by cocktails. The Orchestra’s value proposi-
tion has been clear and consistent: preserving a cultural heritage for new
generations, while providing a platform for the works of contemporary
innovators of orchestral music.
Yet behind the scenes, the ride to stay on top of its game has been a
rocky one. In its long existence, the Concertgebouw Orchestra has faced
a crisis of sorts nearly every decade or so, often revolving around conflicts
between artistic and business interests. The Orchestra has survived each
and every one of these crises. With the Gatti case—a rare Me-Too erup-
tion on the Dutch classical music scene—the Orchestra weathered yet
another storm. Sponsors, donors and the audience remained fiercely loyal
to the orchestra proving itself a ‘strong brand’ that elicits robust support
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at a time when it could easily have become vulnerable. Over the years, it
has demonstrated an enduring vitality in the face of recurrent turbulence.
The Orchestra is more than a group of top musicians, excelling on
international stages. The Concertgebouw Orchestra provides a sense of
identity to a city and its urban elites. Influential patrons have tradition-
ally supported the institution with their money and political acumen.
The nineteenth-century founders of the Concertgebouw building and the
Concertgebouw Orchestra were members of the urban aristocracy who
wanted to provide allure to the city of Amsterdam, while rubbing them-
selves into that newfound allure. They wanted to be identified with a
majestic concert hall and the elevated practice of symphonic music. To
this day, the concert hall and the orchestra both have a robust appeal to
a select group of wealthy sponsors and corporate donors, including some
of the Netherlands’ most prestigious corporations.
How did the orchestra evolve into an institution, defined here as an
organizational form that reliably performs a societal task or function in
a highly valued way? This chapter investigates how the Concertgebouw
Orchestra learned to navigate two sets of colliding forces and how that has
shaped its character. One such force was organizational in character and
pertains to the complex relation between the Concertgebouw building
and the Concertgebouw orchestra. The second source of turbulence has
been the tension between artistic and commercial visions. These two
forces continually test the relationship between the chief conductor and
the business director of any top orchestra. By mastering these challenges,
the Concertgebouw Orchestra has become an enduring institution.
An Auspicious Beginning
The early decades of the Concertgebouw Orchestra make for a compelling
story of legendary chief conductors and a superior concert hall.1 In the
late 1880s, a new music temple with unique acoustics was built on the
southern edge of Amsterdam. It was founded and funded by six wealthy
citizens—a lawyer, an equity trader, a banker, a cotton trader, a wine
merchant and an attorney—who thought the time was ripe for the city
to boast an ambitious, high-performing orchestra and a concert hall to
match it. To this effect, they invested part of their private fortunes,
earned in the Dutch East Indies and on the Amsterdam stock exchange,
and founded the Concertgebouw Ltd. They governed both building and
orchestra, acting as the employer of its musicians and staff (until 1952).
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The Concertgebouw opened its doors in the Spring of 1888. Six
months later, the Concertgebouw Orchestra staged its first performance.
Violinist, conductor and composer Willem Kes was the first perma-
nent chief conductor and artistic leader of the orchestra. He introduced
a broad repertoire, including contemporary orchestral music, to the
Amsterdam audience and instilled a culture of disciplined musicianship
within the orchestra. Under Kes’s 7-year reign, the concertgoing public
was socialized into the kind of concert etiquette that prevailed in other
major centres of classical music around Europe, banning waiters, smoking
and chatting during performances that had been customary around
Amsterdam prior to the opening of the Concertgebouw.2
In 1895, Kes was succeeded by Willem Mengelberg—at just 24 years
of age. In his extraordinary half-a-century reign as chief conductor and
leader of the orchestra, Mengelberg turned the Orchestra into a top-
tier musical institution. Craving for perfection, Mengelberg transformed
peripheral and pedestrian Amsterdam into an internationally respected
centre of classical music on par with traditional strongholds such as Berlin
and Vienna. His music, portions of which have been recorded, stood out
by compelling interpretations rooted in the architecture of the composi-
tions. Especially striking were Mengelberg’s engaging style of conducting,
the blending of the instruments, the extraordinary rhythmic precision,
and his strongly developed sense for detail and transparent orchestral
sound (Zwart 1999).
Institution-Building Leadership
The authoritarian Mengelberg turned the orchestra into a highly disci-
plined and cohesive unit, thanks to a rigorous selection of orchestra musi-
cians and uncompromising performance expectations. Endless rehearsals
lifted the orchestra to an ever-higher level. Film footage shows how he
conducted: with radiant energy, demonstrating a clear and demonstrative
baton technique (Bowen and Holden 2005: 127).
Mengelberg struck a judicious balance between devoting much atten-
tion to monumental and iconic works of classical music such as Bach’s
Matthäus-Passion and the avant-garde of contemporary composers, such
as Mahler, Richard Strauss and Schönberg. Mengelberg’s commitment
to performing both iconic and emerging composers gave the orchestra
its distinctive character and shaped its size and staffing. Mengelberg
invited conducting composers to Amsterdam, such as Debussy, Grieg
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and Schönberg. Furthermore, he brought works of Dutch composers
such as Diepenbrock and Dopper to the Amsterdam audience. The
musicians’ curiosity and commitment in performing lesser-known pieces
and composers contributed to the orchestra’s much-lauded chameleonic
character.
His close ties with living composers helped shape the orchestra’s
distinctive character as both guardian and modernizer of classical music.
His friendship with leading contemporary international composers such
as Gustav Mahler and Richard Strauss proved an artistic asset. Both regu-
larly came to Amsterdam to conduct their own works, as Mengelberg
vigorously championed their music. Mahler considered the Netherlands
his second cultural homeland after his native Austria. The acoustics of
the Concertgebouw building were ideal for this late Romantic reper-
toire. A grateful Strauss dedicated his symphonic poem Ein Heldenleben
to Mengelberg and the Orchestra.
Quality control in selection and retention of musicians was and remains
a cornerstone of the Concertgebouw Orchestra’s quality and reputation.
The audition process originally set up by Mengelberg and evolving further
under his successors boils down to a big knockout competition—with the
musician coming in and playing behind a screen to ensure the influence
of considerations concerning gender, ethnicity, age and appearance. Only
one per cent of the candidates end up in the Orchestra. The process is
nerve-wracking for the musicians being auditioned. Auditioning success-
fully requires a complete fusion of musician, music and instrument. The
difference between good and outstanding is small but critical and the jury
is extremely selective. A vacancy remains unfilled until someone is found
who has the desired level. Until then, the orchestra will fall back on substi-
tutes. Once in the seat, the musician must display a sufficiently strong
personality, yet prove flexible and able to adapt in what is a demanding
job involving ceaseless study, rehearsal, performances, travel, recordings,
meetings with sponsors and the need to ‘get along’ in a community of
precocious talents. The musicians must sacrifice economic comfort for
artistic integrity: they earn on average 35% less than their colleagues in
other top orchestras.
Part of the Orchestra’s reputation for the vigilance and adaptability of
its musicians stemmed from an unexpected quarter: the peculiar acoustics
of the Concertgebouw. On the concert stage, musicians were not seated
particularly near to each other and could not hear each other very well
(and this is still the case today). Therefore, they were compelled to listen
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very intently during play. This bred a level of concentration and alertness
that was second nature and became a source of the young orchestra’s
growing reputation (Ferwerda 2013: 127).
The creation of the orchestra had occurred under a lucky star.
The economic growth at the end of the nineteenth century was a
major contributing factor. Yet financing the two-pronged endeavour—
the building and the orchestra from scratch—entirely with private money
proved challenging. From the 1910s onwards, first municipal and then
national government funding was required. In return for the subsidies,
government funders demanded subscription concerts as well as ‘people’s
concerts’ for music lovers who were less well-off. Both types of concerts
required the orchestra to diversify its programming and further broaden
its repertoire to cater to the tastes of a broader public.
Its public stature increased thanks to the touring of major concert
halls in several European countries, starting in 1895, and thanks to its
growing body of recordings—initially released on 78 rpm records. Inter-
national tours and recordings reinforced each other in the orchestra’s
quest for artistic prestige. In sum, within two decades after its founding,
the orchestra could pride itself on a distinct identity, a highly rated
competence and a fast-growing international reputation. The latter found
expression in endorsements from members of the royal family, ministers,
musicologists and composers from across Europe. The daily La Libre
Belgique wrote in 1926 that ‘the Concertgebouw Orchestra, together
with the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra, has mastery over the symphonic
world’ (Bottenheim 1950: 81).
The Mahler festival, organized in 1919/1920 on the occasion
of Mengelberg’s 25th anniversary as chief conductor, formed a first
apotheosis of the orchestra’s ascent. It was not just an artistic highlight
in the life of the building and the orchestra: with musicians from around
Europe participating in the proceedings it became somewhat of a cultural
peace conference, reuniting key players from Germany and France who
had been on opposite sides of the Great War and had barely interacted
since.
As the institution-building leader who had brought the orchestra up to
world class, Mengelberg became a revered figure. As his fame spread, he
made a series of high-profile guest appearances throughout eastern and
western Europe and the United States, with an important side engage-
ment as principal conductor of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra
between 1922 and 1930 (Bowen and Holden 2005: 126). The second
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half of Mengelberg’s career took a darker turn, getting hamstrung by
fiscal and financial malaise and eventually ruined by his pro-German atti-
tude and behaviour during the German occupation of the Netherlands
during World War II. The former folk hero fell from grace after the end
of the war and was no longer allowed to conduct in the Netherlands.
Until his death in 1951 he lived a reclusive life in Switzerland, feeling
banished and misunderstood (Zwart 2019).
Tensions and Conflicts
Behind the façade of the ostensibly seamless upward trajectory of the
orchestra, significant tensions occasionally flared up. Firstly, there was
the uneasy duopoly—common in many arts organizations—between the
Chief Conductor and the Business Director, each representing a partic-
ular set of values and priorities within the orchestra’s system. As early as
1902/1903 a power struggle took place between Mengelberg and busi-
ness director (and previously a horn-playing member of the orchestra)
Willem Hutschenruyter. This so-called ‘Concertgebouw conflict’ took
place against the background of growing disgruntlement of the musi-
cians about the great difference in salary between themselves and the
conductor, who earned eight times as much as they did. It evolved
around four issues: the position of the orchestra vis-à-vis the board of
the Concertgebouw Ltd. that owned and operated both the building and
the orchestra; the position of the orchestra vis-à-vis the chief conductor;
the position of the business director within the orchestra-conductor
force field; and, perhaps most important of all, Mengelberg’s dictatorial
behaviour towards the musicians (Samama 1988: 20–21). All parties made
their complaints known to the board. Emotions ran high. The board sided
with the chief conductor; the business director left and the orchestra had
to cop it.
Notwithstanding—or perhaps as a response to—Mengelberg’s long
reign characterized by autocratic leadership, the orchestra’s musicians
developed a remarkable democratic self-consciousness. In 1915, they
founded the Association ‘Het Concertgebouworchest’ (sic) in order to
promote their interests with the board of the Concertgebouw and the
chief conductor. Meanwhile in the 1930s, history repeated itself when
conductor Mengelberg came into conflict with another business director,
his namesake and distant relative Rudolf Mengelberg. As far as the
conductor was concerned, Rudolf Mengelberg was to have position nor
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title on a par with his own stature, but nevertheless was expected to solve
all the orchestra’s organizational problems, including financial setbacks
(Zwart 2016: 342). The director stood his ground and demanded to be
given a suitable level of authority. This time, the conductor backed down
and the board retained the director.
Secondly, almost from day one there were financial troubles. This
should not come as a surprise; many cultural institutions suffer from
them. American economists William Baumol and William G. Bowen
made a connection between expenses of performing arts institutions
(ballet, dance, music, theatre) and technological progress, which in
most economic sectors boosts productivity. Orchestral labour productivity
hardly rises. To perform a Mahler symphony, a certain number of musi-
cians and a certain amount of time are needed. Playing faster with fewer
musicians is not an option. Expenses in the labour-intensive orchestra
world rise faster than in market-oriented sectors which have substan-
tial possibilities to boost productivity. The consequence of this is a ‘cost
disease’ which will inevitably cause budgetary problems, though orches-
tras such as André Rieu’s that confine themselves to highly popular niches
within orchestral music may at times beat the odds (Koopman 2018:
231–233).
In Amsterdam, the orchestra’s private founders were faced with refi-
nancing challenges and budget overruns. As maintenance costs of the
building increased and wages of musicians and the chief conductor rose,
it became more difficult to stay in the black, which was reflected in
the patterns of patronage. In the decade following 1910, the traditional
patronage proved insufficient to cover the costs. Public funding in the
form of subsidies from the city and the state became a necessity, but with
it came another set of actors whose views had to be taken into account
in charting the course of the orchestra and rendering account of how the
public’s money was being spent.
Thirdly, the relation between the chief conductor and the business
director had become an endemic source of tension. From day one,
the regents of the building had given the chief conductor a very wide
berth. This model regularly caused tensions involving Mengelberg and
his successors and their business director counterparts. Given the fact that
the board had few levers at its disposal to diffuse these tensions, conflicts
could easily spin out of control. The demarcation of tasks and responsi-
bilities was blurred. The director was supposed to implement decisions
of the board and focus on administrative tasks. In consultation with the
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board he had to find a balance between the artistic mission zealously
pursued and defended by the chief conductor and the personal, financial
and organizational possibilities of the institution.
A cultural institution like the Amsterdam Orchestra can thus be decon-
structed in various organizational units (Orchestra, building, commerce).
Each of these units is represented by what Selznick (1957) referred to as
administrative elites. An institution can only move forward and stay true
to its founding mission if these elites find a way to work together. Insti-
tutional leadership is effective if it becomes collective leadership. In the
remainder of this chapter, we will see that institutional balance is both
jeopardized and achieved by these administrative elites.
Post-War Consolidation:
Towards Self-Governance
The Second World War had a major impact on the institution. During
the war years, both the building and the Orchestra benefited from the
German occupier’s expansive culture funding. Budgets had grown expo-
nentially in 1940–1944, especially in the music sector. Post-war culture
ministers stuck to this budget, even stretching it further.
At the same time, the Orchestra’s wartime choices scarred its repu-
tation. The military authority and the Ereraad voor Muziek, a post-war
purging body, assessed that the board, the artistic management and the
orchestra had done too little to resist the assault on its music by the
German occupier. The government had expected a stronger sense of
responsibility. Conductor Mengelberg was banned from ever conducting
again in the Netherlands because of his compliant attitude towards the
occupation. His intended successor Van Beinum was reprimanded and
Rudolf Mengelberg was suspended as a director of the Concertgebouw
for two years. Thirteen of the sixteen Jewish members of the orchestra
who had been fired in 1941 had survived the war and returned to the
orchestra.
Van Beinum eventually did take over the baton from Mengelberg.
Using a more democratic leadership style than Mengelberg, Van Beinum
succeeded in re-energizing the musicians and steering the orchestra back
to public popularity, although not without significant hiccups. When
experiencing a period of ill health he was obliged to hand over the baton
to a guest conductor. The job was given to Paul van Kempen who was
controversial because of his musical activities in Germany during the
170 B. KOOPMAN
Second World War. Such a tainted past was extremely sensitive shortly
after the war, when right in front of the Concertgebouw, there were still
German bunkers. A fierce row erupted, including major protest actions
outside the concert hall that even made it into The New York Times.
The uproar reopened a fault line in the governance of the institution.
The musicians had become tired of the paternalistic style of the regents of
the building, who under the existing governance structure could unilat-
erally set wages and hire and fire conductors and business directors. The
regents were businessmen, and the musicians felt that the orchestra’s
artistic and organizational interests were held back by the regents’ incli-
nation to put the running of the building first and that of the orchestra
second. They wanted to escape this straightjacket.
The quest for autonomy of the orchestra musicians and the polit-
ical support for this ambition among the Amsterdam city council and
part of the press had grown to such an extent that the unrest could no
longer be squelched. The conflict became public in 1950, dragged on
for many months, regularly creating headlines and triggering passionate
political debates. Eventually, a solution was reached that involved a new
set of arrangements between four parties: the ministry of Education, Arts
and Sciences, the city of Amsterdam; the Concertgebouw Ltd.; and the
Concertgebouw Orchestra, which was now acknowledged as a separate
entity for the first time. In 1951, a direct relationship was created between
the two governments and the orchestra, which meant that the subsidies
no longer flowed via the Concertgebouw Ltd. In 1954, after a transition
phase, a permanent foundation was established to be at the helm of the
governance of the orchestra. Day-to-day management was put into the
hands of a triumvirate: the Chief Conductor and a 2-person executive
consisting of an artistic and a business director.
Though governance and revenue streams of building and orchestra
had been decoupled, the Concertgebouw building remained the name-
sake and sound chamber of the Orchestra. The Concertgebouw Ltd.
remained its landlord and service provider—being the owner/operator of
the large instruments and the music library as well as the party handling
the Orchestra’s financial and subscriptions administration on a fee-for-
service basis. Having lost government subsidies (which now went entirely
to the Orchestra), the Concertgebouw building got into dire straits finan-
cially, causing the building to slide into a state of disrepair in the 1950s.
Climate control suffered. In winter, people would turn up their collars or
wear their coats and scarves. In summer, temperatures could surge and
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the windows at the top of the hall were opened, producing a downdraft
over audience and orchestra members. Strings players’ shoulders and arms
hurt, wind instrument players struggled with condensation, harps had to
be retuned (Koopman and Berkhout 2015: 26).
The new governance structure meant a new beginning for the
Orchestra. The founding document of the newly independent Orchestra
states: ‘The purpose of the foundation is to promote the Dutch music
culture by means of the conservation and development of the Concert-
gebouw Orchestra and by staging music performances by this orchestra,
using all the legal purposes serving this goal’. This formula remains valid
today.3
With the separation, the Orchestra gained autonomy. A form of
self-governance was introduced. The Foundation Royal Concertgebouw
Orchestra employs the staff and musicians, most of whom are members
of the aforementioned Association. Three members of its board are also
member of the foundation board and are thus directly involved in all
board decisions. The orchestra’s artistic and business directors—who
are named by the foundation board and may not be a member of the
Association—interact with musicians on all levels. Artistic policy is deter-
mined by the Artistic Council (Artistiek Beraad) which includes the chief
conductor, the artistic leader and representatives of the management and
the orchestra.
It seems, as one former director once sighed, that everybody is forever
evaluating everybody else at the orchestra. At times, this has certainly bred
conflicts, slowing down decision-making and causing a degree of inertia.
But this adversarial process also helped the administrative elites to find the
required balance that a cultural institution under pressure so badly needs.
Dealing with New Maestros
Within any orchestra, the margin between order and chaos is small. Top
orchestras need strong leadership. But a chief conductor has to earn and
then use the hard-gained authority to imbue the orchestra with a musical
vision and equip it to deliver on that vision.
In many ways, the leadership style of Mengelberg’s post-war successors
Eduard van Beinum (1945–1959) and Bernard Haitink (1963–1988) was
refreshing after more than half a century of Mengelberg’s authoritarian
leadership. Both chose to give the musicians room to develop themselves
and demonstrate their skills. And unlike Mengelberg, both were adverse
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to snobbery. The drawback of Van Beinum’s personable, informal style
was that it might open the door to a decline in the discipline instilled by
Mengelberg and which had served the orchestra well. His term as a chief
conductor ended abruptly when died of a heart attack during a rehearsal,
not even 60 years old.
His legacy was soon eclipsed by Haitink, who became the stand-out
conductor of the post-war orchestra. He took up the position when he
was in his early thirties, and was initially seconded by the experienced
German conductor Eugen Jochum. His early period with the orchestra
was anything but easy. Originally trained as a violin player and relatively
inexperienced as a conductor, he had to become an authority figure for
an orchestra whose veteran musicians had played under the great Mengel-
berg and had internalized his style and standards. It was a hard grind, but
his dedication and technique helped win them over.
He was helped along by demographic change. Just as the young
Haitink was gaining some authority with the group, a watershed genera-
tional change occurred. The old guard gradually made way for a younger
cohort that brought the spirit of the roaring sixties into the Concertge-
bouw. They no longer took the power of authority figures for granted,
and were wont to argue with conductor and directors every step of the
way. Yet, within the orchestral world with its internal focus, where in the
end one single man decides, a more democratic culture is difficult to instil.
Indeed, initiatives and innovations not advocated for or at least
condoned by the chief conductor were therefore bound to have a
hard time. For example, the energetic post-war orchestra director Piet
Heuwekemeijer had a vision of a large pool of musicians from which
he could form a symphonic core as well as a chamber orchestra and
several smaller ensembles. In his view, musicians could perform a broad
repertoire that way.
Heuwekemeijer, who had played the violin in the Orchestra in the past,
sought to revive this vision, which he had originally developed during
the last years of the war. But his ideas, however visionary, went too
far for Haitink and part of the orchestra. They feared his plan might
damage the orchestral sound crafted under Mengelberg. In addition, the
musicians also anticipated logistical and practical obstacles. The board
eventually sided with the chief conductor—as it had done during the
notorious Concertgebouw clash of 1903/1904. Another director bit the
dust: Heuwekemeijer left.
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The emerging new culture of classical music not only was a divisive
element internally, it also prompted major criticism from the outside
world. Haitink was not neglecting the new music, but gave it less atten-
tion than his ‘progressive’ critics desired, notwithstanding his frequent
performances of music of moderate modern and sometimes less moderate
modern contemporaries. Five young composers demanded that the
orchestra’s management appoint another conductor alongside Haitink,
who was to be specialized in new music. In their eyes, this expert—
they favoured the charismatic Bruno Maderna—would be the spiritual
successor of Mengelberg, who in his day had introduced the musical inno-
vators of the era, such as Mahler and Richard Straus, to the orchestra.
In late 1969, the rebelling composers disrupted a concert with rattles,
horns and the occasional flute. Some concertgoers cracked nuts. But the
protests failed to achieve their objective. Artistic Director Marius Flothuis
protected Haitink and the orchestra board chose to weather the onslaught
of the angry young men.
Haitink would evolve into a major conductor of global stature. He
spoke about his predecessor Van Beinum respectfully, built a broad reper-
toire without precedent and was acclaimed for his interpretations, which
besides an intense musicality displayed both respect for the score as well
as sensitivity for the nature of the orchestra. He thus developed his
own sound signature. He succeeded in maintaining and exploiting the
orchestra’s Mahler tradition initiated by Mengelberg in an inimitable way,
reaching millions with countless recordings, intercontinental tours to the
United States and Japan and Eurovision Christmas matinee performances.
Besides his commission at the Concertgebouw Orchestra he pursued a
successful second career in England, not only as an orchestra leader but
also as an opera conductor.
An austere man, his professional persona was far removed from the
jet-setting prima donna type modelled by his illustrious contemporaries
Herbert von Karajan and Leonard Bernstein. Under his leadership, the
Concertgebouw Orchestra once again became a close-knit team, inspired
by Haitink and eager to perform. Haitink, in turn, was inspired by the
input of solo instrumentalists within the orchestra. At times, this brought
about magical moments during concerts in which the well-attuned musi-
cians felt exactly what others wanted or would do. A feeling of radical
unity—an unio mystica (Zijderveld 1998: 21; Bekaert et al. 2016: 21).
After the rise of the ensemble culture in the 1960s, the 1980s again
brought new changes impacting symphonic orchestras’ fortunes. The
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shelf life of chief conductors began to diminish. A term of a quarter
of a century, like Haitink or Von Karajan had served, became a thing
of the past. Influenced by the trend of globalization, an army of guest
conductors travelled around the world with their one-night stands, gener-
ally drawing on a limited repertoire. Long-serving chief conductors with
an exceptionally large repertoire, like Haitink, became a rarity. Guest
conductors with a specific focus or specific skills were brought in, such
as Nikolaus Harnoncourt for the performance of old music.
The orchestra’s management failed to communicate its increasing
engagements with guest conductors clearly to Haitink, who himself
worked in England part of the time. A feeling of discomfort and a
level of distrust of the Concertgebouw Orchestra’s management emerged
inside Haitink, and continued to fester ever after (Hagmann and Singer
2019: 22–23, 58–59). The arrival of Harnoncourt imposed limitations
on Haitink’s repertoire. He had to remove works by Bach, Haydn and
Mozart from his programs. This, in addition to the fact that the orches-
tra’s musical director Van Royen had set his eye on the young Italian
conductor Riccardo Chailly as Haitink’s successor and had unveiled this
early on, set the stage for a protracted, tense and emotional final period of
Haitink’s tenure. Dismissal letters were written and withdrawn. A whirl-
wind of rumours occurred and accusations were widely reported in the
media.
In the final phase, Haitink only interacted with the orchestra inspector,
the manager of the podium staff who operates in the bowels of the
building. The orchestra’s audience base was incensed by the drama and so
were the main subsidy providers. The national government’s arts minis-
ters Elco Brinkman urged the parties publicly to cool it, as did Amsterdam
mayor Ed van Thijn. But there was no backing down. Haitink left full of
resentment, disillusioned by the politics of the orchestra’s management,
an abrupt farewell of a chief conductor who had succeeded in ensuring
the post-war orchestra retained its world-class status.
Balancing Artistic and Commercial Interests
During the reign of Haitink’s successor Riccardo Chailly (1988–2004),
tensions between commercial and artistic interests were stretched to the
limit. The post-war orchestra had become strongly subsidy-driven. As
long as the state and the city’s money continued to flow in, the orchestra
contentedly accepted it without thinking of alternative funding. When
7 THE AMSTERDAM CONCERTGEBOUW ORCHESTRA … 175
faced with fiscal crisis in the early 1980s, Dutch authorities began to
curb spending drastically. The ensuing subsidy cuts hit the orchestra
hard. Contributions from sponsors and donors were needed to save the
orchestra from bankruptcy. In the foundation board, thoughtful lawyers
and public administrators made way for entrepreneurs and executives
from the financial world. They knew how to bind companies and banks
to the Orchestra.
Business Director Willem Wijnbergen, who in 1992 had joined the
orchestra following a career at Procter & Gamble, set about ‘cleaning up’
what he considered to be its dusty and tired back office. He also pursued
a strong foreign presence for the orchestra, intensifying its international
touring commitments. By virtue of higher fees paid by foreign concert
halls and numerous CD recordings, he managed to reduce the deficit on
the orchestra’s budget. The orchestra remained dependent on subsidies
but now for slightly less than half of its annual budget—around 29 million
euros today. Over time, the financial reserve built by Wijnbergen in those
years laid the foundation for an endowment whose revenues were used
for the purchase of expensive music instruments and the pursuit of special
projects.4
At this time, the Concertgebouw building’s finances were in better
shape than those of the orchestra. Its Director, Martijn Sanders, who had
worked in the movie theatre business, had managed to win the support of
top businesses, authorities and individuals for the ailing institution with an
American-style fundraising campaign. Twenty million euros were spent to
put the sagging building on a new foundation, modernize it and add an
extension, a new cellar and modern technical installations. The concerts
continued during the renovations.
The building’s executive board pursued event programming policies
that gave more airtime to other musical acts. It featured a series of ‘World
famous symphonic orchestras’. It also set up an endowment to benefit the
preservation of the monumental building as well as projects in the field of
music education and involvement. One thing remained unchanged: the
endemic tension between the operating logic of the building and that of
the orchestra. For example, legal wrangling regarding the settlement of
the division of the assets between building and orchestra continued four
decades after the 1951 act of separation between the two.
The Orchestra’s artistic integrity remained intact. The arrival of
Riccardo Chailly in 1988 initially brought in a new era with much late
Romantic, twentieth century and contemporary work. Chailly—in his
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thirties and the first foreign-born chief conductor—was a mediagenic
maestro who eagerly positioned himself in the tradition of Mengel-
berg. He sharpened the orchestra’s artistic profile. His choices forced the
orchestra to study many complex parts within a short period of time. On
top of that, Chailly—a control freak and precision fanatic—rehearsed in
a stricter manner than Haitink had done, leaving the musicians less room
for personal input that they had become accustomed to.
A New Lease on Life
Tensions between administrative elites kept making victims. Wijnbergen’s
commercial approach eventually got him into strife with the well-
respected Artistic Director Jan Zekveld who had joined the orchestra in
1993 but then left prematurely and to considerable media and political
fanfare in 1996. One year later, then-state secretary of Culture Aad
Nuis warned of a downward spiral in which the orchestra produced an
ever-rising number of CDs geared to attract prestige abroad, and trading
its artistic excellence for a safer ‘middle of the road’ repertoire that
was required to sell CDs. Wijnbergen saw the writing on the wall and
resigned in 1998.
He was succeeded in 1998 by the experienced Orchestra Director
Jan Willem Loot. Upon his arrival, Loot pioneered a new management
model. The co-equal triumvirate model with a chief conductor, a business
and an artistic director had outlasted its usefulness, with more and more
unresolved conflicts between them landing on the desks of the orches-
tra’s foundation’s board. Under the new model, the executive board
became a triumvirate, yet with Loot as a clear primus inter pares as general
managing director, to be seconded and supported by an artistic and a
business director. In relation to the chief conductor, he opted for a form
of shared, complementary leadership: the managing director and the chief
conductor became equal partners.
Entrepreneurship soon flourished. The Orchestra relied on three
complementary forms of patronage—traditional patronage, considerable
levels of public funding and corporate sponsorship. Managing Director
Loot caused a stir with the creation of a dedicated new record label for
the orchestra.5 Loot also invested in a concert series with an adventurous
repertoire, which attracted a lot of attention. His equally experienced
successor Jan Raes likewise was unafraid to take risks. He professionalized
the in-house orchestral academy for emerging talent, raised the number
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of family concerts, educational apps, interdisciplinary concert formulas in
cooperation with other Amsterdam art institutions and partnerships with
primary and secondary education. These initiatives helped to preserve
a balance between the Orchestra’s financial needs and its institutional
integrity.
But it was an uneasy balance, which chief conductors not always found
easy to handle. Chailly, a classic prima donna who had already strug-
gled with the Amsterdam orchestral democracy upon his arrival, found
it especially difficult. Chailly’s leadership style gradually prompted rising
irritation and increasing levels of sick leave among the orchestra musicians.
In the middle of the 1990s, there was criticism of Chailly’s interpretations
of French and late Romantic music, among which that of Mahler—the
historical trademark of the orchestra. Yet there was also a kind of gritted
respect for the ease with which he conducted the modern repertoire and
opera music. But the general atmosphere in and around the orchestra left
much to be desired at this time. Disappointed by what he saw as disre-
spectful machinations, Chailly moved to Leipzig in 2004—yet another
painful parting of a long-serving chief conductor.
With his successor Jansons, the partnership model proved very effec-
tive. The 61-year-old Latvian, the first incoming chief conductor with
decades of world-class experience under his belt, turned out to be the
mature and visionary orchestra leader everybody wanted. In his view,
the chief conductor is someone who takes care of his orchestra members
while guarding his artistic and human principles. Setting extremely high
standards in recruitment and retention, he was at the same time deeply
respected within the Orchestra for his empathy and professionalism.
One concern was the fact that Jansons—like Van Beinum—had a heart
condition, was under permanent medical supervision and was sometimes
absent.
Under Jansons, the orchestra flourished artistically. He questioned
nearly everything. Following a day of rehearsing in a certain tempo, he
could easily surprise the Orchestra in the evening by opting for another
tempo at the concert. This was in sharp contrast with Chailly, who rarely
deviated from the rehearsed tempo. Jansons could master almost every
style. He extended the Orchestra’s repertoire, fitting well his notion of
the ‘universal orchestra’. Jansons also upheld the Amsterdam Mahler
tradition. In his opinion, few composers were able to express such an
unparalleled spectrum of moods and thoughts, from drama and joy to
sarcasm and hatred.
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In 2013, the orchestra went on a world tour, also visiting Africa
and Australia. The documentary of this tour was a major hit on Dutch
television, introducing the Orchestra to a large audience and turning
its musicians into public personalities. Between 2016 and 2018, the
orchestra visited all EU member states. It performed together with local
youth orchestras. Raes also initiated a European orchestra project for
young talent. Moreover, in 2018 he signed for the acquisition and reno-
vation of the privately financed RCO House. The new accommodation
combined staff offices, rehearsal studios and a small concert hall for
chamber music—a e10 million project.
Jansons succeeded in firmly embedding the orchestra within the
highest levels of the symphonic premier league. In 2008, British maga-
zine Gramophone declared the Concertgebouw Orchestra best in the
world, based on a survey among international music critics associated with
among others Die Presse, Le Monde and The New Yorker. Loved by the
orchestra, the critics and the public, he left amicably in 2015.
Thriving Despite Turbulence:
A Resilient Institution
A top orchestra reaches an institutional equilibrium when it reaches
artistic excellence within robust budgetary boundaries while answering to
the notions of external critics with regard to the nature of a top orchestra
(Tovey 2003: 214). Scottish moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre sees
a connection between practices and institutions (MacIntyre 2007: 218–
226). Respect for traditions—conceived of by MacIntyre (2007: 257) as
‘embodying continuities of conflict’—is a sine qua non for artistic labour.6
To enter a practice is to enter into a relationship not only with one’s
contemporary practitioners, but also with those who have preceded us in
the practice, particularly those whose achievements extended the reach of
the practice to its present point.
Projecting MacIntyre’s philosophy onto the Orchestra, we recognize
the everlasting battle between artistic aspirations and commercial inter-
ests; between traditions, meanings and values and techniques, processes
and procedures—in short, between substantial and functional rationality.
When artistic goals are pursued so strongly as to dwarf commercial
considerations an orchestra can rapidly drift into dire straits. Conversely,
when commercialism reigns, safe mainstream programming may ensue
and compromise the artistic stature of an orchestra.
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Balance remains critical. Institutions must acquire money and other
material goods; they are structured in terms of power and status, and
they distribute money, power and status as rewards. Nor could they do
otherwise if they are to sustain the valued, artistic practices of which they
are the bearers. For no practices can survive for any length of time when
institutions cannot sustain them.
Navigating these competing values has proven challenging for the
Concertgebouw Orchestra. As we have seen, it encountered a crisis of
sorts nearly every decade in its existence, usually stemming from escalating
conflicts in negotiating its two embedded fault lines: building v. orchestra,
artistry v. business. Its initial governance was rooted in paternalism and
autocracy. Over time a system of commissions, decision rights and consul-
tation structures evolved that ensured the success of the Orchestra as an
institution. Institutional resilience did not only spring from the leader-
ship of chief conductors and business directors. It also resides with the
members of the Orchestra—one hundred and twenty strong personalities
submitting themselves to one entity, assuming shared responsibility for
maintaining the Orchestra’s values and standards of excellence.
This chapter shows that organizational design is also critically impor-
tant for an institution. During the 1980s/1990s, the Orchestra’s virtuous
cycle came perilously close to sliding into a vicious cycle of decline. The
dyadic structure of an artistic and a business director that was in place at
that time failed to resolve the inherent tensions between artistic ambitions
and commercial imperatives; it even began to undermine effective gover-
nance. Business Director Wijnbergen was focused on generating income
through numerous foreign concerts and an extensive program of CD
recordings, while Artistic Director Zekveld was bent on presenting the
demanding Amsterdam audience with the most magnificent (and expen-
sive) billings. The duopoly model lacked a primus inter pares with the
authority to restrain both parties’ behaviour. There were simply too many
conflicts that paralyzed the organization and risked rendering it stagnant.
It was not until the orchestra’s governance structure was changed
and long-serving general managing directors with broad authority were
appointed (Loot, 1998–2008, and Raes, 2008–2019) at the top of what
was now a triad that a mature and balanced approach began to emerge.
Within this more stable governance framework, artistic dreams could
be spun and musical beauty could be created without losing sight of
the precarious business realities. The subtle balance between home and
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abroad was maintained: the Concertgebouw Orchestra remains both an
Amsterdam orchestra and a global player.
What has remained is the Orchestra’s musical DNA: its velvet string
sound, the golden sound of the brass, the personal timbre of the wood-
wind players and the stylistic flexibility. This DNA has been firmly
embedded within the organization, is difficult to copy and apparently not
dependent on one or a few visionary individuals. The metaphor of the
Ship of Theseus in ancient Athens comes to mind. Each rotting plank
was being replaced and as the years went by, ultimately not a single plank
was original. The ship nevertheless remained, in a sense, Theseus’ ship.
With some luck, an attentive listener can sometimes hear remnants of
Mengelberg’s orchestral sound in today’s orchestra, even though none
of the original musicians play in the orchestra today, and there are musi-
cians from more than twenty nationalities. It is the mystery of the creative
process.
Maintaining Balance in the Face
of Future Challenges
The symphony orchestra is one of the great cultural achievements of
European civilization. It is also one of Europe’s most significant cultural
exports. What began as relatively small collections of musicians in the
courts of central Europe in the seventeenth century has not only grown
in size but also achieved wide geographical spread. Institutionalization
of these orchestras is based on a delicate compromise between financial
needs and basic artistic principles that motivate a community of musicians
and help to win the respect of the public.
Leadership clearly matters in bringing about institutionalization. The
Concertgebouw Orchestra’s musical DNA and international reputation
builds on Mengelberg’s conductorship. He laid the foundation for the
Mahler tradition, an interactive practice that continues to be maintained
and exploited today. The orchestra leader made ample use of the freedom
granted to him by the Concertgebouw’s culture regents. This regularly
caused tensions between conductor and director, and among his succes-
sors. This model, a recurring rupture, proved a fruitful basis for an
ever-renewing and successful orchestra.
The Concertgebouw Orchestra will have to find an answer to the
changing audience demographic and preferences. This does not mean
it needs to bring in laser beams and smoke machines or perform one
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blockbuster after another to please the audience. The solution might be
found within the orchestra’s own history. Mengelberg made friends with
composing contemporaries. The current orchestra could reach out to
leading twenty-first-century composers who have breached into younger
and bigger audiences, such as Christiaan Richter.
Tensions will always remain. Financially, the Orchestra is always skating
on thin ice. The Orchestra most likely will remain dependent on sponsor
and donor contributions. So far, this has not damaged its artistic
autonomy and there are no indications that its decline is imminent. But
institutional balance between artistic necessities and financial needs is
essential. Competing orchestras in Germany, Austria or the United States
are always tugging on Amsterdam’s top talents. Moreover, for financial
reasons, international top talent looking for an orchestra position is likely
to think twice before auditioning in Amsterdam, where one has to accept
substantially lower salaries. Artistic standards and institutional integrity
must be defended. The Orchestra is too important to be allowed to
subside into cultural antiquity for an ever-shrinking group of interested
music historians (Cottrell2005: 251, 264).
Questions for Discussion
1. Maintaining a balance between artistic vision and financial realities
is a central challenge for any cultural organization. What can be
learned from the Concertgebouw Orchestra’s institutional journey?
2. What lessons can be drawn from the Concertgebouw Orchestra’s
experiences in striving to balance ‘museal’ and the ‘laboratory’
functions that other cultural organizations might find useful?
3. How has the Concertgebouw Orchestra’s authorizing environment
evolved over time and how have these changes impact upon its
institutional legitimacy?
4. The story of the Concertgebouw Orchestra is a story about organi-
zational elites. What lessons can be learned that may be useful for
the management of the various elites in an institution?
5. What key challenges to the value propositions and mission of
cultural institutions exist at the present time? How might institu-
tional leaders tackle them?
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Notes
1. Since 1988, the Concertgebouw Orchestra has the predicate Royal.
Abroad, it uses the name Concertgebouw Orchestra.
2. He left after 7 years, joining the Scottish Orchestra in Glasgow which
offered more artistic leeway and higher earnings.
3. The meaning of the broad formulation ‘music culture’ remains unclear.
4. In the years until 2019 a total of 42 million euro’s in donations was
received.
5. Chailly had taken his contract with Decca with him to Leipzig.
6. Historians are more used to invented traditions—a term used by the British
historian Eric Hobsbawm and his African colleague Terence O. Ranger
to refer to the mythical historical stories used by for example nineteenth-
century nation states to provide themselves with impressive genealogies.
They consider these stories of ancestry a form of ‘false consciousness’. See
Paul (2014: 74).
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CHAPTER 8
TheWorld Anti-Doping Agency: Guardian
of Elite Sport’s Credibility
Maarten van Bottenburg, Arnout Geeraert,
and Olivier de Hon
Introduction
In 2013, Lance Armstrong received global condemnation when he
admitted to having used doping to help secure all seven of his Tour de
France victories. This remarkable fall from grace from an all-American
hero shows how society does not tolerate the use of performance-
enhancing drugs. Doping thus poses a major problem for all sport
organizations and their stakeholders, ranging from corporate sponsors
and media companies to public authorities: it affects the credibility of
international sports competitions and therefore the legitimacy of their
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policies. A globally standardized anti-doping policy has consequently been
developed and refined over time. But no matter how tight the rules
have become, doping abuses keep coming to light, ranging from use at
the individual level to large-scale, state-supported doping programs. The
standard response has been to further strengthen the fight against doping.
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is the umbrella organization
that has been created to lead the global fight against doping. It promotes
and coordinates harmonized rules, procedures and sanctions, and moni-
tors their application by sports organizations and governments. It also
encourages research and the development of education and prevention
programs.
The establishment of WADA in 1999 was a milestone in the endeavour
to establish a globally harmonized and coordinated anti-doping policy.
Previously, this policy was characterized by fragmentation, lack of
resources, and ineffectiveness. The International Olympic Committee
(IOC) and the international sport federations (ISFs) each had their own
regulations. A small number of governments had introduced national
anti-doping legislation. Overall, however, there was a lack of serious
commitment to the fight against doping and a growing, mutual distrust
between governments and the sports world, which both had reasons not
to take doping abuse too seriously (Houlihan 2002a, b, 2004).
Understandably, there was scepticism about whether the establishment
of WADA could change this state of affairs (Hoberman and Møller 2004).
Already in 2005, however, one of the sharpest anti-doping policy critics,
John Hoberman (2005), noted that WADA had achieved a credibility that
the IOC had never earned. It managed to develop into an organization
with a distinct, legitimate identity that is now considered indispensable in
a system that pursues a doping-free world of sports.
The development and implementation of the World Anti-Doping Code
(WADC) in particular commanded a great deal of respect. With this
Code, WADA ensured a significant degree of harmonization in the anti-
doping policy. It also laid the foundation for closer cooperation between
governments and sports organizations on the doping problem (Hanstad
2009). The WADC has been adopted worldwide by more than 600 sports
organizations, including the IOC, and by far the majority of national
governments worldwide. By doing so, they pledge to follow the Code
regulations that apply to them, including a sanctioning regime if they are
declared non-compliant. Pielke and Boye (2019: 295) call it ‘one of the
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most successful examples of international cooperation in history’. And
that is not an exaggeration.
WADA receives support from both sports organizations and govern-
ments not just for what it does, but also for what it is (cf. Boin and
Christensen 2008). Amid the divergent and often opposing interests
of competing athletes, teams, sports organizations and countries in the
global battle for medals and championships, WADA is considered to
be the impartial, objective, balanced and transparent referee on doping
cases. It presents itself as ‘the guardian of the values and spirit inherent
in the Code’ (WADA 2019b). With this, WADA not only appeals to
sport ethics, but also to more general public values, in particular health,
integrity and equality. These values underpin WADA’s specific mission: ‘to
lead a collaborative worldwide movement for doping-free sport’ (WADA
2019b).
As a global standard setter and guardian of these values, WADA has
built up prestige and trust worldwide. That does not mean that its role in
anti-doping policy has been undisputed. On the contrary, in the twenty
years of its existence, the Agency has endured many storms of criti-
cism. Questions have been raised about the independence and democratic
legitimacy of WADA and the many negative consequences of the near
zero-tolerance approach in anti-doping policy.
Compliance with the WADC is also a continuous source of concern.
Tellingly, increasing evidence shows that the percentage of sanctioned
anti-doping rule violations falls far short of the actual use of doping.
Various scandals have shown that athletes, their teams and sometimes the
states for which they compete, evade doping regulations in an organized
manner. As the recent Russian doping scandal shows (more on that later),
this can lead to large-scale doping, accompanied by corruption, forgery,
blackmail and threats.
Despite these difficulties, WADA’s stakeholders have not called for
the abolition of WADA. Instead, they advocate reform and institu-
tional strengthening through the expansion of WADA’s authority and
autonomy. For most stakeholders, WADA stands for more than an agency.
It represents and reflects a core value that underlies the current sporting
world: to ‘play true’, as WADA’s tagline states. And more importantly:
it preserves the credibility of elite sport. As such it protects what Pierre
Bourdieu has called ‘the illusio, the fundamental belief in the value of the
stakes and of the game itself’ (Bourdieu 2005: 9). In other words: WADA
reinforces the belief that international sport competition is based on fair
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play and worth the investment by sport organizations, private companies,
and public authorities.
This chapter explores why and how WADA has developed into an insti-
tution that leads the global fight against doping. How did it build its own
place and identity in the sporting world? What enabled it to grow into
an institution with control over powerful ISFs and national states? What
impact does its reputation have on sports organizations and governments?
And how does it deal with the criticisms and scandals that threaten to
jeopardize this reputation?
WADA differs in a number of respects from the other institutions
discussed in this book. It is the youngest organization in our sample.
As a result, this organization has been able to root itself less deeply as
an institution than the other portrayed organizations, making it more
susceptible to the volatility of its environment. In addition, WADA is
unique in that it is a hybrid organization that is funded and managed by
both public and private authorities. This hybrid structure ensures support
and commitment from its authorizing environment and, thus, legitimacy.
But that legitimacy does not automatically increase its autonomy. WADA
must constantly be careful not to be crushed between the forces that the
sporting and public authorities exert on each other. That requires strength
and flexibility that grows as the organization acquires the character of an
institution.
A Moral Crisis in Elite Sport
The founding of WADA was a solution for a joint problem of sports
organizations and national governments: restoring and maintaining the
credibility of international sport competition. In brief, the recurring medi-
atized doping scandals in the second half of the twentieth century resulted
in the construction of a societal need for preserving the credibility of
elite sport. The resulting pressure constituted the driving force behind a
coordinated global approach to anti-doping. Distrust in the sports move-
ment’s ability to credibly and effectively lead the global fight against
doping led to the establishment of an ‘independent’ (i.e. hybrid) agency
tasked with coordinating the global fight against doping.
The use of stimulants in sport did not give rise to organized doping
control for a long time. It was long seen as a more or less acceptable form
of personal preparation and care. A number of deaths, in particular those
of cyclists Knud Jensen during the Rome 1960 Olympic Games and Tom
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Simpson on the flanks of Mont Ventoux during the 1967 Tour de France
changed the dominant attitude towards doping and increased the pressure
to prohibit the use of performance enhancing drugs (Dimeo 2008).
A limited number of ISFs and the IOC responded to this pressure
by introducing modest in-competition drug testing programs. However,
they had compelling reasons not to investigate allegations of doping
too seriously: Developing, organizing and conducting doping tests is
very expensive, suspending athletes can result in lengthy litigation, and
revelations of doping abuse can damage sport as a commercial product
(Hoberman 2005; Houlihan 2002a). National governments, moreover,
generally saw doping as a sport-specific problem that had to be solved
by the sports movement (Hanstad et al. 2008; Houlihan 2001). A large
number of governments were passive about the issue as they did not want
to invest major resources in anti-doping or jeopardize their international
sporting successes.
The prohibition of doping set requirements and expectations for policy
implementation that no single sports organization could meet as many
questions were left unanswered. Which resources and methods did and
did not increase performance? How could doping be monitored during
and outside of sports competitions? How could the reliability of labora-
tory results be guaranteed? How could the rights of athletes be protected?
How and by whom should the controls, analyses and administration of
a global anti-doping policy be organized and financed? No single sports
organization had the authority and expertise to establish a credible system
that answered all these questions and could be applied to all sports in all
countries (Hoberman and Møller 2004; Houlihan 2002a; Hunt 2011;
Krieger 2016). In fact, without the joint and combined efforts of sporting
authorities and public authorities, an effective drug control regime could
simply not exist (Ritchie and Jackson 2014).
This situation changed from the 1980s. Various Western govern-
ments increasingly attached importance to high-level performance of
national teams. Canada, Australia and France in particular took the lead
in this respect, followed by various other European countries, including
the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands. They drastically
increased their elite sport budgets and legitimized the prioritization of
elite sport with reference to its assumed effects on sport participation,
public health, social cohesion, national pride and international prestige
(Houlihan and Green 2013; Van Bottenburg 2013). It should there-
fore come as no surprise that the doping scandal enveloping Canadian
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sprinter Ben Johnson at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games hit like a bomb;
worldwide and especially in Canada. A series of inquiries into the values
and belief systems underpinning Canada’s elite sport system followed
the Ben Johnson demasqué. Almost simultaneously, inquiries were held
into major doping scandals in the United Kingdom and Australia. These
inquiries resulted in increasing societal pressure to pay more attention to
the dangers and downside of elite sport, including doping.
Giving an impulse to anti-doping policy only made sense for govern-
ments if this were to be done globally to create a level-playing field. First,
domestic tests did not affect athletes that would train and compete in
events in other jurisdictions where testing was unavailable or ineffective
(Houlihan 2002a). Second, having more effective domestic anti-doping
policies than rival countries meant losing out on the opportunities
for international prestige offered by sporting success at major events
(Houlihan 2001). Finally, ineffective anti-doping policies increasingly
undermined the credibility of national performances in international sport
competitions, the more society came to associate elite sports with doping
(Houlihan 2004).
As multiple allegations of doping abuse and doping cover-ups emerged
in the 1980s and 1990s, activist anti-doping nations increased their pres-
sure on the IOC and the ISFs (Hanstad et al. 2008; Verroken 2005). The
sports movement responded with inertia and vacuous optimistic rhetoric
about the successes of their anti-doping policies (Houlihan 2001). The
1998 Tour de France doping scandal proved a watershed in this respect.
Three days before the start of the Tour, the French police found a large
number of doping products in the car of Willy Voet, the Belgian soigneur
of the Festina cycling team. This was followed by raids on other cycling
teams and arrests of cycling team directors, doctors, soigneurs and riders.
The drug finds and confessions revealed a large-scale, systematic and
organized use of doping in professional cycling.
The broader significance of this scandal was in the strong governmental
intervention it elicited (Houlihan 2002a). This showed that (in this case:
the French) public authorities were ready to take action and intervene
in challenging the deeply embedded culture of doping in sports, that
generated more and more media attention and caused public outrage
(Hoberman 2005). Doping was no longer only an issue for athletes; it
had become a matter of global public concern.
Aware of the threat of increased public intervention, the IOC
responded by convening a World Anti-Doping Conference in Lausanne in
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February 1999. Its aims were to restore the public image of the IOC and
reclaim its leadership of the anti-doping movement. But the conference
went differently than the IOC expected. Its moral leadership was ques-
tioned when several politicians lambasted the IOC for its past inaction on
the doping issue (Hanstad 2009). Moreover, the conference was held at a
time when the IOC’s credibility had been further weakened by the fallout
from the Salt Lake City corruption scandal. Members of the IOC were
accused of taking gifts from the Salt Lake Organizing Committee during
the bidding process for hosting the 2002 Summer Olympics.
In this atmosphere, the IOC was not resistant to the joint action
of public authorities that demanded a more significant role in anti-
doping policy for themselves. What was originally proposed by the IOC
as an IOC-led Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Agency thus became
the World Anti-Doping Agency (Hanstad et al. 2008). To ensure an
acceptable degree of independence, public authorities requested that the
agency was not placed under the control of sport organizations. More-
over, Canada was successful in its lobby to situate WADA’s permanent
headquarters in Montreal, and not Lausanne, where the IOC is based.
Even though this was a ‘win’ by the narrowest of margins, its symbolism
cannot be overstated.
The creation of WADA was an irreversible step for the public author-
ities: they would not allow the responsibility for anti-doping to return
entirely to the sports organizations. Conversely, from the outset, sports
organizations strongly opposed attempts to further the independence of
WADA from the sports world (Hanstad 2009; Houlihan 2002a). Both
parties agreed to make WADA the leading global organization in anti-
doping policy based on joint funding and governance. As such, WADA
became the vehicle for the solution of a shared problem: it potentially
restored the credibility of international sport competitions to global audi-
ences, reconfirmed the leading role of sport organizations in organizing
these competitions, and legitimized and protected the investments in
elite sport and anti-doping policies by a growing number of national
governments.
A Global Public–Private Body
The dependence of WADA on both sporting authorities and public
authorities and the struggle for an equal distribution of power between
these parties determine the organizational DNA of the World Anti-
Doping Agency. Both elements are reflected in the design and governance
192 M. VAN BOTTENBURG ET AL.
of WADA. They have also been decisive for how WADA has built its
institutional status and has responded to fundamental questions and deep
crises during its existence.
The Agency was constituted on 10 November 1999 as a foundation
in the meaning of the Swiss Civil Code. Its legal seat is, therefore, in
Switzerland, like the IOC and many other ISFs, though its principal office
is located in Canada. It was founded by the IOC, represented by its
president, Juan Antonio Samaranch, and its Director-General, François
Carrard. At the request of the public authorities, the IOC funded WADA
entirely for its first two years of operation. It endowed the Agency with
an initial capital of five million Swiss francs, followed by a contribution of
18.3 million USD in its first two years of existence. According to Toohey
and Beaton (2017), this was a significant gesture by the IOC to restore
its credibility. While outwardly supportive, the IOC was not convinced of
WADA’s sustainability. At least some of its members hoped that sport’s
anti-doping leadership would return to the IOC if public authorities failed
to reach an agreement regarding their share of the funding (Hanstad et al.
2008). After the initial two years, WADA’s funding was sourced equally
from the sports movement and national governments.
In 2018, WADA worked with a total budget of USD 32.1 million
(WADA 2019a). The IOC’s contribution is drawn from its Olympic
Games revenues (Chappelet and Van Luijk 2018). The contribution of the
governments differs per Olympic continental region. To achieve global
public support for the agency, governments from North America, Oceania
and Europe, in particular, agreed to pay disproportionally more than their
Asian, South American and African counterparts (Toohey and Beaton
2017). In addition, WADA receives a subsidy from the Canadian govern-
ment to help cover the lease of its Montreal headquarters (Chappelet and
Van Luijk 2018).
According to the statutes, WADA is composed of a Foundation Board,
an Executive Committee and several committees. The Foundation Board
is the supreme decision-making body that delegates the current manage-
ment and running of the agency to the Executive Committee. Both
forums are composed equally of representatives from the sporting author-
ities and public authorities. The Foundation Board takes its decisions
by an absolute majority of the votes of the members present; in the
event of a tie, the chairman has the casting vote. Important elements of
WADA’s policy, such as amendments to the WADC, require a two-thirds
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majority and therefore involve an extensive consultative process (Casini
2009; Chappelet and Van Luijk 2018).
WADA’s statutes provide that the Foundation Board will ensure that
the position of chairman alternates between the Olympic Movement
and public authorities. This occurs after two three-year terms, unless no
alternative nomination is made. To further promote and preserve parity
among the stakeholders, the vice chairman must be a personality nomi-
nated by the public authorities if the chairman is a person nominated by
the Olympic Movement, and vice versa (Casini 2009).
This alternating presidency was meant to create equal power relations.
Government representatives, however, often had an inferior information
position in comparison with their counterparts from the sporting author-
ities. Most public representatives ‘come and go’ as a result of constant
changes in national cabinets, while representatives of the sports move-
ment occupy their seats longer than good governance principles might
consider desirable. In the Foundation Board and Executive Board, this
works out in the advantage of the sports movement because they have
far more knowledge and experience than their counterparts (Toohey and
Beaton 2017).
When the Agency’s headquarters were moved to Montreal in April
2002, an office remained in Lausanne to serve the European Region.
Similar offices were set up in November 2003 to serve the Asia/Oceania
Region (based in Tokyo, Japan) and the African Continent (based in
Cape Town, South Africa). A Latin American Regional Office was created
in 2005 in Montevideo (Uruguay). Their symbolic value was critical to
WADA’s successful establishment, facilitating WADA’s geopolitical legiti-
macy in these areas. As a WADA staff member observed: ‘now somebody
from the region is representing WADA they can relate to somebody from
the region. Somebody that understands the issues facing countries, which
knows how to interact and is at least familiar with the protocols involved
by going to their meetings’ (Toohey and Beaton 2017: 490). In 2018,
WADA employed 117 staff members with 48 nationalities, of whom 99
were located in Montreal, 10 in Lausanne and 8 in Montevideo, Cape
Town and Tokyo (WADA 2019b).
This structure makes WADA an unusual, and possibly unique, hybrid
intergovernmental–private body (Casini 2009; Chappelet and Van Luijk
2018). It is funded and governed on an equal basis by sports organi-
zations and national governments: the standards and rules that WADA
develops are established in consultation with these stakeholders. This
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promotes the normative effect emanating from WADA. Its objectives,
rules and procedures directly influence the regulations of sports organi-
zations, the national legislation of states and the daily lives of athletes.
WADA has become ‘a very significant institutional model’ (Casini 2009)
for effective international regulation in other areas, such as those of
environmental or health regulation (Casini 2009; Jenart 2018).
WADA is not the only international organization whose members are
drawn from both the public authorities and NGOs or other private insti-
tutions (Chappelet and Van Luijk 2018). WADA, however, constitutes
a rare case of ‘true joint decision-making, where private actors hold
veto power’ in international politics (Börzel and Risse 2005: 202). The
equality between public and private actors in the governance and funding
of WADA is also quite uncommon among hybrid public–private bodies.
Establishing Performance and Reputation
Despite initial scepticism about its ability to overcome the manifold chal-
lenges in anti-doping governance, WADA quickly built up both a sound
reputation and a good level of credibility. Leadership played a key role
in this regard. While IOC Director-General François Carrard was instru-
mental in coordinating the negotiations with public authorities leading to
the establishment of the agency in 1999, it was WADA’s first Chairman,
the Canadian Richard ‘Dick’ Pound, who had proposed establishing an
independent global anti-doping agency following the Tour de France
doping scandal. Subsequently, he successfully advocated the equal funding
of WADA by sports movement and public authorities, thus securing the
latter’s commitment to the issue (Pound 2006).
Before his appointment as WADA’s chairman, Pound, a former
Olympic athlete, had served sixteen years as a member of the IOC Exec-
utive Committee and eight as vice president. A lawyer and an accountant,
Pound ‘was considered to be among the IOC’s most effective adminis-
trators’ (Hunt 2011: 112), combining ‘excellent leadership skills’ with
‘immediate charisma and presence’ (Parent and Séguin 2018: 232). As
the head of the committee negotiating television and sponsorship deals
on behalf of the IOC, he laid the basis for the strong commercialization
of the Olympic Games in the 1980s and 1990s. His work as chairman of
the ad hoc commission on the Salt Lake City corruption scandal solidified
his reputation as the “go-to guy” to investigate allegations and/or tackle
highly sensitive cases (Parent and Séguin 2018: 234).
8 THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY … 195
Following WADA’s establishment, Pound contributed greatly to its
success by ‘put[ting] his strong leadership in the service of the anti-
doping effort’. Parent and Séguin (2018: 222) contend that, as chairman
of WADA, ‘Pound committed himself wholeheartedly to the fight against
doping, building up the agency, raising athletes’ awareness of the problem
of doping, chairing international conferences and overseeing the prepara-
tion of [the WADC]’. Pound used his extensive network that reached
across business, politics and the sports movement, to build relations and
establish support for WADA (Pound 2006). He furthermore used his
media-savviness to figure prominently in global anti-doping discourse,
conveying ‘honesty, integrity, and sense of justice’ through ‘his trademark
straight-shooter approach’ (Parent and Séguin 2018: 231). While sports
leaders had been criticized for either sweeping doping under the carpet or
adopting a compromising attitude, Pound made it abundantly clear that
he supported an ‘aggressive anti-doping mechanism’ (Hunt 2011: 135).
Unafraid to speak his mind to uphold the value of doping-free sport,
he contributed to WADA’s identity as an independent uncompromising
anti-doping agency by engaging in public fights with recalcitrant ISFs
and high-profile athletes (Parent and Séguin 2018). In short, Pound was
‘a near perfect match for WADA’s need of an aggressive leader’ (Hunt
2011: 113).
Pound’s efforts were backed by WADA’s growing track record. WADA
quickly controlled all discussions and policy developments that had to
do with international doping policy (Beamish 2013). Moreover, WADA
showed the world that it could deliver on its mission by successfully
tackling a number of large doping cases surrounded by a great deal
of publicity. Although WADA was established only in November 1999,
it succeeded in making ‘a significant and favorite impression’ at the
Sydney 2000 Olympic Games (Houlihan 2002a). By conducting addi-
tional out-of-competition doping tests in advance and setting up an office
of independent observers during the Olympic Games, WADA immedi-
ately demonstrated that it wanted to create new confidence in global
anti-doping policy. During the Nordic World Ski Championship in Lahti,
Finland, WADA helped to uncover a wide use of blood doping among
cross-country skiers from the home country.1 WADA emerged from this
highly mediatized ‘Lahti scandal’ as a new power, boosting its legitimacy
and credibility (Hanstad et al. 2008). ‘We started looking professional.
We had a budget which was well prepared (…) We had very concrete
programs in place. I think all that helped people realizing that they
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were not giving money to a black hole’, a WADA representative recalled
(Toohey and Beaton 2017).
Soon after the Nordic Skiing World Championships in Lahti, WADA
announced plans for 8000 out-of-competition tests over the next two
years. WADA also accepted the IOC’s invitation to observe all anti-doping
activities during the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. With the
successful performance during major sporting events, WADA was able to
show immediately that it was a new powerful actor.
But these were just quick wins compared to the effect of the drafting,
acceptance and implementation of the WADC, the ‘fundamental and
universal document upon which the World Anti-Doping Program in sport
is based’ (WADA 2019c). This Code provides the overall framework for
anti-doping policies, rules and regulations within sports organizations and
among public authorities. Together with a number of International Stan-
dards, it indicates which substances and methods are prohibited, how they
are checked, which sanctions are imposed on violations, what the rights
and obligations of athletes are, and which laboratories and agencies in the
global anti-doping policy are recognized by WADA.
The Code was accepted after extensive consultations among all stake-
holders and came into effect as of 1 January 2004. The signatories of the
Code included the IOC, ISFs, the International Paralympic Committee,
NOCs, National Paralympic Committees, Major Event Organizations,
National Anti-Doping Organizations, and WADA. Around 600 sports
organizations have thus accepted the WADC. Moreover, it was included
in the Olympic Charter. The adoption and the implementation of the
Code was now mandatory. Governments or sporting institutions that fail
to comply with the WADC might be rendered ineligible for bids related
to the Olympic Games or other major international events (Casini 2009;
Jenart 2018).
As the WADC is embedded in private law, WADA cannot force any
national government to formally comply with the Code. But it can
bound national authorities to Code through a UNESCO Convention.
In October 2005, the International Convention against Doping in Sport
(an international treaty), was unanimously approved by 191 govern-
ments at UNESCO’s General Conference. The Convention enabled
national governments to align their domestic policy with the Code,
thereby harmonizing the regulation and legislation of anti-doping poli-
cies (Beamish 2013; Casini 2009). More than 180 countries have ratified
the Convention (WADA 2019b). This worldwide acceptance has greatly
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contributed to cementing WADA’s moral and geopolitical legitimacy
(Toohey and Beaton 2017).
The WADC is not a static document. It has been modified over time,
following rulings on doping-related disputes by the Court for Arbitra-
tion for Sport, the evolution of the use of doping, concerns over athletes’
rights and new analytical techniques and detection tools. Following broad
rounds of stakeholder consultation, revised versions of the Code entered
into force in 2009 and 2015.2 These have various extensions and spec-
ifications, which have greatly increased WADA’s mandate. Examples are
the introduction of whereabouts and the Athlete Biological Passport, and
the acceptance of new or adapted rules regarding sanctioning, registration
and information exchange.
For a reliable implementation of the Code, WADA has accredited
several dozen laboratories worldwide for testing blood and urine samples.
These samples are collected from athletes by doping control officers from
National or Regional Anti-Doping Organizations (NADOs/RADOs),
ISFs, or so-called ‘service providers’ (commercial companies that can be
hired by anti-doping organizations to perform anti-doping work). All
affiliated states must have a NADO or join a RADO.3
Over the years, WADA has evolved into a global standard setter that
carries out significant normative functions and produces ‘soft-law’ in the
form of recommendations and good practices. Looking back, Houlihan
(2014: 274–275) concluded that ‘in the thirteen years since its establish-
ment, WADA has been extremely successful in developing a coordinated
approach to doping (…). The speed with which the Code was ratified by
IF’s and other sports organizations, especially the IOC, was exceptional,
but no less so than the speed with which the UNESCO Convention was
ratified. Within six years of its establishment WADA could rightly claim
that the architecture of a robust anti-doping policy regime was firmly in
place’.
That does not mean that the use of doping has decreased as a result
of WADA’s successful policy. In the context of this book, ‘being success-
ful’ means that WADA is recognized and esteemed in its role as guardian
of the values and spirit of the World Anti-Doping Code, thereby gaining
reputation and legitimacy as an institution. That the anti-doping regime
is becoming more strict, the costs of this policy are increasing and the
privacy of athletes is coming under increasing pressure, while it cannot
be demonstrated that the policy is becoming more effective in reducing
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doping in sports, is another matter (De Hon 2016; Waddington and
Møller 2019).
Mission Mystique in a Challenging Environment
WADA’s image differs from other international sport organizations that
operate in the highly challenging world of commercial and professional
sports. This is a transnational, non-governmental world of high passion
and big money. Cheating, bribery and corruption risks are real. Trans-
parency, democracy and internal accountability are at relatively low levels
(Geeraert 2015). In this challenging environment, WADA manifests itself
as an oasis of credibility. This contrast gives WADA’s ‘mission mystique’
(see Table 8.1) something special, endowing it with enhanced value and
profound meaning (Goodsell 2011). This applies to both WADA’s sense
Table 8.1 WADA’s mission mystique (based on Goodsell 2011)
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of purpose, the passion and commitment with which it pursues its mission
and the way in which the Agency strives for organizational transparency,
autonomy and renewal in the execution of that mission.
Mission
WADA has what Goodsell (2011) calls a ‘specified mission’: by accepting
the WADC, the sporting and public authorities have delegated to WADA
the authority to act as a global standard setter and referee agency, amidst
divergent interests of athletes, teams, sports organizations and countries
in the global battle for medals and championships. This mission has
assumed the status of an ‘agency mantra’: it is ‘repeated over and over’
(Goodsell 2011: 16) in its documents and, thanks to its treatment of
high-profile cases, also in public discourse.
Intentionally or unintentionally, WADA’s logo accentuates the contrast
between the Agency and its environment: a black square against a white
background with a green ‘equal sign’ in the box and the words ‘play true’
as tag line under the name of the organization. The square shape repre-
sents the customs and the rules that define sport. The colour black evokes
neutrality and refers to the traditional colour of the referee in the world
of sports: WADA wants to be seen as a referee agency with impartial,
objective, balanced and transparent judgements. The ‘equal sign’ in the
black square shape expresses equity and fairness. ‘We observe the highest
ethical standards and avoid improper influences or conflicts of interests
that would undermine our independent and unbiased judgment’, WADA
emphasizes as its core values (WADA 2019b).
Passion and Commitment
WADA is proud of the way in which it manages to implement its mission.
The first motivation for this is that WADA performs its extensive tasks in
a surprisingly small organization. At the end of 2019, WADA had a staff
of around 100 employees. Second, the passion and commitment of these
employees is grounded in the conviction that it is necessary to fight for
the good cause: to protect athletes, to protect sports and greater public
health; to promote honesty, integrity and equality; and to fight against
cheating and the dangers and consequences of doping in an environment
where bribery and corruption are always looming. ‘Our fight is every-
one’s fight (…) We are proud to be leading the play’, WADA states in
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an introduction video of its activities (WADA 2019b). Third, the pride in
the organization is based on the conviction that WADA can make a differ-
ence. As WADA Director-General, David Howman, underlined in 2015:
‘Sometimes we forget how unique WADA is on the international sport
and political stage and how the achievement of harmonizing rules is very
rarely done globally’. This joint cooperation between public and sporting
authorities ‘gives us real strength’, a WADA representative declared. ‘They
realize that it is impossible not to think about having sport and govern-
ment together. Sports failed prior to WADA’ (cited in Toohey and Beaton
2017: 489).
In order to cultivate and institutionalize this ‘esprit de corps’,
WADA regularly pays attention to its origins and historical highlights.
It commemorated, for example, the signature of the 100th, 125th, 150th
and 175th government to ratify the International Convention against
Doping in Sport. It has been celebrating ‘Play True Day’ every year on 10
April since 2013 along with athletes and anti-doping stakeholders around
the globe. And of course, it used its own anniversaries to look back at its
historical development and achievements. In 2019, it published a video
celebrating its 20th anniversary, which was premiered during the Agen-
cy’s Fifth World Conference on Doping in Sport in Katowice, Poland.
The video featured a number of WADA’s external and internal stake-
holders speaking of how WADA came about, its leaders, its progress and
its challenges.
Transparency, Autonomy and Renewal
As a result of the participation of public authorities in its funding and
governance, WADA is experiencing greater internal and external pressures
to be impartial, transparent and accountable than private international
sports organizations do. These core values therefore constantly recur in
WADA publications, both with regard to its functioning as an organiza-
tion and its anti-doping policy. To give substance to this, WADA always
collects feedback from all stakeholders with each renewal of the Code,
International Standards and Technical Documents. It promotes scientific
research to ensure that its policy is accurate, comprehensive and up-to-
date. And it publishes Annual Reports with extensive financial reporting
and statistical data on anti-doping tests worldwide.
Nonetheless, WADA faces strong criticism, in particular from NADOs,
athletes, academics and journalists. The criticism mainly focuses on
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WADA’s rigid approach to the principles of the anti-doping policy, its
convoluted internal decision-making processes, its failure to give athletes
a strong voice in these processes, and its overall unresponsiveness to crit-
icism (Dimeo and Møller 2018; Waddington and Møller 2019). Here
the relative youthfulness of WADA as an institution seems to be avenging
itself. More than institutions that for many decades and sometimes even
centuries have managed to acquire a rock-solid position, WADA often
appears uncertain in debates about its functioning.
WADA’s quest for autonomy and impartiality is a common thread
throughout its history. The hybrid nature of the organization puts WADA
by definition under influence and supervision of the sporting authori-
ties and public authorities. This can, of course, easily lead to conflicts of
interests. Chappelet and Van Luijk explain that ‘[a]mong the Code signa-
tories there are definitely different cultures, attitudes and approaches to
issues such as nationalism and patriotism on the one side, and corrup-
tion, fraud, nepotism, cronyism and bribery on the other, which directly
impact on WADA’s work targeting cheating in sport’ (Chappelet and Van
Luijk 2018: 181). WADA must navigate smartly, cautiously and inde-
pendently through the geopolitical and sector-specific interests of sports
organizations and national governments to avoid improper influences that
would undermine the impartial and unbiased nature of judgements and
decisions.
WADA’s pursuit of autonomy and independence is accompanied by
calls for more funding and governance reforms (Chappelet and Van
Luijk 2018; Landrove and Hendriks 2017). Whereas the WADA budget
increased annually by 3.5% from USD 20 million in 2004 to USD 32
million in 2018, the Board agreed to an annual growth of 8% for the
period 2018–2022. Moreover, the Board implemented various reforms
of its widely discussed governance model. This included the appointment
of an independent committee to identify and vet members of the inau-
gural Nominations Committee, the establishment of an Ethics Panel that
provides independent expert ethical opinion of urgent or contentious
issues, and the establishment of an external, independent Compliance
Review Committee to monitor Anti-Doping Organizations’ compliance
with the WADC.
This renewal can be seen as an attempt to restore the damaged trust
in WADA’s leading role in the fight against doping, resulting from the
biggest crisis it has faced in its existence: the Russian doping scandal. This
doping scandal came to light in 2014 and threatened to throw WADA
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into an institutional crisis for a long time. The next session will discuss
the depth and impact of that crisis.
An Institutional Crisis
More than ten years after its establishment, Houlihan (2014: 274–275)
concluded that WADA had been extremely successful. He also cautioned
that ‘there is substantial evidence of a shallow level of commitment from
a number of important governments and international sports federations’
with compliance as ‘the central problem facing WADA’. The ink of this
publication had not yet dried when a Russian doping scandal highlighted
the scale of the compliance problem that WADA faced.
The crisis started in 2014, when the German public TV channel ARD
broadcasted an alarming documentary about Russian doping practices on
the basis of anonymous tips, secret recordings and whistleblower’s testi-
monies. The crisis deepened in May 2016 when the former head of the
Moscow anti-doping laboratory, Grigory Rodchenkov, disclosed doping
practices during the Sochi 2014 Olympic Games. Investigations initiated
by WADA in response to these testimonies confirmed and substantiated
the image outlined in the media (McLaren 2016a, b; Pound et al. 2015,
2016).
The investigations were chaired by former WADA-president Richard
Pound. His commission confirmed that Russian athletes were using
doping on a large scale, that trainers were systematically integrating
doping into their training and competition schedules, and that Russian
authorities had developed a failsafe strategy to avoid punishment even
when discovered. The Russian secret service developed a technique to
exchange sealed urine samples for clean ones, allowing positive analytical
findings to be turned into negative outcomes. During the 2014 Sochi
Winter Olympics, the Russian authorities went one step further: to escape
the eyes of many foreign anti-doping experts, the secret service exchanged
the urine samples through a hole in the wall of one of the rooms of the
testing laboratory.
A trail of corruption, forgery, blackmail and threats came to light:
top officials from the Russian and international athletics federations
demanded large sums of money from Russian athletes to cover up positive
tests and delay sanctions against these athletes; Russian sports associa-
tions offered money to Doping Control Officers to turn positive tests
into negative ones; and the whistleblowers who brought this to light felt
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forced to move abroad for fear of reprisals, continuing their lives under
different names and in changing places.
The most problematic part of this affair for WADA was not so much
the large-scale use of doping among Russian athletes. More fundamental
was that there was a coordinated policy behind this from the Russian
Ministry of Sport, the Russian Federal Security Service, the Russian
Olympic Committee, the Russian national sport federations, the national
anti-doping agency RUSADA and the WADA accredited Moscow and
Sochi Laboratories. Moreover, the top of an ISF, the International Asso-
ciation of Athletics Federations (IAAF), also appeared to be involved in
masking and corruption. It became clear that large-scale corruption could
exist within the carefully designed global anti-doping system full of checks
and balances. It took several whistleblowers to expose this scheme. It was
never picked up by WADA’s own policing efforts.
WADA’s initial response deepened the crisis. Whistleblowers who
passed on information about the abuse in Russia before the affair came
out, were referred too easily to RUSADA, which later turned out to
be corrupt (Harris 2016). Moreover, WADA did initially not succeed
in bringing international sports organizations in line regarding the sanc-
tioning of Russia. Despite a broad call to take action, the IOC decided
to admit individual Russian athletes under a neutral flag to Rio 2016 and
Pyeongchang 2018. The unanimous decision by WADA in September
2018 to declare RUSADA compliant again was also heavily criticized.
This allowed Russia to fully participate in the international sports compe-
titions again. Critics charged that WADA had succumbed to Russia’s
power and pressure from the IOC. The American double Olympic hurdle
champion and president of the United States Anti-Doping Agency, Edwin
Moses, called the decision of WADA ‘the U-turn of all U-turns (…)
which has sparked shock among sports fans and clean athletes worldwide’
(Moses 2018).
The saga is not finished yet, as doping-related cases often linger for
a long time. WADA’s decision to reinstate RUSADA was subject to
the strict condition that the authentic data and raw underlying analyt-
ical data from the former Moscow Laboratory would be handed over to
WADA. Indeed, this condition contributed to the retrieving of raw data
and samples. Some of this data appeared to have been manipulated and
tampered with before it was retrieved by WADA. In response to this,
WADA decided to ban Russia from major international sporting events
for four years, on charges of tampering with doping-related reports. At
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the moment of writing the appeal by Russia at the Court of Arbitration
for Sport is still pending.
Challenges to Institutional Resilience
The Russian doping crisis can be seen as a litmus test of the institutional
status that WADA has built up since 1999. Previous doping affairs (the
Lahti scandal in 2001, the BALCO scandal in 2002, Puerto in 2006,
the Armstrong affair in 2012, to mention only the most dramatic ones)
did not harm WADA’s reputation and authority. On the contrary, the
outcome contributed to its development into an institution. But that was
only the case as long as the Agency joined forces with national govern-
ments and the sports movement and was not pressured by those who
mitigated the seriousness of the issues or wanted to cover up.
Leadership was crucial in these cases. Lance Armstrong’s fierce fight,
backed by the International Cycling Union (UCI), against WADA and
Richard Pound in 2008 is a case in point. In a letter to IOC Presi-
dent Jacques Rogge, Armstrong asked for the suspension of Pound as an
IOC member, whereupon the IOC ethics committee recommended that
Pound should exercise greater prudence in his public pronouncements. In
response, Pound said he was accountable to WADA, not to the IOC. In
the Russian doping affair, it was again Pound who took a firm and keen
position vis-à-vis Russian sport federations and governmental authorities.
Although he has long since abandoned his formal leadership position,
he played a crucial role in the management of the Russian doping crisis.
Pound acted openly in the press against decisions that were not in line
with the serious facts that the independent investigation under his lead-
ership had brought forward. He realized like no other that the action of
WADA in this doping scandal is a crucial case for the credibility and future
of WADA as an institution.
WADA has been fiercely criticized for how it has handled the Russian
doping affair, but virtually none of the critics called for its abolition. On
the contrary, they can be interpreted as pleas for a sense of reality, reform
and even institutional strengthening of WADA: to increase its indepen-
dence from the IOC and national governments; to raise its budget; to
achieve (better) compliance with the WADC; to strengthen its investi-
gations and intelligence gathering capacity; to better institutionalize the
viewpoints of athletes; and to balance the ideal of a doping-free sport
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with athletes’ fundamental (human) rights concerning privacy, discrimi-
nation, fair trial and the like (Houlihan and Hanstad 2019; Landrove and
Hendriks 2017; Read et al. 2019; Waddington and Møller 2019). The
solution of these issues is mainly sought in and requested from WADA
itself.
The bottom line is that its authority has not been called into ques-
tion. The idea remains that without WADA there can be no credible
anti-doping policy. And without anti-doping policy, in turn, credible
sport competition cannot exist. WADA therefore stands for more than an
agency. It stands for a core value that underlies the current world of sports
and that is widely supported by sports organizations, governments and
the public at large, despite many reservations and open criticisms about
the functioning of the anti-doping system. WADA’s mission mystique is
fundamentally rooted in the societal value of doping-free sport. As long
as the public shares the dominant belief that doping-free sport is both
desirable and feasible, this mystique appears sustainable beyond criticism
of WADA’s modus operandi.
WADA’s Experience in Perspective
With its central mission ‘to lead a collaborative worldwide movement
for doping-free sport’, the public–private World Anti-Doping Agency was
given a distinct identity upon inception. In the initial phase, it managed
to gain prestige through quick wins. Within a decade, it was able to estab-
lish its reputation by developing and coordinating a globally harmonized
anti-doping system to which almost all sports organizations and national
governments committed themselves. This policy fulfilled a specific func-
tion for the international sports organizations and national governments
that established, govern and fund WADA. It had to restore and main-
tain the credibility of the international sports competition for the general
public and to legitimize their role in it.
WADA was able to grow into a broadly trusted and well-respected
organization because it could present itself as a neutral, impartial and
objective standard setter and referee agent in a morally challenging and
risky organizational field. As long as doping-free sport continues to exist
as a societal value, high-level sport competition is hardly or not imag-
inable without this organization. WADA’s staff is aware of this mission
and proud of the struggle it is conducting as members of a relatively
small organization: against the use of doping by athletes, but certainly
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also against powerful nations and international sports organizations who
try to mitigate the seriousness of this issue or want to cover up.
Nonetheless, being a relatively young institution, its position is not
undisputed yet, as the Russian doping affair has shown. In such cases,
WADA must act vigorously and adopt an autonomous, impartial stance.
This requires strong leadership, which was offered by its first chairman,
Dick Pound. The Russian doping scandal made it painfully clear, however,
that his personal leadership has not yet been transformed into institutional
leadership as a collective endeavour.
WADA’s hybrid structure is both its strength and a weakness. On
one hand, important decisions do not come about without the consent
of major international sport organizations and public authorities. More-
over, both public and private authorities keep each other in balance,
making it easier for WADA to transcend the interests of individual sport
organizations and national states. On the other hand, WADA ultimately
cannot make decisions autonomously of its stakeholders. In response to
the recent crisis, governments and sports organizations have agreed with
WADA governance reforms that increase the organization’s budget and
further institutionalize the consultation of athletes (without giving the
latter decision-making power). However, as an institution, WADA appears
not yet powerful enough to act as a fully autonomous referee agent.
As with other ‘wicked problems’, such as poverty, drugs, crime or
obesity, it is not to be expected that WADA will solve the doping problem.
But it does contribute to the public credibility of the sport. That was
also the reason for the sporting and public authorities to create WADA.
Recurring, highly mediatized doping scandals put the romance of sports
competitions under pressure, precisely at a time when commercial and
public investments in international sports increased. WADA was an answer
where an urgent need of sports organizations, companies, governments,
media and the general public came together.
Questions for Discussion
1. WADA is unique in that it is a hybrid organization that is funded
and managed by both public and private authorities. What has this
construction meant for its development as an institution?
2. In a relatively short time, WADA created a virtuous cycle of insti-
tutionalization (see the introduction chapter of this book). Can
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you describe what that cycle and explain how it benefitted the
institutionalization process?
3. How has WADA’s authority and legitimacy enhanced its autonomy?
4. Defend or attack the following statement: WADA will neither
disappear nor develop into a fully autonomous organization.
5. WADA experienced an institutional crisis. What caused this crisis and
how did WADA survive it?
Notes
1. After a cross-country skier from the host country failed an in-competition
doping test on the opening day of the competition, substantial out-of-
competition testing initiated by WADA was carried out on the whole of the
Finnish team. As a result, a total of six cross-country skiers were sanctioned
for violations of the doping regulations.
2. A new version was scheduled for 2021.
3. In some countries NADOs are funded jointly by national sporting and
public authorities. Many NADOs, however, are funded entirely by their
national government or part of the NOC, although they are supposed to
be independent from them.
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CHAPTER 9
CERN: Guardian of theHuman Aspiration
to Understand the Universe
Jos Engelen and Paul ‘t Hart
High Modernity in Geneva
The campus of the European Organization for Nuclear Research, known
the world over as CERN, does not immediately light a spark in those
who visit it. The visitor centre does impress with dynamic visual displays
of space, matter, movement and energy. But it is not until one is taken
underground deep below the Geneva countryside and into the organi-
zation’s current crown jewel, the Large Hadron Collider, that the lure
of the endeavour becomes irresistible. It is like that moment about two-
thirds into any James Bond movie, when Bond is being led—often at
gunpoint—into the villain’s subterranean headquarters and encounters
a hidden world of shafts, staircases, miles and miles of electrical cables,
gigantic machines, control panels, busy technicians in overalls and focused
scientists donning hardhats.
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It is a captivating spectacle. Indeed, as one observer put it, ‘[t]he
idea of accelerating subatomic particles to almost the speed of light, and
smashing them into each other deep under the French and Swiss coun-
tryside, has a Bond-villain grandeur that has manifestly caught the public
imagination’ (O’Neill 2008). It is in these bowels of the Large Hadron
Collider that one sees CERN’s craft epitomized: high science being put
to work to comprehend the origins and dynamics of the universe.
The official name of this organization—Conseil Européen pour la
Recherche Nucléaire (CERN)—does not reflect what it does. No nuclear
fusion or fission is attempted there. It is not in the business of generating
energy, let alone building weapons of mass destruction. CERN is best
described as the world’s most formidable centre for particle physics. Its
mission is radically ambitious: uncovering what the universe is made of
and how it works. CERN hopes to achieve that mission by providing
particle accelerator facilities that enable world-class research in funda-
mental physics, bringing together scientists from all over the world to
push the frontiers of science and technology. Having made discernible
progress on its mission over the course of the past half-century, it has
become widely recognized as one of the most successful cross-national
collaborative research organizations of all times.
CERN is a European organization with permeable boundaries that has
developed into the undisputable hub of a global network of scientists
without peer. The CERN Community, both at its Geneva campus and
its many tentacles in research institutes around the world, has invented
and built the capacity to sift through many billions of particle collisions
and detecting promising patterns among them. CERN’s Data Centre is
widely regarded as pioneering the future of computing, with very large
quantities of data—about 1% of daily global data traffic—being continu-
ously analysed through seamless connectivity to 170 other data centres in
36 countries (Cogen 2016). CERN has gifted its most renowned spinoff
technology—the World Wide Web—to the world for all to use (Gillies
and Cailliau 2000).
To get to this point, CERN has managed to resolve the existential
political conundrum that plagues most large-scale public endeavour (see
Schulman 1980). For more than six decades it has managed to straddle
the inevitable gap between the requisite multi-year up-front investment
of money, infrastructure and human effort, and the eventual accomplish-
ments that make everyone feel it has all been worthwhile—in its case
scientific breakthroughs in the world of particle physics.
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As we will show in this chapter, CERN is without a doubt to be consid-
ered an institution as defined in this volume and yet it is an unlikely
organization to achieve this lofty status. Its mission is elusive and it has no
preordained path to achieve it; in fact, the whole point of its mission is to
discover such pathways towards new knowledge of the fundamental parti-
cles and forces that govern nature at the deepest level, which demands
incessant, vast, costly experimentation. It is a multinational endeavour
that requires physicists to collaborate on an even keel with engineers
and, even more challenging, with government bureaucrats from almost
two dozen member states. As an intergovernmental organization it has
to navigate geopolitical complexities, diplomatic challenges and misalign-
ment between the organization’s needs and the political and budgetary
realities of its member state funders.
Its unparalleled analytical capability has enabled CERN’s scientists to
achieve its greatest deliverable so far: the discovery of the Higgs boson
particle. The jewel in the crown of the Standard Model of Physics, it
had been the last hold-out particle remaining hidden during the quest
to check the accuracy of the Model which describes three out of four
fundamental forces (not covering gravitation) in the universe and classifies
all elementary particles known to man. The Standard Model has become
‘the most accurate scientific theory known to human beings’ (Starkman
2018) and the discovery of its hitherto only hypothesized linchpin, the
Higgs boson, validated more than a generation of scientific endeavour
within particle physics.
CERN has been able to thrive, we argue, by evolving a partic-
ular mode of harnessing human ingenuity: overcoming the fault lines
and centrifugal forces that inevitably arise between the various parties
involved. CERN as a cooperative venture has been driven by a sense
of interdependence, entrenched norms of mutual respect, trust, empathy
and consensual decision-making. CERN’s ethos is one of transparency
and knowledge sharing. Its governance has been far-sighted. It has
delivered scientific advances, technological breakthroughs, spinoff tech-
nologies and a thriving global scientific community. It has been able to
do so on the wings of consistent support from member state governments
and favourable media coverage. Robinson (2019: 48), who studied its
governance up close, observes that
CERN has an unchallenged standing of legitimacy and enjoys a shared set
of normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions
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of validity and a common policy enterprise throughout its epistemic
community.
The thriving development of CERN, continuing for over 65 years, is best
described as a combination of a smart institutional design, good gover-
nance, resourceful leadership and resilient collaboration. This powerful
mix provides the spring board for the astute adaptation and dogged
determination that allow CERN to sustain its performance. But in the
beginning, this was all far from certain. This chapter tells the story of
how CERN got to where it is today. We will explore what constellation of
circumstances, choices and practices has allowed it to become and remain
a global science institution. Moreover, we will examine CERN’s future in
view of the growing tension between the size and duration of requisite
investments and the uncertainty about if and when it will deliver its next
piece of magic.
Working on a Dream: Building CERN
CERN was founded in September 1954. Its roots lie in two sweeping
developments. One was the coming together of scientific aspirations
to move beyond the state of the art of mid-twentieth-century physics.
Another was the cooperative spirit that pushed diplomats, businessmen,
academics and other elites towards greater unity among the countries of
Europe in the wake of the Second World War. Acting against the gloomy
backdrop of the escalating Cold War which was dividing the continent,
this informal but influential network saw that science had a crucial role to
play in doing so. At their instigation, leading French quantum physicist
Louis de Broglie had an address delivered in his name to the first Confer-
ence on European Culture, hosted by the Swiss writer and promotor
of European federalism Denis de Rougemont in Lausanne in December
1949. He observed that
[A]t a time when we are talking about the peoples of Europe, the question
now arises of developing [a] new international unit, a laboratory or institu-
tion where it would be possible to work scientifically in a manner outside
and above the framework of the different participating nations. As a result
of the cooperation of a large number of European States, this body could
be endowed with more resources than those available to national labora-
tories and could subsequently undertake tasks which by virtue of their size
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and costs remain prohibitive to these [national laboratories]. (quoted in
Gillies 2018: 12)
De Broglie was talking about scale. The need for resource-pooling proved
a powerful rhetorical tool for the advocates of an advanced European
physics laboratory. Robinson (2019: 43) notes that eventually:
Consensus to form CERN was reached through the timely and powerful
combination of … European-minded politicians and single-minded Euro-
pean particle physicists. The politicians were looking for practical ways of
reorienting Europe and the physicists were looking for their facility.
It was a case of scientific idealism challenging scientific realism. The
Manhattan Project and the race to develop ever more powerful weapons
of mass destruction that was taking shape in the early post-war years were
the palpable developments against which De Broglie and a core group of
academic colleagues from around Europe sought to cast the new Euro-
pean scientific collaboration. CERN was to be a purely scientific venture
and not to engage in military R&D. It was to be genuinely European and
thus not dependent upon collaboration with the United States (where
influential fellow physicists such as Isidor Rabi helpfully lobbied for the
cause of European physics). And it was rooted in the recognition that
the cash-strapped impoverished nations of Europe could only hope to do
something worthwhile in this high-investment area of scientific research
if they were going to pool their resources. It took De Broglie, Rabi
and other scientific champions another five years of advocacy and deft
manoeuvering of the geopolitics of science—particularly in a sensitive field
such as ‘nuclear’ research—before there were enough signatures on the
intergovernmental convention document establishing the new institute.
The Early Years: Overcoming Challenges
The early decades that followed its founding were not easy. CERN was a
‘shell organization’, with a name, a site, a budget, a formal governance
structure, a dedicated group of foundational leaders and a rump staff. It
was many years away from being in a position to deliver the kind of scien-
tific breakthroughs it aspired to bring about. A study of the early years of
CERN’s institutional development shows how during its first decade and
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beyond, the organization was struggling to find its feet. It was dealing
with several challenges.
First and foremost, the scientists and non-scientists (science admin-
istrators from the member states) had to learn to get along. Trawling
through the paper trail of memos, minutes and reports from those early
years, Pestre (1988: section 9.1.2.1) notes that despite the overall atmo-
sphere of goodwill and mutual respect, various forms of ‘incomprehension
or of denigration’ lurked in the background, ready to surface when there
were tensions about budgets, priorities and allocation of contracts for the
construction of facilities and equipment:
Th[e] esteem which the scientists have [for the non-scientists on the CERN
Council and in key committees, see further below] is never blind, is never
as total as it appears to be between the members of the physics clan them-
selves. It is limited precisely because the ‘politicians’ are not, after all,
high-energy physicists… [T]his is sometimes expressed in … a measure
of condescension towards the non-scientists – and notably he ‘politicians’,
those who stop them from doing their job properly, who always introduce
unnecessary complications, who never grant even the budgetary minimum
without looking sour, without bickering – and who want to control.
In their efforts to persuade ‘the politicians’, the scientists regularly
resorted to ‘offensive selling’ of their projects and their budgetary claims:
Since CERN always had to act quickly – CERN was to be the first in the
world [to achieve this or that scientific or technological milestone] – and
since CERN had to have the best men and the best equipment, it was
always easy and tempting to present the ‘politicians’ with a fait accompli,
… [making] abundant use of the argument that things were ‘urgent’ and
top priority. (Pestre 1988: section 9.1.2)
Likewise, to obtain decisions from the CERN Council, CERN’s scientific
leaders regularly invoked the threat of losing out the physics race to the
Americans, with their massive science community and post-World War II
opulence and momentum. The civil servants serving on the Council and
its Finance Committee, who had to straddle the mandates provided to
them by their national government superiors and the desire to be seen to
be a constructive partner in the great cooperative venture envisaged by
the scientists, found it hard to challenge their claims.
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Secondly, not all European physicists were internationalists. While
subscribing to the general idea of a joint facility, they also kept in mind
and promoted the interests of their own research programs, their own
teams, their own labs back home. This guarded posturing was prevalent
in the early years when CERN had not yet proven its worth and had
not yet delivered on its aspiration to become the hub of the European
high-energy accelerator fraternity. And there were the British, who were
fundamentally ambiguous about what really was in it for them, given that
they had made significant advances in particle physics on their own during
and following World War II.
Third, CERN’s governance structure—which envisages a balance of
power between the (supranational and scientifically driven) Director-
General and the elite scientists whispering in the DG’s ear on the one
hand, and the (intergovernmental and policy-driven) Council on the
other—had to settle in. The CERN-based actors sought, and by and
large managed, to keep national bureaucracies at arm’s length and gain
a measure of autonomy in setting directions for the institution. Pestre
(1988: section 9.1.3.1) characterizes the early governance of CERN in
terms of a ‘jealously guarded autonomy of the Council’ and machinations
of a ‘pro-CERN lobby at its heart’ designed to ‘neutralize’ any initiative
from any of the member state authorities seeking to bypass it.
Fourth, there were protracted and heated discussions about CERN’s
internal management. The early Director-Generals, particularly Cornelis
Bakker (1955–1960) and Victor Weisskopf (1961–1965) faced the chal-
lenge of herding cats, with powerful divisional directors such as the head
of the synchrotron division (and future director) John Adams looking to
build their autonomy. There were constant proposals and debates about
internal organization, which were essentially about where the power of
policy initiative and investment decision-making would come to lie in the
organization, and how accountability for policies and expenditures was to
be organized.
Achieving Momentum
It was not until the early to mid-1960s that the incentives for commit-
ment to this form of international scientific cooperation started to kick
in. In 1959, CERN’s first major common pool resource, the proton
synchrotron—then the world’s highest energy particle accelerator—
became available. Many high-profile experimentalist physicists began to
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use it, which cemented commitment to CERN beyond its close-knit
founding community. It was a watershed moment, laying the founda-
tion for what became the politically impenetrable fortress of scientific
collaboration that CERN has since become:
Not constituted from above, by a juxtaposition of delegates nominated
administratively by the states…, the central core of the Council built itself
up in the course of a battle which lasted several years. From these begin-
nings an unusual degree of cohesion was born, along with a determination
to succeed, which bore fruit thanks to the favourable context in which it
emerged, the context of a Europe looking for ways to unite, and fascinated
by all that was nuclear… Once the leaders of European nuclear physics real-
ized, early in the 1960s, that there was no alternative to building a central
installation for the ever-heavier equipment their science demanded, and
once they accepted that this installation would be CERN, they no longer
submitted their national authorities to conflicting pressures… Speaking
with a single voice to the exterior, they ensured the continued good health
and the success of the organization and left the member states watching
developments from afar. (Pestre 1988: section 9.1.4)
Fast forward fifty years and a picture of a settled institution and a
cohesive science community emerges. A series of landmark achievements
demonstrated the added value of the collaboration across disciplinary and
national boundaries. The institution leans on decades of ‘identity work’ to
ensure that the constant flow of new and eager scientists come to regard
CERN as not just a tool to be used but as a place that confers identity and
respect on them. Here we see a virtuous cycle. A deep sense of commit-
ment and loyalty feeds into high performance by virtue of CERN’s ability
to continuously attract top staff and make them work together to achieve
both scientific advances and tangible, brand-enhancing outcomes:
The combination of … high scientific and political standing, ambitious
forward-looking research programme, independence as a supra-national
organisation [and] cash-based finances results in an ability to recruit and
retain very competent staff. As an established international organisation…
CERN is able to offer attractive employment conditions (salaries, pensions,
etc.). The staff form an interacting community characterised by a vigorous
exchange of ideas. At times, ideas emerge that can be transformed into
innovative new technologies, even commercial products. (OECD 2014:
64)
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How CERN Is Governed and Managed
Robinson (2019) identifies a range of what he calls ‘mechanisms’ that
are embedded in CERN’s institutional design that have allowed it to
overcome the threat of gridlock that besets any multilateral collabora-
tive endeavour. The pathways in the left-hand column of Table 9.1 refers
to Hale and Held’s (2017) theory of gridlock-busting factors. The right-
hand column then details to which extent and in which forms these factors
can be found within CERN. Let us now take a closer look at what lies
behind these mechanisms.
Smart Institutional Design
The 1953 Convention articulates CERN’s mission and institutional
design. It offers a sense of purpose and ground rules for governance that
have stood the organization in good stead. It is crystal clear about what
CERN is to be and not to be. The Convention explicitly instructs all
staff to work without fear or favour for the benefit of the international,
collaborative entity that CERN is and not to be influenced by preferences,
demands and hints from any of the member states or other research insti-
tutes. The Convention stipulates that the fruits of all its work should be
made publicly available.
The Convention also limits CERN’s activities to scientific collabora-
tive research on high-energy particles, laying down clear boundaries and
norms for how it is to pursue its activities: ‘The Organization shall have
no concern with work for military requirements and the results of its
experimental and theoretical work shall be published or otherwise made
generally available’ (Convention 1953, Article II,1). A former director-
general notes: ‘The spirit from the beginning, was that we are not at
CERN to profit; we are there to help to achieve the common objec-
tive. A principle introduced by the founding fathers that still exists today’
(quoted in Robinson 2019: 43).
This clear delimitation of CERN’s mission—no military pursuits—
provides the Council with a key lever to check on mission creep and
ensure the coherence of resource allocations without stifling innovation
in how CERN researchers pursue the mandate. The CERN Council is
the supreme authority of the organization. Appointed by the Council for
a single 5-year term, the Director-General leads the CERN Laboratory
on a day-to-day basis, supported by a senior management team called the
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Table 9.1 Pathways to effective international collaboration: the case of CERN
Pathway CERN community mechanism
1. Shifts in major powers’ core interests • Catastrophic Second World War led to
incentivisation for States through the
European Movement and embryonic
UNESCO to combine with visionary
European particle physicists to create
the Organisation
2. Autonomous and adaptive international
institutions
• Governing bodies have been given
inimitable capabilities to adapt to
emerging issues and shifting
constellations of power and interests
• Member States have one vote each in
Council; the primacy of the State is
sacrosanct
• Science Committee members are
elected solely on merit by peers and
are independent of national and/or
other institutional affiliations
3. Technical groups with effective and
legitimate processes
• Experiment team’s authority comes
from intellectual contribution and
consensual decision-making; project
adhocracy and trust in the workforce
leaves teams of experts to solve
complex problems in whatever manner
they see fit
• The name ‘CERN’ is synonymous with
the very best scientific research
standards, execution and
delivery
4. Multiple, diverse organisations and
institutions coalesce around common
goals/norms
• Unmatched global reach: over 12000
researchers from institutes in over 70
countries being actively engaged
• World-wide connectivity with very
large quantities of data being
continuously analysed through seamless
connectivity to 170 other data centres
in 36 countries
• Centre of excellence for holding of
global fundamental physics seminars,
conferences and events
(continued)
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Pathway CERN community mechanism
5. Mobilisation of domestic constituencies • The data confirmed that these two
Beyond Gridlock pathways do not fully
feature
6. Civil society coalitions with reformist
states
7. Innovative leadership as a reaction to
gridlock
• Leadership is characterised by
inclusivity and equality of contributing
disciplines in terms of voice and status
• Leadership has an aura of invincibility
within the global fundamental physics
community. A reputation borne out of
its repeated scientific successes and its
ability to overcome obstacles, threats
and set-backs by fair, timely and
consensual governance
• See (3) above for leadership of
technical teams
8. Innovative Funding • Scrupulously fair funding formula
based on Member State economic
strength for annual cash contributions
• Procurement protocols help maintain
alignment of work share to
contributions but are not bound by
strict ‘juste retour’
• Experiment projects are effective
collaborations of in-kind contributions
Source Robinson (2019: 50)
Directorate. Below them operate a series of departments. All major policy
and funding decisions require Council approval. The Council controls
CERN’s activities in all matters scientific, technical and administrative.
It approves programs of activity, adopts the budgets and reviews expen-
diture. Each of the 23 member states has two delegates on the Council:
one science administrator and one leading scientist.
The Convention provides for a ‘one member, one vote’ decision-
making mechanism within the Council, thus steering CERN’s governance
away from the politics of (financial) weight that plague so many other
intergovernmental organizations (Goetz and Patz 2017). This mechanism
creates a stable, level-playing field and has survived the growth of the
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organization from 12 to 23 member states (late 2019) and the attendant
differentiation of member state resources and capabilities.
Most Council decisions require a simple majority, but some, such as
the appointment of a new director-general, require two-thirds majorities.
In practice, the Council reaches decisions by consensus and strives for
unanimity. The Council is supported by two pivotal advisory commit-
tees: the Scientific Policy Committee and the Finance Committee. The
Scientific committee is composed of top scientists regardless of nation-
ality who are elected into membership by their peers on the committee.
The Finance Committee consists of technical experts from the member
states and mainly focuses on matters related to financial contributions.
In Robinson’s (2019) fieldwork at CERN, many long-serving staff
voiced how proud they were of ‘their’ Convention as a document that sets
the scene for fostering international collaboration and provides a healthy
balance between top-down and bottom-up management approaches. As
one interviewee granted: ‘we owe a lot to our founding fathers both on
the scientific side and wise people in the ministries and governments at
that time who made that happen’ (Robinson 2019: 43).
A Conducive Culture
CERN’s leading figures embraced the norms of collaboration, trust, trans-
parency early on. As an example, the internal norm became that of
individual but collective authorship of papers, both within as well as, when
pertinent, across the collaborative experiments. This has meant alphabeti-
cally listing all members of a collaboration as authors on any paper written
based on data from that project by any member of that collaboration. As
a result, some CERN papers ended up having over 500 authors. Though
not without difficulties and trade-offs for the career choices of the indi-
viduals involved (Birnholtz 2008), this norm of credit-sharing helped the
CERN circumnavigate most of the credit-driven professional competition
and rivalries between individual researchers and groups within the organi-
zation that have such a debilitating effect in many other laboratories and
research groups in the academic world.
CERN’s institutionalization owes a lot to the way in which it has
evolved norms and practices of balance-seeking. Balance between funding
member states and the spending CERN administrators. Balance between
small and large contributors. Balance between centralized lab and infras-
tructure funding and bottom-up funding of the experiments. Balance
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between getting on with current work and preparing the ground for
taking on new challenges and realizing future ambitions that may
be decades away. Balance between the scientists’ advances in funda-
mental physics and the engineers’ development of the technological tools
required to test them. Balance between running a tight ship financially
and maintaining the ability to respond flexibly to financial setbacks or
emerging expenditures. Balance between the patience required to achieve
major scientific breakthroughs and the need to be seen to be active, rele-
vant and impactful now, which is critical to maintaining a global public
and political support base. Balance between banking on the authority of
established scientific leaders and empowering the innovative irreverence
of emerging research talents.
Such balancing is necessary to prevent the twin dangers of gridlock
and mission creep (Selznick [1957] referred to conservatism and oppor-
tunism). The conditions for a balanced institution must be created in its
organizational structure and nourished through its organizational culture.
Take the ‘power distance’ (Hofstede 1991) between the established ‘God-
professors’ and next-generation budding talents. In its examination of
the economic and societal impact of CERN, the OECD (2014) paints a
picture that epitomizes what Goodsell (2011) considers a ‘prime quality’
of public institutions: its official truths are open to contestation because
this power distance is actively kept within bounds. Here’s what the OECD
(2014: 65) reports about CERN:
All large research institutions are necessarily hierarchical organisations, with
well-defined structures and procedures for ensuring responsibility, account-
ability and reporting. CERN’s version of the hierarchy is relatively “flat”,
especially where it concerns communication and interaction across the
vertical dimension of the hierarchy. It is not unusual for junior members
of the staff, or researchers from collaborating institutions (even graduate
students) to “buttonhole” the senior laboratory leaders in order to present
original ideas or opinions. In part, this is a consequence of the inherently
meritocratic nature of scientific research but, at CERN, it is reinforced
by the special status of the laboratory that sets it apart from traditional
institutions.
Another good example is the funding regime. Its ingenuous architec-
ture is a key source of CERN’s strength. It provides a solid central
base funding but allows no one to get ‘fat’ and complacent. It incen-
tivizes entrepreneurship and coalition-building among staff members,
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research institutes and nation states while hedging against excessive risk
accumulation:
Countries contribute to a central fund for the infrastructure of the lab as a
whole. However, while the infrastructure of the lab comes from the pooled
fund, the experiments do not. This means that while the Large Hadron
Collider (LHC) was built by CERN using the money contributed to the
central fund, the four giant detector experiments were funded, designed,
and built by independent collaborations of nations. This way, if one falls
behind, it doesn’t necessarily mean the entire project will suffer. (Lucibella
2014)
The funding regime spreads the load fairly among member states; their
contributions are pegged to (developments in) their GDP. If times are
lean in a particular member state, its representatives in the Council do
not face pressure to go home and fight unwinnable budgetary battles
with their science and treasury departments in order to maintain a set
contribution amount. Moreover, as critical episodes involving budgetary
and political turbulence in the United Kingdom and then Germany in
the 1980s and 1990s have shown, there is a collective norm of empathy
and a propensity for pragmatic long-term thinking within the Council
and in CERN’s Directorate and Finance Committee. This leads them to
respond flexibly to the budgetary and political exigencies of the moment
by accommodating the predicaments of certain member states through
collective burden-sharing. Grand as it may sound, particularly when it
comes to the politics of budgetary processes within publicly funded orga-
nizations, fairness, empathy and adaptability are demonstrably built into
the fabric of CERN’s decision-making structures and the rules by which
they operate.
The Importance of Leadership
CERN would never have existed but for the visionary leadership of its
founders. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, leading physicists such as De
Broglie and Rabi gelled with diplomats and other promotors of European
cooperation to argue the case for transnational science collaboration. To
persuade not just small states (who had nowhere else to go anyhow) but
also Europe’s major powers France and Great Britain (whose geostrategic
preferences and academic chauvinism might otherwise have led them to
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turn against participation in a joint enterprise) and their World War 2
opponents Germany and Italy to partake in this coalition was a major
coup of academic entrepreneurship and diplomatic ingenuity.
Also, the sheer stability of its scientific and administrative leadership
cadres in the critical early years of the organization has proved an impor-
tant factor. During the first fifteen years of its lifespan the Council was
dominated by a core group of men—they were all men—of the first hour
who had held key positions in CERN and/or were representatives of
countries that carried weight. The same goes to a large extent for the
Scientific Policy Committee. This stability at the core helped to create
interpersonal trust between these institution-building leaders. It helped
them to contain centrifugal forces and deal with emerging conflicts prag-
matically. These members of the institution-building generation took up
their roles in a particular way: they were not acting as national gate-
keepers but as ambassadors for the organization within their respective
constituencies (Pestre 1988).
Furthermore, with multiple power centres and multiple balancing acts
between constituencies, carrying different values and interests, an orga-
nization like CERN can only be steered and adapted through a form of
dispersed leadership (Verbeek 2009). Over the decades, a now entrenched
form of power-sharing has developed between Directorate, Council, the
committees, the divisions the experimental collaborations. The rules of
engagement provide a conducive setting in which individual and teams
of scientists can ‘do their thing’, yet within parameters and levels of
resourcing and accountability that are negotiated and determined in the
interplay between the key institutional nodes in the governance structure.
The Director-General is the face of the organization in the world outside
CERN, and an influential authority figure within it, but cannot and will
not impose major policy decisions on the system. Smooth relationships
between DGs and Council presidents are essential for greasing the wheels
of the relationship between the core executive team (the Directorate) and
its ‘board of directors’ (the Council).
Finally, in a science organization such as CERN it is pivotal that a
significant share of the leadership structures and processes are animated
by professional authority figures, whose leadership claims are rooted in
substantive expertise and peer esteem rather than managerial qualities or
political networks. CERN is not run solely by ‘administrators’, far from it.
There is a large and vocal community of scientists that jealously ensures
that Parkinson’s law—‘(administrative) work expands so as to fill the time
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available for its completion’—will not creep up on them. The scientific
community needs to perceive a DG as ‘one of us’; the very few that did
not have a stellar scientific CV had to work hard to earn its respect.
A Path-Dependent Collaborative Regime
CERN began as a collaborative proposition. Collaboration remains at
its heart today. The language of collaboration is deeply entrenched in
CERN’s structures and semantics. CERN’s entire modus operandi belies
the notion that science is essentially or even predominantly a competitive
enterprise.
The genius of CERN’s formula is that it does not deny the existence
and propulsion power of competition between scientists, but that is has
found a way of harnessing these competitive instincts within an overall
framework of collaboration. In models of collaborative governance (e.g.
Ansell and Gash 2008; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015), the essential fuel
that makes collaborations succeed is a composite of felt interdependence
around a task or ambition that is salient to all the parties involved; the
growth of trust and alignment of motivations between participants that
may have widely varying perspectives, responsibilities and values and are
subject to their own governance structures and accountabilities; commit-
ment to a process of joint deliberation that they consider fair, safe and
effective in forging paths towards concerted action; and eventually a
generative cycle of trust-building begetting joint action that produces
tangible benefits to all which in turn increases the appetite for continued
collaboration. The story of CERN that we have told in this chapter refers
to each of these elements.
In addition, however, we should consider the important role of path
dependencies that started to happen from the early 1960s on and were
brought to a new level once the LHC project had begun and eventually
produced the results that turned CERN into a near-mythical institution.
The OECD’s (2014: 63) analysis of CERN’s impacts on innovation picks
up on this point:
CERN’s network of institutional and personal contacts played a critical
role in catalysing R&D, and in overcoming difficulties in meeting cost and
schedule goals. To some extent, the network is there simply because of
the passage of time (the institutions concerned have been interacting for
sixty years). It is true, as well, that national research organisations receive
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their funds from the same agencies that finance CERN, so that the linkages
emerge naturally during the elaboration of national science policies.
Once the participating nations decided to pool their resources in this
domain of science and kept at it for over a decade, this changed the
incentive structures of the next generations of high-energy physicists and
institutions. There was now this unique common pool resource without
which the experiments that needed to be done could not be performed.
As similar accelerators in the United States and Japan closed down in the
1960s–1980s or were never built, there were no alternatives left, thus
raising the costs of exiting from the collaboration (or of not entering it
in the first place). Once thought of as a mere resource, CERN became an
intellectual ‘hub’ and a source of professional identity, further increasing
its professional centrality, the attractiveness of membership and thus the
centripetal pull of its resource claims.
A Case in Point: The Large
Hadron Collider Project
Gillies’ (2018) assessment of CERN’s crowning achievement reflects the
contemporary consensus within and far beyond the global network of
scientific contributors to and users of CERN’s technology and data:
CERN’s Large Hadron Collider is a triumph of human ingenuity. It has
pushed technology to new and hitherto unimaginable limits. Far from
struggling more than one particle collision per bunch crossing – a scenario
feared when the LHC was first proposed, the experiments are dealing with
dozens. The LHC produces close to a billion collisions in each detector
per second, and processes have been perfected to sort out those that might
contain interesting physics.
Key to the success of the LHC accelerator and detectors are the orga-
nizational capacity and performance standards that have evolved within
CERN. The high-energy physics community ‘self-organized’ in a remark-
able way from the early days of the LHC project. In the years leading up
to the decision to go for the LHC, the CERN community faced a stark
choice: the next step for high-energy physics after the Large Electron–
Positron collider (that was in operation between 1989 and 2000) would
ideally be a linear electron–positron collider, but nobody knew how to
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build it. The alternative was to build a hadron collider, but nobody could
build the requisite detector for catching the data it would generate. From
these two ‘impossible’ options, the community chose the second. After
years of groundbreaking R&D-work, the gamble payed off.
The LHC Committee (LHCC), a peer-review committee consisting of
independent scientists, was set up in 1992 and continues to shape the
experimental LHC program and provide stewardship of it. It advises on
directions, monitors progress of the experiments and assesses the credi-
bility of experimental schedules. It reports to the Directorate and Council.
Although the LHCC reports ‘up’, it also interacts closely with the seven
multinational experimental collaborations that have formed around the
LHC.
Each experiment is run by collaborations of scientists from institutes
all over the world. All experiments use detectors to analyse the myriad
of particles produced by collisions in the accelerator, but each has its
own sets of detectors and therefore data to work with. Though each
experiment to some degree pursues distinct questions that emerge from
scientific debates among the participating scientists, the experiments also
compete on as well as cross-validate one another’s observations on the
big-ticket aims of CERN (i.e. discovering the Higgs boson).
In general, the LHCC’s advice is accepted by the collaborations,
precisely because in case of disagreements it offers an arena for open
and robust debate. Trust in the integrity of its processes thus mitigates
conflicts that could otherwise disrupt and delay the joint efforts (Engelen
2012).
The seven experimental collaborations—the largest of which consist of
more than a thousand members hailing from dozens of different insti-
tutes and supported by dozens of funding agencies—organize themselves
but adhere to a generic structure agreed with CERN. The collaborations
were underpinned by memoranda of understanding (MoUs). Although
not legally binding, these documents were signed between CERN and
the collaborating institutes and were essential in agreeing on the contribu-
tions and long-term commitments from each of the institutes, including
CERN, and then for monitoring that the various partners delivered on
these commitments.
These MoUs also formed the bedrock upon which the worldwide
LHC Computing Grid (wLCG) was founded. The wLCG forms the
essential data-analytic support structure necessary to process the massive
amounts of data generated by the experiments conducted in the LHC.
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It was not until relatively late after LHC approval that it was realized
that the computing effort required for processing the LHC data would
need a highly innovative approach and would also require very substan-
tial investment, both at CERN and worldwide. The MoUs, drafted at
CERN’s legal department and signed by delegates from the participating
institutions with appropriate mandates, were particularly important as a
way of communicating with the national funding agencies providing the
all-important financial footing of the collaborating partner institutes and
institutions.
Resources review boards (RRBs) were set up for each experiment
and continue to shadow them throughout their lifetime. Their member-
ship consists of one representative from each funding agency with the
experiment’s management in attendance. They are chaired by CERN’s
Director of Research and provide the interface between the experi-
ments, the national funding agencies and CERN. During the long years
of constructing the experiments, the RRBs were particularly crucial in
securing adequate and continuing funding.
The RRBs monitored progress in light of available (or pledged)
resources. For the large general-purpose experiments in the LHC, ATLAS
and CMS, a ceiling of 475 million Swiss francs for each was set by the
CERN Directorate as the maximum investment costs. Capping invest-
ment in this fashion proved to be a great incentive for the experimental
collaborations to be as resourceful and realistic as possible. The term
‘descoping’ was invented to denote the process of giving up some (redun-
dant) functionality in order to save costs. In case of unavoidable additional
expenditure, the RRBs provided the platforms for assessment and for
reaching agreements on additional pledges from the funding agencies and
from CERN and for postponing certain investments that were less urgent
than others.
This process was, not surprisingly, punctuated by conflict. For example,
the management and operating costs for the experiments were not always
readily accepted or even understood by some of the funding agencies.
In order to make the cases as convincing as possible, a Scrutiny Group
reporting to the RRBs was formed. The experiments provided detailed
information on the costs incurred (retrospectively) and made estimates
for the next year. After scrutiny, these costs were then shared between the
participants. The discussions were often emotional. ‘Users’ are not used
to paying for things at CERN, and yet CERN could not and would not
provide financial carriage of the entire experimental program in addition
230 J. ENGELEN AND P. ‘T HART
to the investments (and running costs) for its accelerator complex. The
RRBs provided crucial platforms buffeted by clear rules of engagement
for working through these tensions and laying the foundations for cost-
sharing agreements between funding agencies (Engelen 2012).
Sustaining the Mystique:
Challenges of Consolidation
As Höne and Kurbalija (2018: 70) note, CERN’s governance structures
and practices allow for its projects to originate from and be driven by
the needs and ambitions of science, while allowing for compromise on
the basis of political and resource considerations. This track record of
achieving workable balances will be put to the test in the coming decades,
in a European and global environment that is much more turbulent
and less favourable than it was in the decades when the LHC came to
fruition. Womersley (2019) reflects the ambivalence, noting that as ‘the
archetype of intergovernmental organization in science, [CERN] offers
great stability in the face of political upheavals such as Brexit’, at the same
time admonishing the CERN community that ‘its challenge today is to
think outside the box’.
The history of CERN buffets Mazzucato’s (2018) celebrated thesis
that only the state—in CERN’s case a growing coalition of states repre-
sented in its Council and Finance Committee—has the required capital
and persistence to fund the kind of fundamental research that produces
the knowledge infrastructure for highly impactful and commercially viable
innovations. So far, so good. Yet, if iconic organizations (Bekaert et al.
2016) are to retain their status as institutions, they need to be able to
continuously challenge the very ‘way we do things around here’ that
has produced their past successes. Indeed, Selznick (2000) reminds us
that to maintain viable, an institution will have to adapt to maintain its
fruitful relation with its ever-changing environment without forgetting
its founding mission, shedding competitive advantage or effectiveness,
suffering identity damage—while maintaining its moral integrity. But how
to accomplish this when their past and present are regularly glorified both
externally and internally? As organizations institutionalize, their character
and modus operandi become imbued with value. This begets stability but
loses flexibility (Selznick 1957: 7).
How then, in this era of the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’ and
the ‘Asian Century’, can an international knowledge institution such as
9 CERN: GUARDIAN OF THE HUMAN ASPIRATION … 231
CERN overcome this twin threat of complacence and rigidity? Ansell
et al. (2015) propose that institutional leaders should pursue a strategy of
dynamic conservatism in which the organization engages in ‘pre-emptive
adaptation’ to foreseeable and consequential changes in its operating as
well as its political environment.
This is highly apposite to CERN. In today’s era of ‘monitory democ-
racy’ (Keane 2018) and public disenchantment with many public institu-
tions, the benign opinion climate surrounding CERN cannot be taken for
granted. Media and other watchdogs may change their tune on CERN.
As one pre-Higgs Boson critic (O’Neill 2008) observed astutely:
The media would rather talk excited gibberish about the LHC than ask
hard questions about support for science in a democratic society, or the
proper priorities for research in physics. The CERN scientists are happy to
meet the media’s demand for hyperbole, as it obscures the most important
questions about funding for CERN. This should not sound too negative.
The LHC is a magnificent human achievement, a great feat of collaboration
and logistics, and it will surely bring fascinating scientific advances. But, in
a sane democratic society, the media and the scientists themselves need
to do a better job about talking sensibly about its purpose, goals and
justification.
CERN wants to remain a nimble, cooperative, science-driven interna-
tional organization.1 At the same time, it has to adapt to an ever more
dynamic scientific and science policy landscape and to a more complex
geopolitical picture in which the European ideals and identities that
helped create and sustain CERN have come under pressure. With large
states such as Russia showing an interest to be included as members, the
CERN Council has to weigh the extent to which such new applicants not
only merit inclusion on the grounds of scientific capabilities and resources,
but are likely to fit its governance culture.
Meanwhile, other large and scientifically ambitious states such as Japan,
China and the United States are currently not bound into CERN by
membership status (if they were to join, through the size of their GNP’s
they would dominate the budget vastly and throw the balanced system
of governance out of joint). This being the case, some are developing
their own plans for the next big post-LHC facility, effectively challenging
CERN’s de facto monopoly in advanced particle physics research. This
only ups the ante for one of the major challenges to CERN in the coming
decade: to build and sell its own business case for the next mega-facility,
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whose scale and time horizon surpass anything the organization has ever
tried before.
If it is to retain its iconic status, CERN will need to produce new
quantum leaps in physics and technology in order to stay ahead of
the pack, sustain its position as an icon of global science and deliver
‘public value’ above and beyond satisfying scientific curiosities. For that
to happen, it needs to once again make strategic choices about its future
research directions, bring its stakeholders along on that journey and
secure very large amounts of money for very long periods of time. Given
how many resources, careers and reputations are invested in its path
leading up to the present, asking and answering these questions will
require strategic leadership of the highest order. It will come down to
the interplay between Directorate, Council, the CERN Community and
its member states and stakeholders to rethink, retain and renew CERN’s
way of operating without compromising its core mission and values which
have served it so well in its first six decades.
Questions for Discussion
1. Discovering what the universe is made of is just about the most
elusive mission that one can think of for any organization. What
role did this lofty, elusive and super long-term ambition play in the
institutionalization of CERN?
2. How did CERN manage to get government policymakers from
its member states to keep funding the boundless ambitions of its
scientists for over nearly 70 years?
3. What risks did CERN take in pushing for the construction of the
Large Hadron Collider, and how did it manage these risks?
4. What role did leadership play in building CERN into the interna-
tional scientific institution it is today, who exercised this leadership
and what forms did it take?
5. If you were asked to advise about the setting up of a new long-term,
international scientific laboratory to be underpinned fully or mostly
by public funding, what lessons from the CERN experience do you
think are crucial to incorporate into that advice?
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Note
1. In a break with tradition, CERN’s current Director-General, Fabiola Gian-
otti was reappointed for another 5 years in her position after reapplying for
it when her term as DG expired (Banks 2019). She envisages a post-LHC
world in which CERN is no longer the only game in town. She realizes
that CERN cannot afford to drag its feet in pushing for the next frontier:
‘With CERN, Europe has regained leadership in fundamental physics at the
energy frontier and also in the advanced technologies that are needed to
do these experiments… [I]t would be a real pity if that leadership were to
go elsewhere in the world’ (quoted in Sample 2019).
References
Ansell, C. K., Boin, A., & Farjoun, M. (2015). Dynamic conservatism: How
institutions change to remain the same. Research in the Sociology of Organiza-
tions, 44, 89–119.
Ansell, C. K., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative governance in theory and
practice. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(4),
543–571.
Banks, I. (2019, November 8). Fabiola Gianotti to remain CERN boss until
2025. Physicsworld. https://physicsworld.com/a/fabiola-gianotti-to-remain-
cern-boss-until-2025/. Accessed 10 February 2020.
Bekaert, X., Jonk, G., Wibbens, P., & Raes, J. (2016). Iconic: How to Create a
Virtuous Circle of Success. London: LID Publishing.
Birnholtz, J. (2008). When authorship isn’t enough: Lessons from CERN on the
implications of formal and informal credit attribution mechanisms in collab-
orative research. Journal of Electronic Publishing, 11(1). http://dx.doi.org/
10.3998/3336451.0011.105.
Cogen, M. (2016). An Introduction to European Intergovernmental Organisa-
tions. Abingdon: Routledge.
Emerson, K., & Nabatchi, T. (2015). Collaborative Governance Regimes. Wash-
ington: Georgetown University Press.
Engelen, J. (2012). The Large Hadron Collider project: organizational and
financial aspects (of physics at the terascale). Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society a: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, 370(1961),
978–985.
Gillies, J. (2018). CERN and the Higgs Boson: The Global Quest for the Building
Blocks of Reality. London: Icon Books.
Gillies, J., & Cailliau, R. (2000). How the Web was Born. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
234 J. ENGELEN AND P. ‘T HART
Goetz, K., & Patz, R. (2017). Resourcing international organizations: resource
diversification, organizational differentiation, and administrative governance.
Global Policy, 8(5), 5–14.
Goodsell, C. (2011). Mission mystique: Strength at the institutional center.
American Review of Public Administration, 41(5), 475–494.
Hale, T., & Held, D. (2017). Beyond Gridlock. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hofstede, G. H. (1991). Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Höne, J., & Korbalija, J. (2018). Accelerating basic science in an intergovern-
mental framework: Learning from CERN’s science diplomacy. Global Policy,
9(Suppl 3), 67–72.
Keane, J. (2018). Power and Humility: The Future of Monitory Democracy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lucibella, M. (2014). CERN: 60 years of collaboration. APS Physics, 23(8), 4–7.
Mazzucato, M. (2018). The Entrepreneurial State. London: Penguin.
O’Neill, M. (2008, 17 September). Politics of proton smashing. New Statesman.
https://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/2008/09/physics-
lhc-cern-scientific. Accessed 10 February 2020.
OECD. (2014). The Impacts of Large Research Infrastructures on Economic
Innovation and on Society: Case Studies at CERN . Paris: OECD.
Pestre, M. (1988, November). The CERN System, its Legislative and Execu-
tive Arms and some global statistics on how it functioned. Geneva: CERN
https://cds.cern.ch/record/720698/files/CERN-CH-27.pdf. Accessed 18
March 2020.
Robinson, M. (2019). The CERN community: A mechanism for effective global
collaboration? Global Policy, 10(1), 41–51.
Sample, I. (2019, February 23). Fabiola Gianotti: ‘There is nothing more
rewarding than discovering a new particle.’ The Observer. https://www.the
guardian.com/science/2019/feb/23/fabiola-gianotti-interview-director-gen
eral-cern-particle-physicist-large-hadron-collider. Accessed 10 February 2020.
Schulman, P. (1980). Large-Scale Policymaking. New York: Elsevier North
Holland.
Selznick, P. (1957). Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation.
New York: Harper & Row.
Selznick, P. (2000). On sustaining research agendas: Their moral and scientific
basis. Journal of Management Inquiry, 9(3), 277–282.
Starkman, G. (2018, May 23). The Standard Model of particle physics: The
absolutely amazing theory of almost everything. The Conversation. https://
theconversation.com/the-standard-model-of-particle-physics-the-absolutely-
amazing-theory-of-almost-everything-94700. Accessed 10 February 2020.
9 CERN: GUARDIAN OF THE HUMAN ASPIRATION … 235
Verbeek, B. (2009). Leadership of international organizations. In J. Kane, H.
Patapan, & P. ‘t Hart (Eds.), Dispersed Democratic Leadership: Origins,
Dynamics, and Implications (pp. 235–255). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Womersley, J. R. (2019, May 8). Building scientific resilience. CERN
Courier. https://cerncourier.com/a/building-scientific-resilience/. Accessed
10 February 2020.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright
holder.
CHAPTER 10
Rijkswaterstaat: Guardian of the Dutch Delta
Margo van den Brink
Ruler of the Dutch Delta
1
As a country below sea level, the Netherlands has battled against the
water for centuries. From pumping water to reclaim land for farms and
houses, to building numerous dikes and dams for flood protection: water
management has determined the spatial contours and structure of the
Netherlands. The national government institution responsible for these
‘water works’ and giving the Netherlands its reputation as ‘conqueror of
the sea’ (Lintsen 2002), ‘ruler of the Dutch delta’ (Van der Ham 1999)
and indomitable ‘master of the flood’ (Collier 2019) is Rijkswaterstaat—
formally known as the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water
Management, located within the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water
Management.
Rijkswaterstaat was founded in 1798, during the French occupation.
Since then, it has evolved into an iconic institution within Dutch society.
It holds a powerful position in the development of both transport and
hydraulic infrastructure in the Netherlands. It is known all over the world
for its engineering expertise, realizing public works of unusual scope and
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sophistication. The Zuiderzee Works (1920–1968) and the Delta Works
(1954–1997) were essential in this regard.
The Zuiderzee Works involved the closure of the Zuiderzee (an inland
sea in the northwest of the Netherlands) by the construction of a major
dam over a length of 32 kilometres, and the reclamation of new polders
in the newly created giant freshwater lake. The Delta Works included the
construction of various dams, dikes and storm surge barriers, closing off
nearly all sea inlets and shortening the Dutch coastline after the storm
surge of 1953, which killed nearly 2000 people and devastated nearly 10%
of the country’s farmland. Rijkswaterstaat’s more recent ‘Room for the
River’ program (2006–2019), rather than building higher dikes, created
more space for the main rivers by constructing new river branches, relo-
cating dikes and ‘de-poldering’ agricultural areas (e.g. Kimmelman and
Haner 2017; Van Buuren 2019).
Rijkswaterstaat is the implementation agency of the Ministry of Infras-
tructure and Water Management. It is one of the largest government
organizations in the Netherlands, employing about 8700 staff divided
across its head office, 7 regional departments and 7 national, specialist
departments. It is responsible for a large part of the Dutch physical infras-
tructure: for flood protection; to ensure sufficient water for navigation,
irrigation and as a source of clean drinking water; for the construction,
day-to-day operations and maintenance of the national motorways and
waterways; and for enabling smooth and safe traffic flows. Its current
mission—‘working to make the Netherlands safe, secure, attractive and
accessible for all’—captures this broad scope of activities (Rijkswaterstaat,
n.d.).
Its combined responsibilities for constructing and maintaining both
‘dry’ and ‘wet’ national infrastructures is unique in the world. Compa-
rable government organizations focus either on water management, such
as the Environment Agency in the UK and the US Army Corps of Engi-
neers (see for a comparison between Rijkswaterstaat and the Army Corps:
Lonnquest et al. 2014), or on infrastructure planning and management,
such as the Highways Agency in the UK and Trafikverket in Sweden.
This chapter mainly concentrates on the ‘wet’ side of Rijkswaterstaat, but
it also draws comparisons with the ‘dry’ side of the organization.
This is a story about a venerable institution that, especially from the
1970s onwards, has faced major adaptive challenges in the light of socio-
cultural and political changes. The explosive rise of the environmental
movement, the democratization within Dutch society, and, starting in the
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1980s, the rise of the neoliberal politico-economic ideology put Rijkswa-
terstaat’s powerful position and its perceived technocratic modus operandi
under pressure. As a result, it found itself on the horns of a dilemma: it
needed its renowned expert status to fulfil its public responsibilities; but
it also needed to distance itself from this expert status to develop into a
more responsive and efficient public organization (Van den Brink 2009).
In response, Rijkswaterstaat developed several proactive adaptation strate-
gies, which focused on reinventing its organizational identity and related
‘mission mystique’ (Goodsell 2011a, b).
This chapter first describes the birth of Rijkswaterstaat and explains
how it developed from a semi-military organization based on crafts-
manship into an institution of civil engineers with a strong technocratic
mission mystique. Then it focuses on the period of the 1970s and 1980s,
during which the new ‘waves of change’ caused a deep institutional crisis.
The proactive adaptation strategies that Rijkswaterstaat developed to ride
these waves of change will be discussed, including the reinvention of
its mission mystique in managerial terms. The chapter ends with a brief
reflection on the future of Rijkswaterstaat.
The Birth of Rijkswaterstaat
Rijkswaterstaat’s founding in 1798 was the result of political changes
in the Netherlands. The year 1795 marked the end of the Republic
of the Seven United Provinces. With the help of French troops and
following the example of the French Republic, the anti-monarchist faction
in Dutch politics at the time, the so-called patriots, created the Bata-
vian Republic, in which the confederate structure of the Dutch state was
replaced by a centrally governed unitary model. Within that structure,
a national organization for public works was deemed desirable. There
was an increasing need for more orchestrated forms of coordination and
cooperation between the various provincial and regional agencies with
jurisdiction on matters concerning water management and public infras-
tructures. For example, regular flooding of the main rivers flowing into
the country from Belgium and Germany threatened lives and assets in the
Dutch delta. A concerted effort to eliminate such floods was thought to
require a national organization (Bosch and Van der Ham 2015).
A representative of the patriot revolution, Christiaan Brunings, the
son of a vicar and former head of water management in the province
of Holland, was asked to draw up a plan for this national organization
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for public works. His plan substantially reduced the role of the provinces
and the water boards in favour of more central government influence. It
was approved in 1798. Under the slogan ‘unity, simplicity and indivisibil-
ity’ a national agency was set up ‘for the administration of all that which
pertains to public works’ (Lintsen 2002: 554). Founding father Brunings
became its first Director-General.
The early decades in the life of Rijkswaterstaat (1798 to circa 1850)
have been described as a period of ‘autocratic traditionalism’ (Lintsen
1998, 2002). Rijkswaterstaat started as an organization based on tradi-
tional craftsmanship. The first hydraulic engineers were predominantly the
sons of tradesmen, such as carpenters and windmill builders. They were
self-made men, trained on the job and lacking social status. In those days,
most politicians, administrators and civil servants were members of the
aristocracy or the upper classes, who did not think of the Rijkswaterstaat
engineers as their equals. In their view, the military engineers—recruited
from the nobility whose skills were honed by technical training at a
dedicated school—were the real professionals.
To improve its position and the status of the civil engineering profes-
sion, and to distinguish itself from the other parties involved in Dutch
water management, Rijkswaterstaat set about to professionalize its orga-
nization. This was mainly achieved through the advancement and accu-
mulation of hydraulic knowledge and expertise and by putting hydraulic
engineering on the map through systematic training and professional
socialization.
In 1810, after four years of the Kingdom of Holland under Louis
Napoleon, the brother of the French emperor, Napoleon incorporated
the Netherlands into the French state. Rijkswaterstaat was now part of
the French public works agency, the Corps des Ponts et des Chaussées,
a powerful military and bureaucratic organization (Lintsen 1980: 59–
65). Rijkswaterstaat was transformed into a technical government agency
along military lines, with a hierarchy of ranks and a strong emphasis
on discipline. Like the military engineers, the hydraulic engineers were
now allowed to add a title to their names and wear an official uniform.
The corresponding ‘militarization’ of the Rijkswaterstaat organization is
illustrated by the way in which students were prepared, professionally,
physically and mentally, for engineering practice. Besides character forma-
tion and theoretical (mathematical and natural science) education, the
training approach at military schools also served to promote the esprit
de corps and develop common ideals, such as service to the nation.
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Combined, these reforms helped raise the social status of Rijkswater-
staat’s hydraulic engineers and gave the organization better access to the
corridors of power.
After the demise of the Napoleonic regime in 1813, the Nether-
lands became a Kingdom under the monarch King Willem I. Under
his rule, Rijkswaterstaat experienced a period of growth and accelerating
professionalization. William I perpetuated the hierarchical, quasi-military
organization model that had taken shape during the French period. In
1824 he decided on a new official uniform, and in 1829 completion of
the technical training at the Royal Military Academy in Breda became
an admission requirement for the ‘Engineering Corps of General Public
Works’. This, too, served to reinforce Rijkswaterstaat’s military character.
The ambitious king, bent on modernizing the country and fond of big
infrastructural works, had almost 500 kilometres of new canals built.
He also initiated the reclamation of the Haarlemmermeer lake south-
west of Amsterdam and several other large water bodies in the west
of the country. In this period, a tandem of two Director-Generals, Jan
Blanken and Adrianus François Goudriaan, established Rijkswaterstaat as
a competent manager of large projects, solidifying the agency’s prestige.
Building the Institution:
Professionalism and Technocracy
In the 1830s and 1840s, Rijkswaterstaat’s credibility was put to the test.
In 1830, Belgium broke away from the Kingdom. A lengthy period of
mobilization ensued and until 1839, when a peace treaty was signed,
investments in public works and infrastructure fell dramatically. Rijkswa-
terstaat was rapidly downgraded to a marginal organization with limited
budget.
The malaise would last until 1848, when liberal reformers led by the
Dutch constitution’s chief architect and prime minister Jan Rudolf Thor-
becke staged a peaceful revolution. The influence of the monarchy was cut
back and a democratic polity arose. In the ensuing period (1850–1930),
a gradual emancipation of the hydraulic engineering profession occurred.
The establishment of the Royal Academy of Civil Engineers at Delft
in 1842, the forerunner to the present Delft University of Technology,
heralded the transition from a military to a quasi-academic educational
system for engineers (Lintsen 2002). By putting hydraulic engineering
training on an independent footing, the professionally trained hydraulic
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engineers improved their social status. Between 1850 and 1860 these
graduates of the Royal Academy usurped the authority previously held
by the military-trained engineers (Goverde 1987).
Echoing the spirit of the peaceful revolution, the new vanguard of
civil engineers spoke of ‘a new-born country’ and believed that the
time was ripe for major undertakings (Lintsen 2002: 558). In 1850,
senior engineer J.H. Ferrand and future Director-General (1858–1864)
L.J.A. van der Kun presented a revolutionary plan for river improve-
ments by regulating and standardizing the shape of the river channels
and improving their navigability. This plan was implemented and proved
a great success in eliminating the hitherto endemic and disruptive riverine
floods. Other prestigious projects in which the Rijkswaterstaat engineers
became involved were the construction of a national railway network,
which started in 1860, and the excavation of canals connecting the ports
of Rotterdam and Amsterdam to the North Sea, which began in the
mid-1860s.
An essential element in the success of Rijkswaterstaat was the intro-
duction of steam as a new basic technology. The wide use of steam
engines enhanced the mechanization of production. The industrialization
of Dutch society also had a downside, as it was accompanied by new social
issues in the fields of public housing, public health and factory work. The
new generation of innovation-minded civil engineers became engaged in
these social questions, too. Although their involvement was partly driven
by their desire to create a better world, it was also another way to further
enhance the social status and employment prospects of engineers.2
After decades of sustained momentum, the outbreak of the First World
War halted the implementation of ambitious Rijkswaterstaat plans, such
as projects to further improve river navigation, reclaim parts of the
Zuiderzee and build a new canal linking Amsterdam to the river Rhine.
By the 1920s, politicians and press began to criticize the agency for being
too bureaucratic and inefficient. Moreover, the organization was slow to
adapt to the arrival of automobiles and new technological and scientific
developments relevant to the construction industry.
Water Wizards
The part of the organization responsible for the ‘dry’ infrastructures now
had to fight for its social licence to operate. Not confident that Rijkswater-
staat was capable of delivering a national road network, several Members
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of Parliament questioned whether Rijkswaterstaat should remain respon-
sible for road infrastructure. It took intervention by the minister and the
introduction of a public–private advisory committee on road building for
it to retain its dual (dry–wet) mandate.
In 1930, the Netherlands was on the verge of an economic depression.
Nevertheless, with the appointment of a new Director-General, civil engi-
neer Johan Ringers, things began to look up for Rijkswaterstaat. Under
Ringers’ supervision, Rijkswaterstaat developed into a powerful and deci-
sive organization that operated in tune with the economic problems of
that time and adapted swiftly to new challenges and technological devel-
opments. In 1935, Rijkswaterstaat even became responsible for designing
and delivering infrastructure policy at large. In that capacity it went on
to develop several National Road Plans (see also Bosch and Van der Ham
2015; Arts et al. 2016).
Director-General Ringers managed to radically reorganize the organi-
zation, establishing a head office in The Hague and creating specialized
departments for specific projects and techniques. ‘Specialization’ and ‘sci-
entific management’ were considered key in solving social questions and
controlling the forces of nature. Within the new organizational structure,
the Rijkswaterstaat engineers focused on fundamental research and exper-
imented with new modelling methods and advanced project designs. They
soon became internationally leading experts in the field, with divisions
such as the National Road Laboratory and the Hydrodynamic Laboratory
serving as flagship vehicles for this expertise.
This development began to insulate Rijkswaterstaat from criticism. For
instance, engineer Johan van Veen predicted that the existing infrastruc-
ture would not be able to withstand peak storm surges, leaving the
south-west parts of the country vulnerable to catastrophic flooding. To
tackle this risk, Van Veen proposed a comprehensive plan to close the key
estuaries. To his great frustration, Van Veen found the leadership of the
organization unresponsive to his warnings. In time, he would be proven
right and become known as the ‘Father of the Delta Plan’ (see further
below).
The specialization and scientific development would bring about the
final phase in the lengthy emancipation process of the hydraulic engineers,
as the new rational-scientific approach to hydraulic engineering turned
them into ‘water wizards’. In his novel Roll Back the Sea, which tells the
story of the closures of the dikes that were bombed by British aircraft in
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1944 to drive the Germans out of the polders, celebrated Dutch novelist
A. den Doolaard (1948: 3) offers an observation that still rings true today:
People scarcely understand at all what these water wizards do. But no
matter. The whole of modern society, after all, rests on the confidence
of ordinary people in wizards. And everyone who lives below sea level
in Holland sits back with implicit confidence while the hydraulic-engineer
wizards plug away at the dikes.
After World War II, Rijkswaterstaat reached new heights of power and
expertise. It became perceived as the ‘ruler of the delta’ (Van der Ham
1999). In the post-war years, some of the largest and most important
public works in the history of the Netherlands were built. The post-war
reconstruction and the increasing prosperity after World War II required
a radical modernization of Dutch infrastructure. Moreover, immediately
following the disastrous flood of 1953 that Van Veen had predicted, Rijk-
swaterstaat seized the crisis-driven momentum to develop and implement
the large-scale and innovative Delta Works project. The working methods
of the Delta Department, which was responsible for the Delta Works,
gained widespread international recognition and emulation.
As a result, the size of the agency ballooned during the 1950s and
1960s—from about 350 employees in 1903 to 9940 employees in 1970—
which was accompanied by a process of bureaucratization. The growth
of its mandate and the now large catalogue of tasks and projects that
stemmed from it required systematic coordination. This need was met by
articulating elaborate systems of rules, standards and procedures, a strict
hierarchy and strong social cohesion rooted in a common, Delft-based
professional socialization (Bosch and Van der Ham 2015).
A Technocratic Mission Mystique
In those post-war years, Rijkswaterstaat’s mandate, public stature and
its influence on the physical infrastructure of the Netherlands was more
prominent than ever before. Pressing environmental problems and soci-
etal demands regarding water security, such as the need to find a solution
for the recurrent river floods, were a key driver. Institution-building
leadership by several Director-Generals also played a key role: Brunings
as founding father, Blanken and Goudriaan who established Rijkswater-
staat as competent policy implementation agency, Ferrand and van der
Kun who introduced the revolutionary river standardization strategy, and
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Ringers who managed to radically reorganize Rijkswaterstaat in response
to new social challenges and technological developments.
Full of admiration for the work of the ‘water wizards’, the Dutch public
and politicians put Rijkswaterstaat on a pedestal. Van der Ham (1999:
357) associates this period with the ‘technocratisation of Dutch water
management’: policy was increasingly determined by the bureaucrat engi-
neers rather than by senior civil servants enacting the wishes of parliament.
The increasing belief that technical and scientific knowledge and expertise
could be harnessed to solve social problems informed the culture of Rijk-
swaterstaat and the ethos of its engineers. Rijkswaterstaat had developed
into an iconic institution in the Dutch landscape.
Rijkswaterstaat had acquired a distinctively technocratic ‘mission
mystique’, as it was—in Goodsell’s (2011a: 477) terms—‘endowed with
an aura of positive institutional charisma that is derived from the nature of
its mission and how well it is carried out’. Table 10.1 describes the insti-
tution in terms of Goodsell’s matrix (as presented in Chapter 1). A first
Table 10.1 Rijkswaterstaat’s technocratic mission mystique in the 1950s and
1960s
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important distinctive organizational feature was the presence of a purpo-
sive aura. Rijkswaterstaat was a mission-driven public agency, with, in the
words of a former deputy Director-General, ‘a high value profile’:
We have water that flows from high to low, and which has to be kept at
bay. That is the justification for our existence. This duty will not change.
You can perform it in a different way, but the job remains the same. And
it has to be done now.
Since the establishment of Rijkswaterstaat, flood protection in the Nether-
lands has been a public rather than a private responsibility. Should a dike
break, causing a flood disaster, Dutch society will hold Rijkswaterstaat
responsible. People expect Rijkswaterstaat to take care of them and to
make sure that they can go to bed every night without having to worry
about the water. It is expected and taken for granted that Rijkswaterstaat
has the expertise to prevent floods and other water-related problems.
Though it is also responsible for public works and transport infrastruc-
ture development, its institutional myth was created more in its ‘wet’ than
in its ‘dry’ operations. This can be explained by the country’s endemic
vulnerability to flooding and attendant cultural memory of flooding,
which have bred a deeply felt need for water security that Rijkswater-
staat took a leading role in meeting, earning it a strong reputation based
on achievements. By comparison, the ‘dry’ domain was a much more
complex and contentious policy domain populated by a greater variety of
actors, which did not lend itself to similar acts of engineering heroism.
Rijkswaterstaat developed an effective practice to match its purpo-
sive aura. It did so through the advancement of hydraulic knowledge
and expertise and experimentation with new methods and techniques.
Successful projects, such as river canalization and land reclamation
projects, gave rise to the emergence of an internal norm (cf. Boin
and Christensen 2008) that emphasized the superiority of methodic,
technical-rational ways of formulating and performing infrastructure plan-
ning processes and projects. The technocratic modus operandi bore
fruit during the construction of the Zuiderzee Works, magnifying Den
Doolaard’s image of the Rijkswaterstaat engineers as ‘water wizards’. The
need for and public admiration of the grand infrastructural works solidi-
fied the technocratic way of working and paved the way for new ambitious
public works, such as the construction of the Delta Works, after the
disastrous flood of 1953.
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Internalizing the norm, Rijkswaterstaat’s civil engineers developed a
strong esprit de corps. A distinctive organizational feature of Rijkswater-
staat was the clear presence of passion and commitment among its staff,
buffeted by its technical engineering culture. Rijkswaterstaat engineers
were typically loyal, very motivated, committed and proud of their work.
But above all, they had a strong belief in their own technical abilities as
well as their ability to shape Dutch society through intelligent and perfect
engineering design (Bosch and Van der Ham 2015).
Rijkswaterstaat also honoured and celebrated its past in ways envis-
aged by Goodsell (2011a, b). An example was the elaborate celebration
of the 25-year anniversary of the closure of the Afsluitdijk, the dike that
tamed the Zuiderzee, turning it into the IJsselmeer. Other recurrent
forms of celebrating past achievements and milestones included the prepa-
ration and publication of commemorative books, plaques and ceremonies
(e.g. Stuvel 1957). Combined, they created a sense of living institutional
memory and instilled pride in Rijkswaterstaat employees.
The third distinctive organizational feature identified by Goodsell
(2011a, b) concerns mechanisms that sustain the institution over time,
in other words its legitimacy. Especially during the ‘technocratic’ 1950s
and 1960s, Rijkswaterstaat’s success was taken for granted. The institu-
tion was not challenged. Moreover, as Rijkswaterstaat was responsible for
both policy making and implementation it did have policy autonomy,
which permitted it to meet new social challenges and technological
developments by relying on its technocratic working style.
Under the Gun: Turbulent Times
In the 1970s, the tide turned. Whereas previous social and political
developments tended to stimulate or contribute to the professionaliza-
tion and technocratization of Rijkswaterstaat and the realization of its
public responsibilities, new ‘waves of change’ (Schwartz 1993) put Rijk-
swaterstaat’s technocratic working style under pressure and questioned its
position in Dutch society.
In the early 1970s, there was an explosive rise of the environmental
movement (Cramer 1989). This swing in the national mood was induced,
among other things, by the publication of The Limits to Growth by the
Club of Rome (Meadows 1972). The nationwide support that the Delta
Plan had received during the 1950s and 1960s began to diminish in the
1970s and 1980s when environmental interest groups elicited popular
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support. Many large flood management projects were reframed as ‘man-
made environmental catastrophes’ instead of ‘major triumphs of civil
engineering’ (Disco 2002). Likewise, many road construction projects
became fiercely contested (Arts et al. 2016).
The rise of the environmental movement was accompanied by the
democratization and emancipation of Dutch society. Citizens demanded a
stronger voice in decision-making processes and revolted against the ‘pol-
itics of expertise’ (Fischer 1990). As a result, Rijkswaterstaat’s powerful
position in infrastructural development came under growing criticism. Its
technocratic ethos was now perceived as an autocratic mindset lacking
appropriate responsiveness to new social demands and environmental
issues (Leemans and Geers 1983). Rijkswaterstaat lost control of the
framing of its brand. It was now labelled a ‘state within the state’ that
developed plans in an ‘ivory tower’. It was a ‘technocratic bulwark’ that
was ‘out of touch with society’ and ‘pushed through its plans at any
price’ (Grimbergen et al. 1983; Bervaes et al. 1990). Its existence and
operations were no longer taken for granted but had to be ‘earned’ or
‘legitimized’.
The 1973 global oil price hikes was yet another development that
heavily influenced the position of Rijkswaterstaat within Dutch society.
The resultant economic slump during the 1970s and 1980s brought
high levels of unemployment and pushed up welfare state expenditures
to unprecedented levels. As a result of the fiscal crisis management
that followed, funding for Rijkswaterstaat’s major public works dried
up. Drastic budget cuts ensued. A neoliberal politico-economic ideology
questioning the primacy of state-led social problem-solving took hold in
Western societies. Morphing into what became known as New Public
Management (NPM), the new paradigm distrusted government monopo-
lies (such as Rijkswaterstaat) and claimed that government agencies could
improve their effectiveness and efficiency by incorporating management
tools from the corporate sector (see f.i Hood 1991; Osborne and Gaebler
1992).
Rijkswaterstaat, as one of the largest government organizations, faced
a fundamental reassessment of its position and the way in which it
carried out its core tasks. Flood risk management and road construction
plans became the subject of broad public debate and sometimes intense
contestation. In particular, the proposed fixed dam in the estuary of the
Oosterschelde, the planned river dike improvements and the construction
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of a new highway through the Amelisweerd estate near Utrecht func-
tioned as ‘focusing projects’ (Lowry 2006), damaging the public image of
Rijkswaterstaat. As a result, Rijkswaterstaat entered an institutional crisis
(cf. Boin and ‘t Hart 2000) that forced it to rethink its public value
proposition as well as the way in which it conducted its business, yet
without losing its deep grounding technical and scientific expertise.
Riding the Waves of Change
Through Proactive Adaptation
Through several decades of soul-searching and experimentation, Rijkswa-
terstaat eventually found a new lease on life while staying true to its core
values. Ansell et al. (2015: 102) describe what is involved: ‘An institution
must sometimes transform itself without causing intolerable disruption
(…). This type of reform has a sacrificial ring to it: something valuable,
something that has proven its worth, is being altered or disbanded to
preserve the whole’.
By incorporating elements from the environmental movement (the
ecological turn) and the new neoliberal ideology (the managerial turn),
Rijkswaterstaat initiated a strategic turn by reconsidering its societal and
political position. It reinvented its engineering identity and its technical-
rational value proposition. As a consequence, Rijkswaterstaat experienced
a degree of deinstitutionalization.
The Ecological Turn: Integrated Water
Management and Impact Assessment
Rijkswaterstaat incorporated the criticism of environmental interest
groups by introducing the principle of integrated water management, by
hiring biologists and ecologists to assess the ecological impacts of water
management projects, and by making the environment and the landscape
key issues (Disco 2002). Integrated water management concerns the inte-
gration of the various material aspects of water systems and the integration
of the relevant policy sectors and corresponding interests, such as spatial
planning, nature and water management.3
Rijkswaterstaat’s technocratic culture and working style remained
dominant, as it subsumed the environmental discourse into its techno-
cratic routines. For example, one important way to assess the ecological
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impacts of flood risk management and highway projects became to inter-
pret these impacts in technical terms and developing ecological norms
and standards which these projects had to meet. In the same way, the
environment and the landscape were taken into account. Rijkswater-
staat engineers thus interpreted the environmental discourse in terms
of technical rationalism and a positivist conception of knowledge: tech-
nical methods and methodologies were viewed as the only valid means
of obtaining ‘true knowledge’ and as the only solid basis for solutions
to social and environmental problems. Even though the environmental
discourse reflected a fundamentally different set of values, Rijkswaterstaat
thus managed to reconcile and connect itself with the new ecological
perspective.
The Managerial Turn: Efficiency Operations
and New Forms of Project Management
In the 1980s and 1990s, Rijkswaterstaat had to contend with various
cutbacks and efficiency operations. The increasingly dominant NPM
ideology introduced a new organizational model and an accompanying
financial system. The underlying idea was that the management and
control of such a large and complex organization from only one centre,
namely the Rijkswaterstaat head office, was hard if not impossible.
Another NPM-inspired insight held that such a large and relatively static
organization was unable to cope with the increasing speed of change in
the external environment (Schwartz 1993: 35–36).
In response, responsibilities within Rijkswaterstaat were extensively
reorganized and decentralized to the regional and specialized depart-
ments. Rijkswaterstaat also started to explore the outsourcing of some
of its tasks and activities. Responding to the increasing criticism of its
technocratic working style, it began to experiment with public–private
partnerships. Moreover, to control and improve the effectiveness of new
policies, it experimented with new forms of project management, based
on an instrumental approach to interactive planning.
Despite the many sweeping reorganizations to increase the effective-
ness and efficiency of the organization, Rijkswaterstaat’s core tasks were
never the subject of a public debate. Its technical knowledge and expertise
were still considered the backbone of the organization. The traditional
esprit de corps remained intact. The technocratic culture and working
style of Rijkswaterstaat remained dominant. All this can be explained
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by the compatibility of the neoliberal ideology and the technocratic
modus operandi of Rijkswaterstaat: NPM and engineers were made for
each other. Performance indicators, targets, norms, standards, service-
level agreements, benchmarks, assessments, accounting procedures were
all rational and technical tools introduced to measure and improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of policy making and policy implementation.
The Strategic Turn: Scenario Thinking and Organizational Learning
At the end of the 1970s, Rijkswaterstaat started to reflect fundamentally
on its role and position within Dutch society. Rijkswaterstaat’s strategic
thinking was formally embodied in 1990 with the establishment of a sepa-
rate strategy department at the head office. The first important task of
the strategy department was to explore and analyse the expected long-
term developments in its environment (Scenarioteam RWS 2020 2007).
The second task of the strategy department was to support and facili-
tate strategy development processes and strategic decision-making by the
various management teams.
Rijkswaterstaat was inspired by the writings of Shell’s former head of
planning, Arie de Geus, who acted as external advisor.4 His advice was
to trigger organizational learning before the pain of a crisis by devel-
oping a set of scenarios for the future that contradict and challenge
existing ‘mental models’. Rijkswaterstaat started to consider itself as a
‘living company’ and developed various strategy development and renewal
projects.5 Their main aim was to constantly gauge and adapt Rijkswater-
staat’s direction, both for the short term and the long term. Pivotal to
this strategic turn was that Rijkswaterstaat, now as a ‘living company’,
again remained true to its core values: the strategic explorations were
focused on finding ways to incorporate the new waves of change in its
technical-rational value proposition.
Towards a New Managerial Mission
In the early years of the twenty-first century, the position of Rijkswa-
terstaat and the persistence of its primarily technocratic modus operandi
came under fire once again. Major budget overruns and evidence of poor
management of large and contentious infrastructure projects such as the
Betuwe Line (the dedicated rail freight line from Rotterdam to Germany),
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started to surface. Around the same time, a parliamentary inquiry uncov-
ered widespread and systemic fraud in the construction sector. As the
major government player in the sector, Rijkswaterstaat had failed to signal
let alone tackle the fraud. Both the budget excesses and the fraud case
were extremely damaging for the public image of Rijkswaterstaat.
It stimulated a repositioning within the Ministry of Infrastructure
and Water Management, which sought to reduce Rijkswaterstaat’s domi-
nance and autonomy and increase political control over the agency. The
responsibility for infrastructure policy making was separated from that for
policy implementation. Rijkswaterstaat was stripped of the former and was
internally repositioned as the ministry’s delivery agency. This was a funda-
mental break with the past—the behemoth had been slain: from then
on Rijkswaterstaat’s tasks and responsibilities were restricted to project
management, operations and maintenance. Policy and planning were now
driven by the department. The ‘state within the state’—as Rijkswaterstaat
was commonly referred to in public discourse about the agency—ceased
to exist.
Goodsell (2011b: 24) argued that, over time, ‘a mission mystique
agency must be relentless in engaging in renewal processes’ if it wants to
keep aims and practices up with ever-changing times. The repositioning
of Rijkswaterstaat as a delivery agency was accompanied by the strategic
reformulation of its mission mystique and organizational identity, along
the lines of the then-dominant neoliberal ideology (cf. Metze 2010).
The managerialization of Rijkswaterstaat’s mission mystique was initi-
ated by Director-General Bert Keijts, who, in response to the recent
budget excesses and fraud case, felt a high sense of urgency to renew Rijk-
swaterstaat’s technical culture and technocratic working style. In 2004,
Keijts introduced a ‘Business Plan’ to rapidly transform the agency into a
‘government business’ (Rijkswaterstaat 2004; see also 2008, 2011, 2016).
As stated in these business plans, without ‘a clear perspective’ and ‘vision
for the future’ it would be impossible to realize the intended organiza-
tional changes. Keijts set high ambitions, as he wanted Rijkswaterstaat to
become ‘the most public-oriented national policy-implementing agency in
the Netherlands’. The rhetoric of the Business Plan expressed these ambi-
tions, envisaging three interrelated change trajectories: ‘Public-Oriented
Network Management’, ‘Human Resource Management’ and ‘House in
Order’. These change trajectories aimed to adapt the agency’s distinctive
organizational features to the new strategic and operational environments
it had come to face (Ansell et al. 2015).
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A New Mission: ‘From A to Better’
To improve its much-diminished public image, Rijkswaterstaat recrafted
its mission and purpose. Rijkswaterstaat sought to develop from a ‘tra-
ditional road and water manager’ to a ‘public-oriented, effective and
cost-efficient government business’ that acts as ‘public-oriented network
manager’. It wanted to focus on the ‘users’ of the infrastructure ‘net-
works’ (the main road network, the main waterway network and the
main water system). To realize this ambition, the three networks were
interpreted as ‘systems’ that had to be ‘optimized’: the main aim of
operations, maintenance and construction (‘network management’) was
to make these networks function better and improve customer service
accordingly. Public-Oriented Network Management was thus defined as
Rijkswaterstaat’s new role and working style. Its new core task was to
improve traffic flows on the main motorways and waterways and thus
serve the users on their way ‘from A to B’, from door to door, as well as
possible.
To publicize its changing role and mission, Rijkswaterstaat launched
a public information campaign with the slogan ‘From A to Better’ (Van
A naar Beter). Besides various television and radio commercials, signs
carrying this slogan were placed above the main motorways and water-
ways. Rijkswaterstaat thus adopted a ‘management’ perspective on the
way it wanted to fulfil its tasks as a policy-implementing agency, showing
that the neoliberal managerial discourse again was decisive for the way
in which concepts such as ‘the public’ (i.e. the users), ‘network’ (i.e.
physical infrastructure systems) and ‘network management’ (i.e. opti-
mizing traffic flows) were interpreted. In this way, while staying true to
its technical-rational working style, Rijkswaterstaat aimed to increase its
effectiveness and efficiency and to restore the relationship with the users
of the infrastructure networks.
HRM as Instrument for Organizational Learning
The new way of working required new skills beyond technical knowl-
edge and expertise. Director-General Keijts therefore prioritized Human
Resource Management as an instrument to teach employees the required
social skills and to stimulate organizational learning, which was a delib-
erate attempt to renew Rijkswaterstaat’s mission mystique culture. In
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the first Business Plan (Rijkswaterstaat 2004: 17), the aim of the corre-
sponding HRM change trajectory was formulated as follows:
We are not able to realise our targets without working on a renewed
culture. Traditionally, RWS is a reliable, professional, technically oriented
and loyal organisation. We want to continue making use of these tradition-
ally strong qualities. However, the new perspective requires new emphases
in the culture of RWS.
To renew its organizational culture, a Corporate Learning Centre was
established and various learning programs were developed to teach Rijk-
swaterstaat employees the new competences and social skills that were
required to put the ambitions of the Business Plan into practice. Courses
varied from topics such as the ‘art of professional commissioning’, the
‘art of Public-Oriented Network Management’ and ‘learning to think
from the perspective of the user’. A former Director-General of a regional
department explained the intended change of behaviour as follows:
Have you ever been assisted by the car breakdown service?.…The
patrolmen are trained in two different ways. The most important is
customer contact. This means always being courteous, polite and friendly.
And of course being a super expert with cars.… In order to be a public-
oriented organisation, you thus need people who are prepared to help find
a solution, with the skill to listen….But like the breakdown service, people
who are customer friendly but lack the necessary technical expertise are
of no use. They have to be good at repairing cars. It’s the same with us;
employees in all positions must have the technical and practical expertise
to do their jobs properly. So it is all about combining the two.
Rijkswaterstaat employees were encouraged to develop their personalities
and change their patterns of behaviour. The required new social skills,
such as ‘user-friendliness’, depended on the specific job requirements
and on the specific role employees played in operations and mainte-
nance. Hence, traditional technical knowledge was complemented with
the development of social skills to better engage with stakeholders.
Centralization, Simplification and Standardization
A renewal of Rijkswaterstaat’s organizational structure was also deemed
necessary, in light of its new institutional position as policy-implementing
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agency. Drawing on NPM ideas, the internal management of the orga-
nization had to be much simpler and uniform. For this purpose, the
budget for day-to-day operations and maintenance was cut off from the
precarious annual political budget allocations. Output steering on the
basis of Service Level Agreements (SLAs) was introduced as an alter-
native allocation and control mechanism. The new system governed
about 50% of Rijkswaterstaat’s overall budget. The other half was for the
design and construction of new projects and remained subject to political
decision-making.
In another key development, Rijkswaterstaat continued its policy of
contracting out a considerable part of its tasks and activities to private
construction companies, requiring it to develop the competency to effec-
tively commission projects and preserve fungible markets rather than
designing, building and maintaining infrastructures in-house. This devel-
opment was regarded with considerable suspicion by the engineering
cores within the agency. Finally, several radical internal reorganizations
were implemented to diminish the autonomy and capacity of the regional
offices and create ‘one Rijkswaterstaat’. The establishment of a single,
integrated Corporate Services Department, including a ‘Customer Service
Centre’, was to be a prime lever of increased centralization and uniformity.
The most important aim of the reorganizations was to restore central
budgetary and managerial control, which had been allowed to erode
during the 1990s.
The Phoenix Rises Again
Six decades after the first paradigmatic reorganization by Director-General
Ringers in the 1930s, Director-General Keijts (2003–2010) played a
crucial role in institutionalizing Rijkswaterstaat’s new corporate identity
and developing its new organizational structure. Keijts gained recogni-
tion as ‘Public Manager of the Year’ in 2008 for his efforts to transform
Rijkswaterstaat from a technocratic bulwark into a public-oriented policy-
implementing agency. Drawing on Goodsell (2011a, b), it can be argued
that Rijkswaterstaat ‘managerialized’ its technocratic mission mystique.
Drawing on the neoliberal managerial ideology, it renewed its mission
purpose, its mission mystique culture and managed to invest greatly
in mechanisms that will sustain the institution, such as organizational
learning and its strategic repositioning.
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The threat of (further) deinstitutionalization had spurred the leader-
ship into action. Through these waves of reform, Rijkswaterstaat could
adapt to the changing tides. The techno-managerial strategy it adopted
to modernize its modus operandi enabled it to preserve its strategic core:
the engineering identity and a technical-rational formulation of its task in
society. Table 10.2 summarizes the recalibrated mission mystique.
Table 10.2 Rijkswaterstaat’s new managerial mission mystique
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The Continued Quest for Public Legitimacy
The story of Rijkswaterstaat highlights the power of a well-calibrated
mission mystique serving as a guide for a sense of belonging among
employees and action repertoires that made impossible projects real. It
shows the importance of institutional leadership when agency rationale
clashes with the larger Zeitgeist, resulting in institutional crises. Focusing
projects and deinstitutionalization triggers forced the agency to reinvent
its mission mystique through purposeful, protracted and at times painful
organizational adaptation and learning.
Its new institutional position as an infrastructure delivery agency and
the corresponding new managerial identity constituted an important step
forward. However, Rijkswaterstaat’s formal repositioning as a relatively
autonomous and politically neutral policy-implementing agency explic-
itly concerned its operations and maintenance tasks. In discharging its
construction task and in its contribution to planning studies, Rijkswa-
terstaat remains a political organization, contributing to the ministry’s
projects.
Rijkswaterstaat thus continues to face the inherent tensions of having
to be a ‘business-like’ and a ‘politically responsive’ organization at the
same time. The new managerial organizational identity does not yet
offer a clear way for Rijkswaterstaat employees to position themselves in
politically sensitive construction projects.
The main challenge for Rijkswaterstaat today is to increase its public
legitimacy in both the ‘wet’ and the ‘dry’ domains. It seeks to do so by
incorporating elements of the democratic governance logic in its deep-
rooted technical-rational and newly embraced managerial cultures. In
view of the technical and social complexity of contemporary environ-
mental problems and risks, such as climate change, it can be assumed
that Rijkswaterstaat’s engineering knowledge and expertise will remain
essential assets in addressing these problems. Rijkswaterstaat continues to
develop its ‘social license to operate’ and has formulated the ambition to
become a ‘partner in area-based planning projects’ (gebiedspartner) (Rijk-
swaterstaat 2018). Ultimately, the challenge for Rijkswaterstaat engineers
will be to find a way to engage and participate actively in integrated plan-
ning projects by drawing on its technical knowledge and expertise but
shedding the odour of bureaucratic paternalism and rigidity that has come
to cling to it during the 1970s and beyond.
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Questions for Discussion
1. Rijkswaterstaat is an old institution and is marked by a history
of adaptation. What would the founders of this institution still
recognize if they were to visit it today?
2. What might be the limitations of a strongly technocratic mission
mystique as a foundation for institutional legitimacy in contempo-
rary democratic societies?
3. Compare the two mission mystique tables of Rijkswaterstaat
presented in this chapter. What strikes you in terms of direction and
rate of Rijkswaterstaat’s institutional adaptation trajectory?
4. How can an organization that outsources much of its erstwhile in-
house operational capacity to the market hope to retain a strong
mission mystique?
5. To what extent does Rijkwaterstaat’s institutional story reveal it to
be a ‘learning organization’?
Notes
1. This case study builds upon my earlier monograph: Van den Brink (2009),
particularly Chapters 4 and 5. I would like to thank Bert Toussaint,
corporate historian at Rijkswaterstaat, and Jos Arts, Professor of Environ-
mental and Infrastructure Planning at the University of Groningen, for
sharing valuable insights and reflections about the institutional history of
Rijkswaterstaat.
2. In those days, the minister responsible for water management was also
responsible for trade and industry. A series of cabinet ministers with an
engineering background, in particular Cornelis Lely (during his ministry
from 1891 to 1894), made crucial contributions to the drafting of
legislation addressing these social issues (Van der Ham 2007).
3. Although the environment also became an important aspect in highway
development projects, Rijkswaterstaat found it hard to develop more inte-
grated and holistic approaches to ‘dry’ infrastructure planning (Arts et al.
2016).
4. In particular his article ‘Planning as learning’ (De Geus 1988) and his
book The Living Company (De Geus 1997) influenced the development
of Rijkswaterstaat’s strategic function. De Geus argued that organizational
learning occurs when a new corporate model of reality is being built, which
encompasses and surpasses the diversity of existing perspectives and insights
within the organization.
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5. Examples include ‘Stratewa’ (Strategie Waterstaat, carried out in 1979),
‘Course 200+’ (Koers 200+, carried out in 1993), and the ‘RWS 2020
Strategic Explorations’ (carried out in 2007).
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CHAPTER 11
Médecins Sans Frontières: Guardian
of Humanitarian Values
Liesbet Heyse and Valeska Korff
Provocateurs of the Humanitarian Sector
Few organizations in the humanitarian field elicit such strong reactions as
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), also known as Doctors without Borders.
MSF was started by a handful of doctors and journalists in the early 1970s.
Almost 50 years later, it has become the second biggest non-governmental
organization in the world with 21 national and 17 branch offices, an
annual budget of 1536 million euros, and 47,318 staff (MSF 2019b).1
MSF is different from other humanitarian organizations. What sets
this organization apart is its defined technical and operational expertise,
combined with a fundamentally different interpretation and implemen-
tation of the so-called neutrality and independence principles. Based on
their interpretation of these principles, MSF has developed an ‘ethics of
refusal’ (Redfield 2005: 342) that has made the organization withdraw
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from numerous humanitarian crises, disconnecting itself from govern-
ments and humanitarian organizations. Their critical attitude towards
the humanitarian sector and, increasingly, to itself, has earned MSF the
reputation of an ‘outsider’ and ‘maverick’ among the general public.
MSF has gained notoriety as a provocateur with little inhibition
to deviate from presumably common norms and standards (Bortolotti
2004). This nonconformity never seems to have harmed MSF’s reputa-
tion. On the contrary, their controversial acts triggered revisions of values
and practices, creating an image of MSF as the ‘conscience of the humani-
tarian world’ (Rieff 2002: 83). The organization remains well-known and
highly respected by the general public and is often portrayed as a paragon
of aid provision in the media.
Interpreted by some as a sign of arrogance, MSF’s strict autonomy
and reluctance to submit to coordination efforts is not without criticism
among fellow humanitarians. Yet, at the same time, MSF has impacted
the way humanitarian organizations operate today in multiple ways. MSF
provided an alternative to the sector’s originally strong adherence to
neutrality in aid provision and thereby a different way of ‘doing human-
itarianism’. Operationally, the organization has impacted humanitarian
aid practices via contributions to the fields of humanitarian supply chain
management, emergency medicine and psychosocial care.
This chapter explains how MSF evolved into a public guardian of
humanitarian values and thrived as a humanitarian organization, while
acting as a principled provocateur in its organizational niche. We explore
how the organization was successful in assuring a firm legitimacy base
while simultaneously capitalizing on a nonconformist attitude, whereas
internally it navigated through ‘growing pains’ and conflicts. We draw on
secondary sources and MSF sources for our analysis.
MSF as an Institution: A Distinctive
Identity and Unique Competence
MSF provides medical assistance in areas affected by conflict or natural
disaster. It operates globally with teams composed of both expatriate and
national staff. MSF was founded during the Cold War, an era in which
superpowers used humanitarian and development aid—and the prospect
of progress and modernity this was assumed to bring as an instrument
to lure African, Asian and Latin-American countries into one of the two
Cold War camps. Non-state humanitarian actors had little room to stay
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away from these political dynamics. The founding of MSF was a reaction
to these Cold War politics, as we will show.
MSF belongs to the category of so-called ‘non-governmental organiza-
tions’, often defined as not-for-profit, self-governing organizations aiming
at improving the life of vulnerable groups (Vakil 1997). MSF is labelled
an international NGO, since it operates in countries beyond the country
where its headquarters are located. In this category, MSF is character-
ized as a so-called emergency humanitarian organization, together with the
ICRC (Barnett 2011), and NGOs such as International Medical Corps
and International Rescue Committee. Since MSF aims to reduce imme-
diate suffering, it is an operational NGO: it sends out medical, logistic
and other expatriate staff to provide medical aid. At the other end of
the spectrum there are the so-called ‘alchemist’ humanitarian organiza-
tions that aim to address the roots of suffering by providing long(-er)
term aid, sometimes accompanied by short-term emergency aid. They do
this predominantly through partnerships with local organizations (Barnett
2011). Examples of such INGOs are Oxfam and World Vision.
In 2018, MSF had an annual budget of 1536 million euros, was
responsible for aid projects in 74 countries and employed 47,318 staff
(84% national staff, 8% expatriate staff and 8% headquarter staff) (MSF
2019b). Even though employing a highly diverse workforce (Reijn 2008),
medical staff is the prominent group in the organization.
The organization consists of 21 sections plus 17 so-called branch
offices (MSF 2019a, see also Table 9).2 Five operational centres manage
operations and have decision-making authority over which projects to
initiate. Sixteen partner sections contribute to operations via arranging
staff and funds, and raising awareness. Some sections have opened branch
offices to facilitate their work more regionally.
Each section and centre is connected to an association, with (former)
MSF staff as its members. Each association choses a board of directors and
president during a General Assembly and can provide input on MSF’s
social mission. There are currently 25 associations, 21 associated with
the sections and centres, one with branch office East Africa, and three
regional ones in West and Central Africa, and in South Asia.
All associations are represented in MSF International where associa-
tion representatives meet annually in the General International Assembly
(IGA). The IGA elects the president of MSF International and is ‘respon-
sible for safeguarding MSF’s medical humanitarian mission, and provides
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All countries mentioned below
Operational centres Belgium, France, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland
Partner sections Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway,
South Africa, Sweden, UK, USA
Branch offices Argentina, Beijing, Colombia, Czech Republic, East Africa,
Finland, India, Ireland, Lebanon, Mexico, Moscow, New
Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, UAE, Uruguay
strategic orientation to all MSF entities. It delegates duties to the Inter-
national Board, and holds the board accountable for those tasks’ (MSF,
n.d.b). The international board consists of a mix of representatives of
the Operational Centres and elected members from the associations
(Table 11.1).
Distinctive Identity: A Truly Independent
Organization “Bearing Witness”
The fundamental purpose of all humanitarian activity is the global preven-
tion and alleviation of human suffering (Calhoun 2008; Barnett 2011).
This duty is referred to as the humanitarian imperative. Whereas such
purpose suggests that humanitarian aid is void of power or politics,
historical accounts of the sector show that the various interpretations of
humanitarianism are closely related to historical, economic and political
developments (Barnett 2011).
All humanitarian organizations claim to adhere to a set of human-
itarian principles that guide their actions. The most basic ones are
outlined in the International Committee of the Red Cross Code of
Conduct and thus originate from the era of imperial humanitarianism
(ICRC 1994):
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• The impartiality principle refers to the allocation of aid based
on need alone, irrespective of nationality, race, political affiliation,
religion, etc.
• Independence relates to humanitarian organizations’ ability to revise
and implement activities without being influenced by governments.
• Neutrality refers to the refusal to take sides in a conflict.
• Accountability evokes the responsibility of providers of humanitarian
aid to account for their actions towards their donors and their
beneficiaries.
• Efficiency and effectiveness concern the sensible and transparent
usage of available funds in relation to the outcomes of humanitarian
responses.
• Borrowing the words of the Hippocratic Oath, Anderson (1999)
formulated an overarching dictum of all relief efforts: do no harm.
How impartiality, neutrality and independence relate to one another and
how these principles are best achieved in operational practice has been a
recurring topic of debate (Kanter and Summers 1987; Slim 1997). While
providing a common frame of reference for legitimation, the principles
leave room for re-interpretation and experimentation (Schneiberg and
Lounsbury 2008; Zietsma and McBright 2009).
MSF’s mission statement or ‘charter’ offers a first insight in its position
vis-á-vis the humanitarian principles. The mission specifies the goals and
values of the organization through four principles (see Box 11.1): medical
ethics, independence, impartiality and neutrality (MSF, n.d.c). These
principles overlap with the core humanitarian principles of neutrality,
impartiality, and independence and thus largely align with the moral
code of the humanitarian sector. MSF also promises accountability and
transparency and, critically, adheres to the principle of bearing witness:
Neutrality is not synonymous with silence. Our proximity to people in
distress implies a duty to raise awareness on their plight to ultimately help
improve their situation. We may seek to bring attention to extreme need
and suffering, when access to lifesaving medical care is hindered, when our
teams witness extreme acts of violence, when crises are neglected, or when
the provision of aid is abused. (MSF, n.d.c)
Witnessing refers to the act of speaking out about experiences and obser-
vations during aid operations in order to bring abuses and atrocities
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to public attention, thus advocating on behalf of the aid recipients.
Witnessing is a way of showing solidarity with groups in dire need. This
conflicts with the humanitarian principle of neutrality that implies not
taking sides in hostilities or to ‘engage at any time in controversies of a
political, racial, religious or ideological nature’ (IFRC, n.d.).
Box 11.1 MSF’s Charter
Médecins Sans Frontières provides assistance to populations in distress, to
victims of natural or man-made disasters and to victims of armed conflict.
They do so irrespective of race, religion, creed or political convictions.
Médecins Sans Frontières observes neutrality and impartiality in the
name of universal medical ethics and the right to humanitarian assistance
and claims full and unhindered freedom in the exercise of its functions.
Members undertake to respect their professional code of ethics and
maintain complete independence from all political, economic or religious
powers.
As volunteers, members understand the risks and dangers of the
missions they carry out and make no claim for themselves or their assigns
for any form of compensation other than that which the association might
be able to afford them.
We can further analyze MSF’s distinctive identity and unique competence
through distinguishing between a normative and an operational dimen-
sion. As summarized by Redfield (2005: 333): ‘On the one hand, MSF
embodies the moral insistence of a human right to health and the dignity
of life that goes with it. On the other hand, MSF represents a tech-
nical apparatus designed to implement basic health care quickly over great
distances and under extreme conditions’.
MSF’s inception was by itself a rebellious act: several French doctors
were frustrated with the established humanitarian system in general and
the International Committee of the Red Cross, their employing orga-
nization, in particular. This frustration was caused by witnessing severe
atrocities among civilians during the late 1960s Nigerian civil war and
being forced to remain silent about these under the principle of ‘neu-
trality’. Keen to ‘speak out about the plight of victims, and seeking an
independent, impartial way to provide care where they saw the greatest
need’ (MSF Association, n.d.), these doctors, together with a group of
journalists, formed MSF France, in 1971 (Fox 2014).3
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MSF thus emerged from a fundamental break with the most promi-
nent and central humanitarian organization (Dijkzeul 2004: 219; Barnett
2011) and the principles it represented. Re-evaluating the old (neutrality)
and devising new principles (witnessing), MSF from the very start devel-
oped and applied its own interpretation of humanitarianism and thereby
introduced a new way of ‘doing humanitarianism’. This ‘revolution’
constitutes the founding myth of the organization (Fox 2014) and is
prominently featured in, for example, the ‘About us’ sections of the
homepages of different national MSF sections.4 James Orbinski, presi-
dent of the MSF International Council in 1999, also emphasized this
‘founding myth’ in his lecture given upon reception of the Nobel peace
prize in December 1999:
We began formally in 1971 as a group of French doctors and journalists
who decided to make themselves available to assist. This meant sometimes a
rejection of the practices of states that directly assault the dignity of people.
Silence has long been confused with neutrality, and has been presented as
a necessary condition for humanitarian action. From its beginning, MSF
was created in opposition to this assumption. We are not sure that words
can always save lives, but we know that silence can certainly kill. (MSF
1999)
Some argue that speaking out about human rights abuses is a political
act, since it can be interpreted as choosing sides, which contradicts the
fundamental nature of humanitarian organizations as neutral aid providers
(Derderian et al. 2009). Facing such criticism, MSF argued that it is
the responsibility of humanitarian actors to advocate on behalf of their
beneficiaries as an act of solidarity and to draw public attention to intol-
erable situations, even if consequences are harsh (Captier 2005). MSF
(n.d.e) boldly states that ‘silence [can] kill’, thus making those that
[watch] complicit in the atrocities. In this interpretation, adherence to
the neutrality principle can increase suffering, whereas reporting about
observed atrocities might reduce suffering.
In order to be able to uphold the witnessing principle, MSF argues
that complete independence from other humanitarian actors is needed.
MSF developed a particular interpretation of the independence prin-
ciple. As a result, MSF refuses to participate in sector-wide efforts of
coordination, standardization and fundraising. To the dismay of other
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humanitarian organizations, MSF has not signed up to common opera-
tional standard agreements of the humanitarian sector such as the Sphere
Project’s ‘Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster
Response’ and has rejected the idea of ceding control to collective coordi-
nation efforts like the ‘Inter Agency Standing Committee’ or the ‘Steering
Committee for Humanitarian Response’ (Tong 2004; Stobbaerts 2007).
MSF also does not participate in the ‘Consolidated Appeals Process’, a
collective fundraising mechanism (OCHA 2011).
While willing to cooperate and share expertise, MSF will not submit to
the authority of other humanitarian agencies. In large-scale emergencies
involving various humanitarian actors, MSF ‘will coordinate, but won’t be
coordinated’ as one presenter put it during MSF’s introduction course,
because, as Stobbaerts (2007) argues, ‘the best service for populations in
need will come as a result of independent action rather than participation
in an integrated effort’.
In line with the independence principle, MSF aims for a high degree
of financial independence, obtaining 95% of its income from 6.3 million
non-state funders, such as individual donors and private foundations,
thereby keeping government influence at arm’s length. As a compar-
ison, Oxfam’s 2018 income consisted of 42.6% of institutional funding
by governments and international organizations, whereas, International
Rescue Committee’s 2018 income consisted of 73% of institutional
funding (Oxfam 2018; International Rescue Committee 2019).
Since its foundation MSF presents an alternative means to achieve the
humanitarian imperative that they argue to be more effective. Although
not widely shared among humanitarian organizations, it has come to be
accepted as one interpretation of humanitarianism, and as a prominent
and distinguishing feature of MSF (Hilhorst and Schmiemann 2002).
Unique Competence: Experts in Emergency Medicine
Operationally, MSF’s expertise lies in providing short-term medical aid
within 48 hours after deciding to become operational (Redfield 2005).
This is possible because the organization has its own humanitarian supply
chain, with four logistical centres in Europe and East Africa. The supplies
range from medicines, vehicles and water processing facilities to standard-
ized kits to tackle specific diseases such as cholera (MSF, n.d.f). Especially
regarding (the development of) standardized response kits, MSF has
gained a solid reputation (Redfield 2013). Furthermore, in the field of
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emergency surgery, the organization can quickly deliver and make ready
inflatable tents with up to three operating rooms, postoperative wards and
an intensive care unit (Chu et al. 2010).
MSF also is an important contributor to the development of expertise
in the fields of humanitarian logistics, emergency medicine and psychoso-
cial care (Redfield 2005). MSF staff contributes to these fields through
developing and adjusting guidelines, writing publications and collabo-
rating with academic institutes such as the London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine. Regarding emergency medicine, MSF founded
Epicentre (Redfield 2005), an NGO that ‘conducts field epidemiology
activities, research projects and training […]’ of which the results are
published publicly online (Epicentre 2019). With regards to logistical
matters, the organization works with academia to improve its supply
chain, the results of which are made accessible to others (see, for example,
Van der Laan et al. 2016; Vega 2018). MSF also has a track record in
implementing psychosocial care interventions and innovations (see for
example, Mooren et al. 2003; De Jong and Kleber 2007; Van Ommeren
et al. 2011).
In recent years, the organization has taken up a new role as an advocate
for particular issues. For example, MSF widely advocated for lowering the
prices of HIV/AIDS drugs and for re-thinking investments in medicine
development for diseases that disproportionally affect vulnerable groups
through launching a campaign titled ‘Access to Essential Medicines’
(Redfield 2005; MSF Access Campaign, n.d.). This campaign—paid for
with the Nobel Prize money—has led states and companies to comply
with some of the campaign’s demands (Wong 2012).
MSF’s operational approach has been subjected to criticism, also by
MSF staff (Chen 2014; Redfield 2013; Barnett 2011: 39). MSF has been
accused of neocolonial tendencies, because through sending out expatri-
ates to manage aid projects it reproduces images of Western domination
over the non-Western world (cf. Redfield 2005). The choice for short-
term emergency aid has been met with accusations of providing ‘band
aids’ only. The inclination to criticize and refuse cooperation with others
has also led to criticism. MSF’s sharp condemnation of the international
Ebola response drew rebuke, especially when MSF later had to admit its
own mistakes (Reuters 2014).
Despite these criticisms, MSF has maintained a solid reputation with
the general public. Few organizations enjoy the standing that MSF has
within the field of humanitarian aid provision.5 David Rieff (2002: 83), a
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well-known humanitarian aid expert, describes MSF as ‘the most impor-
tant humanitarian [organization]’ and, precisely due to their critical
approach to normative standards, as the ‘conscience of the humani-
tarian world’. Charity Navigator awarded MSF 95 points out of 100
and the maximum of four stars, and its partner GuideStar has awarded
the organization with a so-called ‘Gold Seal of Transparency’ (Charity
Navigator 2020). Public recognition was also evident when MSF was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999, ‘in recognition of the organiza-
tion’s pioneering humanitarian work on several continents [italics added]’
(Nobel Media, n.d.).
Institutional recognition is reflected in the Framework Partnership
Agreement with the Humanitarian Department of the European Union,
which presupposes that the partner organizations meet quality standards
concerning their ‘internal control mechanisms and risk management,
financial strength and procurement rules’ (ECHO 2008a: 1; 2008b).
Finally, MSF´s legitimacy is also reflected in its sound financial resource
base (Dijkzeul 2004). As the 2018 State of the Humanitarian System
report stated (ALNAP 2018: 103): ‘MSF remains the largest humani-
tarian NGO in terms of operational expenditure and is now the largest
humanitarian entity of any kind in terms of staff size, outstripping even
the largest UN agencies in the number of staff dedicated to humanitarian
response’.
MSF’s Institutional Development
How did MSF evolve into the organization it currently is: thriving as an
organization, highly respected externally, even if it is often criticized for its
outsider position and controversial behaviour in the sector? MSF’s orga-
nizational history shows that this did not happen overnight, or without
internal tensions and conflicts. Below we present a concise institutional
history of MSF related to the above questions.6
The 1970s and 1980s: Ideological Battles and Organizational Splits
MSF emerged from a cooperation between a group of French doctors,
who criticized the ICRC’s modus operandus in the Biafran war, and a
group of journalists. The doctors, led by Bernard Kouchner—who later
would become Sarkozy’s minister of Foreign Affairs (2007–2010)—had
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initiated GIMCU (Groupe d’Interventions Medical and Surgical d’Ur-
gence) to send medical teams to victims of war and disaster (Fox 2014:
258). However, the teams lacked resources and had little impact (Redfield
2005). The journalists were affiliated with a medical journal called Tontus,
which had a journalist who co-authored an article with Kouchner in Le
Monde on the Biafran war. In this same journal, the founding of Sécours
Médical Francais (SMF) was announced, an initiative of doctors and
health professionals to provide aid. Kouchner also joined this initiative.
Given the many similarities in approach and principles, and the shared
need for both resources and publicity, the two initiatives decided to join
forces in 1971 and Médecins sans Frontières was born (Barnett 2011:
144).
The witnessing principle was an important topic of debate when the
two groups merged. Kouchner and his colleagues argued that this prin-
ciple had to be upheld under all circumstances, whereas the Tontus
colleagues pleaded for a more controlled use of the principle. In the
end, it was agreed that the witnessing principle could only be exercised if
explicitly approved by higher management (Barnett 2011: 144).
In 1974, Kouchner challenged this agreement and sent out a team to
help Kurdish fighters in Iraq, against the wish of the Tontus colleagues
(Barnett 2011: 146). In 1975, during the Cambodia and Vietnam
conflicts, internal tensions further increased, especially about the question
whether MSF should also provide longer term aid and whether the orga-
nization should professionalize. Kouchner argued for a continued focus
on short-term medical relief, whereas others argued that the work in the
refugee camps in the region required a longer term approach. Kouchner
won this battle.
Some MSF staff members—led by a medical doctor named Malhuret,
who had worked in the camps—criticized MSF’s dominant focus on
media attention and pointed out MSF’s lack of professionalism. This crit-
icism especially focused on Kouchner’s proposal to arrange ‘a boat for
Vietnam’, as the media campaign was called to help Vietnamese boat
refugees (Fox 2014: 46). As Barnett summarizes the debate at that time
(2011: 151): ‘Would MSF be an organization that made noise and saved
lives in the process, or an organization that saved lives and occasionally
made noise’?
Kouchner argued that professionalization and bureaucratization would
harm the organization’s soul and its inclination to speak out, whereas
Malhuret and colleagues claimed that the organization should move
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away from its strong focus on media attention and the well-intended
amateurism associated with it. Instead, it should train its volunteers and
develop a ‘machinery’ to operate effectively (Barnett 2011: 152). In
1978, Malhuret was elected president of MSF and in 1979, the MSF
Assembly defied Kouchner by adopting Malhuret’s plans for profession-
alization. Moreover, the Assembly decided that ‘witnessing’ could not be
a solely individual choice, as Kouchner always argued; it was an organiza-
tional responsibility. The outcome of the Assembly made Kouchner decide
to leave MSF. He founded a new organization: Médecins du Monde (Fox
2014: 48).
Whereas MSF’s founders mostly had a leftist political orientation,
MSF’s new leaders moved closer to a liberal interpretation of human
rights. One of them—Rony Brauman—introduced a plan to bring
together both leftist and rightist political groups to combat all forms of
totalitarianism. He and his colleague Malhuret succeeded in doing this
in early 1985, with support of the MSF Assembly, by initiating a new
NGO: Liberté sans Frontières (Barnett 2011: 155; Fox 2014: 48). When
Liberté sans Frontières was founded, MSF Belgium opposed this deci-
sion, claiming that this organization was politically motivated and violated
MSF’s Charter. Consequently, MSF refused to financially support the
organization. In 1985, MSF France took MSF Belgium to court, arguing
the latter could no longer use the name MSF because of this refusal. The
court ruled that the aims of Liberté sans Frontières were indeed political
and therefore in conflict with MSF’s Charter. MSF Belgium could thus
not be expelled from MSF (Fox 2014).7
One of MSF’s leaders Brauman adopted a contrarian position when
aid agencies lined up to relieve the suffering of millions of malnourished
Ethiopians in the wake of Bob Geldof’s 1985 Live Aid project. It soon
became apparent—just as in the Cambodian case—that the Ethiopian
government used humanitarian aid for its own political purposes. It with-
held aid to separationist areas, so that its inhabitants had to move out of
the region in order to survive. The government forced them to re-settle
elsewhere and work in labour camps. Brauman decided to speak out about
this in the media, stating that humanitarian organizations had become the
helpers of an authoritarian regime (Barnett 2011: 147). He challenged
the Ethiopian government to evict MSF from the country, which indeed
happened (Fox 2014: 56). The other aid agencies decided to stay in the
country.
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By the end of the 1980s, MSF had expanded from one to six branches:
France, Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg, Holland and Switzerland (MSF,
n.d.c). The discussions about MSF’s mission were as alive as 10 years
ago. For example, in the Dutch section, debate arose about the time
horizon of MSF projects, as had happened 10 years ago in MSF France.
Some projects had become long-term public health interventions, such
as HIV/AIDS projects in the Soviet Union. In 1990, it was decided to
re-focus the projects of the Dutch section on short-term medical relief
interventions. For the longer term public health interventions a strategy
familiar to MSF was applied: a new NGO was founded, called Health Net
International (Heyse 2006).
The 1990s: Increasing Recalcitrance
With the end of the Cold War, not only the nature of conflict changed,
but also the nature of humanitarianism. It marked the start of the era
of ‘Liberal Humanitarianism’ (Barnett 2011) in which assuring interna-
tional security was key, in a world characterized by a multitude of internal
conflicts, such as in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo. Unique to
these years was that the UN—for the first time—acknowledged a universal
obligation to intervene in internal conflicts to protect those suffering. The
UN implemented this decision, starting with Somalia.
The UN intervention in Somalia put humanitarian NGOs—with their
strong adherence to principles of neutrality and impartiality—in a difficult
position. They needed armed protection to reach groups in need, but this
made them lose their impartiality. Whereas MSF for the first time in its
history had decided to pay for armed protection by local groups to get
aid delivered in Somalia, the UN peace enforcement operation was one
bridge too far: MSF decided to pull out because it did not want to be
connected to a UN operation in which violence was used to provide aid
(Barnett 2011: 174).
In 1995, MSF once again withdrew from a country in war, namely
during the refugee crisis in the Great Lakes region. This time, the
organization challenged the most fundamental of all humanitarian prin-
ciples—the humanitarian imperative. Faced with the dilemma that aid
was abused by perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, who used the
refugee camps as bases to reassemble and launch further attacks, MSF,
together with 15 other humanitarian organizations formulated an appeal
to the UN Security Council to separate known war criminals from actual
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refugees. This appeal was ignored and the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees continued treating criminals as refugees.
As a result, MSF made the controversial decision to terminate their
activities in the region (Passant 2009). Claiming a ‘right of abstention’
from crises in which effective relief cannot be implemented, MSF de facto
qualified the universality of the humanitarian imperative (Rieff 2002).
Eventually, some other humanitarian organizations such as CARE Canada
followed MSF’s example, whereas others like Oxfam and the UNHCR
contended that ‘the rights of refugees to receive aid superseded the
problems derived from supplying it’ (Terry 2013: 201).
MSF was strongly criticized for having abandoned their humanitarian
mandate in the Great Lakes region. MSF argued that any engagement
in the camps would do more harm than good, since their humanitarian
assistance helped the perpetrators of the genocide to recover and continue
with the violence. Later that year, all MSF sections gathered in Chantilly,
France, to discuss MSF’s core principles. This led to the signing of the
Chantilly agreement. All sections reconfirmed MSF’s original principles,
and especially the witnessing principle, and that ‘the actions of MSF are
first and foremost medical’ (cited in Fox 2014: 102). However, based on
recent experiences in the field, being present without speaking out was
also accepted under certain circumstances (Fox 2014: 46).
In 1999, NATO launched a military operation in Kosovo. This time,
MSF did stay on the ground but refused to coordinate its operations
with NATO, contrary to other NGOs (Barnett 2011). In October 1999,
during the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict and internal reflections on
MSF’s principles, MSF—now consisting of nineteen sections (Fox 2014:
150)8—was awarded the Nobel Prize. This illustrated that MSF had
become an established and respected actor in the humanitarian sector.
This not only sparked joy within MSF. First, the nomination led to heated
internal discussions as to who was the legitimate MSF representative to
accept the prize, laying bear a lack of consensus and communication
between the nineteen sections (Fox 2014: 63). In the end, it was agreed
that the president of the International Council would receive the prize.
Second, especially the Belgian section wondered whether its rebellious
character now was being ‘Nobelized’ and therefore ‘normalized’. They
organized a debate around these questions titled: ‘Nobel or Rebel: A
Nobel without a Cause’? (quoted in Fox 2014: 61).
As the Nobel Prize illustrated, MSF had become an established actor in
the humanitarian sector. In the 30 years of its existence it had expanded
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from one French section to 19 sections spread all over the world. It was
developing into a full-fledged multi-national professional organization,
meeting the objectives expressed by the MSF Assembly by the end of
the 1970s.
The Early 2000s: Professionalization and Internal Criticism
The 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York in 2001 and the
resulting military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan defined the nature
of humanitarianism in the new Millennium. Humanitarian organizations
could often only reach groups in need with help of Western military
forces, often as part of military strategies to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of
local groups. Simultaneously, the world was confronted with a devastating
AIDS/HIV pandemic, especially in Africa.
In these years, MSF’s professionalization process continued. A study
into the development of formalized human resource management poli-
cies of the Dutch section of MSF illustrates how MSF developed into
a professional employer (Korff 2012). The first steps towards formal-
izing the employee-employer relationship were already taken by the end
of 1990s, as Fig. 11.1 shows.
However, from 2001 on, the production of HRM documents steeply
increased: whereas in 1992 only a few HRM formal documents could be
counted, in 2008 there were about 425 (see Fig. 11.2), focusing predom-
inantly on outlining rules and procedures regarding rewards for services,
but also on topics such as employee well-being, and leave and absence
(Korff 2012: 53). In addition, the organization developed a full-fledged
training program for its staff, ranging from an introduction and social-
ization training for new staff (Korff 2012) to management trainings, and
specialist trainings in medicine and logistics (Visser 2015).
In the midst of this, internal criticism on the ‘personality’ and gover-
nance of MSF grew. The question arose whether MSF could be both a
‘movement’ and ‘an organization’ that was professionalizing and formal-
izing its operations (Fox 2014: 107). Could one ‘bureaucratize a good
Samaritan’ (cf. Waters 2018) without losing the volunteer and humani-
tarian ‘spirit’ so key to MSF?
In November 2004, this led to the launch of the so-called La Mancha
process which aimed to gain more consensus about MSF’s governance
model and mission in times of militarization of aid and AIDS/HIV. The
process was titled La Mancha in reference to Don Quichote (a man with
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Fig. 11.2 Accumulation of formal HRM documents over time in MSF Holland
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‘a sense of ideals, but mad’) and Sancho Panza (a man with ‘a sense
of reality, but no ideals’) (quoted in Fox 2014: 103). The organization
started to collect staff views on MSF’s principles, key characteristics and
future, but also of external actors, as preparation for a General Assembly
to be held in March 2006. The results were published in a four-hundred
page book titled My Sweet La Mancha (Fox 2014: 103).
Not long after the start of the La Mancha process, a tsunami hit South-
East Asia, after which MSF exhibited a particularly fierce interpretation of
the independence principle. Within days, millions of Euros in funds were
raised to support the emergency response in the affected areas. Numerous
humanitarian organizations encouraged and accepted the contributions
(Telford and Cosgrave 2007). MSF, in contrast, took a perplexing step:
after receiving sufficient funds for the foreseen emergency response within
days, a statement was issued on the international MSF homepage discour-
aging further donations earmarked for the tsunami affected regions. The
humanitarian community and the media accused MSF of undercutting the
flow of donations by giving the impression that further funds were super-
fluous (Bennhold 2005). Instead of conceding to such criticism, MSF
contacted private donors to request their approval for making the allo-
cated funds available for less prominent and underfunded crises, such as
Darfur.
MSF’s rejection of tsunami-earmarked funds was justified by efficiency
and accountability concerns. Seeing their emergency response plans suffi-
ciently funded, MSF argued that in order to honour donor intentions
and to maintain an exclusively needs-driven approach, forestalling further
donations was a necessary move. By doing this, MSF indirectly criticized
other humanitarian organizations for being dependent on their donors
and for not following a needs-driven approach. The New York Times and
the Sydney Morning Herald critically discussed this decision as ‘[setting]
off [a] storm’ (Bennhold 2005) and described MSF as ‘deluged with
money’ (Norrie and Pryor 2005), overall expressing concerns that MSF’s
stance would undercut the wave of giving to the region (cf. Deephouse
2000).
MSF’s reputation seemed to have benefitted from the decision, with
later accounts even going so far as to claim that ‘[al]though misunder-
stood at first, Doctors Without Borders’ bold decision to stop accepting
tsunami-relief donation could help revive public trust in nonprofits’
(Barbagallo 2005). Also MSF’s own post-tsunami financial overview
(2005) showed that the rejection of earmarked funds did not decrease
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the overall budget. Moreover, the evaluation of the tsunami response lent
support to MSF’s decision (Telford and Cosgrave 2007), revealing the
arbitrary nature of emergency funding and the lack of needs assessment
in the humanitarian response.
In March 2006, the anticipated General Assembly started in which
more than 200 MSF representatives participated to decide on the
outcomes of the La Mancha process. One important realization was how
much MSF had changed from a predominantly Western expatriate organi-
zation to being dependent on national staff who had unequal employment
and salary conditions compared to expats. All sections vowed to work
towards a more associative international form of governance, acknowl-
edging the need for decentralization, increased quality of interventions,
equal employment conditions for all staff, and being transparent and
accountable (Fox 2014).
A first step in this direction was taken in November 2006, when MSF
South Africa was recognized as an MSF branch office, after extensive
internal discussions, since MSF as a whole lacked procedures for dealing
with the new MSF ‘entities’ that had been established in this decade,
such as MSF Brazil, East Africa and Latin America (Fox 2014: 186–
187, 250). MSF South Africa differed from the other branches, in that
it had been established with the aim to address the HIV/AIDS crisis
in the country, which implied long-term medical aid, not emergency
medicine. The acknowledgement of MSF South Africa, an office that was
non-Western European and focused on long-term medical interventions,
marked MSF’s intention to become more inclusive and international.
From 2010 Onwards: More Provocative Acts
MSF maintained and extended its rebellious, outsider position. It applied
the strategy of withdrawing from countries where MSF’s work or secu-
rity was compromised such as in Somalia (2013) and areas occupied by
Islamic State (2012) (MSF, n.d.c). In 2014, MSF provided input for the
preparation of the World Humanitarian Summit with a research paper
titled ‘Where is everyone? Responding to emergencies in difficult places’.
In this report MSF heavily criticized UN agencies and INGOs, as stated
in the foreword of the document:
…problems remain with the scale up of the UN and INGO response,
which is characterized by bureaucracy and risk aversion….
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…We also put the choices made by INGOs, our peers, in the spotlight:
to profile themselves as emergency responders, but without building the
technical and human capacity to respond quickly and effectively; to work
as implementers for the UN agencies, and become trapped in their bureau-
cracies; to avoid risk to the extent that they won’t work where people most
need them; and to become dependent on the geopolitical interests in play
in various conflicts and crises. (MSF 2014: 4)
Once again, MSF criticized others for losing their independence and not
meeting the humanitarian imperative. The report received much attention
and was criticized for its flawed methodology, bias and lacking accuracy.
Bob Kitchen, director of the emergency preparedness and response unit at
the International Rescue Committee (IRC), argued for example in a blog
titled ‘Where is everyone? We are right beside you’ that IRC did not hesi-
tate to work in difficult settings, such as in Somalia ‘a country so violent
that MSF itself has withdrawn, while many other aid groups continue
to stand and deliver in the face of chaos and mounting humanitarian
needs’ (Siegfried 2014). MSF also received support for its claims. As Abby
Stoddard—a well-known humanitarian expert—stated in The Guardian:
Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) created some welcome upheaval in the
international humanitarian discourse recently, with their compelling Where
is Everyone? report, lamenting the scarcity of humanitarian agencies oper-
ating in difficult environments. As an organization forged from righteous
anger, MSF has never reserved criticism for governments and warring
parties alone. Often its barbs are directed horizontally at humanitarian
counterparts, and this one clearly stung. (Stoddard 2014)
During the World Summit in 2016, MSF applied its well-known strategy
by pulling out, calling the summit a ‘fig leaf of good intentions’ and
claiming that ‘the summit neglects to reinforce the obligations of states
to uphold and implement the humanitarian and refugee laws which they
have signed up to’ (Jones 2016).
Meanwhile, Europe was confronted with an increased refugee influx.
Especially Syrians were finding their way to EU countries, via Turkey and
the Greek isles, but also the number of migrants who crossed the Mediter-
ranean Sea from North Africa increased. MSF was already providing aid to
the latter group on the island of Lampedusa since 2002. In 2015, MSF
decided to launch a search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean
Sea, after the Italian government decided to terminate Operation Mare
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Nostrum, which aimed at rescuing boat refugees from Northern Africa.
Although MSF had never engaged in such activities before, they chose
to do so on the basis of the humanitarian imperative and the witnessing
principle:
As a humanitarian organization, we believe our presence is needed to save
lives, as well as to witness and speak out about the human costs of the
policies and politics at play in the Mediterranean Sea. (MSF, n.d.g)
Again, MSF was confronted with criticism, this time from European
governments that argued that such rescue operations encouraged refugees
to cross the sea and, through this, NGOs would stimulate (paid) human
trafficking. MSF responded by deciding to no longer accept any EU
funding for its operations anymore (MSF, n.d.c). When, in 2017, the
Italian government asked NGOs with search and rescue operations in
their waters to sign a code of conduct that would restrict NGOs’ freedom
to approach refugees, MSF refused where others signed (Smith 2018).
When other NGOs took the initiative to formulate and sign a voluntary
code of conduct somewhat later in 2017, MSF again did not join (Smith
2018).9
In this decade, MSF seems to add a dimension to its role as critic
of the humanitarian sector. In the report for the Humanitarian Summit,
MSF did not spare itself and also discussed its own actions critically (MSF
2014: 20). Later, in 2015, MSF admitted to having made mistakes in
the Ebola response, which was painful since it had first criticized other
international agencies for their failed response (Hussain 2015).
How to Remain a Well-Respected Provocateur?
This chapter has tried to answer the question how MSF could evolve
into a public guardian of humanitarian values and thrive as an organiza-
tion, while at the same time acting as a provocateur. We explored how
the organization was successful in maintaining its reputation, capitalizing
on a nonconformist attitude, while internally navigating through growing
pains and conflicts.
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Nonconformity as an Institutional Characteristic
We posit that MSF’s controversial acts have in fact become integral part of
its reputation. Selznick (1957) coined the term ‘organizational character’
to refer to the institutionalized expectations stakeholders hold regarding
an organization based on the organization’s evolution over time and the
commitments it made to its constituents. Unconventionality is deeply
engrained in the organization’s character. Their founding history remains
a crucial reference point for MSF, as stated by Vickie Hawkins, current
director of MSF UK in an interview with The Independent (Laurence
2014):
Our roots are in radicalism. Our founders were activists who wanted to
shake up the humanitarian aid system. They wanted a form of action that
was more challenging to governments. It is still very much part of our
ethos.
MSF’s radicalism, expressed through the fundamentally different inter-
pretation of the witnessing and independence principles, was the result
of fundamental choices in the establishment of the organization and had
lasting effects: they constitute ‘irreversible commitments’, decisions that
are so central to the identity of an organization that any reversal would
substantially alter the nature of the organization and could potentially
lead to crisis (King 2015). Building on this core commitment, subsequent
decisions to act controversially have contributed to a perception of MSF
as an organization that will ‘go where others don’t’, that MSF is different
from other international aid organizations, and that MSF is willing to
transgress and even affront if it so deems sensible.10 Engrained in MSF’s
character, these notions have become institutionalized as expectations
among its fellows and stakeholders within the humanitarian field. Thus,
when MSF rejects or challenges common practices of the humanitarian
field, it does not defy, but, in fact, meets stakeholders’ expectations.
Looking back, MSF’s viability as an organization might seem
surprising, given the many internal struggles it went through (and still
is going through). MSF’s inclination to be the critic of the humani-
tarian world is also part and parcel of its internal dynamics. Much of
the internal debates revolved around the question whether MSF could
be both an organization and a movement. The organization was (and
still is) navigating pressures for professionalization as an organization
and calls to uphold the ‘volunteer and humanitarian spirit’ of MSF as
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a movement. Furthermore, the time horizon of MSF’s work has been a
recurrent topic of discussion: how short-term should emergency relief be,
if refugee camps exist for decades and diseases are only treated once they
are diagnosed, whereas prevention would be more effective?
Our concise—and obviously incomplete—history of the organiza-
tion revealed some patterns in MSF’s strategies to accommodate these
tensions. In the early years, MSF ‘resolved’ internal disagreements
by means of organizational splits and establishing new organizations.
Attempts to expel the Belgian section in 1985 were not very successful.
Instead, the organization expanded into the multi-national organization
it is nowadays. This increasingly required MSF to find ways to include and
take serious the variety in opinions, positions and ideals of its members.
Quite successful attempts seemed to have been the Chantilly and La
Mancha agreements of 1995 and 2006. More generally, the elaboration
of MSF’s international and associative nature and structure seem to have
at least partly accommodated the organization’s ‘culture of debate’ and
inclination for critical self-reflection (Fox 2014).
At the same time, MSF has embarked on a path of professionalization
and formalization. Although recognizing the risk of bureaucratization and
rationalization of humanitarianism, MSF also seems aware that its cred-
ibility as provocateur is at stake if the organization does not perform
well itself (or at least: is perceived not to perform well). Development
of technical expertise in the fields of supply chain management, emer-
gency medicine, psycho social care and AIDS/HIV has been crucial in
this respect.
In addition, some limits of MSF’s independence strategy to share
its expertise while refraining from coordination with other humanitarian
agencies have emerged. This became especially clear in the Ebola crisis
when MSF had to admit mistakes, after it had first harshly criticized
other international agencies. By publicly acknowledging its own fallibility
through explicit exercises of ‘self-criticism’—while continuing to criticize
others—MSF seems to aim for a balance of being controversial but also
credible, both as an organization and a movement.
The Viability of Nonconformity
MSF’s challenge has always been to remain different in order to maintain
its reputation as an unconventional organization. For an organization to
11 MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES: GUARDIAN OF HUMANITARIAN VALUES 285
sustain a positive reputation while chancing its legitimacy through defi-
ance of conventional norms is difficult, if not impossible in the long-term
(Rao 1994). We argue that MSF could achieve this due to two interre-
lated reasons: the strong value orientation of the humanitarian sector, and
the possibility of framing controversial acts since values are paramount, yet
ambiguous. Framing refers to the conscious and strategic effort of fash-
ioning shared understandings (McAdam et al. 1996), with the purpose to
garner acceptance and support from stakeholders. MSF’s justification of
their controversial acts exhibits such efforts to reframe interpretations and
modify observers’ perceptions. MSF’s controversial acts are not excused,
played down or even defended as inevitable, as has been often observed
(e.g. Sutton and Callahan 1987; Coombs 1998, 2007; Martins 2005;
Rhee and Valdez 2009). Instead they are presented as deliberate and
justified decisions, based on the same set of values—the humanitarian
principles—that they are said to violate.
MSF’s framing of controversial behaviour is grounded in the inherent
ambiguity of the value system of the humanitarian field, which allows
simultaneously challenging and embracing core values of the humani-
tarian field without ever forsaking the common frame of reference. In
challenging standard interpretations of humanitarian principles and moti-
vating this nonconformity by reference to other principles, MSF is able
to defy norms and practices of the humanitarian sector—i.e. act uncon-
ventionally and controversially—while signalling commitment to the core
values of the field, thus remaining a legitimate and respected guardian of
humanitarian value.
This strategy seems only viable if MSF is able to uphold its reputa-
tion as a well-performing and professional organization and to accept
a willingness to acknowledge its own fallibility through institutionalized
self-criticism. In the past decade, MSF has worked hard to ‘speak truth to
power’ through a delicate balancing act of speaking out, being indepen-
dent, criticizing others, facilitating internal debate and being effective as
an organization. Such balancing act inhibits risks: too much internal crit-
icism may lead to new splits or organizational paralysis, and potentially
to declining donor support; too much criticism of others may spiral back
if MSF would fail to be effective itself; and frequently pulling out from
crises and coordination efforts may isolate MSF to the extent that it can
no longer do its work. With its current size and challenges, internally and
externally, only the future can tell whether MSF will be able to continue
to walk this tightrope.
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Questions for Discussion
1. One way for a whole field of organizations to institutionalize might
be through widespread copying of the strategies of leading orga-
nizations in that field. What would happen if other humanitarian
organizations would decide to copy MSF’s strategy of an ‘ethics of
refusal’? Will this enhance their legitimacy or not, and why so?
2. The chapter states that ‘MSF’s framing of controversial behaviour is
grounded in the inherent ambiguity of the value system of its field,
which allows simultaneously challenging and embracing core values
of the humanitarian field without ever forsaking the common frame
of reference’. Explain how this ambiguity helps MSF to legitimize
its controversial behaviour and to stay respected as a humanitarian
organization.
3. To what extent is this ambiguity in value system a trait of any given
policy sector or organizational field, or are there sectors or organi-
zational fields where there is less ambiguity? If the latter, name an
example and think through what would this imply for the viability
of an ‘ethics of refusal’ in such a setting.
4. How might an organization that prides itself on its value set and
moral exemplarship function and be perceived by others as a peer
and as a partner in networks and collaborations? How, in other
words, can MSF avoid getting caught in a trap of institutional
arrogance and aloofness?
5. MSF’s founding leaders played a decisive role in the early phases
of institutionalization. They also became controversial. Does this
mean that the different phases of institutionalization might require
different types of leaders and leadership?
Notes
1. NGO Advisor (n.d.). No. 1 in this ranking is BRAC, an NGO from
Bangladesh.
2. This paragraph is based on MSF (n.d.a).
3. These doctors were not the only ones to speak out; Oxfam, for example,
publicly supported the rebels (Barnett 2011: 135).
4. See for example MSF (n.d.d).
5. Organizational reputation refers to the collective perception and compara-
tive assessment of an organization’s quality and prominence within its field
(Walker 2010; Fombrun 2012; Rindova et al. 2005). Actual performance
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in the sense of the quality of outcomes is, of course, hard to measure,
particularly in the civic sector where, despite ongoing efforts to institu-
tionalize performance evaluation, no standardized metrics exists (Powell
et al. 2014; Hall 2014).
6. For more extensive histories and analyses of the organization, see among
others, Barnett (2011), Redfield (2013), and Fox (2014) that were also
input of this chapter, but also accounts of MSF as an organization as well
as its staff, such as the many works of one of its former leaders Rony
Brauman.
7. During its short life, Liberté sans Frontières gained a reputation of being
anti-Soviet, pro-American and pro-Israel, which went against the polit-
ical beliefs of many MSF staff. In 1989, when the Cold War ended, the
organization ceased to exist (Barnett 2011).
8. These sections were in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and
the United States (Korff 2012).
9. The search and rescue operation was terminated between December 2018
and July 2019 based on the accusation that MSF and its partner SOS
Mediterranee were dumping toxic waste illegally at ports, something the
two NGOs denied. As of July 1019, MSF managed to get back into action
together with SOS Mediterranee.
10. This core characteristic of the organization has even become institution-
alized in the form of a blog and debating website called MSF-CRASH
(http://www.msf-crash.org/en/) that has criticism and debate at its core
mission.
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CHAPTER 12
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change: Guardian of Climate Science
Eric Paglia and Charles Parker
A Global Authority on Climate Change
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), founded in
1988, is the international body that reviews and assesses the latest science
on climate change. Its authoritative reports inform international policy
and negotiations on climate change.1 This is no easy task, as it requires a
consensus between its member governments and thousands of scientists
and experts to produce these comprehensive assessment reports.
Thanks to the IPCC, we now know that there is an overwhelming
scientific consensus holding that human-induced climate change is real.
Scientists believe that, unless global emissions of greenhouse gases
(GHGs) are drastically reined in, a climate catastrophe threatens human
civilization and planetary habitability (Shackley 1997; IPCC 2007; Hulme
and Mahony 2010; Berg and Lidskog 2018). The degree of confidence
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in these scientific claims has steadily increased from one assessment report
to another, which can be seen as an indicator of the increasing institu-
tional confidence of the IPCC itself. Over the course of its five assessment
reports so far, and now well into the sixth such cycle, the IPCC has
provided the scientific basis and justification for the global climate change
regime that is centreed on the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC); what counts as dangerous human inter-
ference in the climate system; and what policy measures and goals the
international community needs to implement if the world is to avoid the
worst outcomes of climate change (IPCC 1988, 1990, 2007, 2018).
The IPCC is widely recognized as the global authority on climate
science. Its assessment reports have provided the scientific foundation
for the creation and evolution of the international climate regime. The
Panel’s First Assessment Report in 1990 played a pivotal role in the
creation of the UNFCCC, the centrepiece of the global climate change
policy regime. Many countries draw upon the IPCC’s work in their
national climate assessments, and the organization’s authoritative reports
have been very important in the UN climate negotiations. For example,
the Fifth Assessment Report (2014) strongly influenced the goals of the
2015 Paris Agreement in terms of the temperature targets and other
fundamental aspects of the accord. The IPCC has developed into a unique
global intergovernmental expert body, with the hybrid quality of being
both scientific and political (Ruffini 2018).
In addition to providing the scientific input for the work of the
UNFCCC, and influencing the decisions of the climate negotiations and
the evolution of the global climate regime, the Panel’s work has become
deeply valued by political leaders at all levels of government, the business
community, civil society, advocacy organizations and other stakeholders.
This recognition extends beyond diplomatic corridors and academic hall-
ways. In 2007, the IPCC and Al Gore were co-recipients of the Nobel
Peace Prize. Greta Thunberg, the Swedish teenage climate activist, regu-
larly invokes IPCC reports and science in her speeches urging political
leaders to take urgent action to tackle the threat posed by dangerous
climate change.
Scientific integrity is the basis of the Panel’s legitimacy and epistemic
authority as well as the source of its policy impact. The Panel seeks to
minimize scientific uncertainty by producing consensus knowledge. The
search for consensus, however, invites the critique from different parts
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of the political spectrum that the organization is either too conserva-
tive in its assessments of the state of climate change, or that IPCC is
an ‘information monopoly’ or a hegemonic authority that eclipses other
perspectives. Moreover, the IPCC has been criticized on epistemological
grounds for its strong orientation towards the natural sciences and the
relative under-representation of social science and the humanities in its
assessment reports. Over-representation of knowledge produced in indus-
trialized countries, and the lower level of participation in IPCC bodies by
developing country experts, also has been a source of controversy. Not
surprisingly, the IPCC is a favourite target of climate sceptics. The IPCC’s
reputation was severely damaged when, in 2010, it failed to respond
effectively to mistakes found in its Fourth Assessment Report.
This chapter analyzes how the IPCC became the primary scientific
authority to policymakers and the public on the existence, severity,
consequences of, and, increasingly, possible solutions to human-induced
climate change. It describes the origins and mandate of the IPCC, how
it carries out its work and achieves consensus, its strategies for estab-
lishing its scientific authority, how its practices have evolved over time,
and assesses its impact and influence on policymakers and global climate
governance. We also examine the various tensions, critiques and contra-
dictions that the organization and its leaders have had to grapple with
across its 32-year history. The chapter concludes with reflections on the
consequences of the IPCC’s work, lessons for institution builders that
can be drawn from IPCC’s efforts to institutionalize epistemic authority,
and the challenges the Panel faces as it adapts its mission to meet new
realities and demands from stakeholders on how best to avoid a climate
apocalypse.
A Brief History of the IPCC
The pre-history of the IPCC is primarily one of scientific organization
and social networking. Well before global warming became a top-tier
issue of international politics, an elite cadre of climate scientists—mostly
from Western democracies but also the Soviet Union—published data
and research results in specialist publications such as the Meteorological
Institute at Stockholm University’s (MISU) journal Tellus; convened in
low-profile conferences and workshops around the world; and launched
scientific initiatives such as the Global Atmospheric Research Program,
the World Climate Research Program and the Scientific Committee on
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Problems of the Environment in collaboration with international organi-
zations such as the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU).
The common denominator in much of this organizing and coordina-
tion of scientific activity was Bert Bolin, an accomplished climate scientist
and long-time director of MISU. Bolin’s scientific and entrepreneurial
leadership played a decisive role in the creation of the IPCC (Kjellén
2009; Rodhe 2013; Parker and Karlsson 2014). Bolin would eventually
become the founding chairman of the IPCC, where he was able to insti-
tutionalize the epistemic community he had helped build into the world’s
foremost authority on the state of knowledge concerning climate change
science (Haas 1992; Grundmann 2006).
Historian of science and technology Paul Edwards (2010) evokes the
image of a vast machine to describe the decades and indeed centuries
of data accumulation, scientific research, and computer model construc-
tion upon which our modern understanding of climate change rests. The
establishment of the IPCC in 1988 is closely connected to this long-term
process. Yet the emergence of the Nobel Peace Prize-winning Panel, a
highly decentralized organization managed by a secretariat of barely a
dozen paid employees, is arguably even more directly related to the steady
development of a geographically diffuse international network—initially
more exclusive than extensive—of concerned climate scientists over the
past sixty-odd years.
The institutional origins of the IPCC can be traced back to two
significant events in the 1970s: the 1972 UN Conference on the
Human Environment in Stockholm, the seminal moment in global
environmental governance from which the United Nations Environ-
ment Program (UNEP) was established; and the 1979 World Climate
Conference in Geneva, arranged by the World Meteorological Orga-
nization (WMO). The latter led to a series of scientific meetings in
Villach, Austria, during the 1980s. The scientific elite gathering in the
Alpine retreat became increasingly concerned with the threat posed by
climate change, and convinced of the need for an international polit-
ical response. A turning point was the 1985 Villach conference during
which the arrangers—UNEP, WMO, and ICSU—recommended forming
a blue-ribbon Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG) to provide
scientific and policy-related advice on climate change to the three organi-
zations, and to consider the possibilities for a global climate convention
(Jäger 1992; Agrawala 1998). The AGGG, first convened in 1986, is
often regarded as the forerunner of the IPCC, which was established two
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years later by UNEP and WMO, with AGGG member Bolin selected to
lead the new organization (Agrawala 1998; Weart 2012).
The UN General Assembly (UNGA) in its 1988 resolution on the
‘Protection of the global climate for present and future generations of
mankind’ endorsed the creation of the IPCC and gave it a mandate
to carry out a comprehensive review and make recommendations with
respect to the state of knowledge of the science of climate change, the
social and economic impact of climate change, and possible response
strategies and elements for inclusion in a possible future international
convention on climate (UNGA 1988). The IPCC’s First Assessment
Report was the result of this request and proved to be the impetus for
the negotiations that led to the UNFCCC.
Consequences of Institutional Design
Factors that facilitated the founding of a globally-representative scientific
institution like the IPCC in the late-1980s included new conceptualiza-
tions of the climate as a global system, advances in climate modelling,
the winding down of the Cold War and an upswing in interest in
environmental politics (Miller 2004; Hulme and Mahony 2010).
But a fundamental aspect of the origin, influence, and institutional
design of the IPCC was the participation of national governments in
climate science. At a time when climate change began attracting greater
political attention, some elements in the U.S. government, particularly
officials within the Department of Energy, were reluctant to cede epis-
temic authority on the issue to a purely international organization such
as WMO, composed primarily of scientists. They were also suspicious of
environmentalist sentiments in the AGGG and the ambitions of UNEP
chairman Mustafa Tolba, who wanted to bring about a far-reaching
climate treaty by replicating the successful process that had led to the
creation of the 1985 Vienna Convention on ozone depletion and the
1987 Montreal Protocol (Agrawala 1998; Weart 2012; Albrecht and
Parker 2019). Hence the U.S. also seeking to balance environmental and
fossil fuel interests, insisted that WMO and UNEP establish an ‘intergov-
ernmental mechanism’ that would effectively supersede the AGGG and
embed political representation in the production of scientific pronounce-
ments on climate change (Weart 2012; Agrawala 1998; Bolin 2007;
Hulme and Mahony 2010).
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The relative advantage or disadvantage of government involvement in
IPCC science has been an enduring subject of disagreement and scholarly
debate. Some have claimed that the IPCC was initially circumscribed by
its consensus requirements, which include political approval of scientific
outputs. Some have argued that the close connection between science
and government is to blame for the Panel’s inability to help bring forth
an effective policy response against climate change. Haas and Stevens
(2011: 147) argue that ‘the IPCC is designed to keep science on a tight
leash’. Industrialized countries, Haas and Stevens (2011) claim, perceived
their interests under threat from increasing public concern over global
warming and the scientific activism represented by the Villach meetings.
It is no surprise, then, that these countries ‘wished to reign in any inde-
pendent political pressure that would be generated from an organized
scientific involvement in collective discussions on climate change’ (Haas
and Stevens 2011).
Lidskog and Sundqvist (2015) point to the IPCCs failure to generate
and frame knowledge in ways that resonate with society and thus mobi-
lize public activism that would, in turn, spur policymakers into action. In
the face of a highly politicized, high stakes issue that challenges science’s
ability to influence policy, Lidskog and Sundqvist (2015) consider the
IPCC a partial success, in that it has become the privileged speaker on
climate change, successfully disseminated knowledge to government insti-
tutions, and rendered it a pressing political issue calling for multilateral
solutions.
Other observers and active participants in the IPCC formative process,
such as Bert Bolin (2007), perceived the establishment of the inter-
governmental mechanism as having provided a significant advantage in
enhancing the organization’s legitimacy, which helped to increase the
political salience of climate change through linking knowledge produc-
tion with national governments and the UN system (Beck 2015).
Jean Ripert, chairman of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
(INC) through which the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change was negotiated, credits the IPCC with making the 1992 signing
of the Convention possible by educating government officials on climate
change (Agrawala 1998). Political scientist Tora Skodvin (2000a) sees
the ‘adversarial scrutiny’ of actors representing conflicting interests as
strengthening policymakers’ confidence in the Panel’s scientific outputs.
While sharing the outlook that the IPCC was initially circumscribed by
its consensus requirements that included political approval of scientific
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outputs, climate change historian Spencer Weart (2012: 41) contends that
by the Third Assessment Report in 2001, ‘the panel had turned its proce-
dural restraints into a virtue: Whatever it did manage to say would have
unimpeachable authority’.
Compared to CERN—the other Geneva-based international scientific
institution examined in this volume—the IPCC has an almost non-
existent administrative and infrastructural footprint, despite the enormous
public, political, and scholarly interest the organization and its core issue
of climate change has attracted in recent years. The vastness of IPCC
machinery, to borrow Edwards’ metaphor, is thus by no means manifested
in its organizational charts or operational budget, but in the network
of experts and the accumulated knowledge mobilized in periodic IPCC
assessment reports published every 5–8 years, as well as in various special
reports on specific climate-related issues. The institution is held together
through an evolving framework of principles and procedures that organize
the Panel’s work within and across assessment cycles.
The IPCC’s Impact
The IPCC has successfully capitalized on its urgent social mission to
provide policy-relevant science to inform governments why they need to
address climate change. The IPCC’s scientific assessments have directly
contributed to the creation and evolution of the international climate
regime. After the IPCC published its First Assessment Report in 1990, the
UN General Assembly took note of the report’s findings and made the
decision to initiate negotiations for a framework convention on climate
change. Prior to this decision, the IPCC had served as the principal forum
for the embryonic political negotiations for a treaty, and the IPCC’s work
on legal instruments contributed greatly to the content of what became
the UNFCCC (Beck and Mahony 2018b). In the years since, the IPCC
and UNFCCC have developed in parallel, and are today closely coupled in
their efforts to provide knowledge and policy responses on climate change
(Thoni and Livingston 2019). In fact, each of the IPCC’s subsequent
assessment reports has contributed to the international climate regime’s
institutional development and had a powerful agenda setting effect in the
climate negotiations.
The Second Assessment Report (IPCC 1996) provided the scientific
backbone for the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The Third Assessment Report
(IPCC 2001) focused attention on the impacts of climate change and
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the need for adaptation (Krug 2019). The Fourth Assessment Report
(IPCC 2007) found that ‘the warming of the climate system is unequiv-
ocal’ and was a key input in the 2 °C limit being recognized for the
first time by climate negotiators in the Copenhagen Accord (Parker and
Karlsson 2017: 451).
More recently, the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (2014), which
stated that human impact on the climate system is ‘clear’, profoundly
influenced the goals of the 2015 Paris Agreement, which explicitly stated
the intention to limit the global temperature increase to ‘well below’
2 °C and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5 °C (Parker et al. 2017).
Including these goals was significant because the 1992 UNFCC simply
called for the prevention of ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system’ without specifying what counted as dangerous inter-
ference or what exactly needed to be done to avoid it. Although the 2 °C
and 1.5 °C targets are political goals and not scientific ones, based on
an ambiguous and somewhat contentious ‘pre-industrial’ baseline (Paglia
and Isberg 2020), they were inspired by the IPCC’s work and the IPCC’s
participation in Structured Expert Dialogues organized by the UNFCCC
to review the 2 °C goal (Carraro et al. 2015). The targets also provide
benchmarks to assess the ambition of countries’ Nationally Determined
Contributions, which Paris requires to become more ambitious over time
to close the gap between what has been pledged and what is required to
meet the agreement’s goals (Parker and Karlsson 2018a).
The sensation that greeted the release of the Special Report on the
impacts of global warming of 1.5°C (IPCC 2018), in advance of the
2018 climate summit in Katowice, where the negotiations over the Paris
‘rulebook’ would take place, dramatically illustrated the IPCC’s role as a
formidable agenda-setter. At the negotiations, the evidence concerning
the negative impacts of climate change presented in the report was
successfully used by the EU and a group of countries collectively known
as the High Ambition Coalition to push through a rulebook that puts
in place a system of transparency, a system of reporting, rules to measure
emissions using IPCC methodology, a system to judge the impacts of poli-
cies compared to what science recommends and an implementation and
compliance committee with some teeth (Parker and Karlsson 2018b).
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The Creation of Scientific Credibility
and Epistemic Authority: Practices and Processes
Naomi Oreskes’ (2004) influential article in Science depicted the IPCC
as the institutional embodiment of the scientific consensus on anthro-
pogenic climate change. In a quantitative analysis of consensus, Anderegg
et al. (2010) used the ‘primary tenets’ of the Fourth Assessment Report
as the baseline for concluding that 97% of climate scientists agree with
IPCC conclusions that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are the
primary cause of unequivocal global warming. These and other studies
demonstrate the epistemic and discursive authority the IPCC enjoys as
the standard-bearer for consensus knowledge on climate change.
The IPCC’s role in establishing that there is a global scientific
consensus on the existence of climate change, and that human influences
on the climate system are real and impactful, have proved indispensable
for the creation of the climate regime and for providing the evidence that
the ambition of climate action needs to rapidly increase. In absence of
an incontrovertible scientific consensus, users of a common pool resource
will often resist regulation and offer competing interpretations of uncer-
tain knowledge (Stern 2011). Just as it was in the debate over ozone
protection prior to the Montreal Protocol (Albrecht and Parker 2019),
this has been the case in the debate over climate change: claims of
scientific uncertainty have made an agreement over international controls
extremely difficult.
The Panel’s epistemic and discursive authority is based on the rigorous
and extensive process by which the IPCC’s teams of expert authors
and peer reviewers carry out their work (Ghaleigh 2016). IPCC assess-
ment reports follow strict procedures, including a two-stage review ‘more
comprehensive, by many orders of magnitude, than that in an average
journal’ (Agrawala 1998: 623–624), to provide an objective, unbiased,
transparent and comprehensive assessment of current climate change
knowledge based on the latest peer-reviewed scientific literature. The
role the IPCC plays with its assessment reports, and the function the
Panel serves, is much like an expert blue-ribbon panel or a commission
of inquiry. In principle, expert commissions allow policymakers access to
knowledge and expertise that, ideally, provide an impartial appraisal of
existing evidence and recommendations for solving problems.
Seen from this perspective, the work of the IPCC, much like a commis-
sion of inquiry, entails two important activities. First, it contributes to
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the collection of information about the causes of a phenomenon or
problem, a process that we may refer to as fact-finding. Second, it engages
in lesson-drawing. Whereas, fact-finding is about establishing empirical
reality and the causes of problems (cause-effect explanations), lesson-
drawing is about suggesting possible ways to solve identified problems
(means-ends explanations) (Parker and Dekker 2008; Boin et al. 2008).
These evidence-based ‘lessons’ are then presented as ‘recommendations’
or possible options for taking action. Moreover, the manner in which
the IPCC’s assessment reports are fed into international decision-making,
primarily through the UNFCCC process, is much like the treatment of
findings from the final report of a commission of inquiry or, as Ghaleigh
(2016: 67) points out, ‘expert evidence by international courts and
tribunals’.
The IPPC has developed a unique competence to reduce uncertainty
while building academic consensus. IPCC assessment reports, of which
five have been published to date with a sixth scheduled for release in June
2022, are structured around three working groups (WG) that review the
state of climate knowledge on: the physical science basis (WG I); impacts,
adaptation and vulnerability (WG II); and mitigation of climate change
(WG III). During an assessment cycle, each working group, assisted
by a Technical Support Unit (TSU), publishes an extensive, in-depth
report that reviews published scientific work (the vast majority of it peer-
reviewed literature) on climate change, as well as a summary for policy
makers. A synthesis report encompassing the results of all three of the
working groups concludes the assessment cycle.
If the three working groups, together with the Task Force on National
Greenhouse Gas Inventories, can be considered the epistemic and orga-
nizational pillars of the IPCC (see Fig. 12.1), the hundreds of authors
(including contributing, lead, and coordinating lead authors) and review
editors selected for each assessment cycle represent a rotating founda-
tion that the Panel and its scientific outputs rests upon.2 The IPCC
Bureau—consisting primarily of chairs, co-chairs, and vice-chairs from the
working groups and the IPCC central organization—is the body respon-
sible for the selection of these experts from among those nominated by
the National Focal Points of IPCC member state governments. It, thus,
represents the key link between IPCC and the scientific community, and
also provides scientific and technical support, and advice on management
and strategy (Livingston 2018).




















Fig. 12.1 Structure of the IPCC (Source IPCC [2019])
The Executive Committee largely overlaps with the Bureau in terms of
its composition. It focuses on internal matters such as enhancing coordi-
nation between working groups and managing urgent issues (e.g., errors
in reports, such as those in the Fourth Assessment Report that led to
Climategate and the Committee’s creation in 2010, see below), as well as
external outreach and communications (IPCC 2019; Livingston 2018).
Plenary Sessions take place at least once, sometimes twice, per year,
bringing together a wide array of experts and government officials from
the 195 IPCC member states to reach consensus on issues ranging from
organizational rules and budgets to the scope and outline of upcoming
assessment reports, including the structure and mandate of the working
groups (Livingston 2018; IPCC 2019). It is also during Plenary Sessions
that the scientific work of the IPCC is reviewed by government repre-
sentatives, making them the primary arena for the Panel’s characteristic
science diplomacy (Ruffini 2018). Organizing the Plenary Sessions and
other IPCC gatherings, as well as providing coordination and commu-
nication support, is the Secretariat, consisting of a small administrative
staff based at World Meteorological Organization headquarters in Geneva
(IPCC 2019).
The public perception that the Panel’s pronouncements are built upon
widespread expert agreement represents a crucial source of strength when
faced with ‘merchants of doubt’ that have sought to sow uncertainty,
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undermine scientific authority and foster indecision among policymakers
(Grundmann 2006: 89; Oreskes and Conway 2010; Paglia 2018). The
thirty-year trajectory of assessment report production has steadily and
significantly reduced the level of uncertainty surrounding the existence
and extent of anthropogenic climate change (Anderegg et al. 2010).
According to some, however, consensus has come at a price. From
this view, the IPCC’s consensus mandate is seen as problematic due to
the resulting tendency to under-dramatize the threat of climate change
(Hansen 2007; Brysse et al. 2013; Spratt and Dunlop 2018).
Nonetheless, although consensus requirements have infused the IPCC
with a degree of institutional conservatism, this approach has served the
Panel well. The ‘Summary for Policymakers’ of each assessment report
serves as a case in point. The process of approving this report, in which
each word of the document must be agreed and approved, line-by-line,
by all the governments and the scientific authors, is arduous. But, in the
process of reaching a consensus on language that is consistent with the
underlying scientific findings, member state stakeholders are engaged, and
potential critics are co-opted. Moreover, once the 195 governments of
the IPCC adopt the ‘Summary for Policymakers’ of an entire assessment
report, it no longer belongs just to the scientists. The agreed document
and its findings now belong to the governments (Smith 2019).
Challenges to the IPCC’s Legitimacy
and Authority: Critique and Crisis
Throughout its history, the IPCC has faced intense scrutiny, criticism and
some major controversies that could have led to its demise. While some
of these controversies have been handled more effectively than others, the
IPCC has managed to respond to the challenges it has faced and incre-
mentally reform and evolve in a manner that has allowed it to maintain its
credibility as the preeminent authoritative voice on the science of climate
change.
The organization’s influence at the interface of science and diplomacy
is complicated by national interests and the inherent difficulties of effec-
tively communicating scientific information to non-specialists (Ruffini
2018). The boundary between science and politics within the IPCC is
under constant negotiation (Beck and Mahony 2018a; Ruffini 2018).
Safeguarding the independence of science in a ‘boundary organization’
(Guston 1999) such as the IPCC has been an ongoing challenge that
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has evolved under shifting societal circumstances and increasing interest
in climate change.
A key challenge has been the precarious balance between scientific
integrity and political demands. From the moment of its founding, the
issue of geographic representation constituted a fundamental political
challenge to the IPCC and the leadership of Bert Bolin. In addition
to the obligations inherent in being a UN intergovernmental body, the
founding chairman considered the participation of developing country
scientists and policymakers to be essential in establishing widespread trust
and credibility for an organization that aspired to speak to stakeholders on
a global level (Schneider 1991). Bolin, however, also put great priority in
the scientific integrity of the IPCC, and was concerned that the regional
representation issue could complicate bringing on board the leading
climate scientists, regardless of their country of origin.
Over the first few years of the Panel’s existence, considerable pressure
was exerted by Mostafa Tolba and G.O.P. Obasi—the heads of UNEP and
WMO, respectively—and certain UN member states to increase devel-
oping country representation in the IPCC, which was initially dominated
by experts from industrialized countries. This North-South divide has
characterized global environmental governance since the lead-up to the
1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment (Paglia and
Sörlin 2020) and has proved to be a challenge for the IPCC and its
legitimacy. In response, several committees, sub-groups, and task forces
were established to address the highly politicized issue that could have
jeopardized the organization’s existence.
The process resulted in increased financial support for developing
country representatives to attend IPCC gatherings. The Fifth Plenary
Session (1991) adopted a set of Principles Governing IPCC Work, which
called for greater geographic balance in the Bureau and Working Groups.
The latter imperatives were carried out through a restructuring of the
IPCC following the Eighth Plenary Session in November 1992 and
resulted in significantly increased developing country participation in
subsequent years (Kutney 2014; Skodvin 2000b; Agrawala 1998). For
example, just 97 authors contributed to the First Assessment Report,
but by the Fourth Assessment Report, which involved over 3500 experts
from more than 130 countries (including some 450 lead authors, 800
contributing authors, and 2500 expert reviewers), participation had
expanded considerably (IPCC 2010: 9).
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The restructuring process that addressed regional representation
largely coincided with efforts to formalize the peer review practices that
underpinned the Panel’s scientific credibility. Following the intense media
attention and political scrutiny the IPCC generated after its First Assess-
ment Report in 1990, and the founding of the UNFCC at the 1992
Rio Earth Summit, the Bolin-chaired Task Force on IPCC Structure
presented its recommendations for institutional reforms related to scien-
tific procedures (as well as geographic balance) at the Eighth Plenary
Session. The IPCC pursued these reforms in anticipation of ‘discredit the
messenger’ attacks from fossil fuel lobbyists and to maximize its credibility
with national governments and climate negotiators (Agrawala 1998: 625).
This resulted in the IPCC adopting at the Ninth Plenary in June 1993 a
formal set of rules for peer review that encompassed both scientific experts
and government officials in a two-tier process.
The practice of line-by-line approval of summaries for policymakers
during IPCC Working Group plenary sessions—attended by both experts
and government officials—also became formalized (Agrawala 1998).
There is an important distinction between the summaries for policy-
maker and underlying scientific reports: while the former are subject
to line-by-line approval, scientific reports, which do undergo extensive
expert and government review, are not subject to line-by-line approval
(Agrawala 1998: 624). The IPCC has introduced review editors to the
report writing process, instituting rules for synthesis reports, and clari-
fying the conditions for the use of non-peer-reviewed material (Beck and
Mahony 2018a).
Climategate: An Existential Crisis
Pachauri’s tenure as IPCC chairman, lasting from 2002 to 2015, began
with a controversy that illustrated some of these long-standing tensions
at the nexus of science and politics. With a background in economics
and industrial engineering, Pachauri became the first non-climate scientist
to lead the Panel after the chairmanships of Bolin (1988–1997) and the
British-American atmospheric chemist Sir Robert Watson (1997–2002).
The latter lost his re-election bid in April 2002 to the Indian national
Pachauri, who was backed by the United States, India, and an array of
other developing countries.
During the run-up to the deeply politicized 2002 IPCC election,
concern was raised that if the highly accomplished Watson did not remain
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chairman, the continuity and scientific credibility the Panel had accrued
over the past 15 years would be greatly diminished, complicating the
recruitment of top scientists for IPCC work (Lawler 2002). Further, alle-
gations were raised that the George W. Bush administration’s opposition
to Watson—an outspoken critic of fossil fuel interests—came under pres-
sure from American energy industry lobbyists, rather than the stated U.S.
position of supporting Pachauri in order to allow a developing country
representative to lead the IPCC (Lawler 2002).
In November 2009, two years after the IPCC and Al Gore were
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the ‘Climategate’ controversy became
the most significant challenge to IPCC authority and legitimacy to date.
It revolved around the publication of hacked emails between IPCC-
associated scientists from a server at the Climatic Research Unit (CRU)
at the University of East Anglia (UAE)—a pioneering institute on climate
change research. The hacked emails, which some claimed exposed decep-
tive practices and data manipulation among leading climate scientists
attempting to contrive a clear signal of warming global temperatures, were
followed several months later by reports of errors in the IPCC’s 2007
Fourth Assessment Report. These included inflated projections on the
rate of melting in Himalayan glaciers and the amount of Dutch territory
located below sea level (55% rather than the actual 26%) (PBL 2010).
Climategate posed an existential threat to the scientific credibility and
institutional authority of the IPCC and the science-policy interface under-
pinning the international efforts to manage climate change developed
over the previous two decades (Hajer 2012). The crisis unleashed a flood
of criticism against climate science and its institutions such as the CRU
and especially the IPCC (Pearce 2009; Hulme and Ravetz 2009), not
only from politically motivated climate sceptics, but also from scholars,
scientists, and other observers who, as analyzed by Silke Beck (2012),
soon took to traditional and online media platforms to provide their
perspectives on the Panel’s various failures and flaws.
The Climategate controversy led the UN to enlist in spring 2010 the
InterAcademy Council (IAC), an international and independent body
based in Amsterdam, to review IPCC policies and procedures (Beck 2012;
IAC 2010). The IAC report, published in August 2010, called the IPCC
a ‘significant social innovation’, lauding it for its scientific achievements
and fostering of a public conversation between scientists and policy-
makers that sustained public focus on climate change. However, it also
noted that while the globally decentralized expert network was a prime
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source of organizational strength, the Panel’s management and gover-
nance structures had not enabled it to keep pace with public expectations
of accountability and the demands that the increasingly critical problem
of climate change placed upon the IPCC.
The main criticisms put forward in the review, which also drew on
other investigations into aspects of Climategate, e.g., a Dutch govern-
ment report (PBL 2010), included shortcomings in terms of transparency
surrounding the selection of authors, reviewers, and scientific and tech-
nical information for assessment reports; a general reluctance to make data
publicly available; and the absence of a comprehensive communication
strategy. This general lack of transparency, exacerbated by the failure to
effectively communicate results (including the complicated issue of char-
acterizing scientific uncertainty), had led to a decline in public trust in the
IPCC (IAC 2010; Beck 2012).
In response to the IAC review’s recommendations, the IPCC at its May
2011 plenary session adopted a communication strategy, grounded in
the core IPCC principle of being policy relevant but not policy prescrip-
tive, in order to provide clear information on IPCC scientific findings
and the Panel’s internal procedures for producing knowledge products
such as assessment reports (IPCC 2011; Beck 2012). IPCC communi-
cations, including basic functions such as press releases, had previously
been handled by its sponsoring organizations UNEP and WMO. The lack
of professional in-house communication capacities impaired the Panel’s
ability to respond effectively to the Climategate crisis (Lynn 2018). The
May 2011 plenary session also addressed the IAC critique on internal
governance issues by creating an Executive Committee to oversee daily
operations and address urgent issues (such as errors in reports) between
plenary sessions, enhance coordination between Working Groups and
promote communication and public outreach (IPCC 2011; Scheirmeier
2011; Livingston 2018).
Throughout the Climategate crisis, a compounding factor was the
complacent and inadequate response of IPCC leadership. Chairman
Rajendra Pachauri, rather than concede factual errors, reverted to a ‘gate-
keeper approach’ against external attacks, lashing out at the Panel’s critics
(Beck 2012). Pachauri’s leadership of the IPCC came to an abrupt end in
2015, when he resigned amidst sexual harassment allegations. Despite the
turbulence of his chairmanship, under his watch, the IPCC published two
major assessment reports and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize along
with Al Gore.3
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In 2015 another non-climate scientist, the South Korean energy
economist Hoesung Lee, was selected as the new IPCC chair. In the
spirit of what has been termed ‘dynamic conservatism’, changing to main-
tain an organization’s distinctive competence (Ansell et al. 2015; Selznick
1957), Lee pledged to continue the reform work that was carried out
after the Panel adopted the IAC’s recommendations. These reforms were
designed to restore and preserve the IPCC’s reputation for producing
unimpeachable scientific assessments. Lee is pursuing a strategy of proac-
tive adaptation by attempting to enhance the IPCC’s policy relevance
further by being more solution oriented. As he put it: ‘I think the IPCC
has done a very effective job of identifying problems. And perhaps we may
have reached a point where we have done enough of identifying problems
and we may have time now to see the solutions of these climate change
issues, the opportunities they offer for the global community’ (Pidcock
2015).
Lee’s commitment to proactive adaptation, the co-optation of critics,
and the engagement of stakeholders can be further seen in his efforts
to make the IPCC’s process more open and transparent, focus more
attention on regional needs, make the IPCC’s work of greater use to
governments of developing countries, and add additional topics, such
as the effect of climate change on the oceans, the cryosphere and the
land, for the IPCC to examine. The prominence of these priorities can
already be seen in the IPCC’s recent special reports and the topics being
investigated in the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6).
In the decision to adopt the Paris Agreement in 2015, the UNFCCC
member states gave the IPCC a new mission that nicely captures the
challenges and dilemmas it confronts in how to maintain its scientific
credibility and relevance while helping to provide solutions to the threats
posed by climate change. Specifically, the parties invited the IPCC to
provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of
1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emis-
sion pathways. This request is exactly what some observers have called for
the IPCC to do more of in the future to remain relevant, namely, provide
more clear policy options to inform choices for mitigating GHG emis-
sions and responding to climate impacts (Carraro et al. 2015). Others,
however, have taken a different view and have warned the IPCC that it
should tread cautiously in the face of such requests due to the risk of
being naively used for political purposes (Hulme 2016).
312 E. PAGLIA AND C. PARKER
The IPCC has successfully changed in order to ‘remain the same’—
responding to attacks, mistakes and scandals by undertaking procedural
reforms and adapting new guidelines (e.g., on cross-checking data,
correcting errors, on how to treat uncertainty, etc.) designed to main-
tain public and political confidence by ensuring its assessments will be
seen as scientifically robust and credible. It has also striven to enhance its
legitimacy by taking measures to provide greater access and inclusion to
developing countries, despite the enduring ‘deep asymmetries in science
production’ and ‘North-South knowledge divide’ that continue to be a
challenge for the Panel (Yamineva 2017).
Conclusions
The IPCC celebrated its 30th anniversary in 2018. In its three decades,
the IPCC has accomplished its goal of becoming the principal insti-
tution where expert assessments of the climate are produced. These
assessments are accepted by the world’s governments. The IPCC has
established, in Selzick’s (1957) terms, a distinct identity and a unique
competence as a provider of ‘policy relevant but not-prescriptive’ scien-
tific assessments. The IPCC gained a strong reputation and earned public
legitimacy by taking on the role of the impartial arbiter and deliber-
ately pursuing a strategy of providing politically neutral reports based on
scientific consensus (Bolin 1994; Beck and Mahony 2018b).
The IPCC’s impact can increasingly be seen in civil society. The
climate activist, Greta Thunberg, who has inspired a massive global youth
movement of school strikes for the climate, in her 17 September 2019
appearance before the U.S. House of Representatives, rather than deliver
a statement of her own, submitted the IPCC’s 1.5 °C report to U.S.
lawmakers. She told them, ‘I don’t want you to listen to me, I want
you to listen to the scientists’ (Milman and Smith 2019). This conver-
gence of high-profile climate activism with the scientific authority of the
IPCC demonstrates the interdependency of political activism and scien-
tific authority in climate change agenda setting (Paglia 2016, 2018). It is
reminiscent of the decisive intervention of Al Gore, whose 2006 climate
documentary An Inconvenient Truth was followed a year later by the
fourth IPCC assessment report, leading to Gore and the IPCC being
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for significantly raising climate change
awareness among policymakers and the general public.
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There are a number of important lessons institution builders can learn
from the case of the IPCC. These lessons are especially germane for
leaders working with global assessment organizations, such as the Inter-
governmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. One lesson is the
need to create an image of distinct expertise and competence (Ansell
et al. 2015). To thrive, institutions must put in place practices that
engender trust from their stakeholders that they are uniquely able to fulfil
their mission. The IPCC institutionalized its epistemic authority through
implementing meticulous procedures and processes that thousands of
leading experts and scientists follow when drafting, commenting, and
reviewing the comprehensive assessments that IPCC regularly produces
on the state of climate change knowledge.
A second lesson is the substantive and symbolic potency of institution-
alizing epistemic authority, which is relatively inexpensive, yet impactful.
The IPCC’s epistemic authority has established beyond reasonable doubt
the existence of human-induced climate change and spurred governments
to create and develop a global climate regime. Civil society and the media
are also increasingly using IPCC reports to advocate for climate action.
Institution builders should also consider the exploitability and trade-
offs between mission and interests that can arise from institutional caution
and a commitment to consensus. The IPCC, because of its intergovern-
mental character and the suspicion of some of its member states, had to
tread carefully. It did so successfully and, by speaking with one voice,
acquired a reputation as a credible and impartial authority on climate
change. Its consensus practices expanded the zone of agreement with its
member state stakeholders, increased its political relevance, and co-opted
potential critics by getting them to share responsibility by adopting shared
summaries for policymakers (Selznick 1949; Boin and Christensen 2008).
However, the downside was that these choices made the IPCC vulnerable
to external criticism. Its cautious approach has been critiqued as insuffi-
ciently urgent, and, in some quarters, the assessment summaries are seen
as politically negotiated compromises that shut out diverse or dissenting
voices (Agrawala 1998: 611).
Finally, institution builders should expect and prepare for institutional
crises. Crises, if mismanaged and not successfully resolved, can derail an
institution (Ansell et al. 2016). However, crises also create opportuni-
ties for adaptation and needed reform (Boin and Christensen 2008: 289;
Parker and Dekker 2008). When facing a crisis, leadership must seize the
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narrative, reach out and communicate with stakeholders and the public,
and provide a convincing plan for what is being done to address the situ-
ation (Boin et al. 2017: 80). The IPCC initially botched its response to
the false allegations of ‘climategate’ as well as to the justifiable critique it
received over errors uncovered in the Fourth Assessment Report. The
IPCC recovered from this threat to its credibility and legitimacy by
subjecting itself to an external review and accepting essential reforms to
its processes and procedures to identify and correct errors. Ultimately,
the reforms burnished the IPCC’s reputation for scientific integrity, and
its subsequent reports have been well received.
To conclude, the IPCC richly deserves its reputation as the world’s
foremost global epistemic authority and guardian of climate science. The
Panel has had a powerful impact to date on creating public awareness
around the problem of climate change, putting the issue of climate
change on the political agenda, and contributing to the creation of global
agreements to address climate change.
The jury is out on whether the IPCC can help forge real solutions to
the climate crisis. To maintain its status and relevance in the future, the
IPCC will have to adapt its mission to this new challenge and it remains
to be seen if the IPCC, by increasing its focus on policy-relevant research,
will truly be able to exercise ‘a “world-making” power by providing
new, politically powerful visions of actionable futures’ (Beck and Mahony
2018b: 1). Moreover, although the diplomatic process is moving forward
and the global climate regime has been enhanced by the Paris Agree-
ment, efforts to date have not delivered climate action of sufficient speed,
scale, and scope commensurate with what science demands to adequately
confront the threat of dangerous climate change.
If the IPCC is to effectively help deliver the climate action that is
needed, it will have to successfully navigate the nexus of science and policy
in the face of increased demands for viable policy options while not squan-
dering its hard-earned legitimacy and credibility. Time is running out for
the IPCC and the governments of the world to demonstrate that they are
truly up to the existential challenge of avoiding climate catastrophe.
Questions for Discussion
1. The IPCC started as a small group of academics and evolved into a
global institution. Can you think of similar examples?
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2. Two leaders are discussed at some length in this chapter. One leader
helped to build the institution, the other leader played a role in the
erosion of the institution. How can one institution be a home of
two such different leaders? What is the lesson that can be drawn
from this analysis?
3. The IPCC experienced an existential crisis. How did the institution
survive this crisis?
4. Did the IPCC emerge stronger from this crisis? Which vulnerabilities
remain?
5. How would you describe the authorizing environment of this
institution?
Notes
1. The ‘Principles Governing IPCC Work’ is the guiding document that
defines the Panel’s raison d’être and expresses the values that it espouses
and attempts to project in the conduct of its work. It states: ‘The role of the
IPCC is to assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis
the scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to under-
standing the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change, its
potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation’ (IPCC 1998).
2. The Task Force was established in 1998 to calculate GHG emissions
(parties to the Paris Agreement are required to follow its methodology
for reporting their emissions).
3. Gore was a strong Robert Watson supporter and initially critical of
Pachauri, calling him in a 2002 New York Times op-ed ‘the “let’s drag
our feet” candidate’ to lead the IPCC (Gore 2002).
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CHAPTER 13
The ACCC: Guardian of ViableMarkets
and Consumer Rights
Amanda Smullen and Catherine Clutton
Introduction
In 2016, following a successful investigation by the Australian Compe-
tition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), Nippon Yusen Kabushiki
Kaisha pled guilty to operating a criminal cartel fixing the freight price
of vehicles imported to Australia. In 2017, the Federal Court of Australia
imposed a penalty of AUD25 million (the second highest penalty ever
imposed since the inception of the ACCC). This prosecution followed
earlier litigation successes against Reckitt Benckiser Australia Pty Ltd. for
misleading or deceptive conduct.
These and other recent successes have generated domestic and interna-
tional acclaim for the ACCC. Australia’s Royal Commission into Banking
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in 2018 criticized most regulatory agencies in the sector but lauded
the ACCC. Indeed, the ACCC’s mandate was subsequently expanded
to take over responsibilities for supervising financial services from the
Securities and Investments Commission. The ACCC received interna-
tional praise for its vanguard inquiry into market dominance of social
media giants Google and Facebook. In 2019, the ACCC was named
Global Competition Agency of the Year (Danckert 2019; Mason 2019).
In short, the ACCC has rapidly established a formidable reputation with
firm institutional embedding in its environment.
The ACCC’s founding legislation tasks the agency to enforce both
competition and consumer law for the ‘public interest’. The protection
of competition and consumers is integral to the cohesive functioning
of the economic and social system. While competition can be a good
thing, it should not push companies to cut corners on the safety of their
services and products. The ACCC thus has a dual, seemingly contradic-
tory, mission: to ensure that markets function in ways that both encourage
competition and protect consumer welfare (Beaton-Wells and Haines
2010; Parker and Scrinis 2014).
Standing up for the interests of consumers and the optimal func-
tioning of markets may be a lofty mission, but in and of itself it does
not ensure stakeholder support. Quite the opposite: some of the ACCC’s
interventions have met with considerable opposition and garnered polit-
ical controversy, inviting critical scrutiny from all sides. Moreover, the
ACCC must contend with powerful corporations and vested interests.
Its mandate inevitably embroils the ACCC in conflicts over the power
of big (international) corporations and (global) economic structures in
Australian public life (Edwards 2020).
Australia was relatively late to introduce (in 1974) ‘enforceable’
competition and consumer law (in comparison with other OECD coun-
tries). Today, the ACCC’s functions, regulatory instruments and legal
sway are as, if not more, extensive than those of its international coun-
terparts. Its steadily expanding remit and powers have come to include
education of both consumers and businesses, investigation, authoriza-
tion of certain (otherwise) anti-competitive conduct that is in the public
interest, price regulation of monopolies and regulation and enforcement
of competition and consumer law across multiple sectors of the Australian
economy.
The ACCC also performs a wide array of expert advisory functions.
Examples include its convening of the government’s inquiry into the dairy
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sector and the role of supermarkets’ purchasing powers (2016–2018),
membership of a Treasury-led working group overseeing the residen-
tial mortgage market (2019), and of a wide-ranging inquiry into the gas
market (2017). Simultaneously, the ACCC maintains a firm footing in the
domestic lives of Australian consumers, for example by providing widely
accessed ‘Scamwatch’ updates, publishing local petrol pricing compara-
tors, and making itself accessible through Commissioner appearances
on prime-time lifestyle programs advising consumers on issues as varied
as how to survive the Christmas sales and how to navigate electricity
markets.
This chapter interrogates the institutional history, formation, and
ongoing institutionalization of the ACCC. Drawing on Philip Selznick’s
classic studies of institutions and processes of institutionalization (outlined
in the introduction to this volume), this chapter analyzes how the ACCC
has become a taken for granted and publicly valued part of the economic
governance landscape in Australia in the face of both corporate and, at
times, political resistance.
While a relatively ‘young’ agency (created in 1995) compared to other
examples in this book, the ACCC has its roots in a much longer historical
process to establish a robust national legal and administrative framework
for promoting competition, fair trading and efficiency. ACCC formed
from a merger of pre-existing organizations: the former Trade Practices
Commission (TPC 1977–1995) and the Prices Surveillance Authority
(PSA 1983–1994). Our contention is that this lineage presented signif-
icant endogenous institutional resources. The ACCC was bequeathed
routine patterns of action, including models of ethical leadership, which
later leadership could recombine, amplify and adapt; a process which has
thus far secured institutional embedding of the agency (cf. Berk 2009;
Farjoun et al. 2015). We argue that the ACCC built upon the internal
and external routines of its predecessors to create a virtuous cycle of
institutionalization (explained in the introduction to this volume).
We first describe the collision of legal, organizational and political
trajectories that preceded and informed ACCC’s creation and formal
design. We then characterize its process of institutionalization by using
Selznick’s (1957) criteria of (1) a distinct identity and unique compe-
tence; (2) strong reputation and public legitimacy; and (3) enduring
viability through adaptation. Finally, we consider the forces of erosion
that challenge the ACCC but, to date, have not disrupted its professional
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commitment to substantive enforcement nor public reputation as a highly
regarded national institution.
Rooted in History: The ACCC’s Precursors
The ACCC began operations on 6 November 1995. Formally, the agen-
cy’s birth occurred through parliamentary amendments to the then Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Clth) (TPA 1974), later to be replaced by the Compe-
tition and Consumer Act 2010 (Clth) (CCA). The creation of the ACCC
was a significant juncture in Australia’s competition policy. For the first
time, a national agency would become responsible for regulating and
enforcing competition law across Australia’s federation. Also, for the first
time, the legislative ‘authorization’ functions of the competition regulator
(alongside prosecution and education functions) expanded to include
overseeing price regulation and access to essential utilities such as elec-
tricity and telecommunication networks. Internationally, ACCC’s design
was unique for its focus upon both competition and consumer law in just
one agency and its multi-sector (from electricity to telecommunications
public utility) focus (Ottow 2014; Jenny 2016). For the agency, it was
just the beginning of an expanding mandate, broadening enforcement
instruments and increasing administrative size.
The creation and subsequent institutionalization of the ACCC
occurred in the context of various legal, organizational and political devel-
opments (Bannerman 1985) that furnished the raw materials for forming
a distinctive institution. We focus here upon the legal, organizational and
political paths that collided with ACCC’s formation. An important devel-
opment was the privatization of public services and their exposure to
competition and price regulation. In Australia, most significant privatiza-
tion reforms began in the early 1990s with sales of public assets, such as
public companies/enterprises and statutory authorities at both state and
national levels. They included the sale of banks, state insurance offices,
airports and railway corporations, electricity generators and electricity and
gas distributors (Walker and Con Walker 2000).
By far the largest privatization (in sale value) was Telstra. Australia’s
telecommunications provider (initially a monopoly) was first opened up to
competition and then sold in two tranches. Informed by then prevailing
neoliberal orthodoxy as to the advantages of market competition, priva-
tization both drew from, and gave momentum to existing competition
law and the rise of regulation (and public regulators) across western
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economies (Moran 2002). Australia was no ‘bit player’, being only second
to the United Kingdom in dollar terms of its privatization programs
(Walker and Con Walker 2000: 17).
Australian efforts to provide legal foundations for federal competition
policy began much earlier, prior to neoliberal orthodoxy, and followed an
‘Austerican’ course. That is, a coevolution between British and American
anti-trust laws to fit changing Australian social, political and economic
structures and perceptions (Brenchley 2003: 30–32). Hardly an unusual
pattern in Australian political/policy institutions (Patapan 1997) the legal
origins for this Austerican competition law date back to 1906 with the
passing of the Australian Industries Preservation Act (AIP). The AIP
followed a solid anti-trust pedigree from the US Sherman Act at a rela-
tively early stage in Australia’s fledgling federation but foundered on
constitutional limits to the federal government’s jurisdiction.
Australia’s path to entrenching ‘enforceable’ federal competition legis-
lation would take almost another 70 years through the passing of the
TPA (1974). As Bannerman (1985), a former Trade Practices Commis-
sion Chairman, later commented business at this time was something of
an exclusive club and only insiders knew what the rules were. Those rules
included price fixing and control of delivery mechanisms, all of which
went largely unremarked. One example directly relevant to consumers of
the day was the practice of petrol price fixing. Petrol stations were tied
to specific suppliers and owners were obliged to charge the prices set by
those suppliers.
The TPA brought distinctively Australian (and New Zealand) features
to its competition approach, such as the groundwork for inclusion
of consumer law within competition legislation. As consumer law was
initially solely a state responsibility, this also paved the way for experi-
ence of cross-jurisdictional collaboration for Australia’s first competition
regulator—the Trade Practices Commission (TPC 1977–1994). Later
amendments to the Act, particularly in 1995 and 2010, would extend
the legislative mandate to all business activity (including state public util-
ities or enterprises) across the nation and enable a national Australian
consumer law with the renaming of the TPA as the Competition and
Consumer Act 2010 (Emerson 2010: 2718).
At the time of the TPA’s inception, competition law was unprece-
dented and untested in Australia. There were not yet any clear precedents
for pursuing legal action. The then Commissioner, Ron Bannerman
(1965–1974), took careful carriage of slow case by case challenges to the
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legality of companies’ registered agreements, thus testing argument for
the contestation (or authorization) of their breach of the ‘public inter-
est’. Authorities needed to discover what it would enable them to do in
terms of breaking up concentrations of corporate power, all too clubby
and comfortable business networks, the misleading and manipulation of
consumers, and other abuses of the public’s trust. Through using the
powers of the law, authorities had to test the waters to find out where its
boundaries lay, and what norms and practices would sustain its effective
application (Bannerman 1985; Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986).
The legal framework and parentage of the Trade Practices Commis-
sioner within the Attorney-General’s Department lent a premium to legal
‘evidence, logic and argument’ (Bannerman 1985: 88). Organizationally,
the Commissioner had to develop capabilities and routines that would
support this orientation in the emerging application of the TPA. For
example, in collecting and preparing case hearings at the Tribunal, the
Commissioner needed to demonstrate that processes were fair and that by
pursuing legal actions the Commissioner was educating businesses and the
community at large about the meaning of the law. These emerging prac-
tices set a precedent of independent, evidence-based administrative and
legal decision-making, purposefully removed from party politics. They
created organizational capacity and examples of how to operate effectively
and with integrity. Furthermore, the consultative work of the Commis-
sioner contributed to changing perceptions among businesses, unions and
the public of the desirability of competition law (Merrett et al. 2007)
which, in turn, led to increased support from these groups.
The TPA (1974) brought considerable expansion of legal and admin-
istrative capacity. Bannerman became the Chair (1974–1984) of a new
agency devoted to administering and enforcing competition law: the
Trade Practices Commission (TPC). This required extending existing
routines of investigation, legal testing and developing expertise to the
whole spectrum of competition law—from the initial focus on price agree-
ments and deceptive conduct towards the more challenging terrain of
assessing mergers and acquisitions.
The fledgling TPC was not helped by the return to power of a
more pro-business Liberal/Country Party government (1975–1983),
which at times tried to curb its mandate and tweak its capabilities (see
Venturini 1980 for colorful accounts). The subsequent Labour govern-
ment’s success in beating economic stagnation and inflation created a
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buoyant, anything-goes economic climate in which regulatory ‘nitpick-
ing’ was not always welcomed either. And irrespective of which party
controlled government, a small and new agency-like TPC had to fight
constant funding battles just to survive (Venturini 1980; Bannerman
1985; Brenchley 2003). Over time, however, it benefitted from increasing
legal, economic and regulatory scholarly interest in its work, which laid
the foundation for its further professionalization (Corones et al. 2009).
Specifically, TPC’s third Chairman Professor Bob Baxt (1988–1991),
a trade practice academic and legal practitioner, worked hard to grow the
agency’s capacity for undertaking litigious action and more sophisticated
enforcement strategies. During his time as Chairman, key commis-
sioners including ANU scholar John Braithwaite and consumer law
advocate Allan Asher developed an ‘enforcement pyramid’. This innova-
tive approach to regulatory supervision meant that the ACCC initially
responded to illegal behaviour through educating and informing busi-
nesses about the law at the ‘base’, only to move up the ‘pyramid’ of more
serious sanctions ending with court action at the point (Corones et al.
2009). Use of education and public information, including publicizing
corporate misdemeanours, was intended to influence corporate behaviour
in more comprehensive and intrinsic ways, rather than simply relying only
on legislative prosecution. By issuing ‘first priorities and directions state-
ments,’ Baxt also ensured that the TPC was transparent about its policies
and intentions. Finally, he set out to persuade corporations and busi-
ness sectors to develop productive competition law compliance cultures,
for instance, by investing in consultative processes with business and
consumers.
In 1983, the Prices Surveillance Authority (PSA)—the ACCC’s other
‘parent organization’—was established. PSA was created within the
Department of Treasury in 1983 (Head 1986; Brenchley 2003). PSA’s
location in Treasury brought organizational experience of working close
to political power, as opposed to the purposeful aloofness of the TPC
in the Attorney-General’s Department. Set up to assist in curbing infla-
tionary pressures in an economy quickly coming out of a deep recession,
the PSA was not given powers to adjudicate or prosecute, only to
investigate and publicize.
In marked contrast with the legal orientation that prevailed within the
TPC, Professor Allan Fels, the inaugural Chairman of PSA in 1989 and
eventual founding Chairman of the ACCC (1995–2003) made do with
what he got and set the new agency on a course of relentless high-profile,
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media-sustained public shaming of business pricing malpractices. Lacking
legislative or constitutional powers, Fels opted to investigate and then
to publicize issues of commonplace consumer spending notably petrol
pricing and the cost of books, CDs and even funerals. Time and again, he
sought to demonstrate how Australian consumers were being forced to
pay more than was reasonable, or were excluded by business cartels and
monopolies from products available elsewhere (Brenchley 2003).
By the early 1990s, there was broad political support for restructuring
the Australian economy and extending the TPA to industries still under
state/territory jurisdiction.
This period saw a suite of measures designed to boost productivity,
including removal of trade barriers, labour market deregulation and colli-
sion of existing competition law and institutional achievements with new
competition policy (including programs to privatize public monopolies).
In October 1992, the Australian Labour Government established an inde-
pendent investigation of national competition policy: the Hilmer Inquiry.
It reported in August 1993, recognizing that—although Australia is a
federation of states and territories—it could benefit strongly from creating
a single market. The inquiry recommended adoption of a national
competition policy. This was to be supported by the establishment of
a National Competition Council to arrive at integrated policies and draft
specific federal-state competition agreements. The Council was intended
to be complemented by the establishment of an Australian Competition
Commission responsible for administering and enforcing the new national
competition policy.
In February 1994, the Council of Australian Governments (the plat-
form where all Australian states and territories negotiate and coordi-
nate policies with the federal government) accepted the thrust of the
Hilmer recommendations. It agreed to the establishment of an Australian
Competition Commission (Council of Australian Governments 1994)
which was ultimately enacted as the ACCC. The ACCC was recognized
in amendments to the TPC (1974) and took effect through a merger of
the TPC and PSA.
Building the ACCC
After its establishment, the ACCC’s role became to enforce the successor
to the Trade Practices Act, the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. It
was set up in 1995 with bipartisan support in the Australian parliament.
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Its mission to ‘make markets work for consumers, now and in the future’
(Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, n.d.).
Our argument is that the TPC and PSA experience (discussed above)
informed internal and external patterns of action (‘routines’) that ACCC
leadership used to institutionalize the agency. The TPC and PSA
bequeathed potent models of organizational leaders with integrity and
fight to the new agency (Merrett et al. 2007; Corones et al. 2009).
From the TPC, ACCC inherited established capacity for legal evidence
and expert independence, precedents for experimenting and pushing the
boundaries of the law in the context of social change, a wide repertoire of
regulatory instruments, initial principles for transparency and longevity of
tenure among expert staff. From the PSA, ACCC inherited routines for
engaging media publicity and grabbing the interests of consumers and
politicians.
ACCC’s founding legislation set out provisions for the appointment of
a Chairperson and Commissioners. Australia’s Governor-General appoints
the Chair and Commissioners on recommendation from the respon-
sible national government Minister. Appointees must have demonstrated
expertise in industry, small business, commerce, economics, law, public
administration or consumer protection. All state and territory govern-
ments are consulted before appointments are finalized, and a majority
must support those appointments. These requirements provide a check
on purely political appointments by the national government. Commis-
sioners can be reappointed, and many have been several times. Once
appointed, Commissioners have statutory office status, which gives them
a legal mandate to make rulings within their sphere of competence and
enshrines their independence from the government of the day.
The first Chairperson of the ACCC, serving from 1995–2003, was
Professor Allan Fels; an academic and economist who had chaired both
the TPC and the PSA (the predecessor regulatory agencies that merged
to form the ‘new’ ACCC). Along with the inaugural group of Commis-
sioners, Fels brought broad experience, far-reaching ambition, and a
fighting spirit to the ACCC. He did not shy from opportunities presented
by the momentum of the national competition policy and ACCC’s
enhanced formal mandate compared to predecessor agencies.
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Crafting a Combative Regulatory Machine
Fels ratcheted up the pursuit of enforcement through litigation, which
directed staff attention and legal expertise towards identifying appro-
priate cases. Fels and his Deputy Chairman Allan Asher had already
begun an ardent litigation strategy while they were at the helm of the
TPC (1991–1995). This resulted in successful prosecutions that occurred
just as the ACCC began its operations. Oft-cited cases include the
TNT/Mayne Nickless freight express cartel, which saw the ACCC garner
the court’s imposition of penalties and costs totaling AUD14 million
in 1995, and the Aboriginal insurance case (more below). The Aborig-
inal insurance case opened the way for the ACCC to use ‘enforceable
undertakings’ as a regulatory instrument. Enforceable undertakings are
the capacity to negotiate an informal settlement which is court enforce-
able should offenders default (Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission 2004, 2014). The TPC/ACCC also pursued moral retribu-
tion in informal settlements and by holding as many parties—individual
or corporate—legally liable for contributing to the conduct.
With TNT/Mayne Nickless, the ACCC used its investigative work
to reveal in court how executives of three different freight companies
reached agreements to allocate customers and market share. This case
made ordinary Australians conscious of corporate misconduct. It was
also significant for subjecting executives to personal fines, sending shock-
waves through the business world. Similarly, the Aboriginal insurance case
involved a series of cases revealing various well-known insurance compa-
nies (from Colonial Mutual to AMP) engaging in predatory selling prac-
tices through misrepresentation and unconscionable conduct in remote
Aboriginal communities. ACCC special investigators from Queensland
and the Northern Territory Regional Offices cooperated closely with local
community members to put the case together.
The agency continued to develop its approach in pursuit of best prac-
tice, although some scholars queried whether its litigation strategy did
much to ensure business compliance (Parker 2006; Parker and Lehman
Nielsen 2011). Coined the ‘engine room’ of the ACCC, the Enforcement
Committee was initially chaired by Deputy Chairman Asher; a former
consumer law advocate (Brenchley 2003). While at the TPC, Asher had
internalized academic insights into how to create an effective agency and
regulatory compliance strategy. Braithwaite, an internationally renowned
regulatory scholar from the Australian National University, had worked
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with Asher as part-time Commissioner in the TPC to develop and apply
an enforcement framework for effective compliance on ‘a limited budget’
(Corones et al. 2009: 150). This inspired the development of a proac-
tive enforcement culture through strategically selecting targeted cases,
relentlessly appealing failed cases (when financially viable), and soft-power
repertoires (such as naming and shaming in the media, among others) to
secure corporate compliance.
The agency invested in the professionalization, technical expertise and
value alignment of its staff. Supply of talented and committed employees
was boosted by the broad momentum that competition policy continued
to enjoy within Australian society. This created opportunities for trade
lawyers, professionals in merchant banking, share analysts, criminal inves-
tigators and economists to pursue careers in regulation and enforcement.
Also, the ACCC had inherited from the TPC a cadre of dedicated
professionals with a deep appreciation for the organization’s public value
proposition.
Insiders attest to a culture of frank internal discussion in the ACCC,
with Commissioners deliberating vigorously in a Cabinet-style process
(Schaper 2019). Annual, externally focused Chairman statements of prior-
ities listing the issues, topics or industries that would be the focus for
the next year (instigated as an internal routine by Baxt in the TPC), and
Statements of Intent responding to the Minister’s Statement of Expecta-
tions became transparency routines. Strategies regarding selection of legal
cases or tackling requests for government inquiries, though, are carefully
guarded and prepared internally. Unlike its regulatory peers, for example
in Australia’s financial sector, ACCC remains untouched by accusations
of collusion.
The ACCC is a self-consciously proud agency. It celebrates its past
and organizes reflection upon its experiences. TPA jubilees are celebrated,
and the organization hosts various annual lectures named after compe-
tition administrators or consumer law heroes, such as the Bannerman
Competition Lecture and the Ruby Hutchinson Memorial Lecture.
Securing Public Legitimacy
In ACCC’s formative years, under Chairman Fels, media profiling was a
part of a strategic effort to bolster agency reputation and secure support
from (or at least disarm) the authorizing environment, notably govern-
ment and business. Biographical studies refer to Fels’ PSA days and how it
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taught, and brought, experience of using the media to obtain widespread
social support for organizational mission (Brenchley 2003; Fels 2010).
For example, highlighting actions, that garnered popular support, or
explaining the benefits to the consumer of technical legal issues, such as
what constitutes ‘misuse of market power’. A self-confessed ‘media tart’,
Fels courted publicity and had a knack for picking fights with ‘big end of
town’ corporations that exposed less salutary aspects of their operations.
ACCC also used other strategies for securing wide legitimacy for the
operations and mission, for example, incorporating affected consumers
in investigating and developing legal prosecution, and, through drawing
from knowledge accrued by state offices.
Fels used the media in ACCC’s early years to trumpet the enforce-
ment successes and consumer protection mission of the organization.
Besides building a broad constituency and familiarity for ACCC’s work,
this reverberated internally as staff saw that their daily work, mission, and
ultimately intrinsic motivation were publicly celebrated. Moreover, using
the media to secure moral deterrence of corporate misdemeanours was
consistent with the pyramid of enforcement noted earlier (Parker 2006).
ACCC developed internal routines for identifying and responding to the
conduct they wished to affect through less to more intrusive enforcement,
e.g. from education about internal compliance systems for specific sectors
or persuasion on moral standards, to sanctions, obtaining reparation and
legal action (J. Braithwaite 2002; V. Braithwaite 2007).
Fels’ media presence also put government and (big) business on notice
about the support ACCC was gathering from consumers, small busi-
ness and farmers. Ultimately, this did not preclude big business from
lobbying publicly against the hard enforcement line of the ACCC (and
its celebrity Chairman in particular). The public shaming of corporate
misdemeanours brought ferocious counteraction from business precisely
because such public moral disrepute was far more damaging to them
than financial penalties (Parker 2006). Settlements often followed when
businesses considered their position in this light.
Notwithstanding the tough and very public battles ACCC action
prompted, the ACCC’s enforcement strategies bore fruit. Leading from
the front, Fels managed to instil a zealous appetite among staff for turning
the ACCC into a no-nonsense, widely known regulator ‘with teeth’,
whose actions were designed to make Australia a more productive and just
society. At the same time, Fels maintained a productive relationship with
government. Fels was conscious of the longer history of the TPC and the
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challenges his predecessors Bannerman and Baxt had faced in securing
ongoing government attention, support and financing. Both Baxt and
Fels used their active advocacy to shape government competition policy.
Fels’ actions, at least initially, impressed the government (contrast
Corones et al. 2009: 164–170; with Brenchley 2003: 90–95). Indeed,
the ACCC came to be seen as a source of legitimacy for government
decisions. For example, on the back of the ACCC’s growing enforce-
ment reputation, the new Liberal/Conservative government chose the
ACCC to oversee the implementation of their politically important and
contentious Goods and Services Tax. This brought more publicity (and
government financing) to the ACCC. Fels and the organization played a
visible role in advertising and education campaigns about the new tax.
ACCC also invested in its interactions with business and in a range
of network engagements. These became increasingly sophisticated and
varied over time, such as through Baxt’s compliance workshops, coopera-
tion with international competition regulators, and through the consulta-
tive committees of the ACCC. These committees traverse the different
functional responsibilities of the ACCC and incorporate representa-
tives from affected external actors ranging from businesses, farmers and
consumers to a range of legal and financial professionals. ACCC main-
tains regional offices that keep a local ‘ear to the ground.’ These structures
and mechanisms of engagement with diverse and geographically dispersed
actors bring outsider knowledge and perspectives into the organization.
It also builds stakeholder understanding of the ACCC’s outlook and
methods.
Over time, a larger trade practices community both within and outside
Australia has developed in support of the ACCC’s mission. This commu-
nity consists of social commentators, legal practitioners, economists,
political journalists, consumer law advocates, international organizations
(such as the OECD) and former Commissioners and staff. ACCC
Chairmen also present public lectures, such as the annual ACCC Chair-
man’s presentation to the Committee for Economic Development of
Australia (CEDA), an influential independent think tank.
Adapting to Challenges and Changes
As a competition regulator, the ACCC must contend with at least three
potentially undermining factors: the political environment and related
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authorization for active enforcement; failure to maintain ongoing refine-
ment of effective enforcement methods supported by legal developments;
and inadequate financing to maintain capacity (Fels 2010). The ACCC’s
institutional armoury, including its integrated approach and established
routines for enforcing competition and consumer law, its multi-sector
focus, and broad constituency have, to some extent, shielded the orga-
nization from budget squeezes or constriction of its licence to operate.
Later Chairmen, following Fels, also kept up a determined effort to
continue to further evolve Australia’s competition law in response to the
anti-competitive effects of corporate power.
Nevertheless, Fels’ and Asher’s aggressive forays into penalizing and
publicizing anti-competitive behaviour saw a significant backlash from
the business community towards the end of Fels’ first term as ACCC
Chairman (Brenchley 2003). Big business remains fiercely opposed to
any measures that strengthen subjection to competition law which dilutes
corporate power and profits. It is no secret in Australia that business
associations actively lobby politicians and governments (behind closed
doors), have deep pockets for lawyers, and rebuke or delay administra-
tive decision-making (Edwards 2020). Fels in particular was subjected
to much vitriol, including from powerful organized interests such as the
Business Council of Australia (BCA). This probably contributed to the
government offering Fels only a shortened second term, while a number
of Commissioners stood down or were ‘moved on’.
Fels was succeeded by Graeme Samuel, a merchant banker and former
head of the National Competition Council, where he was responsible
for negotiating federal-state competition issues in the early years of
the national competition policy. Some commentators described Samuel
as a selection to appease big business, in particular the strong and
powerful lobby, BCA (BCA is long associated with the Liberal party,
then in government). A majority of states initially refused to endorse
Samuel’s appointment, although an eventual compromise succeeded
through appointment of a consumer advocate as Deputy Chairperson.
In his inaugural speech Samuel made it clear that he would not be a
public official that would engage in public lecturing or advocating policy
to government. Also, he explicitly committed not to ‘trample on’ civil and
legal rights of business (Samuel 2003). During his period (2003–2011) as
Chairman, the ACCC engaged in noticeably fewer and a narrower range
of litigation cases (Ergas 2011; Edwards 2020).
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However, Samuel made the criminalization of cartel conduct, an initia-
tive first pursued under Fels, a key focus of his term (Samuel 2004).
In 2009, the new cartel criminalization regime was introduced by an
amendment to the TPA (Beaton-Wells and Haines 2010). This shifted
focus in the Enforcement Committee to identifying and pursuing cartel
cases. While bringing the prospect of accruing political capital through
high-profile successes such as imposing criminal penalties on wealthy exec-
utives, focus on cartel cases took resources and distracted from weaknesses
in other areas of Australian competition law, in particular mergers and
misuse of market power (Beaton-Wells and Haines 2010).
While the ACCC may have reduced the breadth of its litigation
activities under Samuel, a quieter pursuit of enforceable undertakings
continued and grew in different years of his Chairmanship, with posi-
tioning on market power dominance still simmering (Nehme 2008).
In both instances, existing routines in the organization and among
its external constituency kept the ACCC’s enforcement identity and
capacities alive, albeit with a different intensity and focus.
In recent years, the ACCC kept growing. Its staff has more than
tripled since inception. Its statutory roles and enforcement repertoires
have significantly expanded, largely through being proactive in strength-
ening competition law and developing responses to emerging phenomena
(e.g. the rise of social media giants). The ACCC’s proactive adaptation
also included fostering and attending to new public advocacy groups (e.g.
consumer data right initiatives) as a presence in the authorizing envi-
ronment. Moreover, the ACCC’s stature as a competent and stalwart
enforcement regulator appears hardly tainted—even thriving—in spite of
recognition of the more restrained Samuel’s term and ongoing weaknesses
in Australian legislation.
A consistent pattern in the ACCC’s maintenance of its institutional
status has been the ability (inherited from early TPC years) to continue to
experiment and push boundaries of the law in different realms of competi-
tion policy and in response to new phenomena or different constituencies.
It has done this in interaction with the agency’s variegated environment.
For example, when the ACCC’s experts propose new definitions and
norms of how and where to apply the law in internally selected strategic
cases—and these cases succeed publicly—this then reinforces the ACCC’s
enforcement status. In that way, a virtuous cycle has been created.
This key self-reinforcing formula of virtuosity seems to have remained
consistent over ACCC’s lifetime. Though varying with different leaders,
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there have remained established traditions of publicly demonstrating
the significance of ACCC’s functions, not just to corporations but also
to vulnerable groups and, more generally, the everyday experiences of
citizens.
The ACCC has proactively pursued developments in the law. Examples
include acquiring enforceable undertaking powers, increasing financial
penalties, criminalization of cartel behaviour, the introduction of ‘effects’
test, and functions pertaining to social media and data rights. The internal
capacity to pursue these adaptations has been bolstered by diverse regu-
latory instruments, ongoing influx of new and more diverse expertise
through graduate programs, and the gradual expansion of the range
of actors represented in ACCC’s management structure and committee
system. Examples of the latter include the creation of a Consumer Data
Rights Consultative Committee and incorporating small business experts
among commissioners. All these refinements to ACCC internal and
external capacities are facilitated by the quality, integrity and continuity
among leadership. In particular the strong and facilitative commitment
both Fels and Sims lent to building and connecting ACCC’s internal
mission culture with their external success, celebration and focus.
The ACCC’s ‘Mission Mystique’: Lessons
for Regulatory Institution-Building
The preceding sections describe the origins and institutionalization of
the ACCC, drawing from Selznickian concepts presented in the Editor’s
introduction. These concepts, such as building a distinctive identity (here
as a combative regulatory enforcement machine) and external legitimacy,
are further broken down and transposed by Goodsell (2011) in his
categorization of features of ‘mission mystique’ (the qualities which set
institutions apart from mere organizations). In Table 13.1 we summarize
our findings about the ACCC according to Goodsell’s mission mystique.
Twenty-five years after its creation, the ACCC has attained a strong
foothold in Australia’s public sector. It is widely respected and recog-
nized as an enduring institution. As the ACCC enters new terrain for
competition law such as social media and platforms, it continues to
grow and command respect from government and consumers alike. A
most powerful demonstration of the recognition of ACCC’s ongoing
success within its environment has been the recent lauding of the
ACCC’s enforcement efforts against large corporations by Australia’s
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Table 13.1 The mission mystique of the ACCC
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Banking Royal Commission, and the ‘third term’ appointment of current
Chairman Rod Sims.
This chapter has sought to indicate why the ACCC is an institution
and identify some of the processes that have reinforced, and continue to
reinforce, its institutional status. A key argument in the present account
is that the ACCC inherited robust routines from its predecessors, which
provided ACCC leadership with variety in experience to both build a
distinctive internal capacity to respond to and use the configuration of
the environment cultivated by leadership, to sustain ongoing institutional
status through adapting routines for action.
Early ACCC leadership (with experience from the TPC and competi-
tion law) could further consolidate and adapt these routines to contem-
porary environments. Such traditions and routines are today, to some
extent, supported by ACCC’s formal institutional rules and processes,
and informal culture and commitment to legal enforcement and exper-
imentation. Examples include the authority granted by the CCA or
inclusion of variety in agency formal design, state input into Chairperson
appointments, and informal culture and enforcement strategies. Further-
more, traditions and routines are supported by the knowledge gained
through relationships that the ACCC is embedded within, for example its
committee system, international networks of regulators, and media pres-
ence. Even though it is not immune to political influence or industry
counter-reaction, evidence of collusion is limited, and an organizational
buffer is created through ACCC’s broad constituency and commitment to
its mission. The organization has had failures and periods or cases where
its effectiveness has seemed in jeopardy. Yet, to date, the ACCC’s ‘mis-
sion mystique’ (Goodsell 2011) has proved stronger than these incidental
strains and setbacks.
Reflections
After decades of anti-competition policy and legislation, and especially
after 40 years of the ACCC, there are highlights that may provide useful
points of reflection for other public regulatory agencies hoping to gain
institutional status. Chief among these are for leadership to have an aware-
ness of the historical inheritance of the organization and the available
resources these present both for enhancing internal capacity for regulatory
mission and securing external legitimacy.
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In the case of the ACCC, inheritance attributes that brought and
protected ongoing institutional reinforcement include: formal insulation
of expert and strategic decision-making from partisan influence, varie-
gated internal regulatory instruments and external constituencies that can
be mobilized to adapt to new environments and, leaders able to connect
the value and focus of internal agency mission to external constituencies.
ACCC has a strong record of leadership integrity and expertise actively
celebrated and acknowledged for pushing the necessary legal and organi-
zational boundaries to maintain ongoing social relevance of the agency’s
function. This in itself has attracted a stable, impassioned and continuous
cadre of organizational experts. We offer a brief reflection on these key
findings.
First, the experience and principle of insulation from partisan politics or
direct political control is hardly a unique observation in regulatory schol-
arship or the ACCC (Kovacic and Winerman 2015), but it is insightful to
appreciate the historical origins in this case. ACCC formed in a powerful
central government department, the Treasury, yet its precedents (TPC)
in the Attorney-General’s Department provided it time to accumulate
internal capacities for data and evidence collection, and legal prosecution,
in (legal) practices establishing a norm of protecting the public interest
independent of government. Both the skills and values of enforcing
competition law in the ‘public interest’ were institutionalized as values
in themselves distinct from the whims of the shorter terms of specific
governments.
While the establishment of these earlier routines were, of course, never
totally insulated from outside forces or interests, an internal precedent
and mission was set for holding firm on law enforcement. Later insu-
lating this mission would also be formalized in the ACCC’s design which
includes a statutory basis for the ACCC’s function, ongoing adjudication
by courts (not government), and in state input into Chair and Commis-
sioners appointments. One weakness noted in this case is that the ACCC’s
legislation allows the government to shorten Chairman/Commissioners
length of tenure.
Second, the variegated nature of both ACCC’s regulatory instruments
and tasks—from the CCA itself, to advice functions and the use of the
regulatory pyramid—and its broad, diverse constituencies provide agency
leadership ample fodder for responding to environmental demands. While
it maintains a cohesive mission ‘to enforce competition law’, the ACCC
undertakes this across numerous sectors and has a sophisticated array of
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instruments to respond to and anticipate offences. From tough sanctions,
to education, bringing public attention to corporate misdemeanours or
requiring normative not just financial retribution, the ACCC is able to
tailor a raft of measures to obtain acquiescence or normative agreement
on compliance. The range of sectors for which it has responsibility also
acts against establishing ‘special relationships’ with particular industries
that could lead to accusations of collusion. Relatedly, the early inclu-
sion of consumer law into Australian competition legislation has from
the outset ensured a more ‘grassroots’ constituency for the ACCC. This
creates momentum within the organization to ensure that understandings
of the ‘public interest’ are kept relevant and grounded to the domestic
life and values of the citizenry, rather than simply that of corporations or
economists.
Together, all this variety brought together for the mission of ‘enforcing
competition law’ is a resource for the ACCC to conserve its institutional
status. As was seen in the chapter, the external consultative and public
appearances of ACCC representatives and its committee system provides
a means for the organization to maintain a diverse network. Again, variety
in both tasks and constituencies can insulate against political interference,
or provide different outlets for maintaining institutional success despite
challenges in some parts of the environment. Lessons for other regulators
might include how to foster diversity in their environment in a way that
can temper the influence of powerful interests or threats to institutional
status.
Third, the case of the ACCC provided important examples of leaders
connecting and demonstrating the value of the internal operations of the
agency with external focus and achievement. Professor Fels in partic-
ular facilitated a virtuous cycle of law enforcement through internally
ramping up the strategic focus of enforcement strategies, while at the
same time reinforcing this through external shaming and threats to corpo-
rate offenders. Simultaneously, he also publicly celebrated enforcement
successes, where both public proclamations sought to accrue legitimacy
to a broad external public and motivate his staff. In combination with
ongoing experimentation with the law and extending the boundaries
available to the ACCC for obtaining corporate compliance, this leader-
ship strategy seeks to discipline and channel ACCC’s wider institutional
nexus to the agency’s capacities and mission.
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Questions for Discussion
1. How can variety in an institution’s historical experience provide
resources for agency leadership to ensure it adapts to new environ-
ments?
2. What are the pros and cons of an agency having a broad
constituency—in case of the ACCC both consumers and external
experts—from the point of view of building and maintaining insti-
tutional legitimacy?
3. How does the presentation of an institution’s success impact the
commitment of its members, and, under what conditions might
certain forms of external celebration and branding undermine
internal commitment to mission?
4. What would the ACCC need to consider in order to effectively
balance the very different expectations of community, business and
governments and still maintain its institutional status?
5. What might happen to the ACCC institutional aura if a new Chair-
person were to step into the ACCC proposing a radical overhaul of
its suite of enforcement strategies?
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